MB Naqvi

The writer is a well-known journalist and freelance columnist

mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

No world order is a fixed thing. It goes on changing, generally slightly, with major developments and Afghan War is one of those things that are sure to make significant changes. Prognostication of how the war will end and what would follow in Afghanistan is a hazardous business. However, a few scenarios, mostly pessimistic, can be visualised insofar as Asia is concerned.

As of now, whether or not the UN plays a dominant role in Afghanistan some sort of a government would be hammered into shape as a result of its ministrations. And it will certainly be advertised as a broad-based and representative one. Here, some assumptions have to be necessarily made. No matter what the exact composition of the next government, it will be dominated by Northern Alliance which, in its turn, will be subject to much internal dissension and mutual jealousies among powerful warlords like Dostam, Fahim and others.

Further, Taliban are unlikely to disappear altogether from the Afghan scene. Even after their government has been destroyed, there may remain pockets in Pushtoon areas where armed groups would hold out, or will go on losing and gaining them, thus preventing the nominal Kabul government to be successful; resistance to that government will continue in many places, particularly in the Pushtoon areas, where lawlessness might become endemic. The law and order in the country as a whole is likely to remain patchwork at best.

An important subject is what impact would the defeat and destruction of Taliban regime shall have on the phenomena called Islamic Fundamentalism - or rather different extremist schools of Islam. Can it be destroyed or even damaged, leading to the loss of its elan. The assumption being made here is that nothing of the sort is likely to happen. On the country, all extremist schools will be strengthened; they may become even more paranoid and extreme. Other Taliban-like phenomena can go on erupting throughout the Islamic world.

Hopefully, during initial years there would be a united Afghan state, though the government in Kabul might not be stable or make its writ run uniformly throughout the country. But two facts would surely characterise that regime: First, Kabul would continue to be ruled by a basically pro-American set of people who will do what would be in harmony with America's larger political or economic purposes. Secondly, the US military presence would be an outstanding factor affecting the future of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This American presence in either country is unlikely to end soon, though most Pakistanis would like it to disappear as early as possible. So long as the Musharraf regime lasts - and it is likely to last in one form or another for a fair amount of time - the opposition to American presence would be kept contained. In Afghanistan, American influence, based on its troops' presence, is not likely to be constrained in the manner that it might be in Pakistan; Afghanistan, despite is internal lawlessness, is likely to become a major staging station for further advance into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in the first instance, and later throughout Central Asia - and maybe in Russia itself.

The Americans have gained many other advantages, beginning with the fact that the BJP government in New Delhi is pining to be of greater use to America's geopolitical purposes - doubtless aiming to deflect American attention and resources toward Kashmir's cross-border terrorism and other bilateral matters, especially more investments. India is likely to remain a notional or theoretical host of Americans, if necessary of their troops; it would be a great prop for American grand designs for Asia.

Then, China has no theoretical objection to War against Terrorism and, after its admission into WTO, it is not likely to strenuously oppose the American advance into Central Asia at this stage, though friction is surely to arise later on account of agreed Pakistan-China joint ventures on the Mekran coast (Gwadur port) and many other matters. Russia too has its own interests that are seen to coincide with American opposition to Islamic extremism. But thanks to its economic and financial needs, it is unlikely to offer any resistance to America's economic designs on Central Asian republics. The road to American investments in Central Asian republics is wide open - for exploiting their hydrocarbons, other minerals and possible contracts for infrastructure development and equipment for armed forces' modernisation.

It is true that in their heart of hearts, there would be resentment in China and also in Russia. American advance is largely, in current terms, at the expense of China and, to a smaller extent, Russia. Notionally, the scope for Chinese activities, economic and political, has shrunk by the ongoing political advance of the US in what used to be the Soviets' backyard. Russians are now economically (and politically) at sixes and sevens. The communist ideology has disappeared and no replacement has yet been found. Men like Kissinger thought that Russian nationalism, with its innate aggressive and expansionist tendencies, would become a dominant force. Well, it has not done so - not yet, at any rate. So far, economic decline and anarchic conditions have prevented Russian nationalism to claim any significant victory. But should economic stabilisation take place, it would have a fair chance of succeeding - mostly by default. But then, it will have to be militaristic like any other Fascism.

While discontent may continue to grow at the grassroots in most countries that would come under American influence - with governments deciding major policies which keep them in step with the US and which in some fashion promote American economic interests - things on surface might not give any indication of what is going on inside. This ferment would also be helped by the growth of globalisation under WTO and World Bank group. The latter's contradiction creates strong resentment among the poor and the unemployed and the perennially deprived sections. The reason is that the growth of globalisation promotes prosperity in a relatively small section of each underdeveloped society - though it is also true of developed countries but these are not under discussion - while resentment among the poor and the unemployed is sure to go on being aggravated by this disparity. Pakistan is likely to be a typical example of this whole process.

This characteristic impact of globalisation on individual economies, especially in underdeveloped countries, is replicated at the global level: it promotes prosperity in some countries while leaving other (underdeveloped) economies out in the cold. Much of the opposition to WTO and American geo-political overlordship, represented by the trend sketched here, is likely to combine and may add fuel to the fire of anti-Americanism. Should there be economic or other setbacks to other major economic-power centres, a precondition would then be created for them to exploit the general disenchantment against America and its policies, particularly in populous Asia, to challenge the American supremacy dominated and this unipolarity of the world. In this possible contest decisive battles are likely to be fought in Asia.