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analysis Newswatch firstperson Jamaat
over the years Sway,
slips and the fall development inflation Wrong
solutions Ready
for Ramzan
The
'state' of affairs The
politicisation that has taken place over the past 18 months has run
counter to the cynicism that is widespread across society. But this is a
fledgling process and it must be deepened before it can give rise to a new
politics that can build a whole new state project. In the meantime, the
best that one can hope for is avoidance of further degeneration By
Aasim Sajjad Akhtar The state is arguably
amongst the most studied creations of the modern era. Virtually all social
theorists have had to contend with it, some isolating its most tangible
features, others pointing out its nebulousness. The paucity of social
theory dealing with the non-western world has meant that concepts derived
from the historical experience of Europe and North America have often been
uncritically deployed in radically different contexts. Thus, all too
often, in societies such as ours, we employ a notion of the state that is
taken for granted as being universal when it is anything but. Notwithstanding this
significant problem, at a very basic level it can be argued that the
modern I would argue that in
the Pakistani case, we need to think beyond this basic dichotomy of
consent and coercion to understand why a deeply unjust and hierarchical
system of domination continues to persist. This is not to suggest that
Pakistan is necessarily unique – it shares many features with African
post-colonial states in particular. It is beyond the scope of this
contribution to undertake a comparative analysis. Besides, simply
understanding the malaise in this country is an end in itself. In essence, I believe
that, at a very basic level, the Pakistani state has ceased to exist. This
rather outlandish assertion is based on my contention that in Pakistan
what we call the state can no longer be considered a coherent set of
institutions performing distinctive tasks under the guise of a defined
public interest. Even if there is a semblance of coherence associated with
the operation of state institutions, it is unravelling rapidly and this
process does not appear, at least at present, to be reversible. By this logic then, the
relationship that one expects between the ordinary 'citizen' and the
'state' simply does not exist. Neither does the 'citizen' have any faith
in 'public institutions', nor do 'public institutions' deliver services or
justice to 'citizens'. In fact, public institutions are essentially
privatised by whoever has immediate access to them and thereby serve
private rather than public interests. The struggle for control over the
state then is not a struggle to define and then secure the public interest
but is, in fact, little more than a race to secure control of public
resources for private gain. There is some method to
the madness, of course. Certain mafias control a disproportionately large
share of public resources and tend to regulate the resource grabbing of
other less powerful mafias. The military is, of course, the dominant such
mafia and has institutionalised its share of public wealth through a
variety of means. While its claims to its majority share have been subject
to considerable public scrutiny in recent times, the lack of a shared
collective belief that the state can and should serve the interests of the
majority of people ensures that the mafia-like system motors along
unchecked, in full view of the 'public' eye. The state of affairs has
reached the present stage over an extended period of time. I am not
suggesting by any stretch of the imagination that the state has ever been
a trust of the people but only that in the past it at least resembled an
integrated coherent whole and there was less blatant privatisation of
public resources that has become commonplace in more recent times. The unravelling of the
state has been a function of numerous related factors including an
increasingly untenable economic structure in which public coffers have
been propped up by large influxes of aid; the onset of neo-liberal
ideologies of state rollback; the global jihad and its 'blowback';
Islamisation of state and society since 1977; the out-migration of a large
number of working age men from the NWFP and Punjab since the mid 1970s;
the inability of dominant groups to forge a meaningful national identity;
and the dominance of the military and attendant strangulation of the
political process. Unfortunately, there has
been little change in most of these structural planks of Pakistan's
political economy, and in many cases, the process of unravelling has
intensified over time. Here I should make clear that I am not proposing a
variation on the very familiar narrative in which Pakistan is depicted as
a 'failed state'. In fact, it is anything but inasmuch as the mafias that
have monopolised state institutions face no major challenge to their
dominance. Some analysts of course argue that the map of Pakistan is
subject to change in the light of the so-called 'war on terror'. Whether
or not this happens is a matter of speculation. For the time being, so
long as Pakistan continues to exist in its current form, it is not a
failed state by any means. In large part this is
because a significant percentage of street-smart political entrepreneurs
from within the subordinate classes have actually benefited from the
privatisation of the state and are therefore uninterested in forging
collective alternatives to the prevailing political order. To some extent
it can be argued that this cooption of subordinate groups reflects a
garnering of consent by dominant forces, but I would argue that this is
more like a consensus that the state is a field of economic and political
power which is subject to privatisation rather than a set of institutions
serving the public interest. This cynical outlook is
evident even in the case of the majority of subordinate groups that have
gained nothing from the processes that I have outlined above. This is not
an indictment of the very oppressed because in many cases they have
watched the state disappear in front of their eyes, as is the case in the
NWFP due to the so-called 'war on terror'. As I myself have argued
on these pages, the politicisation that has taken place over the past 18
months has run counter to the cynicism that is widespread across society.
But this is a fledgling process and it must be deepened before it can give
rise to a new politics that can build a whole new state project. In the
meantime, the best that one can hope for is avoidance of further
degeneration.
