More with less
Used tea leaves can be utilised to produce bio-diesel on a commercial basis
By Alauddin Masood
A Pakistani scientist, Dr. Syed Tajamul Hussain, and his research team at the National Centre for Physics have succeeded in inventing a catalyst for the production of bio-diesel with the help of spent tea leaves. The effort of the Pakistani scientist has opened up new avenues for alternative environment-friendly energy resources.

politics
Opportunities and challenges
It is a real test for Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly to address the longstanding issues of over two million people living in the far-flung areas
By Jahangir Khan
The people of Gilgit-Baltistan finally got their identification and political rights through the Empowerment and Self-Governance Order-2009 introduced by the present PPP government. The Order still needs constitutional cover-up to make it an Act of Parliament. The significant and welcoming part of the Empowerment and Self-Governance Order was renaming the area from Northern Areas to Gilgit-Baltistan - actually retrieval of its historic name. This development has indeed given the people of this strategically important area identification and helped remove confusion over the region's name.

Not the whole story
Pakhtun history is mostly written by administrators and ethnographers of the colonial period
By Rafi Ullah
The Pakhtuns do not have their own version of history. Whatever we have about them is written by the outsiders. Who will contradict the inherent bias in such a record? The colonial portrayal of the Pakhtuns, such as violence and fanaticism, are crossed-examined vis-á-vis the local folklore with the stipulation that the latter presents the indigenous account of history. It seems advisable to keep our argument within the confines of the Anglo-Pakhtun wars. Pakhtun history is mostly written by administrators and ethnographers of the colonial period, most commonly called orientalists. They have made and, thus, based their viewpoints about the Pakhtuns on their personal experiences as representatives of the British Empire.

A matter of perception
The US and Pakistan governments should work together to deal with a situation arising out of anti-US sentiments
By Waqar Gillani
In certain sections of Pakistani society anti-Americanism seems to be rising. The feeling of hatred for the US exists historically in the country because of certain factors. More recently, a fresh debate has started on the US role in the region, especially after the controversial US aid coming into Pakistan in the form of Kerry-Lugar Act. The aid package was approved by the US Senate in September last year and signed as law by President Barack Obama in mid October.

For some months before the horrific attack on Ashura mourners, Karachi had surprisingly acquired the reputation of being the safest of Pakistan's metropolitan centres. Islamabad and Lahore were the primary targets of suicide bombers and the ethnic tensions that have blighted the city for decades appeared to be at least temporarily under check.

Unfortunately for Karachi's teeming millions, the respite was short-lived. The dust had barely settled on the Ashura carnage that the fires of ethnic hatred were stoked in Lyari. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has since taken the predictable public stand that it is committed to repairing the mistrust between Muhajirs and Baloch, but the suspicions about the MQM's role in instigating the violence run deep.

The latest episode is simply another illustration of how years of divisive conspiracies have ravaged Pakistan's biggest and most diverse city. It was not an accident that Karachi became the site of unheard of levels of ethnic and sectarian violence during the 1980s. Through the 1970s the city was the heartbeat of the country's working class movement, a melting pot of cultures that, despite the odd incident, never experienced the kind of parochial violence that became commonplace in the 1980s and 1990s.

Working-class militancy was anathema both to private industrialists and the state, and it was thus necessary to sow the seeds of division within working people. By the late 1970s it was clear that the more progressive trade union formations were being weakened and "pocket" unions that were linked to establishment parties, such as the Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) and later the MQM started to become major players. Sadly, it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime that set the stage for this subsequent degeneration by undermining the autonomy of the trade union movement.

This is not to suggest that there was no ethnic tinge to the working-class movement before the 1980s. Until the late 1960s, most of the industrial working class in Karachi was muhajir, and the skilled sections of the labour force remained primarily muhajir even afterwards. Sindhi-Muhajir tensions simmered for much of the two-decade period between partition and the popular movement of the late 1960s.

Subsequently, however, with the influx of large numbers of Punjabi and Pakhtun migrants into the city, the composition of the working class changed substantially. Even at the peak of labour struggles in the 1970s, ethnic tensions were latent. It was these tensions that the state proceeded to deepen; the end result was the fragmentation of the labour movement and the politicisation of ethnicity and religion in previously unimaginable ways.

Karachi burned through the 1990s as the real impacts of the state's policies were brought to bear. However, the MQM only established a complete political monopoly over the city after General Musharraf came to power. It was through the suspect local government plan that a formal power-sharing arrangement was fashioned, but despite the gains made the MQM has maintained a commitment to vigilantism as a means of countering the various threats that it faces from both exclusivist and more expansive political formations operating in the city.

The sub-plot of the violence that has gripped the city in the past few weeks has to do with the formal abolition of the local government system. The PPP's slogan of reconciliation notwithstanding, the recent history of Karachi politics suggests that it will be difficult to keep the various power centres in the city happy, largely because the MQM insists that it is able to keep a vice-like grip on the city.

So, for example, even before Muhajir-Baloch tensions erupted, the MQM had been openly baiting the city's Pakhtun population, especially in the wake of the military operation in Malakand which resulted in the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Swat and its environs into Karachi. However, the MQM's provocative politics has not succeeded in cowing Pakhtuns (and other groups) into submission. A party that continues to espouse a clearly racist posture towards non-Muhajirs will necessarily continue to face challenges from those who it vilifies.

