Redeeming sovereignty
How much power do we enjoy over our decisions? Very little, to say the least
By Dr Noman Ahmed
The country has been thrown into the depths of anarchy in the aftermath of tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto. A tragic casualty in this state of affairs is the independence of policy and action of the nation. Internal issues are being contemplated after weighting the commandments emanating from our external peer groups. This trend is not new. A few weeks ago, the media aired adverse remarks of US President against twice former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Probably taking it as a binding precept, the controlling authorities eliminated the Sharifs from the electoral race. It appeared that before filing the papers, the politicians concerned did not fulfill the essential pre-requisite of satisfying the string master about their political objectives.

In the wake of the tragic and traumatic events of December 27, I write these words today not about the post-government "Mohtarma" Benazir Bhutto but about the pre-government Benazir, the vibrant young woman of the mid-1980s who returned to her country in April 1986 after several years of exile in London. That was a Benazir who did not then bear on her forehead any of the metaphoric marks of alleged corruption that would come to mar her image in later years after she became prime minister in December 1988, was dismissed from office on corruption charges by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in August 1990, became prime minister for the second time in September 1993 and was again ousted from office on corruption charges in November 1996 -- this time by President Farooq Leghari, a former long-time member of her own Pakistan People's Party and her own nominee for president.

There was a purity about the pre-government Benazir of the mid-1980s, a mystique that bedazzled even hardboiled members of the foreign press and had them hanging on her every word. I said as much once to British journalist Michael Fathers, the then-South Asian Affairs editor of The Independent, a new London-based newspaper, which, in 1988, only a year after it was launched, had won Britain's prestigious 'Newspaper of the Year' award. Talking to Fathers after a briefing for the foreign press given by Benazir at the Karachi residence of PPP member Pyar Ali Allana, a few days before the 1988 elections, I said, only half-jokingly, "The trouble with you foreign journalists is that you're all a little bit in love with her." "No," retorted Fathers, with a twinkle in his eye, "not a little bit, a lot."

When Benazir landed in Lahore on April 10, 1986, accompanied by several dozen members of the foreign press and party loyalists, she was greeted by a mammoth crowd estimated at close to three million. It was almost as if the whole city of Lahore and tens of thousands of people from other parts of the country had turned out to greet her. They weren't all PPP jiyalas either. Such was her crowd-pulling power that thousands of them were people who had never voted for the PPP. Indeed, many were people who had never voted for any party. Yet they, too, had turned out to greet a young woman who, in some mysterious way, represented the best hope for the country. After her father was hanged, she had spent years in jail and under house arrest during the days of the Ziaul Haq martial law regime, but had never compromised with the military dictator, never struck any backroom deals with the establishment. It was this factor, among others, that had brought millions of people on to the streets of Lahore to greet her.

It was probably the biggest gathering of people in history -- dwarfing even the crowd that had turned out in early 1966 to welcome then-Chinese President Liu Shao Chi when he visited Lahore a few months after the September 1965 war with India.

The crowd that greeted Benazir on that historic occasion in Lahore was so enthusiastic in its response, so charged with patriotic fervour, that she could probably have taken over the government that very day if she had wanted to.

Benazir boarded a truck -- and, no, it wasn't an armoured vehicle -- for the journey from the airport to the site of the Pakistan Minar on the other side of town, where she was due to address a political rally. Proceeding through a veritable sea of slogan-shouting people, her motorcade took more than 10 hours to reach the rally site. Her arrival there was greeted with a roar of approval that seemed to shake the very ground itself. Nothing like it had ever been seen in Lahore or in any other city anywhere for that matter.

During the course of her impassioned speech to the crowd, Benazir said at one point that she had come back to Pakistan to send a message to General Ziaul Haq that the days of his military rule were over and that the time had come for him to depart. Just then, as it so happened, a PIA plane that had taken off from the Lahore airport flew low over the crowd. Dramatically flinging up an arm, Benazir pointed to the plane and shouted (in Urdu), "There he goes!" The crowd roared with delight. It was a magical moment.

Benazir Bhutto's assassination has been widely condemned by world leaders and Pakistanis alike and has plunged the nation into grief. A charismatic personality and a consummate politician, she was a familiar figure on the international scene and was much in demand as a speaker on the lecture circuit in America and other Western countries. There was an aura about her that transcended national borders and made her a much admired person around the world -- notwithstanding the allegations of corruption that continued to be levelled against her throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium.

But it is a very different Benazir I remember from the mid-1980s. Back then she was a much more human Benazir, a much more accessible Benazir, someone one felt one could talk to and even sometimes offer gratuitous advice.

In those days she was the epitome of opposition to the government establishment, the focus of the hopes of millions of poor Pakistanis who saw her as an almost mythical figure who gave voice to their aspirations and would stand by them through thick and thin. She really was the nation's "sister" in those days -- even for those of us, like me, that were never members of the PPP or any other political party.

When she arrived in Karachi in early May 1986, after a three-week swing through other parts of the country, the city's inhabitants -- young and old alike -- turned out in force to welcome her. The road from the airport into town was packed with people, with crowds lining the route and many people standing on the rooftops of buildings along the way to catch a glimpse of her. As in Lahore, she rode in a non-armoured truck and there was no security surrounding her. There was not a gun in sight. The whole atmosphere in the city was festive, as if it were some joyous national holiday. There was no police in evidence anywhere, and people were greeting each other with smiles and flashing 'V for Victory' signs. Every few minutes, along Sharah-e-Faisal, the cry would go up: "She's here! She's here!" But even when the cry turned out to be a false alarm and the crowd learned that her motorcade was still some distance away, nobody seemed to mind.

It was late in the evening by the time her motorcade got to the Nursery area on Shahrah-e-Faisal and those of us who were perched on the roofs of nearby buildings saw her standing on top of the truck, wearing a cap in the PPP's colours and waving to the crowd. She looked like something out of a fairy tale, and impossibly young to assume the mantle of the country's leader.

I described the whole scene in an article I wrote for a Karachi evening newspaper the next day, The article's title was A perfect day for Benazir. She must have read the article, because, a few days later, I received an invitation to meet her at 70 Clifton, her late father's house, where she lived in the days before her marriage to Asif Ali Zardari. When I got to the house, I found it crowded with her friends, party members and journalists. I stood in one of the reception rooms feeling a little lost and -- I have to confess -- more than a little nervous and intimidated. But suddenly, the crowd in the room parted and there she was -- a tall, graceful lady, with a welcoming smile on her face. She greeted me warmly, saying: "That was a wonderful article you wrote." "Thank you," I stuttered. Then stuttered some more.

