M B Naqvi

The writer is a well-known

journalist and freelance columnist

mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

The year 2001 opened in the US with a litigated election to the Presidency; George Bush Junior won it on a technical point. But his Republican Presidency has made the truth of world's unipolarity starker still. The US tendency towards unilateral actions in the spirit of isolationalism stands out.

But isolationalism and the US? One should hasten to clarify that post-1920 style isolationalism is no longer an option for the US; reverting to it now it will ruin it. But its nostalgia lives on --- days when US needed nobody and that it was wholly self-sufficient, neither needing foreign markets for products or for investments --- and still colours action in part. But that self-sufficiency is a thing of the past. The US, in the space of half a century after World War II, has become dependent on a globalised world economy to provide it with vitally needed investment opportunities and it is ensuring these through displaying its military muscle. World's unipolarity facilitates it.

President Bush's war on Terrorism exemplifies the way the US now operates. It gave no evidence of Osama's actual involvement in September 11 attacks and attacked and destroyed the Taliban regime because it was providing protection to him. The way the US persuaded much of the world to support and assist it in its war is typical of the new American methodology. Its allies had to be with America or against it. The US calls it a moral war against all terrorism.

But the outside world takes a pointed notice of the geopolitical significance of America's military advance from Middle East and Persian Gulf into South Asia, Afghanistan and central Asian states of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its diplomatic presence in Kazhakistan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is directly related to hydrocarbons. The US symbolically strong into Central Asia puts it in excellent position to romp home with this new frontier's conquest: cornering of rich markets for investment by American oil interests, in addition to other investment opportunities and prospects for contracts in the modernisation drives of the central Asian republics. All of it pushes back - and out - the Chinese and Russians who had been planning to limit the American role in Asia. Both have suffered a notable setback.

The world has had only one superpower for over a decade; the second superpower, the Soviet Union, imploded and President Vladimir Putin is trying to fashion a new Russia out of the debris along with others. Thanks to Senior Bush's chosen strategy of forcing an instant transmutation of a Communist society - without a private business class, accumulated private capital or a framework of laws to regulate market mechanisms - into a capitalist one, Russian and Central Asian republics' economies remain at sixes and sevens 10 years on. The world notes with sardonic humour that here are 16 new states with wonderful resource bases, highly educated labour forces and several with the wherewithal of being a great power that have economies in various stages of misorganisation that have politically crippled them.

There are other major centres of power and influence: European Union and Japan, with a secondary circle of notable powers: Canada, Australia, India, Brazil and a few others. China, the superpower of the future, is still only a major power struggling to emerge as a super- or near-superpower. Sceptics doubt if it would finally succeed - largely because of the means it is adopting, the internal consistency of which is doubtful. But out of these, Japan and the EU are at a crossroads.

At least Japan has the wherewithal of emerging as a superpower, though it now faces an economic crisis that, if overcome imaginatively and innovatively, can make it vastly more rich and capable of becoming a true superpower; but if its economy cannot be turned-around by the WTO rules, Japan may be in for much travail. The EU is also facing its defining moment.

If the EU succeeds in becoming a true union of free western states, it will be a new political animal; while it may have the potential of a superpower (in a purely military sense) it is unlikely to choose to become one; its orientation is pacific and for wealth creating. It is hard to conceive that its major members can turn their backs on union-making ideal either. Failure of the idea of unification, - unlikely but possible -will be a throwback to an earlier age of nationalistic militarism in Europe, the consequences of which will be fearful. Anyhow that is unlikely.

China certainly needs watching. It is trying to marry what was a centralised and planned economy with modern capitalism - mainly in specified zones. In these 'free' zones, massive foreign investments have flowed in and China's overall growth rates have been amazingly high - in two digits. Several questions arise: what is happening in the rest of the non-capitalist economy by way of being markets for goods produced in capitalist zones and as providers of labour. What is dimly known is that old social services, particularly jobs for all able-bodied adults, are declining and their coverage is shrinking. Nor is the countryside as vibrant with high growth rates. Would capitalism swallow up most of the economy - producing the kind of results that the world is only too well aware of? Or will it regress? - rather unlikely though it is.