The question, however, is not whether the MQM's tenuous monopoly over Karachi should be challenged, but under what guise. The reality of the deliberate politicisation of ethnicity and religion by the state is that anti-establishment struggles are increasingly particularistic in nature. The Baloch struggle is a case in point; there are many strands of the Baloch nationalist movement that are now narrowly anti-Punjabi rather than anti-establishment.

This is not to suggest that exclusivist tendencies are dominant but only to point out that it is necessary to explicitly counter such exclusivist trends and build a broad and expansive politics that challenges proto-fascist organisations such as the MQM without alienating all Muhajirs per se. It goes without saying that this is a formidable task but very little in Pakistan is easy these days.

The PPP has always presented itself as the one political party that is capable of bridging the gaps between the various ethnic groups that comprise Pakistan. And compared to other mainstream parties, the PPP does indeed enjoy the most broad-based support. However, underlying the PPP's politics of conciliation is an unwillingness to tackle the big fish, or in other words, those power brokers that are an impediment to a genuinely democratic dispensation. So, if the PPP placates players such as the MQM, it alienates those who want to challenge status quo and evolve a new political settlement that excludes bullies and bigots.

And so the challenge remains to fashion an alternative politics, something that the myriad progressive political and social forces in Karachi are capable of doing. Even if it is not possible in the current conjuncture to build a mass organisation, it is possible to exert pressure on the elected government to stop ceding ground to those who claim to be at the frontline of the fight against terror even though they themselves were the original perpetrators of terror in the 1980s and 1990s.

The fact of the matter is that ordinary working people, whether Muhajir, Pakhtun, Punjabi, Baloch, or hailing from any other ethno-linguistic group, want peace in Karachi. They want a peace that is based on the guarantee of justice to all people regardless of their nationality. If such a peace can be forged in Karachi, then we will prove that we do not need guns to beat those who use violent means to force themselves upon us.

It seems Karachi is in for another phase of terrorism. Acts of targeted killings have continued for some time. It began with the blast that took scores of innocent lives in the sacred Muharram procession. The reckless acts of gutting property and belongings of local merchants and owners are not mere expressions of anger. Lyari, Baldia Town, Malir, Landhi and Keamari Town are the affected areas. They need a thorough review and precautionary measures to prevent the loss of life and property in the future. Several steps should be taken to bolster the security situation.

A dangerous factor that helps promote terrorism is the assumption that after committing the act one can get away with it. The perpetrators of such heinous acts either consider law enforcement agencies as totally impotent or find out a way to successfully dodge them. Political patronage is another consideration. It is often found that the ruling political elite gives a lot of latitude to their youth or militant wings that do not stop short of carrying out a 'mission'.

For example, political or religious groups often indulge in wall chalking for inciting hatred and reaction from opponents. However, no party has been found taking appropriate disciplinary action in this regard. On the contrary, induction of extremist hardliners is considered as strength for party cadres who at times become too independent to listen to the party leadership.

Neither the establishment nor the political leadership is able to curtail zealots. The cold-blooded murder of policemen and political activists of a particular rank and profile in Karachi is indicative of certain elements. In several situations when an act of violence takes place, the establishment instantly points its finger towards a foreign hand. Our worthy president mentioned it in one of his recent speeches. With very few exceptions, that foreign hand could never be detected. The reasons are quite different from this initial assumption. Internal rifts among gangs and clashes between armed wings of different religious or ethnic groups can develop into urban violence as experienced in the Karachi episode.

From the perspective of planning, accessibility refers to the available choices of entry points, routes, and exit points of the city. This has to be rationally done. A populous area with very few entry points can become a victim of terror. In December 1986, Aligarh Colony, Qasba Colony, Frontier Colony, and Orangi Town were practically cut off from the city when terrorists let lose the reign of terror. Thousands of innocent lives were lost. Similarly, limited accessibility in Landhi and Korangi gave rise to 'no-go-area' syndrome. Narrow winding streets, cul-de-sacs, poor road conditions, and absence of street lights adversely affect accessibility. In the Karachi carnage, an alleged delay in the arrival of fire tenders was attributed to blockages in access.

An important matter is the delegation of authority in managing urban peace. It is more than obvious that the core decision-making apparatus related to security issues is highly centralised. The district and town police force and other tiers of administration are subordinate to the commandments that flow from the top. It shows the existence of several agencies that remain oblivious to local issues, sensitivities, and priorities. It takes away the initiative of improving and shoring up the capacity of local institutions. It is an extremely complex issue given the convoluted political and economic interests that are attached to it. However, the wisdom behind scaling up the strength of local security apparatus is time-tested.

Urban terrorism has become advanced. Amongst the reasons behind its existence, the free manufacture, trading, and distribution of deadly weapons and explosive materials is a root cause. Policy makers must legislate, banning the ownership, usage, and possession of unlicensed and prohibited weapons. Building a political consensus on this matter, expanding the network of monitoring and vigilance, appropriate utilisation of information technology as well as improving local security are few fundamental pre-requisites.

It must be remembered that law and order situation is directly related to economic performance. Terror-hit victims lose bread-earners. To ease down the situation, speedy response towards economic rehabilitation is required. Society and security have many common variables. With the rise in market economy, consumption-driven life styles and break-up of family values, psychological disorders have multiplied exponentially. Young people, especially those hailing from rural and less developed areas are affected to a great extent.

