The writer is a retired army officer and a freelance columnist

kshafi1@yahoo.co.uk

Five days after the event, the Indian media is full of the Agra summit: editorials, lead articles, letters to the editors; indeed, three national dailies giving it banner head-lines: "Summit not unsuccessful: PM" - The Hindu; "From the host himself: Guest took us for a ride" - The Indian Express; "Opposition gives in to PM fact-file - National consensus on J&K was respected during talks" - The Pioneer. Whilst the underlying theme still is that the Pakistanis used the summit to "propagate" their stand on J&K in sly fashion, there is also a grudging (and growing) admiration at the adept media handling by our side, and implicit criticism of the ponderous and negative responses by the Indian side. The Congress Party has gone so far as to accuse the government with "failing to project its viewpoint properly through the media", Congress leader Manmohan Singh who is also leader of the opposition in the Rajya Sabha adding: "The link between diplomacy and the media was very weak and this is another lesson from the summit which the government should take note of."

There are also increasing numbers of thinking people here who are deeply disappointed at their government's repeatedly beating the media drum to criticise Pakistan (when the far greater matter of the summit ending on a sour note goes unnoticed), specially when all our side did was to stay on their toes. Indeed, they castigate the Indian Minister for Information Ms Sushma Swaraj going public on the parleys held till the 15th, and deliberately omitting to mention Kashmir. It is to be remembered that Pakistan's spokespeople only reacted to that by issuing a clear statement that Kashmir had indeed been discussed. In the written word too, there is much comment on the summit. I give below excerpts from an article written by Dr Aijaz Ahmad, which will appear in the magazine Frontline today (Saturday, 21st July).

"Rich in rhetoric, symbolism and even opportunity, the Agra summit kept lurching from exhilaration to impasse, disinformation to breakthrough, hope to high drama to exhaustion, before collapsing in the most disgraceful manner possible, so disgraceful indeed that none of what had been achieved could be salvaged. Soon after midday on the second and last day, television channels showed Mr Abdus Sattar, the seasoned Foreign Minister of Pakistan, telling media persons that a "declaration" was "probable." For some ten hours, solemn commentators on the various channels pondered over the difference between "declaration" and "statement." Around four o'clock, Musharraf's departure for Ajmer was finally cancelled, and the channels construed the cancellation as a harbinger of a breakthrough. By ten or so, as rumours of an impending collapse swirled around, despondency began to set in, and the dimmest sliver of hope was attached to the fact that Musharraf had gone for a quick farewell visit to Mr Vajpayee but had stayed well over an hour. Suddenly, close to midnight, all one could see on the TV channels were the taillights of the speeding cars and vans that were taking the Pakistan delegation to the airport. In a hurriedly organised press conference, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a one-line statement and refused to take questions. Pakistanis spoke only after arriving back in Islamabad.

What had gone wrong? First of all, the utter lack of preparation, especially on India's part. We had clearly extended the invitation without knowing what we wanted from it, and when Musharraf started demonstrating his flexibility we were bewildered. He could do so, we were told by ponderous media pundits, because he was absolute ruler whereas a democratically elected Prime Minister could not take any such steps without consultations. But virtually the whole government was there in Agra, in addition to the Prime Minister himself: Home, Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Commerce, Information, what have you. Moreover, what worth is Mr Vajpayee's unique status if he cannot take a decision, and why was an agenda-less summit organised between two men, assisted by their respective teams, if one of those men could not think on his feet and respond quickly? Why did we not anticipate what was coming? Why was a situation allowed to develop in which Pakistanis were briefing the media and Musharraf himself was constantly talking to the broadest spectrum of opinion-makers, aside from his four sessions with Mr Vajpayee, while Indian officials gave no briefings, except the wilfully disastrous one by Sushma Swaraj who simply hijacked the prerogatives of the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs)? How did it come about that a deadlock that lasted for roughly twelve hours was perceived by all the commentators as the prelude to a great and imminent breakthrough?

Musharraf obviously spent his last hour or more in Agra pleading with Vajpayee to give him a little glimmer of hope to take back to the peace lobby in Pakistan. Why invite him and then treat him with such imperious arrogance that, at the end, even ordinary civilities are dropped, even though he had been most deferential and respectful towards all our leaders, from the late Mahatma Gandhi to the current President and Prime Minister? Would there be any justification in criticising him, as we undoubtedly shall, if he goes back and tells his people that India is simply not prepared for peace and is preparing for even larger military operations in Kashmir?

This is bizarre behaviour on the part of a government that has run so thoroughly out of options. Ceasefires and restraints have come and gone. The Hurriyat has been irretrievably alienated, for the foreseeable future at least. Even autonomy cannot be negotiated with Farooq Abdullah because he cannot negotiate on behalf of those who have the gun. Shall we now resurrect the pitiable Mr Pant?"

That said, what both countries have to do now is to make concerted efforts to keep Agra on track. For no matter what the Indians say when they hark back to Simla and Lahore, and use the excuse that none of what went on in Agra holds because the talks did not reach "closure", the fact is that long and laborious discussions were held between the two sides, and that at least two drafts of agreements - call them what you may: declarations, statements, anything - were almost agreed upon. The fact is that we came within a whisker of an agreement. How then can Agra be negated so completely?