Beyond that there is the old query about the incompatibility between a centralised one-party rule and growth of free capitalist economy; the two do not mix. That produces a profound uncertainty.

Free (capitalist) economies' immediate future is under a cloud by declining growth rates and growing recession in much of the world. How far will this downward spiral go cannot be foreseen with any certainty. All that can be said is considerable trouble lies in store.

In the region, South Asia, Pakistan has been the sickman. Its democracy, after floundering and faltering for over a decade, collapsed in 1999. Its economy has been living on bailouts - thanks to its creditors and IMF who do not want Pakistan to collapse for political reasons. In the last one month outlook has brightened with a new package of aid and rescheduling of loans as political rewards for its new Afghan role. But this too is a bailout for a few years. In contrast, India has done better economically as well as politically, though at a social cost. Its enthusiastic embracing of IMF-recommended 'reforms' has enabled it to keep up a growth rate above five percent - though it is now declining below this figure - and a high ($46 billion) Monetary Reserves level.

But the basic problems of masses unemployment and poverty, despite claims about the latter, remain troubling. While India is able to pay its way - with Paris Club inflows' aid - its future is not worry-free economically. Politically, it is perhaps the most stable country in the third world - something that needs being said to shame the Pakistanis into riding out of their social and political backwardness. Bangladesh has also done better than this country.

Pitifulness of former colonies of European imperial powers does not require extensive comment. Look at the worst cases as also the best. Among the worst Somalia, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan and quite a long line of states is to be found in varying stages of decrepitude and decline. The best were Indonesia, Argentine, Malaysia, India, Nigeria and other non-western members of ASEAN and APEC.

Indonesia and Nigeria are now pitiable giants largely because of political failures. Malaysia and India are an exception because of political leadership remaining formally democratic despite some dilution of spirit. There is scarcely a state or a factor at work in this so-called developing world - not counting the western favourites, Asian tigers, with some dilution and difficulties - that is a success story.

All in all, at the turn of the year, several questions require answers. Where will America's contempt and disregard of the UN, and preference for going it alone, take the world? Insofar as the UN is concerned, there is no doubt that its promise of providing international peace and security to all nation-states, especially small ones, has not been realised. Whatever measure of peace and order exists, it is not primarily because of the UN. This is not to say that if it were to disappear tomorrow, the world will become better. Far from it. For one thing, its specialised agencies are doing invaluable work. As a framework of peace-making, if only it were to be used in its true spirit, it is irreplaceable - except by a more democratic UN with no veto power to anyone and provided it stays independent of the few big contributors of money. Of that happening, there is little chance.

The second question is the quality of the new order and its longevity that the Junior Bush is blasting into shape. Would it be able to solve any of the troubling problems of the world? Can it keep peace? The mighty US is engaged in a long War on Terrorism. Can it really banish terrorism? Some think the way it has been going so far, it may leave festering sores behind that will go on breeding terrorists. Then, there are mankind's old problems: insufficiency and mal-distribution of resources, poverty and backwardness of vast numbers. WTO has worked after a fashion and is now poised, after Doha, to make trade freer and globalisation of economies more marked. What will this do? Will the fruits of new growth be better distributed? Granted that equality in an economic context is as dirty word for the Americans, but what about political equality among states (international law) and rule of law within each state?

Above all else would the Bush Administration be able to reverse the growing recession afflicting the world economy? With faltering Japanese economy and rather stagnant European ones - which have lived with unemployment rates of 10 or more percent for so many years - the world is threatened with a sharper slowdown. The US role thus becomes crucially important. Bush is sure to intensify warlike expenditures.

Maybe he is hoping that the US economy grows faster through this means. But his government is unlikely to spend more in the social sectors. What happens then? Should recession turn into a severe depression - based ultimately on growing poverty of the under-developed world and delays in developing new markets elsewhere - political turmoils can only proliferate and make the depression severer?