There are limited avenues amongst the youth to realize their latent talents. Healthy opportunities cannot be created without state acting as a catalyst. All issues should to be openly debated. This is a slow process. However, short cut substitutes have seldom worked in grappling with problems.

The country is facing a serious crisis in the shape of political and administrative upheavals. Rise in lawlessness and anarchy shall have grave consequences for the state. Let us hope that the political and economic crisis shall be an eye opener for the powers that shape the destiny of this nation.

borrowing

Pakistan is a classical example of debt enslavement in modern history -- a nuclear state influenced by foreign powers through the mechanism of economic subjugation. Our total external debt is to reach nearly $75 billion in 2015 from $50.76 billion early this year -- 45 percent increase in such a short span. International Monetary Fund (IMF) has released its estimates; Pakistan's debt will increase by 13 percent or $ 6.4 billion to $ 57.1 billion by the end of the current fiscal year and is estimated to increase by $ 7 billion, or 12.3 percent, to $ 64 billion by the end of the next fiscal year. These estimates suggest that the external debt will increase by another $2 billion in 2012 and cross $74 billion mark in 2015.

The public and publicly guaranteed debts, including IMF loans, are estimated to increase by 45 percent from $47.26 billion on June 30, 2009, to more than $68.1 billion on June 30, 2016. The amount will increase to $53.3 billion during the current fiscal year and $59.9 billion by end of next year. The total medium and long-term debt which stood at about $41.5 billion at the end of June last year, will increase to $48.2 billion next year and reach $67.6 billion in 2015 -- an increase of about 40 percent. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) will have the single largest share in the external debt, which will increase from bare $9 billion to about $15.8 billion in 2015, by more than 75 percent in five years. The World Bank (WB) debt will increase by 29 percent from $12 billion to $15.5 billion by 2015. Bilateral debt is likely to increase by 96 percent from the current $16 billion to $31.28 billion in 2015.

Pakistan, caught in a deadly debt trap -- burgeoning external loans of $54 billion and domestic debt of nearly Rs. 4 trillion -- is begging for more and more money, not to invest for future betterment but to meet its day to day needs. Because of this vicious circle, where you have to borrow to meet debt servicing commitments, there remains little hope to come out of debt enslavement in the near future to stop looking towards IMF, WB, Paris Club, London Club, ADB -- unless a well-thought out plan is devised and implemented for self-reliance. There are no signs yet for the civil-military bureaucracy and public office holders to stop squandering foreign funds, wasting public money and plundering national wealth. Imprudent economic policies of civil and military regimes have failed to overcome the rising inflation, ever-increasing fiscal deficit, the worsening balance of payments and, unfavourable trade imbalances.

All the governments in Pakistan ruthlessly abused foreign lending/aids/grants and never tried to live within means -- the way our civil-military bureaucrats spend national resources on their luxuries is unprecedented in the entire world. The present economic crisis is a logical outcome of the wrongdoings of the last many decades. During Musharraf's rule, Debt Reduction & Management Committee (DRMC) was constituted with tall claims to evolve a strategy to come out of the debt trap. Nobody knows what DRMC did in practical terms for which it was constituted -- though like many other bodies and institutions it compiled report about Pakistan's debt scenario explaining the technical differences between "debts" and "liabilities" and how these should be recorded in government books. Noted economist, Nadeem-ul-Haq in a recent message asked us to "examine USAID. Where is all the money going? Beltway bandits are taking it all and we continue begging..... sounds like Monty Python".

The debt trap is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It gives neo-colonial forces a modern tool to subjugate countries like Pakistan that try to defy their commands -- e.g., pursuing nuclear programme to overcome energy shortages and striving for economic, political, and social liberation. ADB, in one of its reports on Pakistan observed: "Pakistan entered the 21 Century with serious financial problems. Public debt exceeded 90 percent of its GDP, over 600 percent of its annual revenues, and debt-servicing accounted for over half of current revenues. In 2001, Pakistan was the only country in South Asia to be classified as a severely indebted country by the World Bank. Due to the inability to service external debt, there were two consecutive rounds of debt rescheduling by Paris Club members and one from the quasi-London Club between 1998 and 2001".

This was a slap in the face of those who claimed to have achieved wonders during their democratic (sic) rules. In fact, they messed up the economy in the same way as the military dictators did. Our rulers have failed to understand that economic feebleness makes nuclear capability a liability and not strength. They have pushed the country to the brink of economic collapse. Now on the dictates of IMF they are levying more and more regressive taxes and making the lives of common people miserable. The rich traders and industrialists are not directly hit by such harsh tax measures as they can easily pass on their burden to consumers. They are, however, certainly feeling insecure as chaotic conditions have a visible dampening effect on business environment.

This state of affairs is the direct outcome of state's policies that allow a free hand to the forces of loot, corruption, and terrorism. No other state in the world has undergone such a horrible experience. Clearly, Pakistani rulers have destroyed the state through corruption and incompetence. Unfortunately, foreign-trained Pakistani economists are merely engaged in defending and serving their masters, instead of advising the concerned quarters to enforce financial discipline and better financial management.

