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Economic
policy in the Musharraf era was a mixed bag of the good, the bad and the
indifferent
Pakistan’s
economy has witnessed many changes since October 1999, some for the better
and others for the worse. The daunting challenge for the new government
now is to build on the country’s economic strengths and arrest and
reverse the decline in key areas of weakness
By Kaleem Omar
Let me first of all say that Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz, who was also Pakistan’s finance minister throughout the nearly
nine-year period of President Pervez Musharraf’s rule, was not an
“economic wizard.” Contrary to popular belief, Aziz was not an
economist; he was a banker who rose through the ranks of the banking
profession mainly on the basis of his public relations’ skills. How
Musharraf came to choose him as finance minister back in October 1999
remains something of a mystery to this day.
Aziz was a consumer-finance man and showed himself in
his true colours when he began to push for the deregulation of the banking
sector, including sharply cutting loan interest rates, putting in place a
regime that allowed banks to engage more liberally in giving consumer
finance loans, and lifting restrictions on the number of branches that
foreign banks could open in Pakistan.
As a result of these policies, the banking sector
boomed and many foreign banks from the Middle East and other parts of the
world came flocking to Pakistan. Banking profits soared, and banks were
soon awash in liquidity, fueled partly by the diversion of home
remittances by overseas Pakistanis from the informal havala system to
regular banking channels.
Easy access to low-cost consumer finance led to a
sharp rise in the sale of consumer goods such as cars, motor cycles, cell
phones and home appliances. The sale of cell phones, in particular,
registered a spectacular rise, with the total number of cell phones in the
country soaring from less than 1 million a few years ago to 80 million
today.
On the one hand, this rise in the number of cell
phones vastly increased communications connectivity in Pakistan, allowing
huge numbers of people across the country to talk to each other and
conduct business transactions by phone. On the other hand, however, the
absence of cell phone manufacturing plants in the country meant that all
the phones had to be imported, adding to the country’s import bill and
further widening the already growing trade gap.
The Musharraf-Aziz government, for its part, seemed to
be oblivious to this negative aspect of the communications revolution, and
often cited the huge increase in the number of cell phones as an example
of the success of its economic policies.
Moreover, since the ever-increasing revenues earned by
the cell phone companies (most of which were foreign-owned) were
automatically included in the annual GDP figures (total value of goods and
services) compiled by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, it allowed the
government to claim that its economic policies had boosted the GDP growth
rate to over six per cent – in marked contrast to the average growth
rate of below four per cent that had been seen through most of the 1990s
under the Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto governments.
What the Musharraf-Aziz government tended to gloss
over, however, was that the bulk of the billions of rupees in revenue
earned by the foreign-owned cell phone companies were being remitted
abroad because the government had imposed no limit on such transfers. If
one were to factor these transfers into the GDP equation, the economy’s
growth rate, in real terms, would not have been as high as the government
portrayed it to be.
Other types of statistical legerdemain were used by
the government to support its argument that the country’s per capita
income had risen dramatically in recent years, from about $ 450 in 1999 to
about $ 1,000 in 2007. In making this case, the government chose to ignore
the fact that a falling dollar required that the per capita income figure
be proportionately scaled down to give a more realistic picture of the
actual figure.
The government also tended to gloss over the fact that
it had artificially propped up the value of the dollar against the rupee
by directing the State Bank of Pakistan to regularly buy dollars from the
open market. Under this arrangement, the State Bank was said to have
bought several billion dollars from the open market over a four-year
period. The government said it had propped up the rupee’s value to help
exporters, arguing that a higher rupee-dollar exchange rate would have
meant that exporters would have earned fewer dollars for their exports,
thereby putting additional pressure on the country’s balance of
payments.
While there was considerable merit in this argument,
the downside of the State Bank’s interventionist operations in the
currency market was that it made imports more expensive in rupee terms,
fuelling inflation and driving up the prices of many types of goods,
including capital goods. Higher-priced capital goods, in turn, increased
the cost of expanding manufacturing plants or setting up new factories,
resulting in a slowing down of the industrialisation process.
