What ever will be, will be
April 18, 2001
Ever since that Sunday in March when Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf announced his decision not to retire from the army next October, the subject has concentrated many a mind. Excitement and agitation have characterised most reactions. The reason is that it is not a simple matter: other things are entailed almost automatically. There are any number of indications about what may these things be and the shape of some of the things to come is now reasonably clear.
The first likelihood being assumed all round--and it conforms to a familiar pattern--is that the general will shift residence; the Presidential Palace shall have a new tenant. A more or less orchestrated campaign suggests that becoming a President who is a figurehead will be meaningless. It suggests that bulk of the Eighth Amendment powers plus some more are likely to be given to the President through constitutional amendments. Transition to civilian rule will require indemnification of actions by military officers falling foul of the Constitution or other laws in the three years period granted by the Supreme Court as also provide constitutional cover to the regime's reforms in this period.
This time round an additional innovation is proposed: setting up of a National Security Council under the organic law in which the generals' vote will be decisive. The NSC shall have extraordinary powers including the taking over of the government of Pakistan by army for stipulated periods. It is necessary to remember that 'President' Musharraf will continue to head the army, the NSC and some other bodies too.
As PPP leader Benazir Bhutto's article last week in this paper has suggested that all these powers will make the President the supreme authority in the land with virtually no checks and balances. She has inter alia disclosed that the regime may make some more 'reforms' like shortening the life of the National Assembly and local bodies to three years. It will be compulsory for all political parties to hold annual elections for their office holders. Thus various elections would continue to take place most of the times. Elected politicians (PM) will thus remain engaged in "pointless" elections most of the time and will be unable to do justice to their jobs while all powers will stay concentrated in an indirectly, or indeed partially, elected President with assemblies that cannot exercise authority and power over the executive will cease to matter. The net effect, she says, would be total destruction of the supremacy of the Parliament concept. Governments will exist on generals' suffering in general and of the President in particular, possibly leading to an annual turnover in the Prime Minister's office.
As against this Benazir view, there is the opinion of the commonly respected, and admired, politician, Air Marshal Asghar Khan: "Gen Musharraf is an honourable gentleman who is sure to abide by the Supreme Court's mandate to handover power to people's elected representatives at the stipulated time. As for his becoming President, if the people freely elect him, why not". There indeed is no bar against generals taking to politics or contesting for an electoral office. But it is possible to take issue with one's kind friend here: the sort of election that is likely to choose 'President' Musharraf will not be an ordinary election: The electors will have no alternative. If the CE offers himself to the electoral college, with the availability of patronage of (ministerships), his election would be a mere formality. The thorough gentleman he is, the Air Marshal takes most military officers to be like himself. Remember he asked the people in 1977 to trust Ziaul Haq: He will hold the general election in 90 days. Had Mr Musharraf gone through the political mill from district boards to provincial and national assemblies and had emerged as a commonly-liked leader, it would be one thing. But after having spent a lifetime in the army and then landing into the very top political job is another matter.
It does seem most of these putative changes will take place--in substance. The small print in nearly all of them might contain some unexpected or even startling elements. But on the whole nature, direction and substance of the changes have been indicated. It is thus necessary to consider the consequences. Two considerations emerge: One has already mentioned the loss of the Parliament's supremacy and ultimate authority. National Assembly's continued existence can serve as a facade of, or civilian camouflage on, an authoritarian regime. That is prostituting democracy. The second concerns the rule of law. For all practical purposes, official publicists have juxtaposed good governance against the old-fashioned concept of rule of law as virtual alternatives. The general is supposed to have promised the nation good governance and solution to its difficult problems. This is maiming and mangling the basic concept underlying rule of law. It will also have other longer-range ramifications and consequences.
