The author is a well-known journalist and freelance columnist

mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

We are at a pregnant moment for South Asia. Let us not forget the India-Pakistan cold war rivalry, now nuclear, is balanced on a knife's edge. Not unexpectedly, both sides recoil from the prospect of another cold war and have taken some measures to mend fences. The question at this juncture - still only a start of the 21st Century, the third Millennium of the Lord and the second half century of independent statehood for both states - is stark and insistent: Having spent the earlier half a century in military confrontation over Kashmir, policies of India and Pakistan collide at every step. Shall we continue living in this past or can make a break with the help of the unlikely duo of Pakistani military and Hindu nationalists of India?

Nuclear weapons have already played much mischief: behind this invincible shield, brinkmanship comes natural to both. Pakistanis have gone on stoking the fires of Jehad in Kashmir; Indians have countered with a Poorna Vijay message (war). The world is still aghast at the unfolding events in South Asia, when suddenly Indian PM AB Vajpayee brought an attractive rabbit out of his hat: he unexpectedly invited CE General Pervez Musharraf for talks to Delhi and President Musharraf gratefully accepted. Can they rise to the occasion?

There is something peculiar, almost mysterious, about Indo-Pakistan relations. Dire forebodings of a nuclear winter over the populous Indo-Gangetic plains have suddenly given way to rosy expectations of possible friendship, large amounts of mutually, beneficial trade, economic cooperation, civilised political harmony and reasonable and accommodative spirit. These things have begun to seem to be round the corner. Nobody actually stopped to ask the question, in either country, what had actually motivated Mr Vajpayee in making the U turn from his stand offish stance about not dealing with a murderer of democracy and the Lahore Process. Today he is reduced to trying to lower of expectations of his countrymen from the Summit. Musharraf too is, by reassuring the religious and other hardline lobbies that he has not diluted the stance on the core issue, doing the same thing: lower the common man's expectations.

How can such 180 degree turnarounds in popular moods and climates of expectations be possible? What is underlined is two basic qualities of Indo-Pakistan relations: First, they are really ambivalent. There is a strong enough foundation for sustaining an utterly hostile relationship almost indefinitely - in which wars, murders, rapine and arson can go on, even nuclear devastations can be contemplated. But if there is a credible constructive move from any side, the climate of popular opinion and of their desires and expectations almost instantly changes in favour of closest possible friendship and cooperation. Suddenly amicability becomes a dominant feeling in both countries. Secondly, given half a chance, the common folks on both sides leave no one in doubt about their innate preference for peace, friendship and cooperation with the other side. Expectations suddenly rise unrealistically high because these were always there: dormant and overlaid with the contrary set of history's legacies, stereotyped attitudes. Given statesmanship, people will like to see peace being strengthened almost endlessly by friendly cooperation between the Indians and Pakistanis. At other times and with manipulative leaderships feelings of hostility can take over and move on to struggles, tensions and confrontation. But people's first choice is peace, progress and a better life for common people.

Per se, a Summit is no guarantee of success. Six have taken place in 54 years. Despite high expectations each time, none ushered in an era of friendship, not even Shimla accord and Lahore Declaration. True, Shimla agreement was respected for 18 years - thanks to the traumatic events of 1971. Today, the reality is (a) India and Pakistan are just a few escalatory steps away from a possible nuclear war, virtually on a hair-trigger alert; (b) few know the real calculations of the Indian PM and BJP government's decision to invite Musharraf; and (c) no one knows how the differing dynamics of the two entrenched political classes - the generals-dominated Pakistani establishment and India's rightwing NDA - will deal with the inherent complexities of issues. Can they rise above the special interests of war lobbies and heed the popular yearnings of peace and plenty?

Still, history has afforded a chance to these two hostile power systems to make a new beginning. A wholly new sort of relationship - however unrealistic it may still sound to hardened players of power game on both sides - is suddenly and bewitchingly beckoning from afar. Whether Vajpayee and Musharraf, representatives of the two sets of opposing power elites, will respond positively to that knock of opportunity or will fudge the main issue with a few partial agreements, some CMBs and some minutiae of diplomacy like a somewhat relaxed visa regime, some progress on specific projects like Iranian gas pipeline and resuming cricketing contacts (broken in a spasm of excessive hostility). Cunning politicians prefer to make short term gains and fail to see larger challenges of history. That can suit both politicians, Vajpayee and Musharraf; with appropriate mutual concessions, they can easily preserve their basic cold war attitudes, especially military confrontation - so profitable to a whole lot of hardliners in either country - while tom tomming their success in making this partial agreement or that minor accord. Agreements over the US-suggested, indeed drafted, restraint regime, CBMs, can befuddle and befool the unwary that a breakthrough has been made. But the logic behind the typical Bush moves is relentlessly driving them towards collision and confrontation.

The questions posed by history are several: would in the 21st Century the leaderships of a billion Indians and 140 million Pakistanis continue presiding over policies that condemn a majority of their people to remain poor who are unable to afford adequate social services normally associated with civilised living standards. This is achieved through wasting scarce resources over totally non-productive pursuits in militarising the minds, economies and societies, to the advantage of hardliners, including their propagandists. While the threat of war is in fact growing at macro level, the only rapid growth the Pakistanis have seen at grassroots is in poverty; now 40 percent (60 million human beings) live below the official poverty line. Human dignity is knocked around daily everywhere in South Asia. Would all this continue into the new Century? If so, will there not be a big blow up, one way or another in later years?

There is more to the affairs of millions than clever-by-half political calculations of self-serving political elites. Large issues require statesman-like approach and treatment. South Asia's problems are of gargantuan proportions and the need for statesmanship cannot be over stressed. But alas! statesmanship cannot be bought off the shelf. While no esoteric route to it exists, it does arise when politics is conducted with dedication to the aim of human weal.

However, the choice today is for Vajpayee- and Musharraf-led political classes to make - on the Pakistani side by mainly uniformed politicians - to live in the new Century and the Millennium as a set of squabbling and hostile power elites, each perennially worried about the (military) security threat from the other; or, as a set of humble, well meaning and probably blundering politicians who mean well but are not clued up enough into the arts of effecting grassroots level reconciliation among such populous nations. In the latter case, setting such large chunks of humanity on a course of friendly cooperation in the fields of making more wealth, trading intensively, cooperating in economic planning, attaining cultural excellence, competing in sports and making life more beautiful and meaningful for all is a practicable aim that however requires a leadership that can rise above self serving lobbies. The choice of basic direction belongs, at this juncture, to just two persons: Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf - or at most to two power elites behind them.