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in peace Editorial shift "The
role of Mulla Omar is critical to the whole affair" "Pakistan can act as a conduit..." former director general, ISI By Shaiq Hussain The News on Sunday: For the first time ever, the United States has openly expressed its willingness to hold talks with the Taliban albeit those who are 'moderates'. Do you think there are any moderates or extremists in the ranks of Taliban, or is it only a myth? "No definite view regarding the
initiative" The News on Sunday: What are the prospects of success of the US-backed Karzai-Taliban talks? Tariq Fatemi: See, it’s not about a single effort. It will necessarily be a long-drawn-out process in which there will be hiccups, setbacks and some reversals. But once the process is begun we also have to see the extent to which the Saudis can involve themselves, the extent to which the other Gulf countries do that and the extent to which the Pakistani leadership is willing to play its part.
Afghanistan: the new strategy If Karzai isn’t allowed to negotiate with Mulla Omar, there is no use talking to others who don’t represent the Taliban or would be unable to take Taliban fighters off the battlefield By Rahimullah Yusufzai Re-elected Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently said
he was in a hurry in keeping with his election campaign promise to launch
the peace process in Afghanistan by establishing contact with the Taliban.
That he was serious about it became obvious when he highlighted the issue
at the international conference in London on January 28 and publicly urged
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to mediate between his government and the
Taliban. And within a week he flew to Riyadh to meet the King and
personally and officially request him to guide and assist the Afghan peace
process. So keen was Mr Karzai to seek the blessings of the Saudi King for the peace process that he took along a high-level delegation representing lawmakers, politicians from different ethnic backgrounds and ministers that looked like a jirga of Afghan elders. It was to show to the Saudi royal family that all Afghans who were part of the government and members of different factions in the partyless parliament were behind the peace initiative. It is, however, another matter that the visit also enabled the Karzai entourage as it happens in case of all Muslim leaders visiting Saudi Arabia to perform Umra at state expense. However, the Saudi government doesn’t seem to be in a hurry to commit itself to the peace process. A day before President Karzai’s arrival in the kingdom, a Saudi foreign ministry official reiterated the statement of the country’s foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal made at the London conference on Afghanistan. He said Saudi Arabia wanted the Taliban to dissociate from al-Qaeda and deny sanctuary to its leader Osama bin Laden before they could be invited to any peace talks. This tough precondition should effectively end all hopes at this stage about commencement of the Saudi-mediated peace dialogue between the Taliban and the Karzai government. Taliban would have no incentive to accept this condition and join the peace talks. In fact, their refusal to deliver bin Laden to the US and Saudi Arabia following the 9/11 attacks was the reason for America to invade Afghanistan in October 2001. If they didn’t accept such a condition at that time to try to save their rule and prevent US invasion of Afghanistan, they cannot hope to gain anything significant from the negotiations and that too with the beleaguered President Karzai. By joining a process involving the Karzai government, the Taliban would also be negating their long-held position that first the US-led foreign forces must withdraw from Afghanistan. It is possible the Saudis have put this impossible precondition to avoid getting involved in the messy Afghan conflict and peace process. They know from experience that the Afghan leaders, whether the mujahideen, Taliban or those now in power, aren’t always dependable. They would remember how all Afghan mujahideen leaders got together at the Haram Sharif in Makkah and made a pledge in the shadow of the Holy Ka’aba that they would not fight among themselves and work together to bring peace and enforce Sharia in Afghanistan. The pledge was forgotten when these mujahideen leaders returned to Pakistan. The Saudis have also bitter memories of the Taliban, whose government they had recognised along with Pakistan and the UAE despite worldwide opposition and yet Mulla Omar and his Taliban shura refused point-blank to hand over Saudi citizen, bin Laden, to them despite repeated requests. The Saudis, it may be recalled, generously assisted the Afghans throughout the past three decades and planeloads of Afghan mujahideen leaders and commanders used to be flown to Saudi Arabia all the time to perform Hajj and Umra as guests of the royal family. Unless the Saudis get involved in the peace process and no preconditions are set, there is little chance of any dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Saudi initiative last year to bring together officials of the Karzai government and some former Taliban leaders such as ex-foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, Maulvi Arsala Rahman, Abdul Hakim Mujahid and Abdul Salam Zaeef didn’t involve any representatives of the mainstream Taliban movement led by Mulla Omar. Even then it