Like all bubbles, the low-interest-rate bubble, too,
had to burst one day. Within a few years, loan interest rates again began
to rise steeply, soaring from a low of about five per cent per annum in
2002-03 to over 15 per cent today for business loans and 22 per cent for
consumer finance loans.
Among other things, this rise in interest rates led to
a decline in loan-financed car and motor cycle sales, with the number of
vehicles sold by local assembly plants falling by as much as 40 per cent
in some cases in fiscal 2007-08.
According to a ten-year (1997-2007) review of human
development in South Asia prepared by the Islamabad-based Mahbub-ul-Haq
Development Centre and published by the Pakistan branch of the Oxford
University Press in 2008, Pakistan’s high GDP growth over the last five
years has reduced income poverty in a significant manner and raised
average living standards, but the country continues to grapple with issues
that are fundamental to improve its abysmal human development levels.
The Development Centre’s report says that after a
period of low growth throughout the 1990s, the annual growth figure for
Pakistan has been hovering around the 7 per cent level since 2003-04.
According to the report, the current growth momentum of the country’s
economy is largely the result of greater financial and trade integration
and the good performances of the services and manufacturing sectors.
Although growth to GDP has received strong support
from foreign direct investment, the overall savings and investment levels
in Pakistan continue to be unsatisfactory. The share of agriculture in GDP
has declined to about 27 per cent, implying that the country’s economy
is undergoing significant structural changes.
Some of these changes are of a positive nature, but
others have resulted in negative consequences. For one thing, despite the
increasing urbanisation seen in recent years, over 60 per cent of the
country’s population still lives in rural areas, where employment
opportunities are limited, the infrastructure is in poor shape (or even
virtually non-existent in some areas), and civic services (including
utility services and healthcare) leave a great deal to be desired. The
quality of education in government-run schools in the rural areas is very
bad, and thousands of primary and secondary schools are in shambles,
lacking even such basic facilities as drinking water and toilets. Many
village schools don’t even have teachers, books and other
teaching-materials – making a mockery of the very idea of education.
Higher education is a federal subject, and the
Musharraf-Aziz government has to be given credit for setting up a Higher
Education Commission and for significantly increasing the budget
allocation for higher education, including a substantially expanded Ph.D.
programme. Teachers’ salaries in universities have also been
substantially increased, in order to attract good Pakistani teachers
working abroad back to their own country’s educational institutions.
But school education is the responsibility of the
provincial governments. Schoolteachers’ salaries in government-run
schools are still very low, making it very difficult – if not impossible
– for such schools to attract good teachers. A truck driver or a
carpenter or even a cook earns more money than a provincial schoolteacher.
This needs to change in a hurry, if we are to ever have any hope of
improving the quality of education in government-run schools.
The Development Centre’s report notes that
Pakistan’s economy has to address several serious challenges.
The headcount index of poverty, which had increased
from 25.8 per cent in 1996-97 to 34.7 per cent in 34.5 per cent in 2000-01
saw a decline of more than ten percentage points over the following four
years, according to government figures (though these figures are disputed
by many independent analysts). However, the gap between rural and urban
poverty incidence has not seen any reduction, with the headcount index for
rural areas roughly twice that of urban Pakistan.
Secondly, rising inequalities – income and
non-income – have led to a weaker link between economic growth and
poverty reduction in the country. There has been a gradual erosion of the
consumption share of the lowest 20 per cent of the population and the
consequent widening of the rich-poor gap. This widening gap adds to social
tensions in society, which, in turn, leads to all sorts of other problems,
including a worsening law and order situation.
Thirdly, two-thirds of the rural households in
Pakistan are landless and in almost similar proportion lack access to tap
water. Even those rural households that do have access to tap water face
the problem of often being supplied with water that is not fit to drink,
and is dangerous to health. Many urban households too suffer from the same
problem. Doctors say that almost 80 per cent of all children admitted to
hospitals in this country are those suffering from water-borne diseases
– the direct result of drinking contaminated water.
