The author is a well-known journalist and freelance columnist

mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

Although key Iranian institutions have approved the election of President Muhammad Khatami and the top permanent guide-cum-ruler, Ayatollah Ali Khamenai, had upheld one of Parliament's contentious decisions about making state TV accountable, another liberal measure regarding political prisoners' rights has been shot down. Suppression of pro-Khatami press seems to have been resumed. The hope that the recent electoral showing of the other moderate liberals will not lead to any catastrophic showdown with the ultra rigid clerics entrenched in Council of Guardians, judiciary and security services may no longer be realistic.

The country was, and remains, polarised between supporters of President Muhammad Khatami and the controlling orthodoxy that is opposed to popular urges and yearning for a more relaxed interpersonal behaviour, dress and a freer press and other civil liberties. Mr Khatami had won a landslide victory in 1997 also. Despite his government's lackluster performance in most fields including the economy, electorate has returned him with another thumping majority. Fears are increasing that the ultra orthodox would again frustrate all initiatives of the Khatami government and the Parliament. Some recent developments suggest that this time round too the orthodoxy led by a narrow group of clerics, after an initial hesitancy, have decided to be obdurate.

The significance of 1997 and 2001 polls cannot be exaggerated. Victors and vanquished represented contrary forces. Both are inflexible. It is therefore ominous. The fact is that Khatami is himself an orthodox cleric though with moderate political views. To preserve the original Islamic Revolution of 1979, he thinks it is now necessary to relax some of the old rigidities. Thanks to unrelenting opposition by the extra rigid power structure Khatami's two landslides have objectively made him a rebellious force to the Ayatollah Khomeni led revolution of 23 years ago despite himself. It shows that people are fed up with the utter incompetence with which the clerics' regime has run the economy resulting in widespread unemployment, high inflation and misery for the majority. The extraordinary rigidities of dress, codes of interpersonal behaviour and all manner of prohibitions it imposed were stifling and have aggravated the popular discontent. A revolt was brewing up and the two sections of society, viz women and youth, supported by liberal opinion, have made Khatami a convenient symbol of their revolt. Indeed a lot of people are still unhappy with his moderation and refusal to go the whole hog in opposing the stranglehold of the ultra orthodox clerics. But for the time being Khatami is their man because his moderate leadership can unite diverse elements.

This pent up popular force is a radical challenge that ultra orthodox clerics will ignore at their own peril. They may still be in control of the key institutions and may thus be able to frustrate the nominal government's more radical-seeming policies about the freedom of the press and personal liberties. But for how long? They will merely make the discontent more determined and eventually violent. An almighty clash would occur and that may be the start of an unending civil strife-a likely fate for all ultra orthodox Islamic regimes.

The lesson to draw from Iranian developments is applicable elsewhere. Other revolutionary Islamic states are vulnerable to similar popular reaction. The shadow of such conflicts and shades of this polarisation can be seen elsewhere in embryonic form. The other state where an Islamic Revolution has succeeded is Afghanistan. Despite doctrinal differences between Shiite and a Sunni Islams, the point to underline is that in terms of the nitty gritty of politics, there is little difference between the two sects. Irrespective of theoretical justifications, from a functional viewpoint their political systems are basically the same. People have to live under severe restrictions and rigidities. The differences between Iranian and Afghan conditions are only of degree, local conditions and culture - not on basics.

Both the Iranian and Afghan systems set up what in practice is a personal dictatorship of an Amir or Rahbar or whatever he might be called. His word is law, no matter if a majority disagrees. He can decide all issues all by himself: religious, political, social, economic and cultural and all his decisions, preferences, nostrums and even whims enjoy the sanction Islam: the same as Qur'aanic injunctions. The basic political doctrine in all states is the current ruler's right to rule cannot be questioned and to revolt against even a tyrant - and no matter how he has become the head of the state - is not permissible in any sect. That would be revolt against Islam itself. Political opponents in an Islamic state run the risk of being termed Murtad, deserving death punishment. There are also no differences among various sects over how to treat women, how the men should conduct themselves and indeed what they should wear and how Interpersonal codes of conduct are quite similar, given the uniform insistence on virtue and prohibitions; any laxity becomes permissiveness.

The impact of all Islam-oriented governments and states is the same on citizens. All Islamic states believe in the sovereignty of Allah and the duty of the citizen is only to obey the will of Allah, as embodied in Shariat to be interpreted by the Caliph or Amir, the head of Islamic state. Given the concrete political and social conduct of the Amir or Rahbar, Allah's sovereignty turns out, in practice, to be the de facto sovereignty of individual dictator. Differing with him is punishable as heresy. But since modern states tend to be a huge affair; an individual cannot run all the affairs alone. He has to have advisors and ministers to execute his will (policies); it is thus an oligarchy amounting to the rule of a privileged group-oligarchs act as a college of cardinals. This is as true of Iran as it is of Afghanistan. One already hears of popular distaste of the rigidities imposed by Taliban. Indeed, the word about such incipient tendencies has reached here. In short things already point in the direction of popular reactions akin to Iran's-of course allowing for differing cultures.

Pakistanis have to look sharp because Pakistan happens to be the headquarters of the International Islamic Revolution. Indeed it is not one GHQ. There are several orthodoxies ranging from Maulana Soofi Mohammad in Malakand to Senator Samiul Haq and Maulana Fazalur Rehman and so many others in between. Each is a complete political entity, trying to bring about its own Islamic revolution primarily in Pakistan - but which is sure to spread to the rest of the world. Each group believes in armed Jihad for the purpose - for making the faction's leader the Amirul Momineen of the Islamic State-to-be. The only difference is that Pakistani clerics lack the kind of cohesion and organisation their Iranian counterparts largely due to history.

Some might say therein lies hope of relief, though plenty of fear is natural. We shall have a person like Salahuddin, Samiul Haq, Hafiz Saeed or Azhar Masood becoming the Amir and disagreeing with him even partially will make one Murtad. A system like that is a frightening prospect. Such movements are growing even in states that do not have religious government. Take Bangladesh for instance. Thanks to the polarisation between Islamic-oriented forces, represented by BNP, and the relatively more secular Awami League, all Ulema, the ideological kith and kin of similar Pakistani religious parties, provide the bulk of support to BNP against Awami League. One is not concerned with the arcane ideological differences between BNP's Bangladeshi Nationalism and AL's Bengalee Nationalism, except to note that the religious undertones of the former is likely to help only the Ulema, when and if BNP can muster enough popular support or armed strength. The conflict is fundamentally similar to Pakistan's. In Malaysia the religious orthodoxy is straining at the leash and in the case of Indonesia, it might overwhelm the whole state, though it may cause disintegration of the state. Virtually unending civil strife may be the final outcome in all such cases.