That was the beginning of an acquaintanceship that led, over the course of the next few years, to many more meetings and many more invitations to 70 Clifton. I interviewed her several times for a Karachi evening newspaper. One particular interview in late 1986 was unique in the sense that I got to ask only one question. My question was: "Is the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) dead?" "The MRD is not dead," Benazir began and went on to spell out her point of view on the subject. Her reply filled the whole cassette on my tape-recorder. The sentences were all perfectly constructed, so much so that I could almost hear the punctuation marks in her voice.

After I transcribed the tape, her reply to my solitary question filled the whole page of the newspaper. I thought that that would look a bit odd to readers, so I interspersed her reply with a few additional questions which, in fact, I had never asked.

One evening, at 70 Clifton, in late 1986, she invited a few of us, including a couple of other journalists, to have a cup of tea with her. Halfway through the evening, we began to grill her about her party's plans for the nation. "What about this?" we said. "What about that?" -- and so on and so forth. She listened to our questions for a while, then turned around and said: "Look guys, I don't have all the answers. You've got to help me."

It was a charming and endearingly human response, one which completely bowled us over. At that moment, if she had asked us to jump into a well to help the nation's cause, I suspect most of us would have probably obliged. That was the kind of effect she had on people in those days -- an effect partly explained, I think, by the fact that although she was from a very privileged background and had grown up in the days when her father was the country's foreign minister and later its prime minister, she herself was without blemish, without taint. Having never been in government, and having never been exposed to the machinations of the Islamabad bureaucracy, there was no whiff of wrongdoing about her in those days. Indeed, she had a kind of aura of purity, a sort of fairy tale quality -- the same sort of fairy tale quality that Princess Diana had during the early days of her marriage to Prince Charles.

In August 1986, the government arrested Benazir and locked her up in Karachi's Landhi Jail. When she was released some weeks later, I wrote a poem which was published in the same evening newspaper that had published my first article about Benazir. The poem was titled For Benazir Bhutto on her Release from Landhi Jail. It's first line read: "You run our risks for us..."

She told me a few days later that she had read the poem and that it had made her cry. She told me she had cut out the poem and pasted it on the wall in her house.

Sentiment aside, however, that is exactly what Benazir Bhutto did on more than one occasion during her political career: she fearlessly ran our risks for us.

On December 27, 2007, at Liaquatbagh in Rawalpindi -- the very place where Pakistan's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was shot dead by a hired assassin on October 16, 1951 -- Benazir ended up running one risk too many.

In a speech in the National Assembly back in 1988, after Benazir Bhutto had been sworn in as prime minister, she quoted the following lines from Robert Frost's famous poem Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening: "The woods are lovely dark and deep, / But I have promises to keep, / And miles to go before I sleep, / And miles to go before I sleep."

She sleeps now, and may she sleep in peace. After one death, there is no other.

I first met Abrar Kazi during a five-day consultation on Kalabagh Dam in Lahore, back in 1998. The way he argued the Sindh case on this occasion was impressive to say the least. In fact, he was so impressive that by that end of the event even participants from different parts of Punjab had to agree that the dam, however important it may be for the country's survival, should only be built after consensus among all the four provinces.

That was almost a decade ago. Since then, Abrar Kazi has expanded the scope of his study manifold and has come up with even more solid and convincing arguments -- in the form of books, research papers and articles, as well as from the platform of Sindh Democratic Party (SDP) -- to prove his case against Kalabagh Dam. To say that he sounds reason in whatever he says would be an understatement of the highest order.

To add to this is his humble disposition. Abrar Kazi comes across as a thorough gentleman, who not only respects difference of opinion but also wants to build bridges cutting across all divides, especially ethnic. These factors have helped him earn a respectable name among his fellow Sindhis, but he also wants the people of Punjab to understand and accommodate the viewpoint of other provinces.

Not only is Abrar Kazi's integrity unchallengeable, but he also possesses a beautiful heart. Despite his tough stance on Kalabagh Dam and all his bitterness for the Punjabi-dominated establishment, when I told him that I wanted to interview him as I respected his views, I could see tears rolling down his eyes. The event was Tenth Sustainable Development Conference, hosted in the second week of December by Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad. Excerpts of the interview taken on this occasion by The News on Sunday follow:

The News on Sunday: Would you like to tell us something about your early background?

Abrar Kazi: I was born on February 25, 1942, in the Garhi Yaseen taluka, which was a part of the Sukkur district at that time but is now a part of the Shikarpur district. My father was a civil servant and we were always on the move. Whenever he was posted to a new city, I had to take admission in a new school. I got my college education in Hyderabad, from where I did my BSc. After that, I studied aviation and got a job with Pakistan International Airlines (PIA). Later, I went to Jordan for about a decade in connection with a job. I finally returned to Pakistan and settled down in Hyderabad in late 1986.

TNS: How did you become an expert on water issues then?

AK: It is true that water has never my area of formal education. Whatever expertise I have acquired is an outcome of extensive reading on the subject. Hyderabad was a stronghold of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) when I returned to the city back in 1986 and ethnic riots were at their peak. This situation inspired me to wage a struggle for the rights of my fellow Sindhis, by taking part in social and political activities. As water was and still is a major issue of the Sindhis, I dedicated myself to doing research on this subject.

TNS: Were you never a part of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)?

AK: No. I came much later, in 1986, and was never formally associated with the MRD.

TNS: Can you share details of your published works on the water issue?

AK: Besides my book, entitled Kalabagh Dam: The Sindh Case, I have contributed numerous of articles on the water issue in Sindhi and English newspapers and journals. I also contributed a research paper for a Ford Foundation book, entitled Haunting Shadows of Human Insecurity, published in 2006. My paper deals mainly with the water dispute between Pakistan and India, but also discusses the latter's inter-provincial water disputes.

TNS: Is the application of international water laws different at different levels -- for instance, between India and Pakistan, and between Punjab and Sindh? For example, when Pakistan becomes a lower riparian in water sharing with India, it objects to all the latter's plans for not being consulted first, citing international water laws. However, when Sindh claims its rights as a lower riparian in its water disputes with Punjab, the same are ignored. Can you throw some light on this?

AK: The greatest water disputes have been settled by the United States Supreme Court, which has handed down some excellent judgments over the years in many cases pertaining to the use of water. Though these cases were fought between different states of the US, they related to the use of common rivers. Thus the parameters were set and the international law pertaining to the use of common rivers has evolved accordingly over the years. This law applies to common rivers, whether they are used by two countries or by two provinces or states within the same country.