Newswatch Zalmay Khalilzad stirs up controversy yet again By Kaleem Omar In their editions of
Wednesday, Aug 7, 2008, several leading Pakistani newspapers reproduced
extracts from a story published a day earlier in The New York Times (NYT),
according to which the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay
Khalilzad, is in hot water with other senior officials in the Bush
administration over what they described as his "unauthorised
contacts" with PPP Co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari. According to the NYT, Khalilzad had several telephonic conversations a week over the past month with Zardari, until Khalilzad was cautioned by senior US officials about the unauthorised contacts. The story quoted US officials as saying that Khalilzad had planned to meet Zardari privately next Tuesday, while on vacation in Dubai. The story said the meeting was cancelled only after Richard Boucher, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, learned from Zardari himself that Khalilzad was providing 'advice and help'. NYT said that Boucher had written an angry e-mail to Khalizad stating: "Can I ask what sort of 'advice and help' you are providing? What sort of channel is this? Governmental, private, personal?" The paper said copies of Boucher's e-mail message had been sent to other officials at the highest level of the US State Department, and that a copy of the message had been provided to the NYT by a Bush administration official who had received a copy. The story quoted a senior US official as saying that Khalilzad had been advised to 'stop speaking freely' to Zardari, and that it was not clear whether Khalilzad would face any disciplinary action. The story pointed out that officially the United States had remained neutral in the contest to succeed former President Pervez Musharraf, and that there was concern within the State Department that the discussions between Khalilzad and Zardari "could leave the impression that the United States was taking sides in Pakistan's chaotic internal politics". The story added that Khalilzad also had a close relationship with Benazir Bhutto, flying with her last summer on a private jet to a policy gathering in Aspen, Colorado. The story said Khalilzad's conduct "had also raised hackles because of speculation that he might seek to succeed Hamid Karzai as president of Afghanistan." Khalilzad, an Afghan by birth, was Bush's special presidential envoy to Afghanistan and later also the administration's first ambassador to Afghanistan, following the USA's utterly illegal invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in November 2001. Khalilzad was once described by President George W. Bush as his "favourite Afghan". He remained the US Ambassador to Afghanistan until June, 2005, when he left Kabul to take up his new assignment as the US Ambassador to Iraq. By then, of course, Iraq had become yet another country that had been illegally invaded and occupied by the United States. After Khalilzad's assignment in Iraq ended, Bush appointed him as the US Ambassador to the United Nations -- a post that he still occupies. During his term as the US Ambassador to Iraq, Khalilzad made a habit of trying to malign Pakistan, in contravention of international diplomatic norms. A few days before leaving Kabul to take up his new assignment as the US Ambassador to Iraq, Khalilzad tried to malign Pakistan yet again on June 17, 2005, when he accused Pakistan of "failing to act" against "fugitive" Taliban leaders. That diatribe of Khalilzad's against this country came in an interview with Afghanistan's Aina television channel broadcast on June 17, 2005. During the course of the interview, Khalilzad asked why a Pakistani TV channel could conduct an interview with a senior Taliban commander, Mullah Akhtar Usmani, broadcast on June 15, 2005, "at a time when Pakistani officials claimed they did not know" the whereabouts of Taliban leaders. "There is a lot of chance that Mullah Omar and other senior Taliban are in Pakistan," he said. Warming to his anti-Pakistan theme, Khalilzad added: "If a TV station can get in touch with them, how can the intelligence service of a country which has nuclear bombs and a lot of security and military forces not find them?" Pakistan's then-Foreign Ministry spokesman Jalil Abbas Jilani called Khlalilzad's remarks irresponsible. "An interview with an alleged Taliban leader by a television channel does not mean Mullah Omar or Osama bin Laden are in Pakistan," Jilani said. Khalilzad is a US national of Afghan origin. President Bush nominated him as ambassador to US-occupied Iraq. In April 2005. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmed Khalilzad's appointment in mid-June 2005. As ambassador to occupied Iraq, however, Khalilzad continued to be Bush's special presidential envoy to Afghanistan. In a speech to a forum organised by the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies on April 5, 2004, Khalilzad said that US-led forces in Afghanistan would move into Pakistani territory to destroy the Taliban and other extremist groups if Islamabad could not do the job itself. "We have told the Pakistani leadership that either they must solve this problem or we will have to do it ourselves," Khalilzad said. "We prefer that Pakistan takes responsibility, and the Pakistan government agrees. However, one way or the other, this problem will have to be dealt with." Reacting strongly to Khalilzad's statement, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman told journalists in Islamabad on April 6, 2004 that Pakistan did not require outside assistance to do the job. Describing the envoy's statement as "unwarranted and uncalled for," the spokesman said, "Ambassador Khalilzad is unaware of the position of his own government on the issue." In an obvious reference to then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell's remarks of a few days earlier praising Pakistan's efforts, the Foreign Office spokesman said that the US administration at the highest level had greatly appreciated Pakistan's efforts in eliminating and rooting out the terrorist infrastructure and the al-Qaeda elements from its soil. "Pakistan is quite capable of taking firm action against all undesirable elements and does not require outside assistance," the spokesman added. Khalilzad's superiors must have reprimanded him for his intemperate remarks against a country that the Bush administration had only a month earlier (in March 2004) asked the US Congress to declare a "Major Non-NATO Ally." The upshot was that it took Khalilzad only 24 hours to go back on what he had said in his speech at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies on April 5, 2004. Asked at a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington on April 6, 2004 if he would like to clarify the statement he made a day earlier, Khalilzad said Pakistan had made efforts and moved against the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban operating there. He said the US regarded that as a "good start" and appreciated the efforts made by Pakistan. Echoing Powell's remarks, Khalilzad added, "I very much welcome and appreciate the sacrifices made by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism." Khalilzad's sudden volte face was par for the course. Over the years, he has acquired an unsavoury reputation for changing his stance on various foreign policy issues -- ever since he became a member of the US State Department's Policy Planning staff under the Regan administration in the mid-1980s. The 57-year-old Khalilzad was born in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. While he was still young, his family moved to Kabul, where his Pashtun father worked in the government, and where Khalilzad attended an English-language school. He originally visited America as an exchange student, and left Afghanistan for good in the 1970s when he won a scholarship to attend the American University of Beirut. In 1979 he obtained a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. In the early 1980s, Khalilzad taught political science at Columbia University in New York, where he worked with Zbigniew Brezinski, a former US National Security Adviser. He was also executive director of the Friends of Afghanistan, a support group for the Mujahideen fighting the Soviets. In 1984, he became an American citizen and joined the State Department on a one-year fellowship. In 1985, in the midst of the Mujahideen's war against Soviet occupation, Khalilzad's background and language skills won him a position on the State Department's Policy Planning Council. There he worked under Paul Wolfowitz, who served as director of policy planning in the Reagan administration. The two have been allies ever since. As Deputy Secretary of Defence in the Bush administration's first term, Wolfowitz (who, in 2005, was nominated by Bush to head the World Bank) was one of the leading hawks in the administration and a charter member of Washington's neo-con cabal. What did that make his close ally, Khalilzad? Another neo-con hawk, by all accounts. As Bush's special presidential envoy to Afghanistan, Khalilzad gave a speech upon his arrival in Kabul condemning the Taliban. Yet the same Khalilzad, had at one time, as a paid adviser to the US oil company UNOCAL, courted and publicly defended the Taliban. Afghan President Hamid Karzai is also a former employee of UNOCAL -- which, in 1997, had put together a consortium to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Khalilzad has changed his political tune so often that one analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, Anatol Lieven, said, "If he was in private business rather than government, he would have been sacked long ago." What is remarkable about Khalilzad's views, ever since he did a volte face on the Taliban in August 1998, is how closely they have tracked the Bush administration's Afghan policy since 9/11. Little has been said in the mainstream American media about the prominent role being played in Afghan policy by officials who advised the US oil industry on Central Asia. George W. Bush also has longstanding links to the US oil industry. Indeed, he began his working life as an oil man and was once part owner of a Texas-based US oil company called Harken Energy. In December 2000, following Bush's controversial victory in the November 2000 US presidential election, Khalilzad was chosen by Cheney to head the Bush-Cheney transition team for the Department of Defence. In 2001, Khalilzad also served as a Counselor to then-US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. UNOCAL has been long criticised for doing business in countries with repressive governments and is rumoured to have close ties to the US State Department and the American intelligence community. In the mid-1990s, while working for the Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Khalilzad conducted risk analyses for UNOCAL at a time when it had received signed letters of approval for the pipeline project from the Taliban regime in Kabul. In December 1997, Khalilzad joined other UNOCAL officials at a reception for an invited Taliban delegation to Texas. He participated in talks between UNOCAL and Taliban officials, which were aimed at implementing a 1996 agreement to build the pipeline across western Afghanistan. Hosting the Taliban delegation's visit Texas was none other than Dick Cheney, the-then chief executive officer of Halliburton Corporation, a Houston-based energy services giant which has been seeking oil and gas deals in Central Asia since the early 1990s. Significantly, Khalilzad also lobbied publicly for a more sympathetic US government policy towards the Taliban. In 1997, in an op-ed article in the Washington Post, he defended the Taliban regime against accusations that it was a sponsor of terrorism. "The Taliban does not practice the anti-U.S. style of fundamentalism practiced by Iran," Khalilzad said in his article. Khalilzad wrote, "It is time for the United States to re-engage" the Taliban regime. This "reengagement" would, of course, have been enormously profitable to Unocal, which was otherwise unable to bring gas and oil to market from landlocked Turkmenistan. Khalilzad shifted his position on the Taliban only after its regime awarded transit rights through Afghanistan for the pipeline project from Turkmenistan to an Argentinian company called Bridas, and the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles at targets in Afghanistan in August 1998. Unocal then put the pipeline project on hold.