was highlighted in the media as start of some kind of Saudi-mediated Afghan peace process. It wasn’t and before long the effort was given up. There was no follow-up meeting because the Saudis realised the process had no chance of moving forward. The Taliban view has always been that President Karzai was powerless to make decisions and thus there was no use talking to him. It is a valid argument because even now the US and its Western allies don’t want any talks with Mulla Omar and other top Taliban leaders. If Karzai isn’t allowed to negotiate with Mulla Omar, there is no use talking to others who don’t represent the Taliban or would be unable to take Taliban fighters off the battlefield. In fact, the Taliban Leadership Council rather cleverly inserted three points in their long policy statement released at the end of the London conference. Though the Taliban didn’t describe the three points as their conditions for considering joining the peace process, one could refer to these demands as part of confidence-buildings measures needed to create trust before any talks could take place. One of the points was the Taliban demand that all prisoners should be released whether they are being held in Afghanistan, Pakistan or elsewhere. This obviously meant Taliban prisoners. The second demand was that instead of a few former Taliban, the names of all 144 of them under UN sanctions should be removed from the Security Council’s ‘blacklist’. The Taliban believe that this list was arbitrarily drawn up and there was no evidence that all those named in the list had tied to al-Qaeda. The UN sanctions committee recently removed the names of five former Taliban officials including Mutawakil from the list, but the Taliban Leadership Council termed this move as insufficient and meaningless as the men were no longer part of Taliban movement. The third point made by the Taliban was that the US and Nato shouldn’t be sending fresh troops to Afghanistan if they were keen to support any peace process. President Karzai cannot meet these three demands. Only the US could do so and the Taliban make this argument while defending their inflexible stance of not talking to the powerless Karzai. Their demands concern US and Nato, who in the Taliban view are the real parties to the Afghan conflict. However, the US and its allies cannot just withdraw from Afghanistan after having invested heavily in terms of lives and money and without ensuring that the country doesn’t become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda again. There is concern in the West that the Afghan government may collapse if their forces pull out of Afghanistan and the Taliban could again seize power and start enforcing their oppressive policies again. If this were to happen, the public opinion in the Western countries would be outraged as all the sacrifices of Nato soldiers and the huge funds sent by their governments to Afghanistan would have failed to ensure the stability and longevity of the Afghan government. It is a tricky situation as the Western public opinion is also opposed to long-term deployment of their soldiers in a dangerous place like Afghanistan. Due to lack of better options, it appears that the US and its Nato partners would focus on making a success of the military ‘surge’ now underway in Afghanistan and complement it with a civilian ‘surge’ in the hope of defeating or weakening the Taliban over the next 18 months and persuading the Pashtun tribes that they would be better-off if they sided with the Afghan government. Besides, President Karzai would be assisted with the $500 million reintegration fund to buy-off as many Taliban fighters as possible so that Mulla Omar and his hardliner shura is sidelined and weakened to such an extent that they agree to join the peace process. There is no guarantee that this renewed effort would succeed and most indications are that this may fail. However, there is no harm in making a try in absence of other viable options.
Regional tensions are far too many to allow regional diplomacy to work… By Farah Zia In his latest article 'A Deal with the Taliban?', noted
analyst Ahmed Rashid pre-empts the new reconciliation or reintegration
strategy of the Western powers that has now been formally articulated in
the London Conference. But he says some suggestions ought to be taken into
account before talking to the Taliban. The first among them is: a regional
approach to the problem. He writes, "Convince Afghanistan's
neighbours and other countries in the region to sign on to a
reconciliation strategy with the Taliban, to be led by the Afghan
government. Creating a regional strategy and consensus on Afghanistan was
one of the primary aims of the Obama administration; but little has been
achieved. From Iran to India, regional tensions are worse now than a year