Back in 2004, the Musharraf-Aziz government launched a
scheme to install more than 6,000 filtration plants across the country to
provide safe drinking water for all by the end of the year 2007. But the
scheme has been beset with a host of problems from the outset, including
technical flaws as well as bureaucratic in-fighting between various
federal ministries and between the federal government and the four
provincial governments. In the last months of the Musharraf-Aziz
government, work on the scheme appeared to have fizzled out altogether and
no one seems to know exactly how many filtration plants have actually been
installed and commissioned and what quality of water they are producing.
The same goes for the government’s scheme to provide
electricity to every village in Pakistan by the end of 2007. Thousands of
villages are still without electricity. All this suggests that the
governmental hype surrounding the safe drinking water scheme and the
electricity scheme was more of a political ploy aimed at garnering votes
for the then-ruling PML(Q) party in the February 18, 2008 elections than a
genuine commitment on the then-government’s part.
In short, the seemingly high GDP growth in Pakistan
since 2003-04 has yet to be directed in an adequate manner towards the
betterment of the deprived and marginalized.
Fourthly, as the Development Centre’s report notes,
the agriculture sector still accounts for more than 43 per cent of total
employment in the country, but labour absorption in the non-agriculture
sector has been relatively sluggish. A low labour force participation
rate, underemployment, a high incidence of child labour, falling real
wages for unskilled labour, a growing proportion of unemployed and the
flourishing informal economy (which is undocumented and outside the tax
net) are critical issues plaguing the labour market in Pakistan.
In terms of human development, too, progress in
Pakistan in recent years has been unsatisfactory. The average life
expectancy has been stagnant between 1995 and 2005, though there has been
a modest decline in infant mortality. The overall adult literacy rate is
still very low at 50 per cent. It is even lower in backward areas such as
vast chunks of Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(which are home to more than 5 million tribal people). It is lower still
amongst rural women. In some rural areas the figure is an abysmally low 6
per cent.
Between 1990 and 2000, the literacy rate in Pakistan
grew by an annual average rate of 0.6 per cent of the population. Although
there has been some improvement since then, the annual increase in
literacy is still less than 1.5 per cent of the population. At this rate,
it will take Pakistan another 50 years or more to achieve full literacy.
This is a shameful state of affairs, and the new
government needs to make boosting the literacy rate a matter of the
highest priority.
Currently, Pakistan is spending a paltry 2.4 per cent
of its GDP on education and health, a ratio that has gone down since 1995.
Even an impoverished country like war-ravaged Somalia (which didn’t even
have a government for much of the 1990s and the early years of the new
millennium) spends a much bigger percentage of its GDP on education and
health than Pakistan.
Looking at the overall state of Pakistan’s economy
today (including its increasingly high inflation rate, its burgeoning
trade deficit fueled by the high price of oil imports, its dwindling
foreign exchange reserves which have fallen by over $ 6 billion since last
September, its stagnant levels of exports, its low industrial
productivity, its growing per-capita water shortages, and its chronic
electricity shortages), one needs to remember that these and other
economic problems are not all of the Musharraf-Aziz government’s making.
Some of these problems have been with us since long before Musharraf took
over, while others – such as the high price of imported oil – are
problems over which the government had no control.
What the new PPP-led coalition government needs to do
now, however, is to quickly get on with the task of formulating policies
and putting in place effective implementation and monitoring mechanisms
aimed at boosting GDP growth to get the economy out of the doldrums and
back on track towards a better standard of living for Pakistan’s whole
population, including, above all, the deprived and marginalised. As the
poet Robert Frost once famously observed, “The only way to play tennis
is to play it.”