On the one hand, we are destroying the available capital, industry, and human resource and on the other for economic growth (sic) we heavily and persistently rely on external loans and credits without realising that external loans on soft terms are now becoming scarcer. The IMF, since our approaching it again in November 2008 for 23-month stand-by loan agreement, is imposing tougher and even contradictory conditionalities. It is an undisputed fact that IMF conditionalities have aggravated the inequalities of income and wealth in Pakistan and resulted in unemployment.

The IMF conditionalities have caused more harm to us than doing anything really good, hence it is very painful to note that every government in Pakistan continues to take loans by accepting and complying with these harsh conditionalities. The rationale of seeking more and more debt for curing the evils caused by the mounting debt itself is simply beyond comprehension. It is high time that we stop taking fresh loans. We must mobilise all our resources -- our tax revenue potential alone is not less than Rs. 4 trillion. If we manage to generate these resources, we will be able to meet not only our current and development expenditure but also pay off all the external loans within a span of three to five years.

There are two perennial questions in international economics: One, why do countries engage in cross-border trade? Two, should governments protect domestic industry against competition from imports? The significance of these questions goes beyond academic discussion to the formulation of trade and industrial policies. Economists answered these questions through the concept of comparative advantage. The man who propounded the concept was the 19th century English economist David Ricardo. A country has a comparative advantage in producing a good if it can produce it at a lower cost than other countries.

Comparative advantage needs to be distinguished from absolute advantage, which a country has if it is more efficient at producing a good than its trading partners. Ricardo argued that a country might not have absolute advantage in producing any good but it would certainly have comparative advantage in producing some goods. A country should specialise in producing and exporting goods in which it has comparative advantage, while importing the rest. From this, Ricardo drew two conclusions, both highly controversial. One, trade benefits all countries irrespective of their size as well as all people within a country. In other words, international trade does not have any effect on distribution of income both between trading nations and within a country.

However, evidence shows that trade does affect the distribution of income, both inter-country and intra-country. This is for several reasons. Resources cannot move immediately or free of cost from one industry to another. For instance, labour dislocated in one industry may find a job in another, there is some time lag between retrenchment and re-employment. Two, industries differ in the mix of factors of production they demand. Some industries are capital-intensive while others are labour-intensive. Some industries require low-skilled labour while others need high-skilled labour. Increase or decrease in demand for goods supplied by industries affects factors of production employed by them. Three, even if all countries gain from trade, the gains may not be evenly distributed. Factors such as the level of development of a country, supply-side constraints, and the terms of trade are important determinants of its gains from trade.

As for the basis of comparative advantage, Ricardo believed that countries differed only in terms of labour productivity. In some countries, labour was more productive or efficient in producing food; in others, labour was more suited to producing manufactured goods. Thus, difference in labour productivity was the sole reason for international trade. This, of course, is not correct as there are other factors of production as well, such as capital and land.

In the 20th century, the Ricardian theory was refined by two Swedish economists -- Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. Called Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory, it regards country differences in factor endowments and the technology with which these are combined as constituting the basis of international trade. For instance, some countries like India and China have abundance of labour; others are rich in natural resources such as oil in case of Gulf States and land in case of Australia. Still, others like the US and Japan have abundance of capital. Generally, an economy will export goods that are intensive in the factors in which it is relatively well-endowed. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran export oil, Pakistan and Thailand export textiles, the USA exports commercial aircraft, and Japan exports consumer electronics, etc. The reason is that these countries have the natural resources, labour, capital or technology to produce these goods.

On the contrary, one can hardly expect Switzerland to export bananas or Pakistan to export commercial aircraft, because they are deficient in the required resources making it a better option for them to import these products. Trade also affects distribution of income: owners of a country's abundant (exporting) factor gain, while those of scarce (importing) factors lose.

In short, the concept of comparative advantage implies that countries trade with each other because they are different. Countries having abundance of capital over labour tend to export capital-intensive goods and import labour intensive goods. It is the other way round for countries having abundance of labour over capital. The theory also reposes complete trust in free trade and rejects government protection of the import competing industry.

The theory of comparative advantage explains trade between countries which are different. It also explains inter-industry trade, i.e. trading food for manufactures. For example, Pakistan exports rice to Germany and imports textile machinery from that country. However, the theory fails to explain why countries which are relatively similar engage in international trade. It does not, for example, explain why Germany and the UK, both of which are capital-intensive have bilateral trade. In other words, it does not explain trade between developed countries, which accounts for the major portion of global trade. Nor does the theory of comparative advantage explain intra-industry trade, i.e. international trade of goods belonging to the same industry. For instance, why do the US and Japan export vehicles to each other?

The new trade theory, associated with Paul Krugman, who won the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics, offers an alternative explanation of international trade: Countries also trade in order to realise economies of scale -- the greater the output, the lower the per unit cost. In order to achieve economies of scale, countries need to specialise in manufacturing and exporting a narrow range of products. However, it is not necessary that countries trade in products which belong to different industries. Countries may trade products which, though similar, are differentiated. For instance, the US and Japan have a two-way trade in cars. Autos manufactured by Toyota (a Japanese firm) and General Motors (an American firm) belong to the same industry, yet they are differentiated. A large number of American consumers prefer Japanese cars, while a good number of Japanese consumers like American cars.