ago." The London Conference was attended by about 70 countries, including all countries in the region with the exception of Iran. One reason cited by Iran for boycotting the conference was that it did not see the regional strategy being put to use. At the end of the conference, the list of promises did not include one about a regional solution. But, as Ahmed Rashid suggests, the regional tensions are far too many to allow regional diplomacy to work. To begin with, what constitutes region in the present context is itself debatable. For a country like Pakistan, it means Afghanistan's "immediate neighbours", which of course excludes India. For India, region means "immediate neighbourhood"; and it makes sense considering India's stakes in the country's reconstruction and development. There is every reason to believe that Pakistan's view of what constitutes region must have prevailed because the regional conference in Ankara, held a few days before the London Conference, excluded India and invited Afghanistan's immediate neighbours only. India has formally launched a complaint with Turkey on the issue. Organisers of the regional conference in Ankara may insist that this initiative had nothing to do with the London Conference but the findings of both conferences, including the need to negotiate with the Taliban, are drastically similar. As a matter of fact, the entire region is divided against itself as well as against the Western powers which in turn may be divided on Afghanistan. Like the two superpowers once did, these regional powers, be it Iran and Saudi Arabia or Pakistan and India, have been fighting their proxy wars in Afghanistan and apparently do not share the dividends of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. The eight year long war imposed by the coalition of the willing has only aggravated the situation. What exactly are the stakes of these regional powers and can these be accommodated in a regional strategy? Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the first two countries to recognise the first Taliban government in Afghanistan. Since 9/11 though, the Saudis have recognised the government in Kabul and have severed all links with the Taliban. However, when the Karzai government approached the Saudi government to "open a diplomatic a back channel with the Taliban", it readily accepted the opportunity. Also, it has been rightly pointed out, the Saudis are perfectly placed to hold regional negotiations because of the credibility they enjoy in the Muslim world. Beginning from home, Pakistan's case is problematic. Being an immediate neighbour and having done the famous U-turn on Taliban, it still has a mistrustful relationship with the Karzai government and both sides have engaged in a blame game - cross border interference - for long. Pakistan's security concerns regarding India are emphatically played out in Afghanistan, bringing alive the issue of Kashmir. Outsiders, no less the Afghans themselves, believe that Islamic militants are still seen as crucial strategic assets by Pakistan's military establishment to "block Indian influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir." Even if this view is misplaced, the links between the Taliban on both sides and the fact that Taliban control most of Afghanistan has put Pakistan in a position where it feels it has a bigger role to play regarding any possible solution. Recent survey results clearly show Afghan population as liking India's role many times better than Pakistan and India certainly has invested impressively in Afghanistan's reconstruction. But the ground realities or simply the war weariness of Western powers puts Pakistan in a better bargaining position. India has consistently maintained that this distinction between good and bad Taliban is untenable and has been an avid supporter of the Northern Alliance government. However, the emerging consensus in Afghanistan is contrary to India's position and it needs to revise its strategy. The other major power, Iran, may want to discuss security, drugs and refugees in the context of regional talks. The Chabahar route through Iran is said to be the most feasible route for transporting NATO supplies into Afghanistan. Actually, after 9/11, for some time, the interests of Iran and the United States converged in that both did not want Taliban to return to power in Afghanistan. But then President Bush counted Iran in the "axis of evil" and things changed. We don't know what Iran's position would have been if it had attended the London Conference. But it certainly is interested in stabilising Afghanistan because of its "proximity to the volatile areas of Afghanistan". The Western powers believe that because of Iran's influence with the non-Pashtun groups, it can create instability within Afghanistan. Within the region, the Saudis do not want to see Iran expand its role in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The erstwhile occupying power Russia does have security concerns in Afghanistan but its stakes are much lower compared to say China which has invested heavily in economic development, reconstruction and infrastructure. China is looking for a stable Afghanistan but, like Iran and Russia, it is wary of the continued US military presence in the region. As for the Central Asian States, they are reluctant to have formal trade with Kabul. Repressive regimes and poor populations have led to the growth of more Islamic militants in the areas bordering Afghanistan. An ideal regional solution should therefore take these areas into account. Without that, peace on either side is impossible. To conclude, one feels that a regional consensus on the need for negotiations with the Taliban is perhaps the first step which may lead to a more representative government in Afghanistan. The criticism, that talks with Taliban or militants as a strategy has not worked elsewhere, may be valid but it needs to be attempted in the context of Afghanistan before it can be declared as a failure. A more representative government than the present one will be best placed to resolve regional tensions and everything else.