Son of the soil 'There are some sane elements within India who have sensed that over the last 60 years India tried its best to win the hearts and minds of Kashmiris but failed' By Raza Khan Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai is an
ardent advocate of the Kashmiri freedom struggle. He has been a spokesman
for the Kashmir cause for over three decades and has travelled around the
world lecturing on the subject. His articles have appeared in The New York
Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Times, Chicago Tribune, Wall
Street Journal, Financial Times and many other publications. Dr Fai is the Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council and Kashmir Centre. He is also the founding chairman of the World Peace Forum and the Chairman of the International Institute of Kashmir Studies. B He did his Ph.D in the discipline of Mass Communication from Temple University, Pennsylvania. Before that he obtained a masters degree from the Aligarh University in India. He has the honour of addressing various sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights at Geneva. Dr Fai has already organised five International Kashmir Peace conferences at the Capitol Hill, Washington, DC and in other places on the same topic. TNS had an opportunity to interview him in Peshawar while he was on a visit to Pakistan. Excerpts follow. TNS: What is the current status of Kashmir in the backdrop of the changed regional and global political scenario? Ghulam Nabi Fai: There is a realisation internationally that the status quo in Kashmir is not an option. The world has realised this on the basis of a lot of experience, efforts and engagement. Both India and Pakistan have tried to develop trade ties and have people-to-people contact etc. but they have reached the conclusion that ultimately they have to do something about the issue of Kashmir. At least, in the US, the realisation is vivid that the status quo in not an answer to the Kashmir problem. The understanding in the US was articulated by a statement of President Bush in the White House, on his way to India and Pakistan in 2006, that they (the US) would accept any solution of Kashmir that was acceptable not only to India and Pakistan but also to the people of Kashmir. In February this year, an editorial in Boston Globe suggested a similar idea. Then on Aug 17, 2007, there was an opinion piece on the editorial page in The Times of India by an Indian who said that a lot of blood has been shed in Kashmir. So their government should let the Kashmiris go if they want to. So there are some sane elements even within India, who are saying this not because they are angry with India but have sensed that in the last over 60 years India tried its best to win the hearts and minds of Kashmiris but it failed. TNS: As a son of the soil, can you enumerate different viable options as a solution to the dispute? GNF: A survey was conducted by Hindustan Times in which they asked the Kashmiris what did they want. According to the survey released on Aug 13, 2007, 87 percent respondent Kashmiris answered that they wanted freedom from occupation of India. On Aug 15, 2007 Syed Ahmed Gillani, Mir Waiz Farooq and Yasin Malik gave a call that India and Pakistan were celebrating their independence and they wished both well. But, at the same time, our leadership was saying that we are not enjoying our freedom, so we are going to celebrate this day as black day. That day, the BBC reported, there were tens of thousands of Kashmiris on Lal Chowk in Srinagar. And that at least four of them reached the top of the Ghanta Ghar and hoisted Pakistani flag over them. To have a Pakistani flag in your hands on the day India is celebrating its independence is almost suicidal. So it shows the sentiments of Kashmiris towards Pakistan. Take the case of Sheikh Abdul Aziz on way to Chakoti. When he was killed by the Indian army he had the picture of Quaid-e-Azam in his hands. To set a stage for settlement means that we have to make sure there is India Pakistan and Kashmiris on the negotiating table. If the three parties are negotiating together, I as a Kashmiri don't really care what is the outcome of the negotiations. Because as long as my leadership is there, the leadership I trust, whatever option they agree upon I will have no hesitation in accepting it. This is the position of majority of Kashmiris. TNS: But independence from Indian occupation is one thing and becoming part of Pakistan is another. GNF: Leading Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar has observed there is total isolation of India in Kashmir. But you are right that once we get independence from India then the option given by the UN of joining India or Pakistan follows. But when you are moving to the negotiating table you must not foreclose any of the option that is our standpoint. That is why I don't emphasise the outcome of negotiations at this point as much as I insist on setting the stage for the outcome, making sure that all three parties are there around the negotiating table. TNS: While Musharraf showed unprecedented flexibility on Pakistan's traditional stance on Kashmir, India seems to have been buying time. What lies ahead? GNF: There are no two opinions that India has shown absolutely no reciprocity to the flexibility and options offered by Pakistan. However, international community is not buying the arguments of India. The sad aspect is that some important world capitals have been saying the same thing to India what they have been telling Pakistan but with a major difference. When they talk to Pakistan they talk in public and when they talk to India they use quiet diplomacy. But I am not convinced that the US, or for that matter the UK, have not talked to India to show reciprocity. India is not taking the quiet diplomacy seriously, though. I really believe the impact of quiet diplomacy must be reflected somewhere. There were very important people in a Washington conference recently. They were not part of Indian government but still close to the Indian prime minister. One is Justice Rajinder, the chief justice of Delhi High Court who was appointed by Manmohan Singh as chairman Commission for Minorities and is also an expert with the UN sub commission for Human Rights for a long time. The other is Bharat Bhushan, the editor of Daily Telegraph India. Both argued that final settlement of Kashmir has to be according to the wishes of Kashmiris. So there are really important voices in India who have started shouting their views, people like Professor Raj Mohan Gandhi, the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, who I invited to Washington DC. He said what is going on in Kashmir is a shame. TNS: Don't you think India wants to wait and isolate Pakistan diplomatically to compel it to give up its stance on Kashmir? GNF: Time is not on the side of Kashmiris. It would bring more suffering on Kashmiris. India wants to buy time to make us passive. It can be attained within a decade through giving us jobs, roads, money (which Indians did by the way) but they have not succeeded in making us passive. The saner elements, however, have realised that the aspiration of Kashmiris is neither roads nor jobs nor money. It is the exercise of their right of self-determination. TNS: The issue of Balochistan and war on terror war seems to have weakened Pakistan's bold stance on Kashmir. Isn't internal stability a sine qua non for strong external policy? GNF: That goes without question. A strong Pakistan is a guarantee for not only internationising the Kashmir issue but to provide moral and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. Yes there is some internal crisis in Pakistan and we Kashmiris are praying for improvement of the situation. TNS: What about the US role? GNF: The US is playing a role. For instance, when PM Gilani went to Sharam al Sheikh in Egypt it was President Bush who said that it was time we resolved the issue of Kashmir. But the US having ties with both countries can certainly play a more important role than that. TNS: Do you agree the All Parties Hurriyyat Conference could also have played a more significant role than they have played so far? GNF: There is always room for improvement until you have achieved the ultimate objective. The APHC is not a government nor an NGO; it has done a lot. (Email: razamzai@gmail.com)
JI faces tough challenges ahead in trying to keep a balance between purity and further dilution of its founding principles in seeking to wield state power By Arif Azad In some unexpected ways,
former president Pervez Musharraf's dictatorship has forced major
political parties to do some soul-searching. The nature of the
just-expired Musharraf rule marred and posed serious challenges of
political tactics and shift in ideological outlook for political parties.
