The author is a a well-known

journalist and freelance columnist

mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

June 05, 2001

There is virtually non-stop talk of amending the organic law. Insofar as the current military rulers are concerned, they want to make their reforms irreversible. This is as new an insistence as it is amazing. How can future generation(s) be bound not to change today's changes, supposing they mean to enshrine them in the basic law? The point may become comprehensible if we examine what constitutional amendments are on the anvil.

Cutting through the thick fog of rhetoric, it would seem that the regime is seeking to prolong its own life span in some form beyond the three years granted by the apex court without falling foul of the latter. Components of the desired change are: Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf starts by becoming the President. But to be effective, he would need

(a) Full indemnification of all military or civil officers who helped him to stage the October 12, 1999 coup d'etat;

(b) All the powers for the President that were originally included in the Eighth Amendment of 1985 (most of which happen to be still there);

(c) Giving full constitutional cover to a National Security Council being set up that would give a decisive say to Army high command over national security matter and which can order the Army to takeover the government(s) probably for a specified period and

(d) The present government's so-called devolution of power plan is also designed to be fully protected in perpetuity. Dubbed as hegemony of the Army over the governance processes in the country, all this would constitute the exit strategy for the Army that will leave behind General Musharraf at the head of the system with ample powers, reinforced by NSC, to safeguard its institutional interests.

All analysts agree this is the substance of what is desired by the regime. The question is how to do it. Amending the constitution normally requires a joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate. National Assembly is under suspension. But the Senate has not only been suspended but is now incomplete, as the term of a large number of members has expired. But the SC in its wisdom had allowed the CE to amend the (suspended) constitution in his discretion while retaining, one supposes, the power of judicial review.

The CE can ignore the legal red tape and promulgate all the changes the Army high command wishes off his own bat. All things considered, specially as 2002 polls and subsequent proper constitutional government would depend on quick implementation, the SC might not restrain or countermand the CE in any particular. But there may remain the small problem of its credibility and hence its life span. What if people adjudge the changes self-serving and SC approval as being neither here nor there? Wouldn't it say aye? Such changes might not stick.

Convening the Parliament is a politically costly and time-consuming process. To begin with the Constitution would simultaneously become operative. That will require NA first electing its leader and PM who would proceed to form his government, with provinces following suit. Army will have to swallow not only presumably a PML or PML-led federal government but also a PPP government in Sindh. Governments elsewhere might also not look attractive to generals. On top of it, what if there is no two thirds vote available to Army's friends? And one has jumped one step of the process: the Senate has to be completed by the provincial Assemblies by electing new Senators to replace those whose terms has expired - before the Parliament can meet.

There are politicians, all close to generals, who are called the Like-Minded group of their respective party, who say that the generals are needlessly dithering. Restore the Assemblies, allow government formation, make your preference for the PM's slot widely known and give us some time. We will have a two-thirds vote for the desired amendments and the passage can be as swift as desired. These are, however, claims by interested parties. Not all the generals seem convinced that the Like-Minded can actually deliver full satisfaction. So the apparent dithering, if it is that.

Many earnest conservatives-Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and PPP bigwigs among them-say don't play with the Constitution. It is dangerous; it is a can of vicious worms. Don't you see all the regionalists will demand more autonomy for provinces that Strong Centre lovers will not agree to? Once this Pandora's box is sprung open, the religious Right will demand blanket Sharia enforcement, opening wide the road to true Talibanisation of Pakistan. JI and JUI say precisely this.

Where amendments to the constitution are concerned, there will be no end to people proposing their own ideas. Even this writer will propose: (a) voters of constituencies being organised, preferably through local governments to hear and compare candidates; (b) give them the right to recall a non-performing deputy they had elected; (c) let the election system be reorganised to combine the two systems of first-past-the-post and proportional representation or list system by dividing Assembly's seats into one half for filling through PR system of voting while the other half can comprise deputies elected from geographical constituencies as now; (d) the number of deputies in every Assembly be increased to have one member for every hundred thousand voters while an MPA should represent about 65,000 voters; and (e) separate electorates should be replaced with a common list of voters; and importantly, (f) state be bound to provide gainful employment to all adults, failing which a social security system be instituted; it will initially need Rs100 to 120 billion a year.

Among the plethora of ideas that will be agitated once the idea of amending the constitution is thrown into the ring of things being done, two are most likely: more provincial autonomy and secondly enforcing an uncodified Shariat. While the leitmotif of all politics has been the question of autonomy's quantum for provinces-the country fought a civil war and was dismembered because a province was not willing to let the Centre have the ultimate power. Somehow Centre lovers, mostly from Punjab or PPP members, feel unable to accept any further additions to provinces' power, functions and authority such as they enjoy under the '73's so-called Permanent Constitution. As Nawabzada foresees, Pakistanis might not get an agreed constitution again if this issue gets reopened.

As for enforcing Shariat, all that can be said is that hardliners' definition of it in Pakistan will be indistinguishable from Afghan Taliban's. The latter are orthodox Muslims in terms of what all JUI factions and their militias profess. JI would have no great difficulty in accepting JUI's version of the Shariat. But the country will be legally speaking governed under the same Shariah that holds sway in Afghanistan. Purists will quickly want to abolish the differences that might be initially seen. Democracy, as everyone knows, will be thrown out of the window. That will be resisted and may push the country into an unending civil strife.

The point is why should other interest groups not agitate for their viewpoint if the Army can do so for the sake of its power and privileges. As for the status of the 1973 constitution, it was grossly violated in 1977 and 1999; the whole system of governance was turned upside down. Then Gen Zia virtually prostituted it to get the 8th Amendment passed that did violence to its spirit and basic scheme. More of it is being proposed. That should embolden others to demand a new constitution-making body. After all, the original constitution on which most parties had agreed has never been in operation all these 28 years. Changing the constitution is a game that many can play.