Cold war's many costs
M B Naqvi
The writer is a well-known
journalist and freelance columnist
It is clear that while a war is still possible through miscalculation, escalation or accident, neither New Delhi nor Islamabad wants it. For one thing, it may force nuclear strikes on both. For, it will be odd for any general or government to risk heavy losses or defeat and not use the weapon that can reduce or avoid them; even a winning side may wish to shorten the war or reduce the costs by nuking the enemy. However, the rest of the world is horrified by the prospect and appears to be putting effective pressure on both sides not to let the cold war become a hot one. Hence this stultifying stand off may continue in some form - until the two see its futility and make peace.
Meanwhile both peoples should re-asses the policies of their respective government that have resulted in this endless deadlock. Apart from the initial specific disputes over territory, states, stores and cash, both India and Pakistan inherited attitudes rooted in culture, circumstances and interests that made them rivals. Thus they had peculiar but similar illusions. India, drawing upon six thousand years-long heritage, staked a claim to leadership; 'light comes from the east'. Pakistan, almost as second best, wished to be the leader of Islamic World to the annoyance and even derision by most Muslims. Later, the dynamics of Kashmir dispute made the two states cold warriors and before too long became nuclear powers.
One cost of this disputation that became unending military confrontation from around 1986-87; it clearly had a nuclear dimension. Indians thought that given their nuclear status, Pakistan would desist and stop challenging it militarily over Kashmir. That did not happen and Pakistan acquired its own nuclear capability; it has gone on challenging it.
Pakistanis considered their new capability to be an invincible shield, which they can go on needling India through a Jehad without it being able to use its superior military strength to bear on itself.
The denouement, sort of, is this paralysis of will on either side. This stand off has brought quite a few things into relief: their common militaristic approach to disputed problems has resulted in both states becoming national security states par excellence. A large proportion of their people has stayed poor, unlettered in indifferent health, with high birth rates. Future will not be bright for both until they do not extend the meaning of national security to achieve high levels of human development; indeed human development has to be seen as most of national security. Politics in both countries has been distorted by a jingoistic nationalism that benefits the elite classes and chauvinistic approach.
But first consequence is the un-sustainability of peace and stability in South Asia so long as the two rival nuclear deterrents exist eyeball to eyeball. Nuclear weapons in Pakistan are designated for India. Indian Bomb, too, can only be oriented for use in Pakistan; there is no other conceivable use for it. Defenders of which country can trust the intentions of the other so long as this weapon of offence is sitting there? The Bomb's actual utility between India and Pakistan is either nil or, in exceptional circumstances, lies in a surprise attack of a massive kind. It has no defensive role.
Earlier illusions about these weapons being status symbols or currency of power have to be discarded. Look whether nuclear bombs have made India or Pakistan any whit more respected than before? The world is excoriating both for it and an attempt is on to push them away from the confrontationist path.
On particular illusion was, and is, particularly pernicious: it is the Bomb's deterrence. Was Pakistan deterred from supporting the Jihadis in Kashmir because of Indian nuclear capability? India is threatening to take offensive military action despite the Pakistani Bomb; that is the heart of the current crisis. Should India invade, Pakistan has now proclaimed that it would not make a nuclear response. Or else it stands to suffer totally unacceptable damage from the expected Indian riposte.
The Bomb has thus proved to have no deterrent power nor is it any practical use. Let Indians make their own assessment of their Bomb's cost effectiveness. India's wish to make war, or its noises, is predicated on Pakistan's Kashmir policy and apparently the presence of the Pakistan Bomb has made no difference.
The conclusion emerges: both countries, all things considered, cannot go to war. So why are their forces deployed on forward positions? Why incur the extra costs? The BJP government's wisdom in scrapping agreements and established trading practices regarding normal visas, rail, road and air links or MFN status is open to question. Who will suffer most? Not the ruling elite in either country but the common Indian or Pakistani - mostly members of divided families or small traders shall suffer. Denial of air space to Pakistani aircrafts will do what? How will it change the policies that India dislikes? It is claimed that common Indian sentiment is being responded to? It bears examination from which Indian quarter is this pressure coming? Could it be that political and electoral benefits are seen by the spin doctors of the ruling Parivar? The true human and economic costs need to be seen.
The immediate political costs are borne by secular democratic parties and forces in India, while Hindu chauvinist parties stand to profit from the aroused anti-Pakistan sentiment in the February polls. Ideas of equity and fairplay are forgotten in the jingoistic propaganda of 'let us punish Pakistan'. In Pakistan war psychoses work wonders for the ruling Junta of generals. All talk of immediate elections and true reform are relegated to the background and what becomes ostensible is to 'stand united behind the Army because the enemy stands menacing at the door'. The generals cannot ask for a better gift from India than this cross-border tension. May be the two ruling groups are helping each other's political longevity.
What Messrs Vajpayee, Fernandes and Jaswant are doing is to politically strengthen the anti-Hindu religious parties and groups and other anti-India Rightwing groups in Pakistan. This preempts the politics of dealing with the concrete problems of common people. In fact all social and economic reforms - except those suggested by IMF, WB and WTO - is being preempted by the politics of jingoism on both sides. Economic progress is being downgraded as a value.
The politics being pursued has an international dimension: Automatically, the Americans are being invited to come and separate the two - who want to get at each other's throat but dare not do so. The US leadership role in Asia is being immeasurably strengthened and helped. Pari passu, others' role is being diminished. Even the Indians and Pakistanis are showing themselves to be unable to keep peace - so necessary for maintaining stability sought by all major powers - without outside help.