In short, the law does not make any distinction between the two. And this is the way it should be, both morally and legally. How these laws are applied -- especially in a country like Pakistan, where even the Constitution is held in abeyance after every few years on one pretext or the other -- is another thing. In simple words, Pakistan's position in its water disputes with India is exactly the same as is of Sindh in its water disputes with Punjab. The laws are clear, but we have to do away with jugglery of words to implement them.

TNS: Can you tell us something more about the water laws?

AK: Basically, three are three major laws related to the water issue. One of them has been derived out of the British common law. It states that if a stream of flowing water is being used by people for personal use (not agricultural use), they have complete freedom to use it as much as they want. The second major law is that the upper riparian will always seek consent of the lower riparian before initiating any such project over the common rivers that may adversely affect the latter. This law ensures equitable distribution of water in future once the project has been completed. It has been derived from the Government of India Act, 1935, with relevant clauses in turn derived from the Canal and Drainage Act, 1871, which clearly states that consent of both the parties is required to initiate a new project over common rivers.

The third law, which is especially important in Pakistan's context, states that the existing projects on a stream will always have preference in terms of allocation of water over the ones that are built later. Let me share the example of Sindh here! Sukkur Barrage was built in 1932, Kotri Barrage in 1954 and Guddu Barrage -- which is located above Sukkur Barrage -- in 1967. However, when water is released to Sindh, allocation of Sukkur Barrage should be met first though Guddu Barrage comes before it. Only after ensuring that the needs of Sukkur Barrage have been met, as it was the first one to be built, water should be released to Kotri Barrage. Similarly only after ensuring that the needs of Kotri Barrage have been met, water should be released to Guddu Barrage.

The reason for this is simple: the barrages which were built before others already had users when new barrages were constructed on the same stream of water. The logic is that existing users cannot be deprived of their right to water to accommodate new users. This is simple common sense, but it continues to generate a lot of controversy in Pakistan. A number of barrages in Punjab -- Chashma, Jhelum, Taunsa to name a few -- were built after the ones in Sindh, but the dominant province allocates water to them without any regard for the older barrages and their users. All this is against the law.

TNS: Does Sindh itself follow this law?

AK: No. Even within Sindh, Guddu Barrage does not release water for the users of Sukkur Barrage without first ensuring that the needs of its own users have been met. In fact, the irrigation system in the province is a complete mess due to rampant corruption. Any release of water through canals should be advertised beforehand, so that the users can make the best use. But this is not the case in Sindh, as the irrigation department's officials accept bribes to divert water to the lands of the influential people.

TNS: Why is the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) so obsessed with Kalabagh Dam, despite global opposition to large dams?

AK: The reason why WAPDA insists on Kalabagh Dam to the exclusion of everything else is simple and it is because of this reason that feasibility studies of new dams are not being conducted: no province other than Punjab accrues any economic benefits. Foreign investors were willing to explore coal in Thar, which would have generated an additional 1,000 megawatts of electricity for the country, but the project was shelved to deprive Sindh of its due revenue and of 300,000 jobs for its people.

Despite availability of foreign investment, the Thar coal project was stopped by Mian Nawaz Sharif during his second tenure as prime minister, only in order to ensure that the excuse to build Kalabagh Dam remains. This is the biggest grievance of the people of Sindh. The decision to shelve this project was against the interests of all Pakistanis, not only of the people of Sindh alone. In short, Wapda nurtures a grudge against the Sindhis and does not want the centre of gravity to be shifted from Punjab to any other province.

Even while Benazir Bhutto was alive, political pundits considered Asif Zardari her biggest liability. In death she has become an icon, but Zardari, having taken over the leadership of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), is quickly becoming public enemy number one. The intelligentsia has expressed dismay at the succession principle that has seen 19-year old Bilawal thrust into role of party leader alongside his father. 'Feudalism' -- long the whipping boy of Pakistan's urban elite -- apparently explains the lack of 'internal democracy' within the party.

It is true that the PPP is, for all intents and purposes, a cult. Arguably only in the couple of years after it came into being and before it took over the reins of government did the party actually have an identity and politics that did not revolve completely around the Bhutto name. Ever since, and particularly after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution in 1979, and despite the presence of committed democrats (even radicals perhaps?) in the leadership of the party, it has functioned very much like a cult.

But cults are not necessarily always associated with 'feudal' societies. Osama bin Laden arguably enjoys cult-like status, as does Sachin Tendulkar in India. For too long Pakistani intellectuals and haughty urbanites, who perceive themselves to be progressive in their thinking, have attributed the majority of Pakistan's problems to 'feudalism'. Many such people have very limited exposure to rural life and base their convictions on popular depictions in TV serials or perhaps drawing-room stories told by others like them.

It would be foolish to deny that large parts of Pakistan remain subject to the often arbitrary power of rural notables that have typically derived their authority from their control over land. By the same token, however, it would be foolish to assume that landed power remains as entrenched as it was, say, 60 years ago when Pakistan was created. Things have changed; urbanisation and attendant migrations have changed the social landscape and, with it, eroded some of the power of the rural landed class.

Yet rural notables are still power brokers, or, according to the experts, 'feudalism' persists. Over the past couple of years, a variant of 'feudalism', namely the Baloch sardari system, has also been the subject of intense vitriol as the state has argued that its military incursions into the province are designed to loosen the retrogressive grip of sardars over their hapless people. More generally, 'feudals' are said to be opponents of 'development', because social and economic modernisation ostensibly weakens them.

But what has been proven in Pakistan over the past 60 years is that tremendous socio-economic upheavals have not eliminated landed power by any means. To explain this apparent paradox, it is necessary to invoke the state. Even before the creation of Pakistan the state in what became the Pakistan areas insulated landed notables from the adverse effects of capitalist modernisation, because the political order that the British fashioned was based on landed notables playing the role of intermediary between the state and people.

Over the past 60 years, a similar pattern has persisted because the state remains as unrepresentative and extractive as it was during the colonial period. The state has been dependent on political clients to help it maintain an oligarchic dispensation and in rural areas, the natural choice has been the landed class. As new classes have emerged in the wake of modernisation they have started to compete with the landed class, but the historical accommodation of the latter with the local administration -- in particular, the thana and katcheri -- has ensured that it continues to play the intermediary role most effectively.

