MB Naqvi

The writer is a well-known journalist and freelance columnist

mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

The military regime has to fight on three fronts - fortunately not militarily. Pakistan's western borders with Afghanistan have after the collapse of Taliban power suddenly become overly sensitive with all manner of uncertainties and possibilities. Many of the Taliban activists, leading members of their hierarchy, from Mulla Omar down, and above all the Al-Qaeda's Chief and its other members may head for Pakistan through the porous border. The anti-Taliban coalition is sure to infer this and once it loses hope of finding Osama and his close associates, it will press for starting an armed search inside Pakistan. That will create a first-rate crisis because it is sure to involve American and British soldiers and detectives in sensitive area from where thousands of volunteers went to fight along side Taliban.

In the east relations with India have been traditionally bad and they have gotten even worse thanks to Kashmir Jihad. Danger of actual hostilities breaking out is not absent. The Indians seem to be contemplating to make hot pursuit forays into AJK, which would be tantamount to an attack on Pakistan, in accordance with oft-repeated stance of this country. Earlier, it was thought that since both countries have acquired nuclear weapons they will not make war because of mutual deterrence. Lately the Indian Defence establishment has adumbrated a new doctrine: 'nuclear weapons of one country deter the nuclear weapons of the other; scope for armed clash with conventional weapons exists'. It is through this opening that India thinks it can punish Pakistan for its perceived role in cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.

While Pakistan has become a member of the anti-Taliban coalition it does not seem to impress India. For, the deeper and longer-term nature of Indo-American partnership seems to override other considerations; indeed the likelihood of Americans turning their attention to terrorism in Kashmir as the Indians are urging is troubling enough. The subject occasion many uncertainties and should be treated as, again, a major crisis. At any rate, even if an all out war does not break out, India promises to keep up heavy diplomatic pressures on this country.

In addition, there is a third and far more complex front: domestic politics. It is bristling with ugly possibilities. Press has been full of reports about a possible deal with the PPP chief Benazir Bhutto. A deal of sorts has been all but visible between General Pervez Musharraf and the Like Minded Muslim Leaguers all along. The military regime had all but outmanoeuvred the ARD, except for two factors: continued allegiance of 35 or so MNAs and many Senators to Mr Nawaz Sharif and secondly, there is the Army's mindset: it regards these two top leaders as too corrupt who have to be kept out of the new politics the military regime has come to devise. President Musharraf's statements about his Presidency only signify that the Army wishes him to stay as an all-powerful President indefinitely. It looked uncommonly like an assurance to White House that come what may the Army will not relinquish its power, though it may repeat the charade of democracy as it did in 1985 to 1999.

Doubtless the generals, especially General Musharraf, as President and COAS, are supremely confident that they can safely handle all situations. Insofar as the nation's overall problems and challenges are concerned, there never was a period when there were so many dangers on all these three fronts. In fact, these are serious Crises and they have become only worse with the passage of time because successive governments, usually in deference to generals, never seriously tried to resolve them or prevent assuming the present dimensions. Today, a purposeful examination of these Crises is necessary. Few can underplay the importance of what might happen on either side of Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan or along the LoC with India. All Pakistanis are justifiably anxious and apprehensive about both sets of possibilities. But one point must be heavily underscored: crises on, along or across the borders result from the internal policies of this country and tackling them requires, at bottom, changes in domestic policy orientation. Foreign policy is always a result and in many ways extension of domestic policy orientation, only secondarily influenced by foreign countries. We should, therefore focus sharply on domestic policy orientation in order to adequately resolve the Crises across the borders.

The primary crisis at home takes the shape of an explosive polarization between the pro-Taliban religious parties and the government, which by making a U-turn in its Afghan policy, has enraged the former. It is not really a new crisis; it has been with us from the early years of independence. It is all about Pakistanis' perception of themselves based on the reasons that forced partition on India. Original Muslim League leadership - all of it non-religious in the sense of being non-orthodox - wanted division for basically non-religious purposes: to make economic progress with a human face and where Muslims will be free from perceived Hindu tyranny. Which is how Quaid-i-Azam's leadership could unite all Indian Muslims, which no orthodox Maulvi could.

