analysis
On the foreign side
In Pakistan's foreign policy, overriding emphasis has remained on protecting its territorial integrity -- the security narrative has become synonymous with the overall foreign policy vision rather than being treated as a mere subset
By Moeed Yusuf
The art of foreign policy making predates the modern nation state. Its critical considerations have remained largely unchanged over the centuries.

What gives constant headache to Washington
There are many disagreements within the US policy making circles as Pakistan remains a conundrum
By Ammar Jan
It is now clear that the biggest foreign policy challenge for the Obama administration is what is now known in the official policy-making circles as the 'Af-Pak' region.

Convergence of interests?
Pakistan's relations with US are believed to be the best in recent years but there are certain grey areas
By Farah Zia
The fact that Pakistan's foreign policy is obsessed with India cannot be overemphasised. This has been the determining factor in all other relations that we have cultivated with other countries over the years. Once the security and defence paradigm was laid out, it was but natural for us to turn towards the Western bloc led by the United States. We needed a strong bulwark, nothing less than a superpower, which may get us our Kashmir and build up our military's strength. In return, we were willing to play any role to further US's global or regional needs.

Neighbourhood woes
Is Pakistan's representative government fully independent in shaping foreign policy decisions on India?
By Ather Naqvi
The Indian border security forces recently claimed to have repelled another firing foray from the Pakistan side of the international border in the Indian Occupied Kashmir. No wonder, given the knee-jerk reactions the two countries are prone to, the incident happens to be the fourth since the beginning of 2010. This incident can be taken as a microcosm of the broad contours of foreign policy the two countries formulate regarding each other. Hence, the question: Is Pakistan's foreign policy India-specific?

Pakistan's foreign policy has remained India-centered all along. Having as big a neighbour as India was not an enviable position, to begin with, nor did we try to mend fences. Little wonder, we only built relations with other countries if it suited our defence and security needs.

We've tried to match India, soldier for soldier, missile for missile, nuke for nuke, to the best of our ability in the little more than 60 years of our existence. As a security state, we made no attempt to make institutions or develop economically during this time.

Today, we stand at a juncture where the stakes of elected government in foreign policy-making are minimal to say the least. In a little more than a year, the president who had extended a hand of friendship to India and claimed to have made the no-first strike offer is forced to continue a hundred years war with India on Kashmir. So, who does the foreign office work under in Pakistan, is a legitimate question to ask. Are the democratic government and the military on the same page when it comes to relations with India or the United States, is the next logical question.

Of course, there is the contrary view that Pakistan, being a nascent democracy where civilian institutions are weak, must not attempt to meddle in foreign policy matters at this stage and try to strengthen itself first. There is another view that a foreign policy of another kind is impossible, considering the centrality of Kashmir issue in Indo-Pak relations.

Implicit in our Special Report today is the urge to break away from this set pattern of foreign policy-making. From the Afghan policy of the 1980s to the incidents of 9/11 in the United States to the unmitigated suicide attacks in Pakistan, the turn of events demands that we try and re-determine the contours of our foreign policy and make it more development- and economy- and people-driven than it is at the moment.

The art of foreign policy making predates the modern nation state. Its critical considerations have remained largely unchanged over the centuries.

Realpolitik dictates inter-state conduct. Emanating directly from the realist school of thought in international relations, countries seek to pursue their self-interests at the cost of others. These foreign policy interests are self-defined and among others subsume security, geographical, economic, ideological, and cultural concerns. The importance accorded to these varies from country to country and even differs across relationships of a particular state.

Pakistan's foreign policy mechanism is anomalous to the theoretical formulation presented above in many ways. For one, the country has survived on a very narrow policy base. The entire outlook is primarily reflective of two concerns: security and ideology. Overriding emphasis has remained on protecting Pakistan's territorial integrity; the security narrative has become synonymous with the overall foreign policy vision rather than being treated as a mere subset. Hardly surprising then is the fact that the monopoly of the Foreign Service bureaucracy on providing policy direction and input on external relations is undermined by the excessive interference from the security establishment.