In effect then, if 'feudalism' persists, it does so because the state has kept it afloat. Rather than call it feudalism however, it would be much more helpful to understand power relations in rural areas as part of a nationwide political system in which neither constitutionalism nor the principle of popular sovereignty have ever been allowed to take root. In other words, the dominance of administrative institutions -- whether behind the scenes or in the form of direct military rule -- has ensured the reproduction of power relations at the local level.

The cult of the Bhutto clan will give way only if a cycle of uninterrupted elections take place in Pakistan and, more generally, if the state becomes more representative rather than remaining the guarantor of an oligarchic dispensation. Let us not forget that the Awami National Party (ANP) is also cult-like in its leadership patterns (Ghaffar Khan-Wali Khan-Asfandyar Wali), as is the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Mufti Mahmood-Fazlur Rahman) and the majority of other political parties in the country. It is far too simplistic to put the blame for this state of affairs on 'feudalism'.

For the time being, those who purport to be committed to democracy need to recognise that heaping criticism on Zardari or Bilawal or anyone else is an entirely counter-productive exercise. For better or worse, particularly after the assassination of Benazir, the PPP is the most popular party in this country regardless of what one thinks about its leadership. If and when the party comes to power, it will already be up against its leadership because on the one hand the military cannot be expected to give up its claims to being the arbiter in Pakistani politics, while on the other Washington will expect adherence to its imperial ambitions.

It may be argued that this impending dilemma is of the PPP's own making. Indeed, all mainstream parties in this country, at least as they are currently constituted, are part of the oligarchic dispensation. The PPP is not a revolutionary party and should not be counted upon to make a clean break with the status quo, as much as one would hope that it would after losing yet another Bhutto to unnatural death. It is indeed a great tragedy that the conditions are ripe for a genuine transformation in the structures of power in this country, but that there is no political party to spearhead such a transformation.

But if one is able to recognise the problem, it is imperative to understand that for there to be any chance that the democratic process takes root, political parties should not be made into the villain even before they are in power. If and when a viable political alternative does come to the fore, things may be different. But for the time being, the goal of ending the military's monopoly over state affairs demands an end to superficial attacks on the PPP or any other party for being 'feudal' because such attacks hurt more than they help.

The performance of the economy in 2007 was essentially the same as in preceding years: robust gross domestic product (GDP) growth, low level of savings and investment, increase in foreign investment and workers' remittances, widening current account and fiscal deficits, and high inflation rate. Human development indicators continue to be an area of serious concern with the country's related ranking falling further in the last year.

Growth, savings and investment

In the fiscal year 2006-2007, the economy grew at seven per cent thus continuing the growth momentum of the preceding three years. The services sector grew by eight per cent, while the commodity-producing sector grew at six per cent. Within the commodity-producing sector, the agricultural sector grew at five per cent, while the industrial sector at 6.8 per cent. The manufacturing sector grew at 8.4 per cent, while the mining and construction sectors grew at 5.6 and 17.2 per cent respectively. Whereas the growth in the services and agricultural sectors was above the target (7.1 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively), the manufacturing sector grew below the target of 11 per cent.

As the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) noted in its Annual Report for 2006-07, the economic growth, though healthy, was not broad-based. The growth in the services sector was contributed mainly by the financial sub-sector, which grew at 18.2 per cent. Similarly, the industrial sector's growth can mainly be attributed to 17.2 per cent growth of the construction sector. Moreover, the growth in agriculture was mainly a result of 7.6 per cent growth of major crops.

Another area of concern was the continuing low level of savings and investment. National savings-GDP ratio was 18 per cent, while investment-GDP ratio was 23 per cent. These savings-GDP and investment-GDP ratios included $5.49 billion workers' remittances from abroad and $5.12 billion foreign direct investment (FDI), respectively. The key to sustaining the current high growth rate is to increase the level of savings and investment.

Investment has a two-fold role in the economy. In the short-run, investment affects aggregate demand and thus output and employment. In the long-run, it affects GDP growth. A country's rate of growth depends largely on how much it sacrifices present consumption to provide for production of capital goods. That is why savings and investment are called the engine of growth. The principal determinant of both savings and investment is the real per capita income, which, as we shall see later, does not present a rosy picture in Pakistan's case.

Foreign trade and foreign investment

In 2006-07, the current account deficit reached the highest-ever level of $7.09 billion. This surge can be attributed mainly to the trade deficit, which increased from $1.20 billion in 2003-04 to $13.40 billion in 2006-07. In July-November 2007, the trade deficit reached $7.22 billion, compared with $5.44 billion in the corresponding period in 2006-07. To narrow the trade deficit, a country needs to either bring down imports or push up exports. Reducing imports is not without problems.

Firstly, a growing economy deficient in indigenous resources needs foreign capital goods and raw materials to sustain growth. Hence, reduction in import of industrial or capital goods will weaken the economy's growth momentum. Secondly, in a country like Pakistan -- where customs duties are a major source of public revenue -- cut in imports badly affects public finance. Thirdly, import restriction, which is done largely by increasing applied tariffs increments the cost of doing business and reduces export competitiveness.

The other option -- export promotion -- is easier said than done. The most important factor governing a country's export performance is the supply side constraints. Pakistan has a narrow export base, and is mainly an exporter of primary and low technology products. The industrial and export constraints of Pakistan are brought out by its low ranking -- 91 in 2005 and 94 in 2006, out of 125 countries -- on the global competitiveness index. Undoubtedly, on the demand side, effective marketing and preferential market access are important for any substantial increase in exports. But without overcoming supply side constraints, they cannot be of much use.

A country's current account deficit is financed by inflow of capital from outside, of which the most credible source is FDI. The growth of FDI in Pakistan has been quite remarkable, increasing from $949 million in 2003-04 to $5.12 billion in 2006-07. In July-October 2007, the FDI inflows were registered at $1.23 billion, representing an increase of nearly four per cent over the corresponding period in 2006-07. The composition of FDI inflows, however, remains a matter of concern, as they are concentrated in two sectors: the communication sector (37 per cent) and the financial sector (18 per cent of FDI inflows). On the contrary, the manufacturing sector has received meager FDI. For instance, the all-important textile sector accounts for only 1.15 per cent of the total FDI inflows.

Fiscal deficit

Fiscal policy is the principal tool available to the government for aggregate demand management. The government, in order to push up the aggregate demand and thus raise employment level, has been pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy for quite some time. The fact that the unemployment rate has stayed around 7-8 per cent for last few years despite high GDP growth shows that the fiscal policy has not borne fruit. Expansionary fiscal policy in itself is not a problem. As is the case with most other developing countries, where the private sector is not that dynamic, the public sector in Pakistan has to play a major role in stimulating the aggregate demand and thus creating job opportunities.