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF KEY ECONOMIC
INDICATORSCOMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Unit
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
(I)
Real Sector
Real GDP Growth
%
4.2 3.9
1.8 3.1
4.7 7.5
9.0 6.6
7.0 5.5-6.0(P)
Agriculture
%
1.9 6.1
-2.2 0.1
4.3 2.3
6.5 1.6
5.0 --
Large Scale Manufacturing
%
3.6 1.5
11.0 3.5
7.2 18.1
19.9 10.7
8.8 4.8
Investment
% of GDP
15.6 17.4
17.2 16.8
16.9 16.6
18.1 21.7
23.0 --
National Savings
% of GDP
11.7 15.8
16.5 18.6
20.8 17.9
17.5 17.7
18.1 --
Inflation
%
5.7 3.6
4.4 3.5
3.1 4.6
9.3 7.9
7.8 110-120(P)
- Food Inflation
%
5.9 2.2
3.6 2.5
2.9 6.0
12.5 6.9
10.3 --
- Non-Food Inflation
%
5.6 4.7
5.1 4.3
3.2 3.6
7.1 8.6
6.0 --
- Core Inflation
%
6.2 4.4
4.2 3.6
2.6 3.7
7.6 7.1
5.5 --
(II)
Fiscal Sector
Revenue Collection (CBR)
Billion Rs
308.5 346.6 396.4
403.9 461.6
518.8 591
713 846
--
Fiscal Deficit
% of GDP
6.1 5.4
4.3 4.3
3.7 2.4
3.3 4.2
4.2 3.6
Public Debt
% of GDP
100.4 94.8
82.8 79.7
75.1 67.1
62.2 57.2
55.2 --
- of which foreign currency
Denominated
% of GDP
53.1 45.8
42.3 40.8
36.7 32.0
29.4 26.6
24.6 --
Debt Servicing
% of Total 64.0 63.8
57.0 51.1
35.7 31.1
30.4 27.5
25.4 --
Revenue
(III)
External Sector
Exports (f.o.b)
Billion $
7.5 8.2
8.9 9.1
10.9 12.4
14.5 16.5
17.1 16.3(P)
Imports (f.o.b)
Billion $
9.6 9.6
10.2 9.4
11.3 13.7
19.0 25.0
27.0 38.0(P)
Trade Deficit
Billion $
-2.1 -1.4
-1.3 -0.3
-0.4 -1.3
-4.5 -8.4
-9.9 10.7
Remittances
Billion $
1.1 1.0
1.1 2.4
4.2 3.8
4.2 4.6
5.5 6.2-6.7(P)
Current Account Balance
% of GDP
-4.1 -1.6
-0.7 0.1
3.8 1.4
-1.6 -3.9
-4.9 7.0
Billion $
-2.43 -1.14
-0.51 1.34
3.17 1.31
-1.77 -5.0
-7.0 --
Total Foreign Investment
Million $
403.3 543.4 182.0
474.7 820.1
921.7 1676.6
4485.5 8428.3
3.6
Foreign Direct Investment
Million $
376.0 470.0 322.4
484.7 798.0
949.4 1524
3521 5125
--
External Debt and Forex Liab
Billion $
37.6 37.9
37.1 36.5
35.5 35.3
35.8 37.3
40.2 --
External Debt and Liabilities
% of Forex 347.1 297.2 259.5
236.8 181.2
164.9 137.2
117.3 122.5
--
Earnings
Foreign Exchange Reserves
Billion $
1.7 1.3
3.2 6.3
10.7 12.3
12.6 12.8
15.7 --
(IV)
Monetary & Capital Market
Weighted Avg. Lending Rate
%
15.4 14.0
13.7 13.1
7.58 5.05
8.2 10.2
10.6 --
Credit to Private Sector
Billion Rs.
103.0 18.0 48.6
53.0 168.0
325.0 390.3
401.8 356.3
--
Stock Market (KSE Index)
1991=100
1055 1521
1366 1770
3403 5279
7450 9989
13772 --
Market Capitalization
Billion Rs.
286 392
339 408
746 1357.5
2036.7 2766.4
3980.8 --
Market Capitalization
Billion $
5.7 6.7
5.8 6.8
12.8 23.4
34.3 45.7
65.3 --
(P)
: SBP Projection
Source: Ministry of Finance
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