Sifting the moderate Taliban from the hardliners While looking for candidates among the Taliban to become their partners in a peace and power-sharing dialogue, the Afghan government and its Western patrons often complain that they don’t know whom to talk to and where to find them. President Hamid Karzai once famously remarked that Taliban leader Mulla Mohammad Omar should tell him his address so that he could go there to meet him. He even offered to host Mulla Omar in Kabul and provide him the needed security. It is, however, another matter that Mr Karzai cannot guarantee his own security what to speak of someone like Mulla Omar, the most wanted man in the region after Osama bin Laden and his deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Taliban are part of a movement that was founded on the spur of the moment in the autumn of 1994 to take on the Afghan mujahideen who at that time had turned into brutal warlords and highway robbers despised by the common Afghans. As Taliban aren’t a political party, the need was felt to have one strong leader backed by a shura, or council, to keep unity in its ranks. Mulla Omar was given the title Amirul Momineen, or Commander of the Faithful, and all Taliban members were required to obey his orders. This has kept the Taliban movement intact and Mulla Omar its unassailable head. Apart from the Taliban, or students of madrassas who formed the nucleus of the movement, commanders and fighters from almost all Afghan mujahideen groups joined it as the Taliban captured one province after another and finally took Kabul in September 1996. Those joining the Taliban bandwagon brought their own thinking and existing factionalism into the Taliban movement, but the real Taliban from Mulla Omar’s inner circle continued to control its direction and monopolise the leadership. This is the Taliban hardcore and the hardliners in the movement. Mulla Omar is arguably the most hardliner in the Taliban movement and he has stacked the Leadership Council, the military council that organises the resistance to the US-led foreign forces in Afghanistan, with Taliban commanders loyal to him and ready to fight until the end. The late Mulla Dadullah, Akhtar Mohammad Usmani and Abdul Razzaq Nafiz, the three top Taliban military commanders, were also part of the more radical group. In fact, the existing members of the Leadership Council led by Mulla Abdul Ghani Biradar, Mulla Obaidullah, Mulla Akhtar Mohammad and Sirajuddin Haqqani too are hardliners. Military commanders as a rule are hardliners and right now they call the shots in the Taliban movement due to the fact that their fighting skills and sacrifices have enabled the Taliban to fight a far superior enemy and hold the US and its allies to a standstill in the battlefields of Afghanistan. It would be difficult to find moderates in the ranks of the Taliban. Anyone who dares to differ with Mulla Omar and challenges his Leadership Council would be classified as moderates or, in the words of the US officials, ‘reconcilables’. But such types of Taliban are few and far between. Those who defected from the Taliban ranks were killed or had to escape to places that are beyond Taliban control. The rest are all ‘irreconcilables’ who refuse to surrender arms or give up their fight against the US-led coalition forces. The former Taliban, now part of the Karzai government or living in Kabul under the protection of the Afghan authorities, are also loosely grouped under the label of moderate Taliban. Among them are former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil and the four others whose names were recently removed from the UN Security Council’s sanctions’ list. They include a current member of parliament Mohammad Musa Hotal, former Governor of Urozgan in the Karzai government Abdul Hakim Munib, Faiz Mohammad Faizan and Shams-us-Safa Aminzai. Through them and other former Taliban officials such as Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, etc the Karzai government wants to reach out to the mainstream Taliban led by Mulla Omar for a possible deal. Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador in Pakistan who was arrested in Islamabad and delivered to the US, is also seen as a likely contact-person for the Taliban. However, Taliban have made it clear that those no longer in their movement cannot represent them. In the circumstances, Taliban who resist foreign occupation and refuse to talk to the Karzai government could be broadly labeled as hardliner Taliban and ‘irreconcilable’. The ones willing to do business with the Afghan government and through it with the US-led coalition on the latter’s terms could be called moderates and ‘reconcilables’. — Rahimullah Yusufzai
The last Special Report we did on Afghanistan was also about a new strategy. That strategy was about the US troops surge in Afghanistan and how the US administration wanted to engage in a fight to the finish with the militants. There could not be any engagement with the Taliban till they severed all links with al-Qaeda and owed allegiance to the constitution of Afghanistan. On their part, the Taliban weren’t ready to negotiate either, not until the NATO-led forces left the Afghan soil. That wasn’t too long ago. Alongside, there were conflicting signals. There was talk about the exit strategy which indeed was finally given. As early as spring last year, the Saudis brokered talks between the Taliban and the Karzai government representatives. Between then and the London Conference, there were whispers about more such talks between the UN and US representatives and the Taliban. Of course, there has been the domestic political pressure in Western countries, protesting the growing casualties of soldiers. Meanwhile, the Taliban have continued to gain more territory and contained the Karzai-led dispensation to a mere 30 percent of the country. And then came the London Conference with a promise to negotiate with the moderate Taliban. Some called it reconciliation, others reintegration. Still others saw this new strategy as a paradigm shift — a paradigm shift at a time when the allied forces have seen a huge surge, a realisation about the need for negotiations when the enemy is at its strongest. Some suggest this is the best time to convince the Taliban to engage in a political process because they are so powerful. Others think the Taliban have adopted a new strategy — they want the military confrontation to end for some time and the occupying forces to leave so that they can strike back with renewed energy. The truth is that there is war weariness on both sides. The allied forces have been through it for eight long years. For Afghanistan, the war never stopped in the last 30 years. However, things will have to be brought to their logical and sane and peaceful conclusion. The US president while making the announcement that the US forces will start withdrawing in July 2011 has said "we will execute the transition responsibly, taking account of the conditions on the ground". This is easier said than done. The logistics defy this as realistically possible. The Afghan National Army remains hopelessly untrained. The only reasonable explanation that comes to mind is that the occupying forces have decided to change the conditions on the ground. The Afghans will certainly fare better if there is no enemy left to fight with, and hence the need to have a dialogue with the Taliban. Hopefully they have devised some strategy for the warlords as well. And hopefully the new strategy works to the advantage of all stakeholders.