However, the expansionary fiscal policy poses problems when public revenue remains stagnant, as in the case of Pakistan. In the last five years, public revenue-GDP ratio has remained stagnant at around 14 per cent. To finance the budget deficit, the government resorts to borrowing from the SBP. This means printing more money and thus adding to the already high inflationary pressures. While it will not be advisable for the government to cut public expenditure, it has to increase its revenue. This entails broadening the tax base and improving the tax collection system.

Inflation

Inflation remains a fundamental macro-economic problem. In 2006-07, inflation was 8.5 per cent, which rose to nine per cent in July-November 2007. Inflation begets many problems. One major problem is that it brings down real incomes of the people and thus discourages both savings and investment. Inflation, if grown out of bounds, wrecks the monetary system by bringing the value of the currency to naught. Inflation also diverts economic resources to speculative or non-productive activities, such as investment in real estate.

By increasing the prices of inputs, inflation pushes up the cost of production and thus increases the final price of exportable goods, making exports less competitive in the international market. However, what makes inflation a real problem is that the efforts to contain it generally end up lowering output and employment level in the economy. This is because in its attempts to check inflation, the government slows the pace of economy by pursuing either a tight monetary or fiscal policy, or both. This trade-off between inflation and unemployment makes disinflation a real challenge for the policy makers.

Social indicators

Human capital development is necessary for sustaining the momentum of economic growth. Poverty, sickness and illiteracy reduce people's productivity and thus their capability of making contribution as economic agents. Human capital development is still to form an important component of the government's growth strategy, which focusses on a trickle down -- rather than a trickle up -- approach. This is evident from the low budgetary allocation for the sectors of health and education, which collectively is well below three per cent of the GDP. Hence, Pakistan's ranking on human development index remains low, falling from 134 in 2006 to 136 in 2007 (UNDP Human Development Report 2007-2008).

Though per capita income in Pakistan has, according to official statistics, risen to $925, the increase is nominal thanks to the high inflation rate. Besides, per capita income does not tell us about income disparities. A country may have a high per capita income, but at the same time may also have gross income inequalities. Pakistan is one such country where increase in per capita income has been accompanied by increase in income inequalities. This is corroborated by the SBP annual report, according to which Gini Coefficient -- a measurement of income disparities -- has increased to 0.29 from the last fiscal year's 0.27.

Conclusion

The challenge for the government in 2008 is to maintain the high growth rate, and increase the level of savings, investment and employment -- while at the same time containing inflation, and current account and budget deficits. However, without improved governance, and strong and responsible political institutions, it is not possible meet these challenges. Whether it is attracting FDI, raising the level of domestic savings and investment, increasing the per capita income or developing the human capital, a transparent, predictable and stable political regime is necessary.

The financial managers and tax collectors have persistently failed to overcome fiscal deficit and remove fiscal imbalances, as their policies are based on collecting taxes at source and without bringing the mighty sections of society within the tax ambit. They are interested in number game and are bent upon collecting taxes where the are not due: there is a direct link between growing poverty in Pakistan and distortion in tax base since 1991, when major tax burden was shifted on consumers by introducing presumptive taxes in the income tax law.

The lack of judicious balance between direct and indirect taxes, levy of regressive taxes in the garb of income tax, petroleum development surcharge, etc, have pushed an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis below the poverty line. The sole stress on indirect taxation (even under the garb of income taxation through presumptive tax regime on number of transactions) without evaluating its impact on the economy and the life of poor masses is a serious cause for concern.

According to official figures, the contribution of income tax (though major portion of it is now composed of indirect levies or expenditure taxes) as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) is continuously declining -- it was merely 2.8 per cent in 2006-07, 2.9 per cent in 2005-06, 3.0 per cent in 2004-05, 3.01 per cent in 2003-2004 and 3.15 in 2002-2003 (CBR Year Books 2003-04 to 2005-06 and Economic Survey 2006-07).

According to a budgetary document titled Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts 2007-2008, of the collection of direct taxes of Rs 329.7 billion (as per the latest figures released by the Federal Board of Revenue -- FBR) in the fiscal year 2006-2007, the share of various taxes is as follows: Income Tax (312.0 billion), Workers' Welfare Fund (1.50 billion), Workers' Participation Fund (6.50 billion), Foreign Travel Tax (2.619 billion) and Capital Value Tax (5.0 billion). It is strange to note that Foreign Travel Tax has been shown as a direct tax.

In reality, only income tax of Rs 220.0 billion (not 312.0 million, as officially claimed) was the total share of direct taxes in the total tax collection of Rs 841.4 billion. Taxes collected at source on goods and services, contracts, supplies, rent, etc, which being full and final discharge are in substance indirect levies, if subtracted from income tax collection, the actual figure comes to Rs 220 billion. Thus the share of income tax as a percentage of the total revenue is not more than 26 per cent, whereas the same is claimed to be 31.7 per cent at page 68 of Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006-2007. This exposes the so-called authenticity and reliability of official figures.

The reliance on indirect taxes, which constitute about 70 per cent of the total tax collection, proves beyond any doubt that the tax system is directly contributing to rising poverty, as people who possess enormous income and wealth are not been subjected to income taxation in Pakistan (wealth tax was abolished as a condition for joining of a person as our finance minister!). Thus the very purpose of redistribution of wealth as the main object of taxation is being defeated. It is pertinent to mention that in 2006 Sweden collected taxes at 50 per cent of the GDP, a rate almost twice as high as that of the United States and Japan. In most countries of Europe, tax revenue, on an average, makes 40 per cent of the GDP. In comparison, Pakistan collected taxes at only 9.5 per cent of the GDP in 2006-07.

Out of total collection of Rs 841.4 billion by the FBR in 2006-07, regressive taxes were to the tune of Rs 620 billion (after making adjustment of indirect taxes collected under the head of income tax!). This has distorted the economy, raised the cost of doing business, widened the gulf between the rich and the poor, and made the national industry non-competitive. The revenue deficit, despite this collection of Rs 841.4 billion, is monstrously high at Rs 200.5 billion and the fiscal deficit at Rs 373.5 billion.

Despite this, the chairperson of the Central Board of Revenue (now FBR) claimed that the share of direct taxes sharply increased to 39 percent in 2006-07 against 30 percent in 2005-06. This is gross misrepresentation of data. If presumptive taxes on goods and services camouflaged as income tax are excluded from the collection of direct taxes, the share of indirect taxes touches 70 per cent. It is pertinent to mention that the average share of direct taxes for high-income countries is 46 per cent, while in the low-income countries it is 28 per cent. In 2006, Iran and India posted direct tax shares of 40 per cent and 29 per cent respectively, as compared with 31.7 per cent (in reality, 26 per cent) by Pakistan.