The new trade theory offers a plausible explanation of intra-industry trade, which is prevalent among countries at similar level of development. Gains from trade are substantial when economies of scale are strong and products are highly differentiated. This is applicable more to high-tech manufactured goods than raw materials or traditional sectors like textiles and footwear. Hence, intra-industry trade is likely to be greater between industrialised or developed countries than between agrarian or developing economies. Intra-industry trade also has relatively small income distribution effects. Hence, trade between advanced economies is likely to have smaller distributional effects than trade between developed and developing economies.

Unlike its comparative advantage counterpart, the new trade theory makes a case for government intervention. By a judicious use of subsidisation and high tariffs, governments can help some domestic firms achieve economies of scale. Such an approach has been called strategic trade policy. It has been argued that the R&D of Boeing, the giant manufacturer of commercial aircraft, was largely subsidised by the US government. A similar argument has been made in respect of Japan's dominant position in manufacturing lap-tops. However, the real problem is to choose the right industry or firms for protectionism. A wrong choice means that public resources or consumer interest will be sacrificed on supporting an industry or firm which has little potential for development. A case in point is the auto industry of Pakistan, which has not been able to stand on its feet despite a high level of protectionism.

Farmers in Swat are anxiously waiting for the promised compensation for the huge losses they incurred during the last couple of years. As funds have been delayed, government functionaries assure the farmers that funds will be released soon. The insurgency and the subsequent military operation have badly affected agriculture in Swat and the adjoining agencies. Fruit and vegetable production has stopped in Swat, known as the fruit and vegetable basket of the country.

Initial damage assessment by the Food and Agriculture Organisation and district government departments in July 2009 estimate losses at 62 percent for vegetables and 56 percent for fruit in Malakand Division and Malakand and Bajaur Agencies.

According to Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA), an Islamabad-based organisation, Swat alone has suffered fruit losses of Rs3 billions and vegetable losses of Rs1.4bn in the last two years. This assessment, however, does not include the losses caused during or after the military operation, the body reports.

The provincial minister for agriculture, Arbab Ayub Jan, says compensation package had been finalised and farmers will be compensated for their losses soon. Secretary Agriculture NWFP, Attaullah Khan, says the government will surely give compensation to the insurgency-hit farmers. "The PC-1 has been approved. Now detailed work plan is being prepared for the purpose. After that, compensation to the farmers will begin immediately." "Besides, the government will arrange for tractors and other field-levelling machinery for the affected farmers," he adds. Dr Sher Mohammad, an official of the agriculture department in the militancy-hit area, who is also Director General Livestock NWFP, says the Damage Needs Assessment (DNA) report, prepared by the government in collaboration with the World Bank (WB), has estimated Rs2.2 billion losses of fruit and Rs2.8bn of vegetables in the area. He says the losses in Swat are higher.

The DNA-based Rs85 billion work-plan for Malakand envisages Rs22 billion for agriculture, livestock and irrigation sectors in the area. But lack or delay in the release of funds has made it impossible to initiate it. For want of money, the plan will be implemented in phases. The federal government is yet to release Rs17bn for the first phase which was approved by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani in November.

An official of the agriculture department in Swat says 78 percent fruit orchards in Swat suffered from normal to heavy losses amounting to around Rs1.6 billion and Rs2.1bn losses for vegetables and fruit respectively. "Areas in the Upper Swat like Kabal and Matta were the most affected with around 80 percent losses of fruit production. Over 0.109 metric tonnes of fruit was either destroyed or decayed last year for lack of packaging material or transportation problem. The problem was made acute due to lack of labour and delay in harvesting last year," he says adding, "Vegetable losses have been estimated at around 80 percent each for both kharif and rabi seasons last year. Around 57000 MT of kharif vegetables and around 29000MT of rabi vegetables were lost that inflicted a loss of Rs570 million and Rs293mn on the farmers," the official adds.

President, Model Farm Services Centre, Swat and a farmer, Mohammad Naeem, says peach grown in Swat had eight varieties, "Peach from variety one to seven were totally lost while the last category could be sold up to fifty percent as it matured late. Apple from Swat was also damaged by fifty percent. Most of the fruit orchards were destroyed," he adds.

Naeem says farmers have so far received no compensation from the government, "To deal with cases of corruption and exaggerated claims, the government and NGOs should provide aid, agriculture inputs, and technology through the agriculture department. It should provide enough plants, pesticides, and modern technology rather than giving cash to the farmers," he says adding, "Fruit orchards take around ten years to mature. An apple or peach orchard starts production in the fourth or fifth year but its commercial production begins in the seventh year. The government should help farmers grow more orchards."

Naeem points out that though NGOs are doing a commendable job to support the farmers "the problem is that their support is restricted to the suburbs of Mingora or other nearer sites. A few days ago, an NGO came but distributed only ten fruit saplings to each farmer. It was much less than needed. The far-flung areas such as Kabal, Matta and other upper Swat areas are yet to be given the badly needed attention."

Swat is the centre of both seasonal and off-season fruit and vegetable production. Its fruits such as apple, peach, apricot, pears, and fresh vegetables, like potato, turnip, cabbages, ladyfinger, etc, have a countrywide market and are exported. It provides employment to 70 percent of local populace who does the work like spraying, pruning, packing, and transporting the fruit from orchards and vegetable farms.