No plan B Pakistan’s ability to convince the Taliban to a By Moeed Yusuf President Obama’s new Afghan policy and the
deliberations at the London Conference on Afghanistan have brought about a
paradigm shift in the thinking on the country’s future. The
international community is set to attempt engagement in talks with the
Afghan Taliban. This is the first time that Pakistani and Western — read US — objectives are aligned in the war in Afghanistan. For the past eight years, while both sides have claimed to be fighting a common enemy, at no point did they see eye to eye on who this ‘enemy’ was. Pakistan stuck to its strategic narrative; India, not the Taliban was the ultimate threat. By extension, a pliant Afghanistan that provided strategic depth was a necessity. For this, the Afghan Taliban was the most obvious partner to have in Kabul. The US never managed to address Pakistani insecurities vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan and thus failed to get full support in tackling the Afghan Taliban. The shift in America’s Afghanistan policy then represents a victory of sorts for those in the Pakistani security establishment who had advocated hedging on the Afghan Taliban precisely for this reason. Pakistan will soon be acting as a key interlocutor in the negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. What is more, the negotiations will take place with the Taliban in a position of strength. Indeed, those supportive of this view sense that they will win out in the negotiations stage as well. According to this line of thinking, the Taliban — though everyone realises that they would not have as free a hand as they did in the 90s given that Western interests would not completely subside this time round — will proceed to cater to Pakistani interests in terms of providing a friendly neighbour and eliminating Indian presence from Afghanistan. Also, their return to Afghanistan would ease international pressure on Pakistan. Further, with the Afghan Taliban in power, the Pakistani Taliban’s justification for its actions (we are targeting the Pakistani security forces to raise their costs of supporting the US) would be moot. It would therefore be easier to tackle their propaganda. This is the ideal scenario from Islamabad’s perspective. And it is certainly a possibility. But it is not the only one — not even the most realistic one in fact. Pakistan’s predicament becomes obvious when one realises that its preferred outcome is the only one that Islamabad has considered seriously. There has been no substantive debate on whether it is realistic to expect the Taliban to fall in line so easily. What if they do not? What is plan B? The fact is there is none. Pakistan has ignored warnings suggesting that the Taliban may no longer be willing to play ball in the same way they did before. Consider the complexity in what lies ahead for Pakistan. Islamabad not only needs the Taliban to agree to act as a friendly presence in Afghanistan but it also has to gain the Taliban’s acceptance for the minimal requirements for a deal with the international community – read US. These would at the very least include a guarantee that Afghanistan will not operate as an al-Qaeda sanctuary and that the Taliban will have to work within a broadly representative government. Pakistan’s success depends entirely on how the Taliban leadership reacts to these proposals. While a number of end-states are possible, let me point to three which will dent the optimism surrounding Pakistan’s traditional thinking considerably. To begin with, if Mullah Omar and Co.’s mindset has not evolved at all since they lost power, they will in all likelihood refuse to give into American demands regarding al-Qaeda or settle for a power sharing formula under the Karzai (or a similar) setup. Serious negotiations will be a nonstarter in this case and Pakistan would have failed in its role as an interlocutor. The world will grow increasingly frustrated with the status quo and will put greater pressure on Pakistan to deliver. Failing this, Pakistan’s limited utility in convincing the Taliban to an amenable solution would be exposed. Not to mention, active conflict in Afghanistan would linger. Another potential course could see the Taliban entering into negotiations and while asking for excessive concessions on all other counts, they would agree on the two principal Western demands: power sharing and a clean break from al-Qaeda. Among the list of concessions however will almost certainly be a lead role in the government in Afghanistan and a free hand to practice their ideology. This option would reflect a level of maturity on the Taliban’s part. But then again, too much maturity does not suit Pakistan either for this may nudge them to give a serious thought to options like diversifying their support base and clandestinely offering to maintain a relationship with countries like India, Iran, and Russia. Granted, the Taliban may not openly defy Pakistan’s India concerns. Yet, they could drag their feet or express their inability – they could blame their partners in the government for this – to force a total reversal of India’s role in their territory as a bargaining chip. India is likely to be interested in this option. Third, the hope that the Afghan Taliban’s return to Kabul will undermine the Pakistan’s Taliban’s rhetoric could well be misplaced. The Taliban leadership could use the negotiations as an opportunity to reestablish its formal