The present tax policies of the government are detrimental for economy, social justice, business and industry. Those who possess more economic power (income and wealth) should contribute more to the public exchequer. The ability-to-pay principle is regarded as the most equitable and just method of taxation. It is emphasised primarily for its re-distributive role. In Pakistan, the rulers have completely deviated from this principle, which is, in fact, their constitutional obligation. The existing tax system protects the establishment and exploitative elements that have monopoly over economic resources. There is apparently no political will to tax the privileged classes.

The common people are subjected to General Sales Tax (GST) of 15 per cent plus one per cent Federal Excise (tax incidence is 42 per cent on finished imported goods after applicable customs duty, sales tax, federal excise, mandatory value addition and income tax) on essential commodities (even salt sold under brand names is subjected to 15 per cent GST), but the mighty sections of society -- like big industrialists, feudal lords, generals and bureaucrats -- are paying no wealth tax / income tax on their colossal assets / incomes. It is tragic that in a country where billions of rupees are being made in speculative transactions in real estate and shares, tax-to-GDP ratio is pathetically low (just 9.5 per cent in 2006-07) and the government is least bothered to tax undocumented economy and benami (name-lender) transactions.

The mighty sections of society are engaged in these transactions and rulers of the day, being dependent on them, lack the will to tax them. Pakistan is quite capable of substantially reducing or even eliminating its fiscal deficit and improving tax-to-GDP ratio to 25 per cent within two-year time provided a comprehensive programme, well designed work plan, scientific approach and multi-dimensional strategy is adopted for tax reforms and resource mobilisation.

The FBR is directly responsible for present state of affairs, as its mafia-like operations have been helping people to avoid tax on income by paying bribes. Through the infamous system of Statutory Regulator Orders (SROs), the FBR's top officials provide 'legal' ways and means to the mighty sections of society to amass huge wealth, which is now threatening the state's very survival. It is worth mentioning that soon after the passing of Finance Act, 2007, the federal government reduced rate of collection of tax from purchasers of locally manufactured cars from five per cent to 2.5 per cent. This benefit to local the car manufacturer cartel and those who have the money to buy cars (but not paying any tax claiming that it is from exempt source -- agricultural income) was extended by using executive authority.

The sole stress on indirect taxation (especially under the garb of income taxation through presumptive tax regime on goods and services) without evaluating its impact on the economy and the life of poor masses is a serious cause for concern. The exorbitant rate of GST (on an imported article of public consumption, the effective rate of indirect tax before any further supply is 42 per cent and nowhere else in the world it is so high) is another problem. As a result, a large segment of the middle class is being pushed into lower middle class category, while the total number of people living below the poverty line is also increasing at an alarming pace.

The priority of our rulers is achieving revenue targets, fixed ambitiously every year in utter disregard of how various taxation measures will affect the economy and lives of the common people. Fixing revenue targets in isolation, and without making necessary efforts to improve productivity and economic growth, has forced Pakistan into a dilemma, where it can neither afford to give any meaningful tax relief package to the common people, trade and industry (due to the huge fiscal deficit) nor can it achieve a satisfactory level of economic growth (due to the retrogressive tax measures).

This is a vicious circle in which our policy makers find themselves trapped. They will have to find ways and means to come out of this tangle to make Pakistan a competitive haven, where investors find satisfactory conditions to live and invest. In a country where there is no security of life or property, notwithstanding the availability of a host of tax benefits and other incentives, the investors will never venture to risk their capital.

The year 2007 can arguably be declared 'The Year of Suicide Bombings in Pakistan', as more than 900 people were killed and 1,700 others sustained multiple injuries in the worst kind of terrorism across Pakistan. The Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) remained the worst hit areas, as 55 of the total 71 suicide blasts in the country took place here. Twenty-eight suicide blasts ripped through different parts of FATA and 27 bombers blew themselves up in the NWFP.

The prime target in all these attacks was either security forces or the police. Forty-two of the 71 suicide attacks were carried out in the settled areas. According to the information gathered by different investigating agencies, besides 28 suicide blasts in FATA and 27 in the NWFP, 10 bombers blew themselves up in Punjab, three in Islamabad, two in Balochistan and one in Sindh. The suicide attack in Sindh aimed at targeting the twice former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, when she returned to Pakistan in October 2007 after spending eight years in exile. The blast ripped through Karsaz area of Karachi killed more than 150 people and injured 310 others. The authorities, however, put the death toll in the tragic incident at 117.

Benazir also proved to be the last and the most prominent prey of suicide bombers, one of whom struck on December 27 outside Liaqat Bagh in Rawalpindi and killed her along with a number of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) workers. Intelligence agencies had informed in advance that suicide bombers had been tasked to attack the PPP chairperson. There were two tips off of this kind when Benazir fist visited Peshawar after her exile on December 1, 2007. As a precautionary measure, the police had to provide her additional escort to counter any bid of ramming an explosive-laden car into her vehicle.

Benazir was also requested time and again during her second visit to Peshawar on December 26 not to stand in her jeep to waive to the crowd. Even her food was examined, so that she may not be poisoned, and she was provided the protocol of a head of the state. A scene was created during her fist visit to Peshawar, when the police did not allow a wedding party to enter the colony where the residence of Benazir's host Zahir Shah was located. Later, only three cars were allowed to go inside and pick up the bride.

The districts of Rawalpindi and Swat saw the most number of suicide bombings, six each, in 2007. The districts of Peshawar, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, which each saw three suicide attacks, followed them. In FATA, North Waziristan saw the most number of suicide blasts. The first suicide attack of 2007 also took place in this tribal agency, in January, where four personnel of law-enforcement agencies and a woman were killed and 22 others were injured.

Later the same month, another suicide blast took place at Islamabad's Marriot Hotel; two people, a security guard and the bomber himself, were killed and five others sustained injuries. The first suicide attack in the NWFP took place in Dhaki Dalgaran, in which besides the then-Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Malik Mohammad Saad, 16 others -- including a deputy superintendent of police (DSP) and three union council nazims -- were killed. The militants struck in an almost similar fashion in southern Dera Ismail Khan just two days later, killing two policemen.

