In
the eye of the storm
M B Naqvi
The writer is
a well-known journalist and freelance columnist
July 18, 2001
Three
developments underscore the emerging turbulence in Asia. First, Pakistan is
entrusting the initial work in developing Gwadar as a deep sea port with
envisaged usable facilities for a big naval power, in this case China. The
second is the pointed query from India as to what may be implied in China
developing this strategic facility. It is freely being speculated upon that the
query may not be an expression of only Indian concern; for all anyone knows
there may be hidden in it somewhere an alarmed American curiosity, which power,
in any case, regards itself as the premier naval power in the West Asian waters.
Americans are as
unlikely to welcome
the mere possibility of Chinese naval presence at the choke point of the Persian
Gulf where it has so many bases and deployed naval strength. Pakistan should
expect long-term and determined hostility from both the US and India as a result
of allowing in China where its mere presence can cause troublesome and unending
political eddies in the region.
The second
development is what may be called the growing estrangement between the US and
China. Latest in this trend were two recent stentorian statements by the Chinese
President Jiang Zemin. In one he was indirectly quoted as telling Chinese brass
that they might soon have to prove their professional mettle if Taiwan were to
declare its independence. The second was a clear and direct warning to both the
US and Taiwan: China would not hesitate in using military force to frustrate the
Taiwanese move to declare UDI. That directly pits China against the US, the only
power which can underwrite Taiwan's secession from its motherland: China. And
Americans have certainly been behind the island's growing truculence.
Distance between
the US and China has been growing for some years. The voluble Chinese distaste
for a unipolar world is a decade old, if not older still. It was way back in
early 1994 that China wooed India and Iran at Tehran into forming an axis with
the express purpose of reducing the American role in Asia. Earlier China had
taken the initiative to build bridges with Russia. That Russia, under President
Vladimir Putin responded positively spoke of the Russian feeling of having been
unfairly used and of being jilted. These two powers went on to form the Shanghai
Five that quickly become oriented to politically countering the Islamic fallout
from Taliban in Afghanistan and other Islamic extremists. After the accession
of Uzbekistan, it
is now called Organisation for Cooperation (OSC). It is now a fledgling military
alliance that is likely to grow
and which is
directed at not only the Taliban in Afghanistan but some of Pakistan's policies.
The third is the
bombshell that President George Bush Jr exploded on May 1, close on the heels of
April 1 incident of the US spy plane having been forced to land on a Chinese
South China Sea island. The US would build the Son of Star Wars, the National
Missile Defence system, with its numerous subsystems. This was in crass
violation of 1972 ABM Treaty that has, so to say, kept peace and stability in
armaments levels, preventing further nuclear and missile build ups. The US also
indicated it does not wish to remain bound by the ABM Treaty. This was as good
as unilaterally declaring that 'we would build more and better rockets'. This
would force both Russia and China to embark on building more nukes because, if
the US were to improve the quality of its offensive weapons, the older
deterrents of Russia and China will become vulnerable. A whole new arms race
thus impends. Could a cold war be far behind?
All this means that
events in the next decade or more will be tumultuous, with new alignments
arising, setting off new arms races at larger and sub-regional levels in Asia
and frequent tensions, friction and possible conflicts - around China and in
Central Asia. Among the new alignments, Indo-US axis should be of special
interest to Pakistan. Maybe the Gwadar decision is a knee jerk reaction of
Pakistani generals. But it is thoughtless withal. It ignores Pakistan's own
situation; its economy is on a drip, being supervised by Dr IMF who is otherwise
known as an underling of US Treasury. Factually, no member of Pakistan's
establishment understands how China became a near superpower. Nor has any of
them the stomach for the kind of discipline and of the hardships that the
Chinese methodology involves. None of them
can conceive of
life without the western
cash inflows or
doing without the help and assistance of multilateral agencies that
are US controlled.
Have they acted in a
huff?
China has been a
steadfast friend of Pakistan and has always stood by it. Earlier leaders of
Pakistan understood their limitations in not being able to do as Chinese advised
them. In 1965 Islamabad could not continue the war. Nor in 1971. Nor have they
been able to copy the Chinese methods to develop fast. Economic development in
Pakistan, instead of roaring up and away, has come down with a thud. Pakistan
could learn much from China. It never did. It never acted the way China advised.
By asking the Chinese to build the port, the message to the US, NATO and India
is that Pakistan will align itself with China. Fine, if the military leaders
running the country have counted the cost and have the guts and gumption to
stand their ground.
Doubtless, Pakistan
did apply to join the Shanghai Five and the
application
probably is pending. Russians have found a reason to support Pakistan's
candidacy. But the test for Islamabad's military overlords will come when they
discover that western economic aid, especially of IMF-WB, will soon evaporate
and Pakistan economy will have to stand on its own two feet both for ticking
over and developing. Can they withstand the dirty tricks from CIA for instance
even for a short time? It wont be nice to beg China's pardon later in resiling
from agreed Gwadar deal.
But what is thus
underlined is the inescapable need for a serious review of
Pakistan's role
abroad. Its India policy is calculated to alienate the US, western governments
and media through supporting Jehad; and by supporting Taliban and treating
Afghanistan as a vassal - which is what is implied in saying that Afghanistan
gives strategic depth to Pakistan - has alienated a whole range of nations: from
Iran, Russia, India, US and China to all central Asian nations. Giving China the
contract for Gwadar port, with all its many implications, may neither enable
Islamabad to bypass and defang the new Russo China-led alignment by winning over
China or feasibly contain the Indo-US axis.
Gwadar's
development is certainly desirable. But not when it might cause a political
upheaval that might not be easy to control or which may cause more vulnerability
to the perceived national security. We Pakistanis have to realistically decide
what role we can sustain and what we cannot. There is no point in trying to
punch far above our height - politically and economically. Above all else, we
must realise we are not one of the big strategy's boys; our main aim should be
actual development, social peace and political stability.