But with Pakistan becoming a fact, the religiously-oriented politicians like Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari and Maulana Abul Alaa Maududi argued that since Muslim League used the name of Islam during Pakistan Movement, Pakistan will have to be an orthodox Islamic State. Few ML government leaders paid attention to this while Quaid-i-Azam lived. But with the passage of time, factionalism inside ML and Liaquat Ali Khan government's inability to resolve the constitution-making deadlock led to a sordid tussle for power between Punjab and Bengal groups inside the Constituent Assembly. That resulted in power being cornered by a bureaucratic-military coterie and authoritarian rulers found the Islamic State idea useful. It came handy in for condemning Bengalis' and other regionalist's demands for autonomy as mere provincialism.

But Liaquat government had tried to be clever by half in getting an ambiguous Objectives Resolution passed, thinking that religious lobby's demands could be appeased by it while the normal ML types (modernists) can go on ruling - using Islamic rhetoric as an icing on a basically secular cake. That Resolution strengthened the case for an Islamic dispensation for Pakistan and the rest was done by the successive dictators' need for acquiring a semblance of legitimacy by being ever more shrill about Islam while actually running a Martial Law or its surrogate regimes that were entirely secular, if also anti-democratic.

Anyway, eventually the religious lobby found Taliban to be a good Islamic Model and is now working for a Taliban-like Islamic dispensation for Pakistan, perhaps sans their excesses or rigidities. How dangerous it would be if Pakistan becomes something like the Taliban's Afghanistan is obvious. But this lobby is in fully cry. Today's one-man regime is required to cope with this challenge also. What the regime does not realise is that preventing strikes or containing street demonstrations is not meeting the challenge; a proper and more democratic alternative is necessarily required. This is however beyond the ken of generals.

This is not the only explosive controversy in Pakistan. The country fought a civil war and was dismembered (1971) on the issue of Centre-Province relations. It has been the issue of issues since. Regional nationalists are determined not to go on living under too powerful a centre; they want a genuine federation that gives adequate power to the provinces that coincide with perceived nationalities' homelands - or none at all. It is as explosive now as it was in 1950s and 1960s. Military's interventions have only added to the exasperation of those demanding regional (and local) autonomy: the latter being the prerequisites of justice. The official devolution plan and democratic-seeming local bodies are not seen as enough compensation for the loss of genuine democracy.

There are two other issues that have found no solution: disparity in incomes and opportunities between the rich and the poor, including in the development among regions. It is significant that Authority does not give, after 1971, separate GDP figures for provinces or regional per capita incomes. Why? the poor are entitled to ask: who owns Pakistan and why? The second issue is one of foreign policy. Ever since October 1953 when General Ayub Khan signed an agreement with Pentagon for military aid - behind the back of the Parliament, Cabinet and certainly the people - Pakistan's foreign policy of aligning with the US has been controversial. It is now time to assess what did the country gain or lose. All the gains are to be seen in the prosperity of the elite classes, including the generals. What did the less well-to-do classes get is rapidly growing poverty, high taxes and equally rapidly rising debt servicing burdens, the weight of which falls heavily on the poor.

The continuation of this policy orientation, especially after the restoration of Pak-American alliance, is now at issue: who will gain and who will lose? Majority of Pakistanis is poor and deprived of equal rights. They want equality. This means equal sharing in politics too: let all Pakistanis be equal stakeholders in the Pakistan Limited. Foreign aid received in the name of the people should actually benefit the poor as it does the rich, reducing disparities. This demand has four facets: (i) a more egalitarian distribution of incomes; and (ii) state's firm and legal obligation to eradicate poverty and not merely alleviation; (iii) it must be made the first charge on the national budget through a statutory social security no matter how small the initial compensation; and (iv) no region should noticeably lag behind others.

How is the military regime going to cope with this troubling situation on its two borders and the grim potentialities of domestic polarisations, made worse by frequent military dictatorships. It says it can handle it all by itself, though it is trying to employ some pliable politicians for PR purposes. They will have privileges and perks but no power. They will take most of the flak. The people shall have only one role: to stay laid back, watching the compulsions of history play themselves out under the expert supervision of generals.