Opening gambits having been made, consequence will unavoidably flow. About where it will end, all one can say is what will be will be. It is, however, necessary to ask some searching questions. What signal would this give to foreign powers? Insofar as one can see, there would be no adverse reaction from major western powers so long as democratic trappings are retained like National Assembly, a civilian Cabinet and other supporting institutions such as an Election Commissioner, Auditor General, the Supreme Court and similar bodies. It will be democracy enough for them. Leading western powers have always preferred a basically authoritarian regime with civilian clothes and institutions on display. They prefer such a regime because they feel secure in dealing with it rather than a democratic government that has to consult Parliament, its constituents and citizens. Much the same can be said about the international financial institutions that have so much to do with what happens in Pakistan. They will, in fact, as far as can be seen, be pleased. Look at the IMF. It has preferred to strike a deal with nominated caretaker regimes during the last 12 years rather than negotiate with a Prime Minister who was actually subordinate to the President. So 'President' Musharraf should expect no difficulties from this quarter too.
But the question remains: what message would that give to ordinary citizens of Pakistan: The persons you elected were corrupt, therefore, the COAS felt it necessary to remove them by a coup. He is not going to let Benazir and Nawaz Sharif 'loot' the country again. What he says in effect is quite simple: 'I will look after your interests. You should not worry too much about your rights; you will be better off without most of them. Moreover I am no tyrant; will leave you alone so long as you do not make trouble'. Popular reactions in this country have been, on the whole, unpredictable: people generally remain docile for long stretches of time; there is no indication that they are in any mood to agitate now, no matter what Sharif or Benazir say. But, they can suddenly begin participating in agitational politics and their zeal can grow by the day. They are quite unpredictable in the long run.
The question persists: What message will key sections of society receive. There is the media, there are the political parties, all of them, and of course the professional groups. Their reactions matter. Among them one would wish to mention the young subalterns in the Army and those who may be going into the Kakul Academy. Would they not think that if the circumstances are ripe and God is gracious, I too would be the President. One has not mentioned the religious parties and the Jihadi outfits. Hitherto they have been staunch supporters of the military regime and indeed the religious parties and Jihadi organisations have worked closely with the army for ideological as well as other reasons: their ideas have historically been similar about politics, although Musharraf had projected himself as a modernist and moderate Muslim in contradistinction to the more orthodox (extremists). What about them?
Here Benazir's article is relevant: 'Pakistan has never been closer to a takeover by Taliban-like forces than what it may soon be.' Her argument is clinching: it is so easy to replace the occupant of a single chair where all powers have been concentrated. One is not concerned with the subtle games she may be playing thereby or what her real intentions are. But the observation cannot be faulted.
For the rest, it may be possible for Musharraf to argue with Benazir that her assessment of Islamic forces in Pakistan being really so strong and enjoying such substantial support inside the army is exaggerated or that there is a clear and imminent danger of Talibanisation of Pakistan. The general may be right in thinking that her words are calculated to endear her to American readers. One is not concerned with all that. One merely underlines the argument without approving her possible motives.
Although one shares the fear of Talibanisation of Pakistan to an uncertain extent; but there is no dogmatic assertion here that this is unavoidable or imminent. Pakistan is a plural and multicultural country where Taliban-like rule can only be established after an unimaginable amount of bloodshed for which few have the stomach. Pakistan's security forces are still in a position to prevent that, if they are competently controlled by democratic forces. Otherwise it is dicey.
With Crises building up all around the country, it is not the best time to return to 1980s-like arrangement. Dangers are galore. With an endemic BoP crisis, IMF's formulas of not addressing growth through increased demand and destroying economic stability through price rises and currency depreciation--all in the vain effort to ensure returns on creditors' investments--it is possible that default on external liabilities might yet take place; inflation can suddenly become unmanageable. IMF's conditional help might not suffice in some circumstances. Sheer quantum of external liabilities might become unsustainable. Widespread popular restiveness can invite all manner of troubles, not all of them foreseeable, especially if prices get out of Islamabad's control. Political troubles always come unannounced. It may be no time to restart the 1985-like charade. But, since the die seems to have been cast, we all will reap what we sow.
The author is a well-known journalist and freelance columnist