Apart from Musharraf's arbitrary rule, the rise of middle class, the media
revolution and the eruption of lawyers' movement have added further
pressure on political parties. In the last few articles I had charted some vague outline of changing political outlook of the PPP and the PML-N in the wake of Pervez Musharraf's rule. Like all political parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is undergoing some shift in ideological and political strategy in recent years. In contrast to other political parties, JI has traversed a different trajectory due to its deep ideological politics and its historical closeness to military establishment. JI was founded by Maulana Moudoudi to put into practice his dream of an Islamic state -- a party that was to form the vanguard of Islamic revolution. Until 1970 the party played a significant role in various small-scale political agitations and actions, which it thought would lead to the creation of Islamic state. JI fingerprints can be seen on each agitation -- from Objectives Resolution to anti-qadiani movement of the 1950s. JI spent most of its time in the opposition, seeking to mend the ways of the rulers, dynamics of state-formation and turning ignorant population to Islamic ways. In this endeavour it was largely supported by its Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT) shock troops on campuses and colleges. At crucial points in its agitational politics, IJT furnished JI's much-needed street power. The long years of wilderness lasted till the advent of General Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship. Throughout this period JI shared the establishment's policy on Kashmir -- both politically and militarily -- which led to its closeness with military. This closeness was to reach its peak during General Zia's rule. The JI tasted a brief
spell of office during Zia's rule along with other parties grouped under
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). At that point it, seemed, that the JI
was on the brink of fulfilling its dream of entrenching itself into the
power structure on the coattail of a Jamaat-friendly military
dictatorship. This looked like a classic rerun of Muslim Brotherhood's
initial collaboration with Jamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt when the
Brotherhood felt a whiff of power. However, like Egypt, Zia-ul-Haq quickly dispensed with the services of Jamaat after getting his desired goal of having Bhutto judicially murdered. From then on, JI reaped huge material and political benefits from the Afghan jihad. Throughout the Zia period, Jamaat sailed close to the Ziaist agenda while burnishing its global jihad credentials. After the restoration of democratic rule in the wake of Zia's mid air crash, Jamaat remained a part of different anti-PPP alliances manufactured by the establishment. But this did not result in Jamaat's acquiring the same influence within political alliances of the right that it had enjoyed during Zia's rule Thus JI began to expand its constituency beyond its narrow and ideologically-trained cadres. This period saw the launch of an array of JI satellites organisations like Pasban and Shabab-i-Milli (SM). While Pasban was set up under the influence of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the new look amir, with a view of extending party to the masses, thus attracting young men from different political persuasion, Shahabi-Milli was a response from hard-line ex-IJT. SM did not approve of Pasban's relaxed attitude to music, videos and recital of progressive music. Furthermore, Pasban was more geared towards correcting social injustices. The oft-repeated slogan of Zalimo Qazi aa raha hai (Qazi has set out to get oppressors) was the invention of Pasban in an effort to assert JI's new style socially engaged politics. This radical new strategy, running against the tenor of party's entrenched ideology, did not pass muster with the general public as the doctrinaire politics of JI always came in the way of non-religious way of explaining and doing politics. Therefore the decade 1988 to 1998 was not marked by any major electoral breakthrough or wider acceptance of JI as a popular party; organisationally it remained the most disciplined party though. The election of 2002, however, put the party at the head of a political grouping of Mutahida Majlis -e- Amal (MMA), an alliance engineered by the military regime. Thus MMA occupied an exaggerated influence in the assembly partly due to official patronage and partly due to the reduced strength of two major parties in the National Assembly. Not surprisingly, JI acquired a major influence on the direction of MMA policies due to its superior organisational strength. One of the biggest blemishes on JI's recent political trajectory has been its endorsement of the 17th amendment which legalised General Musharraf's dictatorial rule. JI, for its own part, argued that the 17th amendment was endorsed on the promise that General Musharraf would resign as head of the army at an appointed date as a quid pro quo. This self-interested interpretation has drawn considerable flak from all political forces that saw in this act Jamaat's historic closeness to the establishment despite its public profession to the contrary. With Jamaat's new found passion for mainstream politics, thoroughly tarnished by its role in rubberstamping the Musharraf rule, JI again stood at cross roads. The lawyers' movement provided the party an opening to drag itself back to some semblance of mainstream politics. JI has been active in the lawyers' movement and is in the process of adopting a new idiom of constitutional rule and parliamentary democracy. In tandem with the lawyers' movement, JI boycotted the 2008 elections, which led to the dissolution of MMA alliance -- the vehicle of JI's increased influence in recent years. This also led JI into acute isolation as a result of 2008 election results. On the international level, the JI is also in the eye of the storm by virtue of its Islamist past and its alleged sympathy for al- Qaeda in the Western quarters. How will the JI react to these changes remains to be seen? This task is made more difficult with the erosion of IJT's stranglehold over the Punjab University. While in the past IJT had provided a platform for lower middle classes to project themselves nationally, very few of its leaders have held onto national political platform with any degree of sustained and popular exposure. The only exceptions are those of Javed Hashmi, Altaf Hussain and Ahsan Iqbal. This group managed to do this only after breaking free from JI's rigid discipline and doctrinaire politics. With these multiple pulls -- internal and external- on its ideological purity, JI faces tough challenges ahead in how to keep balance between purity and further dilution of its founding principles in seeking to wield state power. Arif
azad is an Islamabad-based policy analyst and commentator
Nine years of Musharraf in review... By Arshed Bhatti Military dictators are
to Pakistan what hurricanes are to coastal towns: they are very likely;
they are predicted; they come and play havoc. Like most hurricanes,
dictators also leave behind a new type of fertility in the devastated
landscape, in the form of resilience of the people to hurricanes,
increased knowledge of the extent of the wreckage, and a stronger resolve
to avoid them at any cost the next time around. Much like the aftermath of a hurricane that has left behind lots of cleaning to do, we are ready to sow a new crop of hope, progress, peace, tolerance and better future of Pakistan. To do it effectively, let us assess what Musharraf has left behind by way of devastation and new fertility, if any! Musharraf's legacy can not be assessed in black and white, because there is more of grey to it, which we have suffered, celebrated and escaped during his eventful years. He would surely be remembered as a failed dictator. But was he successful in transforming the political landscape of Pakistan, to any extent, in any way? Let's debate. He assumed power illegitimately through a 'bloodless coup' on Oct 12, 1999, which, incidentally his colleagues on ground spearheaded as he himself was midair in a plane. He was instituted Chief Executive, in violation of both his oath to the office of the Chief of Army Staff and the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. On August 18, he was made to quit his office by the very people he had booted out, and in line with the same constitution that he twice violated and many a time, ignored in his 3233 days (55 days short of 9 years) in near absolute power. He was a different dictator in comparison to his predecessors in Pakistan -- of whom we have in plenty: Sikandar Mirza, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Ziaul Haq -- at least on two accounts. He was less intelligent, therefore less manipulative; and he got a guard of honour on his exit. Ziaul Haq leads the abominable league both in terms of violent exit and causing deeper devastation and rot to the society, politics and culture. Musharraf remained adamant from the very first to the very last