M B Naqvi

The writer is a well-known

journalist and freelance columnist

mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

President Pervez Musharraf would soon visit the US as a 'special guest' of Mr George W Bush, the US President. Wendy Chamberlin, the latter's Ambassador to this country, has foretold that this visit will change the fortunes of Pakistan and its people. It remains to be seen how adverse will be the effect on those fortunes. She also reminded later that a return to democracy was indicated which is more than merely polls, requiring as it does good governance and a tolerant culture. She had previously indicated what was to be expected from the President's visit to Washington: more Pak-US cooperation in the fields of defence, closer military-to-military ties, aid for poverty reduction, education and health; and the US might also lift some or all sanctions.

Doubtless, many in the establishment will be greatly enthused. But some of us who have watched the ups and downs of Pakistan's friendship with the US since the very beginning are more restrained. That generals will be ecstatic over the prospect of greater cooperation in the spheres of defence and closer ties between the Pakistani and American militaries -- involving more purchases or lease of military hardware, spares and more training courses in addition to other aid -- is understandable. The others concerned with what the people of Pakistan need have other matters on their minds. They are unable to forget what has been the cost of friendship with the US in the past.

Enough facts are not known about how precisely did Pakistan become the most allied ally of the US. But democracy was murdered (1953-54) by the first (civilian) dictator at a time when negotiations must have started for Pakistan's joining the west against Communist Russia and China; one is however not interested in the question who was the wooer and who was the wooed between them. Pakistan's need for military aid could only have facilitated the process, though that friendship enabled the coterie of conspirators -- Ghulam Mohammad, Colonel Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub Khan -- to rule the roost between 1953 and 1969. Historically this friendship has meant Pakistan Army's power and America's underwriting of it with dollars -- a lethal combination. It was however not America's fault that the second military dictator, General Yahya Khan, could not last beyond 2.75 years.

The third, the inimitable Soldier of Islam General Ziaul Haq, was sustained for more than 10 years, quite like General Ayub Khan's decade. Now that Ambassador Chamberlin has reminded us and President Bush had pledged to stabilise the Presidency of General Musharraf -- and not Pakistan -- presumably by underwriting his government's needs, democrats in this country feel that it sounds like being sentenced to another Decade of Reforms.

Let's get this correctly. The US alone is not responsible for only dictators flourishing in this country. Weakness, incompetence and incoherence of the democratic-minded citizenry are far more culpable. Also, the US connection did facilitate the receipt of around $ 80 to $ 85 billion in total foreign aid. A certain amount of development has undoubtedly taken place. Moreover, Pakistan has been able to run an arms race with India in its confrontation with it on Kashmir. Indeed it is world's seventh or eighth nuclear power today. Arguably, all this might not have been possible without as much US aid and help as was received. But there is certainly a flip side to it.

It is 47 years since Pakistan formalised its American connection and began receiving foreign aid more or less on a regular basis. The debit side of the economic development was writ large over the faces of all Pakistani Finance Ministers of recent years -- all were beseeching immediate cash aid from IMF to avoid default in the balance of payments. Pakistan's economy managers have lived on the edge of security and on their wits. High budget deficits, high inflation, high trade balance deficit, widespread unemployment, high growth rates of population and poverty and insufficient rise in literacy rate and healthcare coverage have been the characteristics of Pakistan economy. In all the statistics, high growth rates in savings, investments, GDP and exports were and are conspicuous by their absence.

This litany is not really complete. The point is that the economy's management -- that affects common Pakistanis more than how governments feel -- has suffered from all manner of defects. Under dictators, it has ignored the necessity of simple prudence of not encouraging increases in consumption without increases in the productive apparatus, production and sustained growth. It never encouraged savings and investments nor was it able to give good governance or even a minimum of financial discipline. Its strategy of development was haphazard. It correctly relied on industrialisation as the immediate objective but had no coherent criteria for it. Ad hoc factories and mills were added without any thought of whether these units can be efficient or really profitable. In the event Pakistan had an industry that requires costly imports but is unable to pay for them. The agricultural policies preserved the rural elites' position largely through subsidies or where necessary circumventing the laws. A heavy social cost was paid in terms of growing disparities of income and opportunities between the elites and the commoners. Mechanisation of agriculture has been undertaken without any thought of what has to be done with or for the surplus rural population -- that now boosts the figures of the permanently unemployed and of poverty growth. These disparities are both horizontal in terms of social classes and vertical in terms of regions. Thus successive dictators and their civilian stooges, with much American assistance, have given the people of Pakistan a badly distorted and unviable economic dispensation.

The point of it all is that what Pakistan needs is a paradigm shift. All the policy orientations in politics and in economics so far have ended in a cul de sac. The economy has been living on bailouts. The improved outlook -- such as $ 4 billion plus in monetary reserves -- is due to the inflow of dollars in loans and in grants for service rendered while imports of machinery and sophisticated equipment remains minimal. Growth rates have been slowing down. Most of the large-scale industry is unable to face international competition that cannot now be avoided under WTO. The main troubles afflicting the economy before September 11 last year are still all there, only worse. Only a reprieve has been available. To repeat, the present cheerful outlook is due to continued inflow of aid. That is nothing to be cheerful about.

Now that the friendship with the US has been revived, the fear is that Pakistanis will continue to live in a 'democracy' that will be effectively subservient to the Army Chief. This is what is the meaning of President Musharraf remaining the President for at least five more years after the present 'term' of three years ends. The supremacy of the military is a fact of life and the presence of the serving generals at the head of the political system heavily underlines it. That is acceptable to the people of Pakistan any further. But they certainly notice that the American support is going to sustain Army's overlordship of a tightly-managed democracy. This American support to the generals, with their readiness to pay for the services rendered, negates the basic human rights of self-governance of the Pakistanis. It is going to reopen all the old wounds of this polity. National integrity and unity are already not in top form. The show of solidarity by one and all during the continuing Indian military forces' threat on the borders is not a proof of meaningful and sturdy unity in normal times.

The renewed American connection would merely lock Pakistan in all its old orientations: in politics, economics and foreign policy. No matter what motivated the Bush administration to start the war on terror, the fact of the matter is that the geopolitical consequences of this war are not lovely to observe -- it has already meant the growing hegemony of America over both South Asia and Central Asia to the detriment of China, Russia and Iran. There are jitters in Iran, Syria, Iraq, North Korea and Somalia. One is not making a plea for saving the regimes that govern these countries. But making the unipolarity of the world so brutally stark and so intrusive is not an advance and Pakistan's foreign policy is now sure to be in hock to the senior partner's expediencies. Militarisation will continue to dominate Pakistan politics.

Concretely, much of the aid received is likely to be spent on replacing the weapons systems in the armed forces on the plea that all the major hardware has long been aging and needs replacement. There would be enough noises about spending more money on education, modern technology and healthcare. No doubt, some more money will be earmarked. But a few percentage points increase in these sectors will scarcely achieve the desired ends nor can it improve overall human development indicators in any significant way. Economy too will continue to live on handouts. As soon as the largess of the donors decreases, as it is likely to after a while, we shall be back seeking bailouts at each year's end on any terms. The prospect is not as rosy as the government of the day thinks it is.

What of the main saving grace of this regime: the free press. It does look today that this hard won freedom cannot be suppressed. But think again. Can free press remain the only flower in bloom in a desert of controlled democracy where a majority of politicians, parties and even institutions will have to be somehow made supporters of the President with extraordinary powers? Some of the lectures to journalists on patriotism, responsibility and research are a telltale preliminary.