Dr Farrukh Saleem

The writer is an Islamabad-based

freelance columnist

farrukh15@hotmail.com

The debate in India is that of a limited-scope conflict. In the past, that faulty thinking used to be Pakistan's policy. An all out war may not be an option for India but India has nullified all benefits accruing in favour of Pakistan from the Afghan campaign. Right now, America needs Musharraf. Our president is, however, bound to find himself in hot wax once Bush has achieved his objectives in Afghanistan. If our president listens to the Americans on Kashmir as well then the institution that he belongs to would have little left to do. If he doesn't then his country may be left with little.

CNN and Fox are telling the world that Pakistan has 140 million fanatics and that Musharraf is the only 'good guy'. Worst of all, the ISI, the Taliban, Kashmiri jihadis and our nuclear infrastructure are now being named all in one sentence more often than ever before.

On December 13, the largest democracy was struck in the heart. It no longer matters as to who did it because at least half the world has written our name on it. The attack had half a dozen imbedded messages. First, the intention was not to kill people but to make a political statement (otherwise they would have hit Chandni Chowk or some other crowded bazaar). Second, a warning to Musharraf that he should not do to the militants in Kashmir what he did to the Taliban. Third, for Vajpayee that militants are revisionist and do not support the status quo. Fourth, again for Vajpayee to pick between retaliatory violence or diplomacy as India's response. Fifth, Musharraf should leave the Afghan border unguarded and move his army to the east. Sixth, that militants have the capability to penetrate India's Parliament House complex, the most guarded five-acre patch in the 3 million square km country. Seventh, for Bush to come out in the open, sooner rather than later, whether Pakistan, America's coalition partner in its war on terrorism, is an associate or an accomplice.

On December 20, The Washington Post ran an editorial titled "On to Pakistan". American policymakers, the editorial insists, are "still debating where the war on terrorism should go next, but as a practical matter it has already moved to Pakistan." The editorial adds, "Pakistani terrorist groups long connected to both al Qaeda and the Taliban have been credibly blamed by India for carrying out a suicide assault on the parliament building in New Delhi." The Post's conclusion is that this is Musharraf's "chance to purge his regime once and for all of its corrupting links to Islamic extremism and terrorism."

A recent editorial in the Cincinnati Post stated, "It would be hypocritical of the United States to tell India, in effect, that our war on terrorism has to take precedence over their war on terrorism" and that the "attack, no less than the assault on Washington, was intended to decapitate India's political leadership and demolish a symbol of its democracy. The Indians, by any standards, including those articulated by President Bush after Sept 11, are entitled to protect themselves from future assaults."

On December 21, The Japan Times wrote, "What produced deep revulsion in India is that the intruders clearly belonged to the two Pakistan-based outfits: Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who are suspected of carrying out their plan at the behest of the country's intelligence agency, the ISI." The paper asks, "What are New Delhi's options ...? There is general consensus among Indians that India must do what the US did to the Taliban in Afghanistan, or what Israel is doing to the Palestinians" adding that "it is about time that the global players realise the game Pakistan is up to."

According to Globe & Mail, Canada's leading English-language daily, "Gen Musharraf's insistence that Pakistan's hands are clean in Thursday's attacks rings a little hollow. His country's secret service has a long record of supporting assorted Islamist extremists, most conspicuously Afghanistan's ousted Taliban regime. If the general wishes to maintain US support, he will heed the stern advice from Washington and quickly move to crack down on terrorist groups that operate with Pakistani support."

On December 21, The New York Times' Op-Ed pages had an opinion piece titled "Our friends the terrorists". The piece opines, "Just to puncture our hypocrisy for a moment: We've been battling terrorism by bolstering backers of terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan, our new ally in the war on terrorism, has a long history of supporting indiscriminate attacks in India and especially Kashmir." Nicholas Kristof, the columnist, is of the opinion that "all in all, Pakistan's ISI is responsible for many more killings than Osama bin Laden." The column concludes by saying that "Pakistan, after so many wrong turns in its history, has tentatively taken a right one in the last few months. Now it must build on that by clamping down on its own terrorists. And, whatever the stench of blood in Islamabad, we Americans must hold our noses and do all we can to help General Musharraf hold his course."

A recent opinion piece appearing in The Hindu opined that "relations between India and Pakistan may have reached a decisive fork in the road - one path leading to war and the other to peace. If Pakistan does not quickly respond to the demarche delivered by India last week to shut down the operations of the terrorist organisations on its soil, India would be compelled to use force against it. A Pakistani retaliation would lead to escalation and a military confrontation. However, if Pakistan does crack down on Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a full-fledged peace process could soon begin between India and Pakistan." C Raja Mohan, the author, is convinced that "there is a growing belief in New Delhi that the time has come to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff."

America and Israel did respond violently. The difference is that both Afghanistan and the Palestinian Authority lacked retaliatory capability. Pakistan is no Afghanistan. Indian politicians are deriving two things out of the Delhi tragedy. First, domestic political mileage by beating war drums (and thus limiting their non-military options along the way). Second, holding on to American attention that is going to be used to classify Kashmir militancy as terrorism. Indian generals, however, are decisively against any full-fledged military undertaking.

In the Delhi misfortune there are lessons for both India and Pakistan. For India, it was a massive intelligence failure and an admonition that Kashmir isn't about to go the Taliban way. It would have to be resolved. For Pakistan, the lesson is that maintaining principal-agent relationships with militant organisations or encouraging private armies for whatever purpose is not in our own long-term interest. For both Pakistan and India, the lesson is that hard-liners on either side of the LoC want the two to go to war which is in the interest of neither.

Can Pakistan be held responsible for what happened in Delhi? Definitely not. Can Pakistan be blamed for it? Perhaps Pakistan's former agents can be. The principal-agent connection, it appears, is being disconnected but agents may be going out on their own, undertaking activities that are - under the new paradigm - against the interests of their former principal. The principal, it seems, is either unwilling or simply incapable of restraining its former agents. The ideal would indeed be for Pakistan and India to get together and fight the terrorists.

Is there going to be a war? For India, economic and diplomatic pressures (and a mere talk of a naval blockade) on Pakistan can be much more effective. Forward deployment of troops is already costing us crores of rupees a day.