Of the 43 suicide blasts that took place in the settled areas of the country, 23 were aimed at targeting security forces' personnel. In eight incidents, policemen were targeted while political leaders were attacked on five occasions. Benazir Bhutto and Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, chief of his own faction of the PPP, were both targeted twice by suicide bombers. Aftab Sherpao was the first of political leaders to be attacked in 2007, on April 28, after he had addressed a rally in Station Koroona, Charsadda. While he remained unhurt in the attack, 28 others were killed and 55 sustained injuries.

The second suicide attack on Aftab Sherpao took place on December 21 last year inside a mosque, once again in Charsadda. Fifty-six people, almost all of them belonging to the same locality and a number of the same families too, were killed in this terrorist attack and more than a 100 were injured. Sherpao remained safe, though his younger son was injured in the attack. Moving scenes were witnessed after the attack, as women rushed to help their male family members.

Another political leader who was attacked by a suicide bomber in 2007 was Amir Muqam, president of the Pakistan Muslim League-Qauid (PML-Q) NWFP. The bomber had made his way to the drawing room of Amir Muqam, the then federal minister for Political Affairs, but he blew himself outside the room when stopped by security officials. Five people, including a former provincial minister, were killed in the blast.

At least two incidents took place in 2007 when it was presumed that a female suicide bomber had blown herself up. In the first one in, Bannu, a burqa-clad bomber struck, killing 16 people and injuring 30 others. However, it was disclosed later that the burqa-clad person was actually a man and not a woman.

In the second incident, in November last year, a female suicide bomber was said to have blown herself up near a military check-post in Peshawar Cantonment. It was even confirmed that the body was that of a female. However, it was disclosed later that she was not a suicide bomber. She was either wilfully transporting the explosives in her bag, hanging with her shoulder, or she even did not know what was inside the bag, which was given to her to take somewhere in Cantonment. It was argued that the explosives were triggered through a remote control device by a terrorist observing her movement from a close angle.

The real victims

Innocent civilians bore the main brunt of clashes between security forces and militants, as well as of the bomb blasts that ripped through different parts of the country, in 2007. There were innumerable civilian casualties in these incidents -- hundreds were killed or injured in North and South Waziristan, Tank, Swat, Kurram, Khyber Agency and other areas in clashes between security forces and militants, sectarian violence and fighting between rival tribes.

More than 400 people were killed in Khyber Agency alone, where two different religious groups remained at loggerheads throughout the last year. The dispute is yet to be resolved, as the political authorities of the agency are paying little heed to it. Similarly, sectarian violence erupted in Kurram Agency, first in March and then again in November, resulting in the killing of more than 450 civilians. Most of the victims were women, children, passers by, traders and innocent people who had taken shelter inside their homes when rival groups attacked houses of each other to revenge casualties from their side.

Military action and retaliation by the militants in Miranshah and other parts of North Waziristan Agency between October 7 and 10 last year resulted in killing of 257 people; almost a 100 of them reportedly were innocent civilians. Besides the October operation, clashes between security forces and the militants in North and South Waziristan agencies throughout the past year left scores of civilians killed or wounded.

There also were a few incidents in which security forces shot dead civilians after suspecting them either of being militants or suicide bombers. The civilians also suffered in Swat, where the government forces were deployed to fight against Maulana Fazlullah's supporters. The two months of fighting resulted in killing of a number of innocent people, while thousands of others had to migrate to safer places in Mardan, Peshawar and other parts of the NWFP after the law and order situation worsened.

The suicide attacks and bomb blasts that continued to rock different cities of the country also killed hundreds of civilians. The tragedy in Sherpao on December 21, the day when the entire country and world was celebrating the holy festival of Eidul Azha, left 57 civilians killed and dozens of others injured. Seven of the victims were from the same family, while almost all of them were from the same locality of the Sherpao village.

-- Javed Aziz Khan

As is the case with all other institutions in Pakistan, political parties have also failed to organise themselves as institutions that follow democratic norms and systematic functioning. There is a serious lack of democratic system within political parties, for instance, when it comes to electing office-bearers or selecting candidates for elections. As a result, family- or person-based politics has strengthened over the years in our country. The establishment in Pakistan has traditionally favoured personalised politics, by downplaying the importance of established political institutions. In addition, the lack of democratic norms and values within political parties has resulted in a system that revolves around individuals and specific families.

Most of the political parties, be it the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) or the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) or Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf, were founded by specific individuals with their own perceptions and not by groups of like-minded people with any specific ideology. Even though many of these political parties were initially established with certain presumptions, over the years these gradually became personality-centred with their ideologies left behind.

This tendency has given way to family- and individual-based politics. The leadership of such parties remains within one family and is passed on within the family, forming a close association between the person or the family and the party. This situation can lead to a leadership crisis in case of sudden death or removal of the party's leader, as usually no second-in-command is groomed in the party to manage its affairs after the main leader. Thus the party's various functions are distributed among different individuals, without one single person commanding authority.

If we take a look at the main political parties in Pakistan, the PPP has been synonymous with the Bhutto family, the MQM with Altaf Hussain and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) with the Sharif brothers (PML-Quaid is not taken into account since it is not a genuine political party!). With the tragic death of Benazir Bhutto, the vacuum created could have been avoided to some extent had a well groomed vice-chairperson from within the party systematically succeeded the deceased leader.

Though Benazir Bhutto's son Bilawal has been named as her heir to the party throne, the question remains whether he is capable of understanding Pakistani politics and leading the strongest political party in the country. Similarly, with the deportation of Sharif brothers to Saudi Arabia, the PML-N suffered a great deal in terms of its popularity and credibility. This situation also led to widespread defections from the party, with majority joining the King's party -- the PML-Q.

Had there been some available replacement to keep the party intact and functioning smoothly, instead of personality-centered leadership, the situation could have been different. Considering MQM as another significant party, at least in Sindh, similar dynamics appear to exist. Without Altaf Hussain, the party may disintegrate into several factions as has already happened to some other similar regional parties.

Many of the siblings of political leaders enter into politics because of circumstances, and not entirely by will. This was also true in the case of Benazir Bhutto, who was forced into politics due to the untimely death of her father, the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The party's leadership was thrust on her by the circumstances. The same has happened to her son, who has been made the party's chairperson at such a tender age. Shahbaz Sharif's son Hamza Shahbaz has also entered into politics now, more so because of the situation created by the forced exile of his family and the national dynamics requiring some new face in the party. This has reinforced the family-centered politics at the national level.