presence in Afghanistan but once achieved, it could begin to look at Pakistan as a candidate for adopting the Taliban ideology. It could conceivably support the TTP, say financially or by harboring its members to pursue the Talibanisation agenda in Pakistan. Considering that although the Afghan Taliban has refrained from challenging the Pakistani state since 9/11, it has strengthened its organic links with the Pakistani Taliban despite Islamabad’s opposition. The Afghan Taliban leadership has previously even intervened to prevent infighting within TTP ranks. Not to mention, Mullah Omar expressed his desire to see Pakistan as a ‘truly Islamic state’ in a letter to the then Pakistani President Musharraf not too long ago. It is virtually impossible to predict which end state will win out. A number of conjectures have been floating around, but nothing more. The fact is that since the Afghan Taliban has been in hiding or on the run since 9/11, there is no objective information on how the group’s thinking has evolved over the past eight years. Is it still a group of dogmatic ideologues who do not believe in any compromise out of sync with their ideology? Or is the outfit now politically mature enough to grasp the importance of remaining within the system? Pakistan’s ability to convince the Taliban to a realistic compromise will be the litmus test of its post-9/11 Afghan policy. The next two years will tell whether Islamabad has gambled wisely or if it has been betting on the wrong horse all along. The writer serves as South Asia Advisor at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC
"The role of Mulla Omar is critical to the whole affair" — Ahmed Rashid, expert analyst on Taliban By Mazhar Khan Jadoon The News on Sunday: How would you analyse the purpose behind the London Conference as well as its outcome? Ahmed Rashid: I think the London Conference helped form
an international consensus on willingness to talk to the Afghan Taliban.
In the conference, 67 nations made a major commitment of money and troops
for civilians and military surge that will take place over the next 18
months. So, with a clear policy of fighting and talking laid down by the
US and Afghan governments, the Afghan problem can move towards resolution. TNS: Do you think a consensus is emerging within the United States and also among its allies about the need for holding talks with Taliban? AR: Yes, I believe there is a growing consensus about the need to talk to the Taliban commanders and fighters who are not ideologically aligned with the hardliners. There is a commitment to talk to the leadership of Taliban, but there is confusion as to who exactly to talk to. Within the US administration there are divisions among the State Department and the Defence Department — whether to talk to Mulla Omar or Jalaluddin Haqqani, or whether they should be talking to other people. There is no consensus on that yet. TNS: You have talked about the strategy of isolating the Taliban from al-Qaeda in your recent piece. What about the oath of loyalty to Mulla Omar? Has anything been decided about him, in the current policy? AR: Well, there is confusion in the West about talks with Mulla Omar. Karzai is very clear, though, about the latter being a part of the solution, but the US and the West are still reluctant, as they hold him responsible for the 9/11 attacks. But it is impossible to ignore Mulla Omar, since the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan have sworn allegiance to him. So the role of Mulla Omar is critical to the whole affair. TNS: You have also quoted Holbrooke as saying that 70 percent of Taliban fight for local reasons or money. Hence the US plans to give them material initiatives. Do you believe this as correct or are they motivated by their ideological commitments only? AR: I think the American and Nato assessment is exaggerated. I don’t know what the real figure is, but it is unlikely that there are 70 percent Taliban who will lay down their arms. But certainly, there is a large number of Taliban who are fighting for non-ideological reasons — for money or revenge, for joblessness, out of frustration et al. These Taliban could be won over through the right policy. TNS: Do you foresee regional tension growing in the days to come? AR: No. In fact, I think the London Conference has shown a unanimous view, and all the countries of the region have supported the idea of talking to the Taliban. Obviously, there is tension between Iran and United States and also between India and Pakistan, but the London Conference has addressed the issues for the region. I think this is the first time that India did not object talking to Taliban. TNS: Do you see the future scenario as benefiting Pakistan or not? Is there still a role left for the ISI to play regarding peace in Afghanistan, considering the army chief’s recent statement that the army is not looking for any strategic depth in Afghanistan? AR: Obviously, most of the Taliban leaders are based in Pakistan, and the Afghan government and foreign powers need Pakistan’s cooperation in order to have access to the Taliban leadership. I don’t see the talks as moving forward without the help of Pakistan. Despite what General Kiani has said, the Pakistan army and the ISI have put in place arrangements and prepared demands that could be related to the future position of Taliban in Afghanistan, Indian role in Afghanistan and the stability and security on the Pak-Afghan border.
