Audacity may be yes, imprudence no
April 04, 2001
It is now clear that General Pervez Musharraf's regime is going to effect changes in the constitution with a view to making his reforms irreversible. Mr Musharraf has been at pains for some time to emphasise the resolve to restructure the political system--mainly to recreate a balance between the President's and PM's powers--and to make the changes irreversible. Concurrently, he seems to have inspired many army-friendly politicians to preach the virtues of constitutionally recognising the military's permanent role in the governance of the country through setting up a National Security Council. This is also a part of what may help make his contribution permanent--which is his leitmotif.
A military regime is an evidence of the failure of a people to govern themselves in a civilised, ie democratic, way. It is an interim arrangement. Whichever way you look at it, it is a transitional halfway house: either the commander prepares the country to resume its democratisation quest; or it evolves into a semi-permanent tyranny of some sort. Tyranny is any system where people's rights are not supreme and it is tailored around the top individual, group or interest (who or which is supreme). A glance at the way this military regime came into office will throw useful light on its thinking or what its main interests are.
The mere fact that the generals of Pakistan Army, and not Musharraf himself, overthrew the constitutional government presided over by Mian Nawaz Sharif determines the regime's basic character and purpose. That Supreme Court has mandated it (for three years) proves nothing: what alternative did the Supreme Court Judges have, except declaring the change illegal, shutting down their doors and becoming unemployed? The legal government had been killed. Nobody resisted. The supremacy of the generals was obvious. It was recognised. Inter alia they attached the condition of holding the polls to the National Assemblies and Provincial Assemblies by a certain date. But what did it signify? Since they allowed the chief executive to amend the constitution, the question arises: polls to which Assemblies are mandated. The National Assembly was the supreme authority in the land on October 11, '99. But if the constitution by October 12, 2002 allows the indirectly elected or even un-elected President to sack or override the National Assemblies, the polls in the interval will have an entirely different, less decisive significance.
General Musharraf, as the delegate or representative of the generals, can legitimately claim the Supreme Court mandate in turning the constitution upside down in pursuit of his reforms. It can include changing its basic scheme, viz of a Westminster-model supremacy of the Parliament reflected in the PM's powers not being limited by any King or President but who remains dismissible without much ado the moment he loses the National Assembly's confidence. It was another general, viz Ziaul Haq, who devised the Eighth Amendment's Article 58(2)(b) as a means of controlling--and not promoting--democracy. This was subordinating Parliament to an all-powerful unelected President. Zia also wanted to make his reforms irreversible. Along the way he perpetuated his own extraordinary powers to override democratic decision-making. Had Almighty not decided to intervene, we all would still have been Zia's subjects.
The point is Supreme Court has done its work: it legitimised the generals takeover. Now there are indications the Generals want to make the changes they propose irreversible: Eighth Amendment powers for the President plus the NSC of basically Zia conception. Along the way, in order to make everything fail-safe, General Musharraf may be given the President's hat also after prolonging his tenure as COAS. That will perpetuate the status of the generals as the group with supreme authority that can sack a government whenever it wants. Hence the constitutional amendments that will extinguish Parliament's sovereignty--necessarily resurrecting a surrogate King's sovereignty. How precisely will the generals make the amendments remains unclear.
If two thirds of NA and Senate votes are available to Mian Mohammad Azhar's friends and allies in PML(L), the restored NA and reconstituted Senate will be there to rubber stamp. Otherwise an alternative route to the same end will have to be devised: Given the availability of President Mohammad Rafiq Tarar--at least for as long as his signatures on a parchment will seem convenient--to sign whatever document General Musharraf presents plus the near certainty of SC's eventual approval, few doubts need be entertained. Modalities do not really matter so long as the generals' will remains supreme and the nerve holds.
The general's audacity cannot be doubted. Perhaps it is a tribute to Pakistani people's docility verging on impotence. It is actually based on their lack of awareness and political underdevelopment. Thus it cannot be said that the generals schemes will not fructify. There is no opposition to the military regime that it need worry about. And yet one would say the generals audacity is going too far. It approaches imprudence. They do not realise what a can of worms this wanton tinkering with the constitution is likely to prove.
Newspaper writers are accused of being responsible for spreading despondency. As it happens, there are scores of well-connected writers who so dutifully reflect this thinking of the rulers and are spreading the word about how successfully has the regime turned around the economy. They apparently can see and publicise how things will be honky dory in a short while. In any case, it is remarkable that in these days of extreme financial stringency when departments are being merged and pruned, there is not one proposal of dismantling or even significantly downsizing the Information Ministry, a wholly questionable entity with over a billion rupees budget. Obviously, it is intended to be used as of yore. More writers and newspapers will be bribed to favour the generals.
The context however works against these designs. Economic distress may, one of these days, force the docility out of the people. The generals are presiding over rapidly increasing unemployment and poverty; higher trajectory of prices will drive the poor to desperate action. The smiles on the faces of WB and IMF only mean more tears in the eyes of the poor. Let no one forget one characteristic of Pakistanis: they might be too poor, disorganised and miserable to oppose and stop authoritarian dictators. But they have always denied them legitimacy and kept them on the defensive. Ayub, Yahya and Zia all remained to the last apologetic about their legitimacy. The idea of democracy is too closely associated with Pakistan and Pakistanis. Then, something happens and they suddenly overcome their dumb meekness and begin protesting. Remember 1968-69 or 1977?
Constitution, to a general, may be a book of 12 pages to be easily torn up. But it embodies hopes and aspirations of a people; at most times it remains a reassuring memory to them. Punjab is the heartland from where most of the Army is drawn. It, therefore, identifies itself with a military regime most of the time. Generals can rely on it. But not all the time. It also identifies itself, off and on, with democratic aspirations of the peoples of other provinces. At any rate, times are changing it; it did produce a Nawaz Sharif, who, despite his political origins and upbringing, tried to control the Army and presumably change its India policy. He did so clumsily enough. But he tried and even had a lot of supporters. The regime is trying to get hold of Sharif's party. But the success in shoving the PML into the official Harem is still partial. Uncertainty for the future is growing even in Punjab.
Other provinces coincide, more or less, with well-developed cultures and ethnic entities, distinguished by separate historical memories, languages and other factors. They want the right of self-assertion and a share in ultimate decision-making in the Centre. Which is why they want more provincial autonomy. In the past, Pakistani governments have, under the influence of centre-loving generals, denied equal status to minority provinces. Their share in resources so far has been inadequate. Punjabi-dominated Centre hates the idea of obstreperous provinces complaining of over centralisation; it once devised One Unit to overcome this protest. Sindhi, Pathan, Baloch and now Mohajir nationalists dub the military regime as the worst form of One Unit.
As before, the generals' supremacy is sure to spark of more separatist tendencies. Economic downturn and growth in poverty is the worst time to perpetuate their rule. Response to the desired irreversibility of generals' pet reforms will call forth a radical kind of opposition. National unity is threatened today with growing challenges that only genuine democracy can meet. Today the biggest challenge is posed by the combination of people's miseries with their hitherto frustrated hopes and yearnings for a caring and responsible democratic regime. Their current pitiable inactivity does not foreclose the possibility of strong action with nihilistic or otherwise destructive intent.
A throwback to 1986 will intensify fissiparous tendencies and a surrogate military dictatorship--that is what sharing of power with a supreme military can mean--will make Pakistan even more unstable. People's alienation will rapidly grow. The impact on national security can only be adverse. The end up of dictatorships, as a rule, is inglorious and hurts all should be remembered.
The author is well-known journalist and freelance columnist