This phenomenon exists not only in Pakistan, but also in the rest of South Asia. Similar personality- or family-based politics exists, largely because of the same reasons as cited for Pakistan. Taking the example of India, the Congress party has close association with the Gandhi (Nehru) family and the leadership of the party revolves within this family. However, there too for the next generation, the entry into politics has not been by choice. The unnatural death of Indra Gandhi and her son Sanjay brought Rajiv Gandhi to the forefront. After his assassination, his widow, son and daughter have entered the political arena. Hence, the personality cult there continues with the Gandhi family as the custodian of the Congress party. Parallel examples exist in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

If we take into account the political situation in the developed countries, personality cult in politics does not appear to be a strong phenomenon. Political parties are systematically run with a democratic process of electing a candidate for a particular period of time and the parties continue to function smoothly with or without a specific individual. Taking Britain's example, the growing unpopularity of once popular Labour Party leader Tony Blair (also the former prime minister) led to replacement of not only the party's leadership but also of the government, with Gordon Brown assuming the respective posts. This transition took place very systematically and smoothly, without creating problems for the party or the nation

This surely is a result of the strong institutionalised democratic norms at national and party levels. Nonetheless, there have been cases where family members of politicians have entered into politics in the Weest. Examples of Hillary Clinton, the wife of former US President Bill Clinton, and Tony Blair's son, who recently has shown interest in entering into politics, can be cited in this respect. However, they were not readily made chairpersons of the respective parties; they had either gone through or will have to pass through their party's procedures to be widely accepted.

For a smooth political environment in Pakistan, there is a need for incorporating democratic values from grassroots to party levels. The idea of democracy in Pakistan has been closely associated with and influenced by political personalities, both civilian and military. Therefore, the political debate on the nature of democracy has focussed mainly on validating 'notion of a personalised form of democracy'. The nature of democracy in Pakistan has been understood not as a process of politics but as the tenure of specific personality in politics, which has undermined the institutionalisation of politics in Pakistan.

Also, repeated military interventions and subsequent removal of political leadership need to be eliminated from any future scenario. Whatever may be the political situation in the country, it is for politicians and the public to address the issue and not the army's job to intervene and try to correct things according to its own interpretation. Institutional differences and disruption of political functioning brings specific personalities and individuals in the limelight and later on the politics revolves around those figures only, and not around ideologies.

The socio-economic and political inequalities, coupled with the 'cult of personalities' has also led to political alienation and dissatisfaction among the masses. The personality cult must subside from our politics to give way to genuine leadership and smoother political environment, and for that to happen the causes cultivating and strengthening such cult would have to be removed first.

The country has been thrown into the depths of anarchy in the aftermath of tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto. A tragic casualty in this state of affairs is the independence of policy and action of the nation. Internal issues are being contemplated after weighting the commandments emanating from our external peer groups. This trend is not new. A few weeks ago, the media aired adverse remarks of US President against twice former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Probably taking it as a binding precept, the controlling authorities eliminated the Sharifs from the electoral race. It appeared that before filing the papers, the politicians concerned did not fulfill the essential pre-requisite of satisfying the string master about their political objectives.

As if it was not enough, the Turkish president was called in to lecture the politicians about the standard practices of dealing with the generals. It was a surprise to see the head of a friendly state fiddling with the most sensitive internal matter in these trying times. One of the most serious damages recently caused to the state of Pakistan is the near complete evaporation of sovereignty during the recent fracas in the socio-political realm. Long sequel events can be cited to prove this happening.

A weakened, politically bankrupt and strategically retreating regime gambled the last traces of working factors of sovereignty in a bargain to stay on the pedestal of power. Ironically, more than one external power groups have spearheaded the meddling in an overt manner. The interference is so unabashedly obvious that the common mind is boggled at the fact that all of this is accepted without the slightest frown 'by the guardians of national security and interest!'

It is not a secret to any one that the sovereignty of the country has faced the greatest blow due to the compromised legitimacy of the present regime. It has parallels in the national history in the former regimes of Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Ziaul Haq. The gross violation of territorial frontiers by unwanted elements from across the border, weakened grips on crucial foreign policy matters, incapability to streamline the unregulated links between various countries and local groups, inability to generate a national agenda of governance and economic priorities, and the ever-increasing influence of super powers on most sensitive issues are a few examples in this respect.

Nationhood cannot be effectively practiced without the freedom of policy formulation and practice by any country. In our case, the central fibre of our nation has been threatened due to the rising interference of neo-cons of the West. State relations have been reduced to contractual arrangements for fulfilling the various spelled out and even clandestine terms of reference. By accepting the unaccounted for funding from the United States, the regime has dangerously jeopardised the future of the entire country for its very short-term gains.

The founders of Pakistan were very categorical about the theory and practice of sovereignty. Even during the transitional phase of acquiring independence, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah did not compromise on even any minute matter that may had cast a shadow on the working independence of Pakistan. History is replete with evidences where he set aside otherwise attractive offers, whenever an eclipse was found approaching towards the independence of policy and action of the state.

Refusal to accept Lord Mountbatten as the joint governor general of the neo-independent dominions is an example in point. Also, despite the fact that Pakistan faced real threats to its security and existence, Jinnah refused to accept any direct interference from any other country, including the US. Once this balance glided below equilibrium, the sovereignty was directly affected. Thirty-two years of military rule, in various ebbs and flows, transformed the issue of defence purchases and cooperation into the policy of compromise.

Whether it was the grant of Badaber post (near Peshawar) to the US for U2 spy plane flights in the 1950s or the fighting of proxy wars on the superpower's behalf, the sovereignty was the most visible casualty. It is ironic to note that during the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the aftermath of 1977 election could not be settled without the involvement of the ambassador of a 'brotherly' country. The same country later hosted another former prime minister and his clan.

The outcome of direct foreign influence has spread out impacts. From foreign policy to social welfare and from education to scientific developments, the implications can be felt. Unabated privatisation of enterprises and assets, including profit making concerns; forced promotion of pseudo-liberal values in the cultural domain and gradual maiming of civil society movements to pave the way for elements compliant to dictatorship are some notable outcomes. The issue has been dealt with so craftily that even the manifestoes of leading political parties have not included restoration of sovereignty as a major factor.

Myths have been created that without direct support of foreign powers, the survival of the nation may be jeopardised. The foreign powers have used this handicap to their full advantage, by making the most of changing situations for their respective agendas. The near future may not see a drastic change in the scenario. The encouraging rise in the political consciousness and struggle to restore civil liberties, however, is likely to pave the way for a positive change. On a positive note, if enlightened and incorruptible leadership emerges after the forthcoming general elections, restoration of sovereignty may not appear a remote possibility!