"Pakistan can act as a conduit..." — Lt Gen (retd) Hamid Gul, former director general, ISI By Shaiq Hussain The News on Sunday: For the first time ever, the United
States has openly expressed its willingness to hold talks with the Taliban
albeit those who are 'moderates'. Do you think there are any moderates or
extremists in the ranks of Taliban, or is it only a myth? Hamid Gul: Taliban are of different kinds but they owe allegiance to Mulla Omar. Some are his followers in the strictest sense of the word, while others support him simply because of his cause. There are two basic pillars of Afghan struggle - faith and freedom - and these have been there since ages and considered a hallmark of the Afghan nation and of its struggle. TNS: Considering recent achievements made by the Taliban against the Nato forces on the battlefield, do you think they will agree on talks with the Karzai government which is backed by the US and its allies? HG: No, Karzai is a puppet and they [the Taliban] will not talk to him. The main players are the Americans and the Taliban. Karzai was imposed as a result of the Bonn dispensation and he has no roots in the people. So, it's politically sagacious not to talk to him. He can't even ensure his own protection and is constantly protected by the Americans. As for talks between Washington and the Taliban, they are possible but there are conditions which have been put forth clearly by the Taliban. These conditions are not stated now but they were given when the Taliban were at their weakest point. Their position now, one of strength, is that the Americans should withdraw from Afghanistan before any talks. Their attacking Afghanistan was unjustified as there was no evidence and still none against Osama bin Laden. TNS: What role can Pakistan play in the talks with the Taliban and what does the latest development mean for us? Secondly, how much of our policy was accommodated in the London Conference? HG: As far as Pakistan's role is concerned, it is very important and most relevant to Afghanistan's situation. There could be no peace talks without involving us. However, the present [Pakistan] government policy seems identical to that of Pervez Musharraf who allowed as many as 56,000 flights from Pakistani soil for attack on Taliban and al-Qaeda strongholds in Tora Bora. Since Musharraf, Pakistan has been an ally of the US. So, if the Taliban want to talk to us or through us, they would look at us as an ally of America but one who they cannot negotiate without. Pakistan can act as a conduit and not as a moderator. Pakistan has gained a lot from the London Conference by throwing the Indians out of the picture altogether. In London, nobody recognised India's position vis-à-vis the Afghan situation. India has invested $1.2 billion and now it finds itself in a limbo regarding how to be a part of the Afghan problem's solution. TNS: What do you make of the US's inclination for talks with the 'moderate' Taliban and its backing of the Karzai-Taliban negotiations? HG: Well, the real issue is that America is defeated. The defeat doesn't necessarily mean more casualties; it follows a certain sequence. First, there is disorientation: you are toeing a certain line but then you find it is going wrong. From this disorientation, dislocation ensues. Al-Qaeda's focus of attention has always been Palestine but they made the Americans commit themselves fully to Afghanistan till they were exhausted. Now al-Qaeda has shifted its focus to the Middle East, towards the horn of Africa, towards Yemen, and they are getting close to Israel. Hence, the Americans are disoriented, and they are also dislocated. The dislocation is followed by paralysis when you don't know what to do. What could the Americans do? Could they send forces to the Middle East? Their economy is in real bad shape and they can't afford to do so. In other words, it's a very tough situation for the US. TNS: What if Karzai's initiative to hold talks with the Taliban fails? What could be the prospects of a durable peace in Afghanistan? HG: If everybody takes their hands off Afghanistan, including even Pakistan, and leave the proud Afghans to their own, the problem [of Afghanistan] could be resolved. Afghanistan has a great future; it's a great nation that can sort out its problems on its own. That leaves no room for external interference. Despite years of infighting, the Afghans have never said they want to break apart or be divided.