According to an estimate, in the year 2006-07, out of the total province-wise fruit of 0.42 million tonnes, Malakand division accounted for 56 percent while Swat alone produced 34 percent. Per capita fruit production for fruit in Swat was 82 as compared to 18 for NWFP. Three in every five peaches that Pakistanis eat come from Swat. Swat is also rich in vegetables production. Besides other vegetables, Swat also accounts for 3/4th of the onion produce in the province. According to an estimate by the South Asia Partnership, the share of Swat in national production of tomatoes is 13 percent.

Onion is sown at around 4000 hectares in Swat. The loss of this important source of income for the farmers in the area ranged between 70 to 80 percent in different areas. "Around 67000 metric tonnes of onion amounting to Rs669mn were lost. This makes the annual loss to vegetable farmers around Rs1.6bn," Naeem says adding, "The area produced 70 percent of yield of onion. In 2006, the area had produced about 108,000 tonnes of onion. "I had sown onion in my field but could not harvest it which caused me a loss of Rs0.1mn," says Abdur Rahim, a farmer from Kanju, Swat.

Tomato was cultivated over 7000 hectares in Swat. The crop was lost entirely as it matured in May and June when displacement had already started. Though prices of tomatoes and onion skyrocketed due to limited supply in the open market Swat farmers didn't benefit. "I would earn around Rs0.2 million from my tomato crop annually. But last year, there was no income for me from the crop," says Maimoon Khan, another farmer from Kanju.

Another farmer, requesting anonymity, says Kabal is still not clear from the militants, "It is inaccessible to outside fruit dealers. There is no aid to them so far. The owners of the fruit orchards there are under great duress." There are around 0.3 million farmers in Swat a majority of whom -- around eighty percent -- are small farmers who do not have money to buy agricultural inputs. They should be given free or subsidised agriculture inputs.

There are several challenges before the government. Experts believe the government should go for small projects rather than mega and complicated projects in the agriculture sector. It should seek community participation in the endeavours.

More with less

A Pakistani scientist, Dr. Syed Tajamul Hussain, and his research team at the National Centre for Physics have succeeded in inventing a catalyst for the production of bio-diesel with the help of spent tea leaves. The effort of the Pakistani scientist has opened up new avenues for alternative environment-friendly energy resources.

From one kilogramme of used tea, nano particles help produce 560 ml of bio-diesel, which can be used alone or blended with petro-diesel. If the process is carried out on commercial basis it can be a giant step towards production of alternative energy resources in Pakistan as the country is the third largest importer of tea after UK and China. The annual consumption of tea in Pakistan is estimated to be around 160,000 to 170,000 tons.

Since there is a global ban on the production of bio-diesel from edible products, Dr. Tajamul and his team started research work on used tea leaves and have succeeded for the first time in the world to prepare bio-diesel from used tea leaves. Their research work also showed that the spent tea leaves can be used for the production of alcohol. Earlier, spent coffee had been widely used for the preparation of alcohol, but no one had ever tried to utilise used tea leaves, even in countries like UK and USA where tea users are in large number.

It is now an established fact that urban waste, both organic and inorganic, is a potential valuable resource, which can be used to generate energy, establish new ventures for the recycling of the solid waste, support a host of cottage industries and provide gainful employment to thousands of people. In economic terms, the waste-to-energy production almost costs nothing as it becomes a source of revenue generation through energy, organic fertiliser production, and supply of raw materials to recycling units as well as the cottage industries.

In 2007, the Germans generated almost 280kWh of electricity by using sewage to make methane. A similar experience in the UK estimates that by the end of 2010 about 75 percent of the sewage will be processed to provide about 350,000 British homes with electricity.

In the Philippines, faced with severe opposition from environmentalists, an integrated meat-processing and canning plant succeeded in converting the industrial waste into bio-gas and overcoming the pollution problem in the early 1980s. By doing so, the company not only dealt with the problem of pollution effectively, but it also found a substitute for electricity and liquefied petroleum gas, earning laurels from the nation and the state.

Pakistan generates many hundred thousand tons of waste every year. In Lahore, the old city alone annually generates over 100,000 tons of waste. If the waste of new localities, like Gulberg and Defence Housing Authority and the suburban areas is added to it, the quantity of waste annually generated by the city might increase to about 150,000 tons. Other mega cities, like Karachi, Hyderabad, Faisalabad, Multan, Gujranwala, Peshawar and Quetta also generate colossal amounts of waste.

Presently, the city governments usually burn urban waste or deposit it in landfill project areas. This has been a very costly proposition not only due to high costs involved but also because of multiple negative impacts on human health, the overall environment conditions and contamination of soil as well as ground-water resources. To rectify the damage, the city needs to opt for the waste-to-energy course in place of the costlier Landfill Projects.

In addition to major benefits, like reduction in waste-related diseases, the closed cell utilisation of carbon dioxide ensures minimum damage to the Ozone layer. Against this, the landfill and combustion treatment for the city waste are most damaging for environment and inhabitants.

While resolving the chronic problem of disposing of the piling up dumps in suburban areas and saving huge amounts of money spent on unhealthy and environment-unfriendly landfill projects, the waste recycle route can partly meet the current energy deficit in addition to generating economic activities and new job opportunities. In economic terms, the waste-to-energy production costs almost nothing as it becomes a source of revenue generation through energy, organic fertilizer, production and supply of raw materials to the recycling units as well as the cottage industries.

