Dr Farrukh Saleem

The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance columnist

farrukh15@hotmail.com

Kashmir is to our leaders what Osama was to the Taliban. Rawalpindi has always had a monopoly of sorts over our Kashmir dilemma, our Afghan dilemma and the internal political cell. As a matter of fact, they haven't done much else. Nine-Eleven hijacked their Afghan policy. December 13 brought down the collective weight of Nato, the planet's largest arms cartel, the EU along with the US and squeezed whatever juice was left in the Lashkar and the Jaish. The big question now is if the US can persuade us to change our ways on Kashmir.

Here's a military mind, one that I respect, in action. I am told that America's 'global war on terrorism' must have been planned out in phases. In the initial phases, we have been made out to be a coalition partner but absolutely nothing is ever shared with us. At Mach 2, F-18 Hornets and F-14 Tomcats penetrate our air space at will. Eighteen feet long Tomahawks cruise over us at 550 mph and we are only given an hour's notice. What sort of a partnership is that? Clearly, we are a partner who isn't trusted. They do need us for the first few phases but a partner who hasn't been trusted is not meant to remain a partner for long.

In terms of time, our investment into the Taliban is less than a decade. With little or no revenue base of their own we must have pumped tens of millions of dollars a year (telephones at Taliban ministries had Pakistani area codes). The accumulated billion was hurriedly written off as a consequence of one transatlantic telephonic threat to our 'strategic assets'. Nothing less would have been convincing enough.

Kashmir is different altogether. Our investment is five decades and a good $35 billion (equivalent to our entire external debt). The various lashkars have been a cheap, dispensable and a renewable source. Under the new 'anti-terrorism' paradigm, the lashkars may no longer be available.

In the meanwhile, the economic squeeze is on. The largest mobilization of Pakistani forces in three decades, greater than during the 1971 war, is costing us hundreds of crores a day. The Indian Ocean is littered with war ships and our 'strategic oil reserves' would last for no more than two weeks. The Federal Reserve, America's Central Bank, has literally crippled the New York branches of Habib Bank, National Bank of Pakistan, United Bank and Habib Bank AG Zurich (the last has actually been the largest Hundi operator). All cash transactions have been banned and the banks have been restricted to personal banking, issuing of money orders and certified checks.

Retailers who sell billions of dollars of apparel to Americans-Gap, Eddie Bauer, Aeropastale, Levis Strauss, Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, American Eagle and Perry Ellis-use to procure $2 billion worth of Pakistani textiles every year. According to the Pakistan Textile & Apparel Group, there is a "64 percent reduction in orders for clothes that would be made from December through February." According to the Ministry of Commerce, 68,500 have already been laid off and 177 apparel manufacturers have locked up their front gates. This, however, is only the beginning.

Over the immediate future, India will not be allowed to distract the superpower at war in Afghanistan by starting out its own show (the Afghan undertaking is on its last leg). American troops are deployed at three Pakistani air-bases while the Americans control at least one-third of our air-space. In the next phase, however, America will take India on board to tame a particularly problematic ally. Bush still needs Musharraf to take care of al-Qaeda runaways. Delhi, at the same time, is trying to persuade Washington-with ample help from Yunus Qanooni and General Fahim-that al-Qaeda's next home is going to be Pakistan. Bush, for now, seems to have convinced Vajpayee to allow Musharraf time to prove his sincerity.

The US Department of State appears to have isolated two explanations behind the attack on the Indian parliament. The "first is that Musharraf knew about plans for the attack and sanctioned it. The second is that he neither knew of nor sanctioned the attack." Odds are that "he neither knew of nor sanctioned the attack." For General Powell, it means that his general in Islamabad is not in full control. For Washington, the dilemma is that the next general may be even less in control.

At the US Department of Defence the debate is on the next phase of action. Unfortunately, Pakistan's name is coming up more than ever before. That's where an implicit American endorsement to the Indian threat of war comes into play. It's quite convenient for the US to use the Indian lever to pressurize Musharraf to clean up.

For Vajpayee, the attack on the red sandstone parliament in-tandem with the current American mood on terrorism provides an ideal, unprecedented opportunity to try and settle his Kashmir dilemma. For Benazir, the way out for Pakistan is to do with Kashmir what the US and China have done with Taiwan-increase trade, continue investing and put the Taiwan issue on the backburner.

Uncle Sam's present prescription for India is intense pressure but no war. We also want to settle Kashmir. The problem is that our leaders have never allowed a national debate on the word "settle". Our leaders have indebted Pakistan and condemned at least two generations of Pakistani Muslims to illiteracy and malnourishment promising them that Kashmir will be settled to the satisfaction of Pakistan. All the e-mails that I get from India and all the Indian newspapers that I read tell me that the Indian leadership may be prepared to accept the LoC as the permanent international boundary. Could there be a better settlement?

Here's the real dilemma. If we listen to the Americans and agree to resolve Kashmir through non-jihadi means then all that this country needs is one-quarter of the current ISI to manage the internal political cell and a small shalwar-kurta militia for internal security duties (may be not right away but within the current decade). If we don't listen to the 'warriors of terrorism' then we have no idea what they'll make of us in the final phases of their 'war on terrorism'. Can the fear of the unknown make our commanders write their own obituary?