day in power that he was not a dictator. In my opinion, this hampered his vision -- if he had any -- in a) clearly seeing his path, b) understanding constraints and c) delivering his promise to divergent interests he chose to cajole. In his address as Chief Executive Islamic Republic of Pakistan, on Oct 17, 1999, General Pervez Musharraf said: "My dear countrymen, Pakistan today stands at the cross-roads of its destiny which is in our hands to make or break... Today we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled, our credibility is lost, state institutions lie demolished; provincial disharmony has caused cracks in the federation, and people who were once brothers are now at each other's throat... In sum we have lost our honour, our dignity, our respect in the comity of nations." If President Zardari chooses to include this para in his speech, nothing will sound out of place after nine years. Justifying the coup, he had stated: "My dear countrymen! The choice before us on 12th October was between saving the body (that is the nation) at the cost of losing a limb (the Constitution) or saving the limb and losing the whole body. The constitution is but a part of the nation therefore, I chose to save the nation and yet took care not to sacrifice the constitution. The constitution has only been temporarily held in abeyance. This is not MARTIAL LAW, only another path towards democracy." His metaphor of limb for the constitution is noteworthy. It seems it was his perverted obsession of this limb that he fiddled and fondled with it at whim, and the limb eventually cost him the whole body of his regime. A few minutes later in his speech, he outlined his 7-point agenda by stating, "Our aims and objectives shall be: 1) Rebuild national confidence & morale; 2) Strengthen federation, remove inter provincial disharmony & restore national cohesion; 3) Revive economy & restore investorsí confidence; 4) Ensure law and order & dispense speedy justice; 5) Depoliticize State institutions; 6) Devolution of power to the grass-roots level; and, 7) Ensure swift and across the board accountability." Nine years later, things on all these accounts are far worse, to say the least. Concluding his address, he had hoped, "And now I would like to share a prayer that I wrote for myself: Oh Allah! I promise my nation sincerity, honesty, integrity and give me: The vision to see and perceive the truth from the false; the wisdom to comprehend the problem and find its solution." Frankly, Allah did not grant him his prayers. As it was the demonstrated absence of these very blessings he prayed for (vision & wisdom) that caused him unparallel disgrace followed by a downfall. Ironically, in spite of his failures, Musharraf is also likely to be remembered quite fondly for certain things which occurred mostly as negative, and sometimes, as positive externality of his autocratic actions. The first two great bits of his legacy are a vibrant civil society and a watchful media. Both of them grew with the help of each other, and in huge proportions regarding their assertion, significance and impact after Musharraf sacked the Chief Justice of Pakistan in March 2007. Both of these seem to be irrevocable phenomenon and the best bet for true democracy. Two powerful and rooted political parties and positively politicised citizens are the next best combination of his legacy. It is ironical though that these four in combination have shown him the door. Fifth seminal fragment of his legacy is demystification of Kashmir as cardinal issue in India-Pakistan enmity, and by corollary the diminished role of the 3rd party in bringing the two neighbours closer. This is again ironic as it came from the author of Kargil crisis, which had brought both countries to the verge of another war. Sixth attribute of his legacy that would trigger pleasant recall is his undoing of institutional discrimination and oppression against women and minorities. He helped defang the hated Hudood laws and introduced joint electorate. Pakistan, after his nine years, is a better place for these two erstwhile wretched entities; albeit they have miles to go before an honourable sleep. The embedded power, privilege and prestige of the Armed Forces in Pakistan were hitherto uncontested and it was unthinkable to talk about them, their actions, their political influence and economic affluence in the public. Musharraf and his failed policies made it possible. Politics as vocation and law as profession were at the bottom of a common citizenís wish-list nine years back; today, both are celebrating a glow and redemption. Similarly, a promising popular culture and flourishing creativity in music and arts can be counted as the next prominent features of his legacy. Musharraf's fatal slips are many. His moving away from the promised 7 points agenda; extension in office beyond the ëlegallyí endorsed term by the Supreme Court; teaming up with visibly less intelligent politicians; cooption of religious right to seek support for 17th amendment; conversion of initially hailed accountability to an instrument of political expediency; double play on the war on terror; selling of citizens to USA; desperate acts to preserve his rule like imposition of emergency, sacking of judges, gagging of media, introduction of ordinance after ordinance to perpetuate his stay in power, and his own sham re-election are some of the prominent ones. The worst legacy he has left is the Militarancy (militancy in civil space by non-military actors because of military's encouraged, active and sustained presence and role in civil space). This has made suicidal bombing an omnibus phenomenon and a house-hold word; and it has surpassed Ziaís klashinkov culture. It will take years, an arm and a leg before it goes. He did all he could to deny true democracy but a true democracy is what we have today. That is the best legacy -- the new fertility of the hurricane -- Musharraf has left behind. As a parting reflection, his eventual fall, in my view, is owed to the brutal -- and clearly avoidable -- assassination of Benazir Bhutto; not to the sacking of the chief justice as is widely believed. Things were not in his grip after December 27, 2007. (Arshed
is an Islamabad-based political activist and runs a cafe) The road not yet taken With the current political confusion prevalent in the country, we must realise that economic growth is closely linked with the efficiency of its transport system By Rehan Khan According to the Brundtland Report, "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." All definitions of
sustainable development require that we see the world as a system. When we
think of the world as a system over time, the realisation dawns that our
generation lives in the circumstances created by our grandparents. Their
decisions have shaped up, for example, how to farm the land which in turn
affects agricultural practice today. Similarly, the economic policies we
endorse today will have an impact on urban issues when our children are
adults. This line of thinking is called sustainable development. It helps us understand ourselves and our world. The problems we face are complex and serious -- and we can't address them in the same way we created them. But we can address them. The same line of logical thinking can be applied to any issue. Developed countries are aggressively focusing on the sustainability of current and emerging land use and thus transportation patterns. This immense focus reveals a significant impact that current patterns of transportation have on the socio- political and economic dimensions of the state. In this context sustainable transportation is seen as transportation that meets the mobility needs, while also preserving and enhancing economic as well as ecological health. However, to make any theory a success on realistic grounds the economic dimension must be taken into account. A quick analysis of the Pakistani transport sector reveals interesting facts. Pakistan, with its 160 million inhabitants, has a reasonably developed transport infrastructure. Like any other country, road transport is the backbone of Pakistan's transport system and thus its functional network. The National Highway and Motorway network, 3.65 percent of the total road network, carries 80 percent of Pakistan's total traffic. Over the past ten years, road traffic -- both passenger and freight -- has grown a lot faster than the national economy. The down side is that over half the national highways network is in dilapidated condition, and the road safety record is nothing to talk about. The country's truck fleet is mostly made up of obsolete, under powered, and polluting vehicles which are often grossly overloaded. Truck operating speeds on the main corridors are only 40-50 kph for container traffic, half of the truck speeds in Europe. For trucks carrying bulk cargoes, the journeys take 3-4 times longer than in Europe. Port traffic in Pakistan is swelling by 8 percent annually. Two major ports -- Port Karachi and Port Qasim, handle 95 percent of all international trade. An encouraging sign is Port Gwadar, which was inaugurated in 2007 and is being operated by Singapore Port Authority, is aiming to develop into a central energy port in the region. However, the continuous rise in the demand for transport brings to the forefront the much scoffed at Pakistan Railways network. It consists of the main North – South corridor and connects all major centers of the country together, can be developed as a means to cater to the rising transport demands. Pakistan Railways (PR) needs to take major steps to make freight services more competitive. The productivity of PR's freight services is about 1/8 of Chinese Railways, 1/3 of Indian Railways (IR), a network of comparable size. PR continues to cross-subsidise passenger services from freight services, resulting in non-competitive freight rates over road transport. In contrast, China rail is 2-3 times cheaper than road. As a result, the PR has a very low and stagnant market share, carrying less than 10 percent of passenger traffic and 5 percent of freight. If worked upon through careful planning, this ignored area can well be the road to economical growth that policy makers have been looking for. This leaves us to assess the some 36 operational airports in Pakistan. Pakistan's main airport is Karachi, yet significant levels of domestic and international cargo are also handled at Islamabad and Lahore. Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) carries approximately 70 percent of domestic passengers and almost all domestic freight traffic. In all, the transportation sector accounts for about 10.5 percent of the country's GDP. It provides over 6 percent of employment opportunities in the country. Dominated by the government agencies. Considering the importance of this sector it receives a meager 12 to 16 percent share in the Federal Public Sector Development Program (PSDP). In order to develop this sector an up close and well researched line action needs to be taken. The first step in solving any problem is to identity the problem, its causes and finally to develop an action plan especially to neutralise the problem area. The transport sector although functional is plagued by many pitfalls. Its inefficiencies with long waiting and traveling times, high costs, and low reliability are dragging the country's economic growth. The poor performance of the sector is estimated to cost the economy 4-6 percent of GDP each year. The above mentioned shortcomings reduce the competitiveness of the country's exports as well as increase the cost of doing business in Pakistan. This strangulates Pakistan's ability to integrate into global supply chains which require just-in-time delivery. Aggressive technological shift, which can be in the form of changes in the conventional vehicles or in the fuel technologies, may bring about a positive change in the situation. However, the reason why positive results fail to see the light of day is because of insufficiency in the public policy. The absence of public policy creates a vacuum as it is not directed towards social benefit. Transportation investments, particularly in highways, have been seen as engines if economic growth and development. One basic reason why states such as Pakistan lacks in this area is the lack of knowledge, let alone a well identified department focusing on such issues. With the current political confusion prevalent in the country, we must realise that economic growth is closely linked to the efficiency of its transport system. To support sustained growth and increase competitiveness there is a dire need to take a strategic and holistic approach to the transport sector. Groundbreaking initiatives should be launched to improve the trade and transport logistics chain along the north-south 'National Trade Corridor' (NTC) linking Pakistan's major ports in the south and south-west with its main industrial centers and neighboring countries in the north, north-west and east. Together the ports, road and railways along NTC handle 95 percent of external trade and 65 percent of total land freight serving the regions of the country which will contribute 80-85 percent of GDP. The rationale behind developing the National Trade Corridor (NTC) should be to reduce the cost of trade and bring it at par with the international standards. This will breathe new life to the cost of doing business in Pakistan and will enhance export as well as put the country back on the road to industrialisation. The state institutions must realise that by developing this sector Pakistan will be lead to a modern and streamlined transport system, which if capitalised upon will result in a chain reaction that will only see development on all fronts. More explicitly it will improve the efficiency of the ports by cutting down on costs and also ensure accountability. This culture of growth will create a commercial environment and will increase private sector participation as well. Similarly, modernising the trucking industry will also benefit the shareholders equity and reduce the cost of transport as transport time will be considerably reduced and fuel prices will be slashed. In short it will sustain an efficient and reliable highways system and will promote secure economically efficient operations. (Email: rehankhan82@gmail.com)
The big jump Upward surge in Sensitive Price Index By Huzaima Bukhari and Dr Ikramul Haq The unabated,
uncontrolled, unchecked and ever-rising inflation is making life of common
people miserable with every passing day. It should be cause of concern for
the people at the helm of the affairs. Inflation for people earning merely
Rs 100 per day has gone beyond 33 percent, the highest in past 35 years,
which according to economic experts will further bump up during the holy
month of Ramadan. According to figures released by Federal Bureau of
Statistics (FBS), Sensitive Price Index (SPI) based weekly inflation
surged sharply by 31.69 percent during the week ended on August 21, 2008
over the corresponding period of the previous year. The big jump in the weekly inflation was caused by major increase in prices of kitchen items and it overburdened the already poverty-stricken segments of our society. The households in the two lower income brackets of up to Rs 3,000 and Rs 3,001 to Rs 5,000 felt the pinch of this weekly inflation the most as it went up by 33.93 and 32.69 percent, respectively. SPI increased by 32.05 percent for the households in the income group of Rs 5,001 to Rs 12,000 and was up by 31.42 percent for more than Rs 12,000 income group. Mr. Saqib Sherani, Chief Economist of Royal Bank of Scotland in Pakistan, commented on the situation worriedly: "due to poor food security the inflation would keep on soaring. I don't expect it (inflation) will come down. It will remain volatile at least till Ramadan". He observed that low-income groups were badly affected due to continuous hike in the prices of essential food items and recent hikes in petroleum products would further aggravate situation for them due to raise in the cost of transportation. The FBS revealed that out of 53 surveyed items, the prices of 47 essential items increased during August 14-21, 2008 as compared to the previous year. The increase is as much as 128 percent in some cases. Traditionally, pulses, rice, and roti are considered essential components of poor man's meal. The FBS statistics showed that masoor pulse price surged by 128.2 per cent, gram pulse rate increased by 53 percent and hike in the prices of mong and mash pulses was also over 45 percent. The price of average quality wheat flour increased over 60 percent. The average quality wheat also became costlier by 72 percent. The rates of rice basmati and rice irri-6 also increased above 60 percent. Low-income groups are not happy with their life. Government servants complain that the increase in their salaries, which the government announced in the federal budget 2008, was not enough to meet daily needs at a time when the rate of a commodity was increasing on hourly basis. Pakistan at the moment is grappling with the worst inflationary pressure of its 61 years of existence. Official statistics admit that consumer price index has increased forty-five fold during the period 1949-50 to 2007-8. The government was expecting an annual inflation target of 6.5 percent during 2007-08, which was raised to 12 percent for 2008-09. Food inflation in June 2008 soared to a record high of 32 per cent. The core inflation (non-energy and non-food) escalated to 13 percent in June 2008 as compared with the modest figure of 5.7 percent in the same month last year. The Wholesale Price Index (WPI), which is generally used to measure the cost of production, registered a record increase of 16.41 percent during 2007-08. SPI, which reflects the prices of 53 essential commodities, mostly kitchen items, recorded a disturbing rise of 28-37 percent during the last week of FY 2007-08. CPI recorded worrisome and substantial rise of 21.83 percent in June 2008 over the corresponding month of last year. From FY 2001 to FY2008, the situation started deteriorating and upward surges in SPI became continuous and at rapid pace. From 2001-02 to 2006-07, the annual rate of increase was around 7 to 11 percent. The government policy of more and more reliance on indirect taxes was the real cause of this disturbing trend. In the total revenue collection of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) from 2002-2003 to 2007-08, the share of indirect collection was between 60 to 65 percent. The steady momentum of inflation during the last three months is directly related to increase of one percent in General Sales Tax (GST) from 15 percent to 16 announced in the budget 2008. The SPI surges are directly related to rise in poverty. According to Centre for Research on Poverty and Income Distribution (CRPID), there are 63% of poor in Pakistan in the category of 'transitory poor'. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) also admitted this fact saying in its annual reports that the standard definition of 'transitory poor' includes those households that are below the poverty line for most of the time but not always during a defined period. The rest of 32% and 5% of the population that subsist below the poverty line have been found to be 'chronic' and 'extremely poor', respectively. Chronic and extremely poor are households that are always below the poverty line, all the time during a defined period. Similarly, on the other side, 13% and 21% of total non-poor (above the poverty line) were classified as 'transitory vulnerable' and 'transitory non-poor', respectively. SPI may increase to 35
percent during the first week of Ramadan as the faithful in this holy
month consume food items in abundance and businessmen raise the prices at
unbelievable levels. Due to this holy month will add more people towards
the category of 'transitory poor'! This portrays an alarming situation as
with rise in SPI more and more people move from transitory category to
chronic category, courtesy inequitable distribution of wealth, unjust
economic system and regressive tax policies. Rulers in Pakistan never
showed any concern for redistributive economic and social justice as their
political goal. One wonders if present government, badly trapped in
various issues, is cognizant of this state of affairs and devising some
practical means to overcome it. (The
writers work for a multi-disciplinary law firm and also teach at LUMS. Email:
The PSDP has been reduced by Rs 100 billion to meet the budget deficit target of 4.7 percent. Economists have serious reservations about the decision By Shujauddin Qureshi In the Feb 2008 general
elections, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) once again raised the slogan
of 'Roti, Kapra aur Makan' and made a commitment to eradicate poverty.
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani promised to adopt austerity by reducing
government expenditures. All the cosmetic announcements to reduce budget deficit did not bring any visible change. The 100-day-plan remained unfulfilled, due to continuing political uncertainty, judicial crisis, incessant operation in Swat and tribal areas of NWFP, sky-rocketing inflation and depleting foreign exchange reserves. The country has witnessed the worst-ever hike in the prices of important items of basic need, which has resulted in surge in inflation. The increased duration of loadshedding due to power shortage has further aggravated the situation. The worst sufferers are the common people. The government has failed to control prices; the withdrawal of government subsidies on power rates, food items and petroleum products in the budget has multiplied people's woes. Pakistani rupee is faced with devaluation of the worst kind. Despite the State Bank's stringent measures to give support to the local currency, it is still hovering at around Rs76-77 per dollar in both interbank and open markets. The budget deficit is growing. The government, finding itself in a tight situation, has announced to cut the development budget by slashing down the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) by Rs 100 billion. Finance Minister, Syed Naveed Qamar, while talking to a group of journalists in the Parliament House last week said that the government spending on the PSDP has been reduced -- to meet the budget deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP, and to ease pressure on Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves. The government had allocated Rs540 billion for PSDP in the annual budget 2008-09. Earlier, under the PSDP, the government had earmarked an amount of Rs24.6 billion for the education sector projects, Rs123.83 million for Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Rs334.630 million for Women Ministry, Rs20.515 billion for Agriculture and Livestock Division, Rs28.79 billion for Cabinet Division, and Rs850 million for Petroleum and Natural Resources Division. The Finance Minister added that the projects affected by this recent cut in PSDP would continue as now they would be executed through public-private partnership (PPP). The minister, however, did not provide any details about this partnership. Independent economists believe that the budget deficit target of the present government is quite ambitious and is difficult to achieve, even by the end of the fiscal year, due to growing inflation in the country. The government domestic borrowings both from the State Bank and commercial banks are further increasing and the cosmetic austerity measures are not working as desired. "The government needs to reduce all its non-development expenditures by 40 percent and check widespread corruption in the government departments to contain fiscal deficit," says Dr Shahid Hasan Siddiqui, senior economist and Chairman Research Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance. He says the economic crisis demands extraordinary measures on the part of the government and not just slashing down the development budget. "The government is compromising on the GDP growth rate at the cost of stabilisation of budget deficit. It has reduced the GDP growth target but increased the inflation rate target," says Dr Siddiqui. He says the same practice was adopted in 1999-2000 also to balance deficit, but the desired results were not achieved. "The tax-GDP ratio, which is at around 10 percent can be increased instead of cutting down the development budget," says Dr Siddiqui, adding that the average tax-GDP ratio in the developing countries is about 18 percent; so there is still room for Pakistan to "expand the tax base and bring more sectors like agriculture into the national tax net". The present government is not solely responsible for the economic ills faced by the country. It has only 'inherited' them. Both PML-Q and the caretaker government had also slashed the PSDP during the last fiscal year. The PML-Q had cut down Rs70 billion out of the Rs 520 billion for 2007-08, whereas the caretaker government that followed them had further slashed it Rs30 billion. The PPP government is, therefore, not an exception. It is only guilty of not taking any practical steps to improve the economic situation even after the passage of more than five months. This is reflected in the official data of inflation. According to the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) data for July 2008, the first month of the current fiscal year (2008-09), the overall CPI-based inflation registered a sharp increase of 24.3 percent as against 6.4 percent in the corresponding month of last year (July, 2007). When viewed in the long term perspective; this July's inflation was the highest since the decade of 1970s. The record breaking surge in overall inflation of 24.3 percent in July, 2008 was largely attributed to a sharp rise in both food (33.8%) and non-food (17.3%) inflation, which increased from 8.5 percent and 4.9 percent respectively from July, 2007. The government has fixed the inflation target for the current fiscal year at 11 percent. Surge in global food and fuel crises have also impacted Pakistan heavily, resulting in massive surge in inflation in general and food inflation in particular. The mounting budget deficit, coupled with the highest current account deficit due to increasing import bill and increasing inflation rate have ruined almost all the economic indicators of the country. Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves have reduced to $9 billion due to increasing import demand. According to SBP statistics, the country's foreign exchange reserves stood at $9.5681 billion during the week ended August 16, 2008, as against $9.92 billion a week earlier. At the time of announcement of the annual budget for the current fiscal year, the government had earmarked an amount of Rs541 billion to finance more than 1,000 ongoing and over 300 fresh development projects under the PSDP. But now the PSDP has been reduced by Rs100 billion to meet the budget deficit target of 4.7 percent GDP. Economists are unanimous in their view that any reduction in PSDP has always been counterproductive. "Any cut in PSDP may increase unemployment and poverty," says Dr Asad Sayeed, an independent economist and Director of Collective for Social Research. "It would also have a negative impact on GDP growth rate."