According to experts, 10-14 thousand tons of waste produced daily in the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi has the potential to produce 60-70 MWs of energy by generating the methane gas from the organic (wet) waste and then using it for the generation of electricity. If the waste produced by the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad could be used to produce some 60-70 MWs of energy, imagine the potential that the metropolitan cities of Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, Karachi, Hyderabad, Peshawar and offer in this regard. The garbage collected in the metropolitan towns of Karachi and Lahore could definitely produce 10-15 times more electricity and organic fertilizer as well as support an equally larger chain of recycling units and cottage industries and job opportunities.

While adoption of waste-to-energy method has reasonable prospects for providing additional source for energy to meet the country's growing need for energy, the adoption of the proposition would also solve the menace of clogged gutters, overflowing drainage and sewerage channels, and piles of litter, which has become a common sight and constant eye-sour in almost all major towns and cities.

Another source for energy production could be the damaged/spoiled fruits or vegetables and corns, which are unfit for human consumption. According to sources, some 40 percent of the total fruits and vegetables produced in Pakistan are lost during harvesting. The damaged fruits and vegetables can also be used for producing low-carbon fuel for cars. The sugar (fructose) found in fruits, such as apples, oranges and dates, can be converted into a fuel, which experiments have revealed, contains far more energy than ethanol.

Likewise, various types of waste products, including polythene bags, can be used to make bio-diesel fuel. Some of the developed countries are heartily embracing bio-fuels as a way of reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and dependency on imported gasoline/oil. Britain has already developed the technology to create bio-diesel from corns, palm oil and a range of other materials, including weeds.

Meanwhile, it is estimated that Pakistan's demand for oil is expected to double by 2015 and quadruple by 2025 as a result of the continuous economic growth. While the thirst of developing countries like Pakistan for energy is increasing, the resources of the present energy exporting countries in the Middle East and the Far East are depleting fast, resulting in the escalation and sudden fluctuation in the price of oil products. This calls for tapping all available resources for the production of energy so as to optimise the indigenous production of this important resource, which is considered vital for the continuous economic growth of the mankind.

Not the whole story

The Pakhtuns do not have their own version of history. Whatever we have about them is written by the outsiders. Who will contradict the inherent bias in such a record? The colonial portrayal of the Pakhtuns, such as violence and fanaticism, are crossed-examined vis-á-vis the local folklore with the stipulation that the latter presents the indigenous account of history. It seems advisable to keep our argument within the confines of the Anglo-Pakhtun wars. Pakhtun history is mostly written by administrators and ethnographers of the colonial period, most commonly called orientalists. They have made and, thus, based their viewpoints about the Pakhtuns on their personal experiences as representatives of the British Empire.

Charles Lindholm nicely explains this point, "… the image of the Pathan varied according to the vacillations of colonial policy. We may discriminate several views: the emissary/guest, represented by Elphinstone and Masson; the naïve imperialist view of Burnes; the treacherous and greedy portrait painted by direct administrators of the Forward Policy; the savage but honourable warriors seen by soldiers of the British army in the wars of expansion; the loyal and gentlemanly Pathans presented by the agents of indirect rule." (Frontier Perspectives: Essays in Comparative Anthropology)

These various pictures of the Pakhtuns by the colonial masters need to be put in proper context. If one seriously wants to understand the Pakhtun society, one must be careful in accepting the colonial writings as authentic. Lindholm further writes, "These pictures are drawn by distinct individuals, but they are also obviously a reflection of particular historical colonial situations."

What are these "particular historical colonial situations"? It is, candidly speaking, a vigorous claim to and belief in the spatio-temporal centrism of Europe. But one has every right to "question the prioritisation of any single centre…. There's no place outside ourselves, or outside whatever it is that we wish to study or move, that can serve as our foundation." (Beverley Southgate) Only belief in cultural irreducibility and de-centrism will help us in appreciating the Pakhtun society in its own right.

The Anglo-Pakhtun wars make an interesting but difficult area of study and research. The colonial masters found the Pakhtuns difficult to subjugate. The latter were decidedly ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of their freedom. They fought in the defence of their homeland. Of course, they were stern in resistance. But their resistance, although violent, cannot be directly attributed to their nature as is interpreted by the colonialists and orientalists. The Pakhtuns were not superstitious, fanatics, or warlike. They were clearer in their strategy and fought out of the spirit of freedom. Wars were imposed upon them. They were not, after all, aggressors. Pakhto tappa, a genre of folklore, testifies this argument.

They (the colonisers) fight in the heart of the village

Get up now you coward, so that I can gird your lions

The Pakhtuns are heroic but their heroism is generally construed in an inappropriate way. Professor A. H. Dani has also not dealt it in a just way. His analysis of the Pakhtuns is not something in which he approaches the development of civilisation in Gandhara (the land of the Pakhtuns). But, still, he seems nearer the point than the orientalists as he sees Pakhtuns' resistance to empire builders and aggressors out of their "sense of freedom".