"No definite view regarding the initiative" —Tariq Fatemi, former ambassador to the US The News on Sunday: What are the prospects of success of the US-backed Karzai-Taliban talks? Tariq Fatemi: See, it’s not about a single effort. It
will necessarily be a long-drawn-out process in which there will be
hiccups, setbacks and some reversals. But once the process is begun we
also have to see the extent to which the Saudis can involve themselves,
the extent to which the other Gulf countries do that and the extent to
which the Pakistani leadership is willing to play its part. To me, the very offer [of talks] conveys two messages: one, that the Americans and the British have now recognised that there is no domestic support in their own countries for remaining engaged in an open-ended conflict in Afghanistan. Secondly, that they are now shifting from a purely military strategy to one that is a skilful mix of political as well as military. That said, in my view, what is most important is that this initiative also has a domestic aspect which is to lessen the growing anger that can be seen in Europe and America among the people who strongly feel that the quicker this engagement is completed the better. TNS: With the Taliban putting forth tough preconditions for talks such as withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, can they be brought to the table for negotiations? TF: It remains to be seen as to what will be the Taliban’s attitude towards this offer of reconciliation and reintegration. The Taliban could feel that the Americans, Nato and the ISAF have failed to destroy them and so there is no need at all for them to go in for some kind of a compromise, especially since the Americans have already indicated that they wish to begin the process of withdrawal in July 2011. On the other hand, certain sections of Taliban may think that instead of continuing with the war if they can enter a political dispensation in Afghanistan at this point of time then they may be able to assert themselves once the foreign troops have left. Hence, it is going to be a very difficult decision depending on the extent to which the American-British plan reaches out to the Taliban. What will the attitude be, what kind of immunity will be provided, what kind of security guaranteed etc — these are the many things to ponder over. TNS: What role can Pakistan play in the talks with the Taliban and how much of Islamabad’s policy was accommodated in the London Conference? TF: I will not call it ‘accommodation’ but recognition, because the manner in which the London Conference was prepared, the meetings that were held in Istanbul and finally the role played by the Saudis, Pakistanis and others in ensuring that sufficient importance is accorded to political strategy are a recognition of the fact that Pakistan’s role is crucial both to the military and political strategies. It implies that there can be no success of the Americans without total participation and involvement of Pakistan. Likewise, there can be no reconciliation or restoration of peace in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s backing and support. The Conference also recognised that it is the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan that are vital rather than others such as India. TNS: Tell us something about the stakes of other regional powers like Iran, Russia and China. Do you see any role for them in talks with the Taliban and, in broader context, the restoration of peace in Afghanistan? TF: Iran is a very critical player and it has linguistic, ethnic, religious affiliations with powerful elements in Afghanistan. It has been close to Afghanistan, traditionally, for thousands of years and, therefore, it cannot and should not be ignored and its interests should not be sidelined. China, on the other end, is concerned about the growing Talibanisation of Afghanistan but at the same time it is not happy over the growing Nato involvement in the region. Russians, similarly, are concerned about the Islamic movements in the region but they also favour an end to the conflict in Afghanistan so that the Americans can be pushed out of the region and Russia can then play the role that it desires to in Central Asia which has been traditionally an area of its influence. India, of course, is a big and influential power. Its economy is doing very well — something which has led to a degree of arrogance and assertiveness that is evident in the manner it tries to push itself to become a critical player in Afghanistan. But India’s long-term interest is also in promoting reconciliation in Afghanistan. It is because a disturbed and turbulent Afghanistan will not be of any advantage to India or any other country. TNS: There is also a perception that any overt role of mediation by Pakistan could backfire for reasons such as deep mistrust among Afghan leaders, unpredictable reactions by Pakistani militants and possible Taliban resentment of pressure from its former backer, Islamabad. What is your take on this? TF: Pakistan will have to move very cautiously; it will have to consider the interests of all the groups in Afghanistan. It cannot be pushing an agenda that is harmful to the interests of any community. Pakistan will have to convince all the players that its interests are in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. It is going to be a big challenge for the Pakistani leadership, how they can urge the Taliban to enter into the reconciliation process and, at the same time, they do not upset or unsettle the other major power players. — Shaiq Hussain
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