The masses are openly blaming the government for its inability to control the situation and its failure in providing some relief to the people By Sibtain Raza Khan The month of Ramzan is
eagerly awaited by the God-fearing and the profit-seeking. The urge of The Ramzan this year is coming with the highest level of inflation recorded in the country. In July 2008, the overall inflation increased to 24.3 percent as against 6.4 percent in the last July. The current inflation is most noticeable in edible items and the gradual withdrawal of subsidy on the petroleum products and CNG has aggravated the overall inflation in the country. Hoarding, black marketing, high import of food items and devaluation of rupees, along with the affects of international economic situation has created an unbearable pre-Ramzan price-hike that is making lives miserable for lower and middle class. The prices of essential daily items like sugar, flour, oil, pulses and milk have shot up, as the profiteer mafia has become very active and has artificially created price hike before the beginning of Ramzan. According to some reports many owners of factories have stopped the supply of goods to increase the demand of their items as well as artificially raise their prices. The masses are openly blaming government for its inability to control the situation and its failure in providing some relieve to the people. Utility stores that were supposed to provide daily used commodities on subsidised rates, have recently raised prices of 88 items by 20 percent. Such increase in prices has disturbed the limited budget of common man. However, on government side, there is a promise of special Ramzan package in which edible things would be provided on subsidies rates. But, government is not handling this issue with commitment and the issue is being treated as a management issue and no strict legal actions are undertaken against the culprits. The government claims to have taken notice of the situation, yet its actions are restricted only to raids, imposition of fines and warnings to shop keepers that are not the main culprits. Such limited response cannot resolve such a huge problem. The actual culprits of such troublesome situation are the factory owners and the hoarders and firm actions have to be taken against these unfair profit seekers not the poor shop keepers. Though Consumer protection laws had been enacted in 2006 but no serious implementation is in view even after passage of two years. Lack of proper government response towards the issue has aggravated the problem. Public has become so desperate that they have even gone to the extent of suggesting that the suicide bombers creating havoc for the general citizens should hit these profiteers and hoarders, who have become a major problem for them. This price hike problem is affecting people from all walks of life and is generating public response. For instance a student during a survey expressed his view that, 'on the eve of Christmas, there are sale points in Western cities, whereas on the eve of Ramzan and Eid, what we Muslims do, Shame on us'. While a middle class worker suggested that "Godowns of hoarders which are full with wheat, rice, pulses, sugar and other food items should be set on fire." Ammad Saeed, a social worker, opines that "district administrations have no vision, no capacity and no commitment to protect consumers' rights.'' Sajid Waheed, a school teacher complained that the "Philosophy of Ramzan is to feel the pain and sufferings of poor and needy people and Pakistani Muslim hoarders and unjust profit seekers try to give more pain and sufferings to the poor and needy people". Similar kind of desperation was expressed by a housewife "No flour, no pulses and no vegetable… What poor families eat?" Zahid Fasih an employ in private firm said, "Profiteers and hoarders should not be spared and exemplary punishments should be given to them." These views are shared by the bulk of population as the problem is affecting a vast majority. Although there are many factors that have led to present inflation in the country particularly price hike in food items, as have been mentioned above, however, there is also failure on the part of government departments to take any tangible action to counter this problem. There appears to be lack of planning and vision in the concerning departments to tackle the issue. There is need for greater commitment and strict action against the powerful and influential profiteers. Consumer protection laws have to be strictly executed and proper documentation of transactions has to be maintained to keep a check on the hoarders who unreasonably charge higher prices. Instead of harassing poor shop keepers, big hoarders should be arrested and supply of goods should be ensured. There is also need for eliminating the dominating role of middle man, while providing opportunities for the farmers to access markets easily. Market intelligence can be used to control the artificial inflation created by the profiteers. The sufficient supply of essential items should be ensured, especially during Ramzan through 'Sasta' bazaars and utility stores. The media can also be used as a tool to create awareness among people and also to keep government authorities vigilant on artificial price hike. Some responsibility also lies on the part of public that they should purchase goods according to requirement and not for stock purposes. Use of imported goods should be discouraged and consumption of local food items should be encouraged. There are some genuine problems too and that have to be accepted by the masses, such as increase in transport cost, damages to the stock and inflation at the international market and fuel crisis that has serious implications for the local market. Government itself is in struggling position and cannot address all issues simultaneously; however, inflation and economic situation should be among the top priority areas requiring urgent attention. The political struggle between different state organs and between the political parties has diverted government's attention from the problems which are being faced by public. People have voted for their representatives to improve their lives, however, as yet there is no visible progress on any side which may assure public of a better future. The Holy month of Ramzan instead of being a peaceful and content time for people has become a worrying time due to increased price and lesser availability of essential items. Government has little time left to control this problem and only a swift and strict action can provide relief to the people, otherwise people should get ready for a tough Ramzan ahead, while the profiteers be all set for their profit-making month. (Email sibtainrazakhan@yahoo.com )
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state is the repository of power in society, a most compact representation
of the relationship between dominant and subordinate classes, castes,
races and genders. The most successful state projects are those in which
the system of domination garners the broad consent of subordinate groups.
In such a situation, the state and dominant groups with which it is allied
are insulated from anti-systemic movements because the subordinate groups
that would want to foment such movements accede to – implicitly or
explicitly – the social and political order which oppresses them. 
profit maximisation by the profiteers and hoarders has created
difficulties for the faithful, as the pre- Ramzan price hike has
challenged the purchasing power of the majority. The provincial or the
district government has not been able to check or control this
uncontrollable inflation.