Charles Lindholm, on the contrary, writes that, "when the Pathans were conquered, and the British attempted to show their mastery, a different aspect of the Pathan was revealed." He is of the view that the Pakhtuns' social system made them resolute to resist the British. This system, according to Lindholm, "operates for a balancing of parties. One is never defeated by the other". He further explains the Anglo-Pakhtun tension in the same way. "Two different systems of values were at complete loggerheads in this situation: the social lineage organisation with its intrinsic hatred of domination and its polity of individualism and betrayal, contra the British class system with its ethos of elitism and its values of fair play and cultural superiority."

Lindholm's analysis of the Pakhtun society is based on his approach and, therefore, hardly represents the insiders' perceptions and understandings. The Pakhtun society is, no doubt, egalitarian but it is by no means hostile to central authority. Pakhtuns like order and peace. They pay respect to their elders and leaders. Pakhto folklore testifies this view. No single evidence can be presented which is spoken out of contempt for authority and leader.

The pakhtuns wholeheartedly accept a person as their leader and consider acquiescence to him as obligatory provided he deserves the privilege. A tappa praises Ahmad Shah Abdali's leadership:

Sons may be borne by any mother

But very few will be borne to equal Ahmad Shah

A Pakhto couplet says:

Leadership is claimed by many

But a few deserve to have the honour

Pakhto folk poetry also disproves Lindholm's viewpoint that the Pakhtuns opposed the British in line with their social lineage system. The Pakhtuns resisted them as per their obligatory nang-e-Pukhtana which kept them uneasy with the aggressors.

The British's claim as the "harbingers of the benefits of civilizations" as well as their oppressive policies failed to awe the Pakhtuns. The latter, thus, remained involved in a series of imposed wars. This phenomena needs to be taken out of the established colonial frame of reference into a new discourse. It should no longer be dealt as something specific to the Great Game of nineteenth and twentieth centuries; rather it must also be approached as a people's history.

In certain sections of Pakistani society anti-Americanism seems to be rising. The feeling of hatred for the US exists historically in the country because of certain factors. More recently, a fresh debate has started on the US role in the region, especially after the controversial US aid coming into Pakistan in the form of Kerry-Lugar Act. The aid package was approved by the US Senate in September last year and signed as law by President Barack Obama in mid October.

The US and Pakistan governments should work together diplomatically and politically to deal with a situation coming out from anti-US sentiments. That can be done with employing good-governance to stop the silent majority of the country from seeing the aid as something bad for Pakistan.

The coming years seem to be tough for the US in this region. One way out of this situation is to ensure that affected people get the benefits of welfare projects. Certain religio-political elements, who do not see the Kerry-Lugar Act as something helpful for Pakistan, have taken to the streets with their usual "Go America go" slogans. For many, this situation has been created to make a political statement. Americans' official vehicles were stopped at various check points on the main roads in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore, which is an ordinary thing but the issue was highlighted in the press, creating ambiguities.

The Legatum Institute, a London-based think tank, has also recently produced a survey indicating that Pakistan is likely to become a more Islamist state and increasingly anti-American in the coming years. "Rather than an Islamist takeover, you should look at a subtle power shift from a secular pro-Western society to an Islamist anti-American one," said Jonathan Paris, who produced the report.

There are multiple factors of this rising anti-Americanism in Pakistan. This is intentional and also unintentional. Many people, unintentionally seeing the history of US policies in Pakistan and in this region, believe that US is doing wrong. They also believe that the culture of both nations is different. They agree with democracy and constitutionalism of US but not their culture. And this is also because of the US itself. US policies have worked to make people hate them.

Still, the US role in helping thousands of people affected by the earthquake of 2005 is appreciated. There were many US camps in Pakistani Administered Kashmir, which provided relief to the quake-hit victims. The US can develop goodwill with the people at the grassroots level by contacting them at the local level.

To some, the anti-US propaganda is deliberate. They believe that the US is not playing a constructive role in Afghanistan. They think that the US is not serious in helping Pakistan and India resolve the Kashmir issue, etc. These are the fears that emanate from the past.

Iran is another example. When in 1970s, the US issued more than 8,000 diplomatic passports to his citizens that created a serious problem. Such things started creating misperceptions in the Iranian society. In Pakistan, political discourse is dominantly religious. Vernacular media (Urdu media) and the political forces in the opposition also fan anti-American sentiments to gain political benefits.

In this situation, the growing anti-Americanism in the country and expanding American infrastructure, in the form of expanding embassy and consulates and bringing more staff for streamlining the Kerry-Lugar aid would be giving a tough time to the US policymakers in the coming few years.

If the situation remains the same, there is a possibility of rising misunderstandings between the two societies. The US will have to play a positive role. The government of Pakistan, which is at the receiving end, needs to deliver the goods to generate goodwill. Otherwise, the trust deficit between the people of Pakistan and the US will continue to increase. Ultimately, it will also be very difficult for the Pakistan government to not standby with the people. A strong commitment on the part of the two governments is required to deliver to the people so that the conflict is resolved.

There seems to be no strategy in place to deal with this issue through a discourse. The spending of billions of US dollars will make a difference only if it addresses the problems of the common people. A lot will depend on how this aid is spent. There is a need for preparing a comprehensive strategy to deliver the goods with good governance and administration by the government of Pakistan. Have the US and Pakistan governments prepared a system for proper utilisation of the aid? That is a serious question.