The salience of the security aspect can be traced back right to the beginning. The circumstances in which the country was created, the territorial threat from the east and the relative strength of the military as an institution ensured an India-centric view of the world and an upper hand for the military in determining the policy towards New Delhi.

The early days set the tone. The country's foreign policy remains obsessed with India. Pakistan's claim on Kashmir has preoccupied much of the thinking and the overall Pakistan-India relationship has been held hostage to this issue for decades. Further, while New Delhi's designs to dismember Pakistan (again) have subsided in recent years, there is still a firm belief – justified in my view – that India wishes to relegate Pakistan to the status of a weak, pliant state. Armed conflict remains a realistic possibility; this justifies the relatively high defense spending as well as the predominance of the military establishment in the society writ large.

The security establishment's intrusion notwithstanding, the India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir has had a fair bit of consensus across the country. Even within the Foreign Office, the Kashmir policy has continued to find support from most relevant quarters. In terms of popular appeal, much of Punjab, Karachi, and a large part of NWFP have remained wary of Indian designs through the years. While citizens in interior Sindh and Balochistan may feel differently, the demographic spread implies that the latter can be considered exceptions in this case.

Virtually all other critical relationships (but the ones dictated by ideological concerns) flow from the establishment's India-centric vision. Pakistan reached out to the US in the early years to balance against the then pro-Soviet India. Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) were essentially treated as a hedge to counter the much stronger Indian defense capabilities. Even though the upturns in Pak-US relations were not triggered directly by concerns about India, Pakistan has always used America's willingness to goad New Delhi to negotiate with Pakistan on its terms as the ultimate benchmark of US sincerity towards Pakistan. In fact, in the post-9/11 scenario, America's reluctance to do so is one of the biggest factors that have cost it Pakistan's all-out support.

The Sino-Pakistan relationship is no different. China has been viewed as the principal buffer vis-à-vis the Indian threat. Indeed, the all-weather friendship has borne substantial dividends in terms of creating a regional power balance as well as providing Pakistan with strategic and economic support.

The second major limb of the country's foreign policy has been the outreach to the Muslim ummah. Driven primarily by the Foreign Office in this case and based largely on ideological grounds, successive governments have seen it fit for Pakistan to pose as a torch bearer of the Muslim world. Owing partly to the basis of its creation – Pakistan and Israel are the only two recently created states formally meant to protect the religious freedoms of a minority – Islamabad has always been at the fore of defending various Muslim causes. The outreach to much of the Muslim world is based on this conviction. The ideological affinity is not limited to the obvious cases -- Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, etc. Rather, it has dictated policy even in regions where Pakistan's presence is otherwise negligible. Africa is a case in point where the stronger relationships are heavily skewed towards the 'green' parts of the continent.

Perhaps the biggest failing – this is also the key digression from the trend followed by the most successful of countries – has been Pakistan's inability to lend the economic aspect its due importance. The security-centered mindset has impacted the institutional thinking such that the economic angle of foreign policy making has always played second fiddle. Barring a handful of exceptions, much of the trade takes place with countries that feature prominently in either the ideological or the security framework.

What is described above is applicable to Pakistan's entire history as the underlying principles that have informed Pakistani foreign policy have remained constant. From periods where Pakistan was in the limelight in global affairs to those when it slid into relative obscurity, the security-centric vision and the Muslim connection have remained important.

The present is no different.

To cite an example, the India-centric outlook can be found in the seemingly unrelated US-Pakistan equation at the moment.

Despite having been forced to the forefront of global terrorism and having secured the position of a frontline US ally, the strategic narrative has remained unchanged, that is unless the Indian threat is tamed, Pakistan cannot afford to divert its attention fully to the Western border. The desire to hedge the bets vis-à-vis Afghanistan also flow from the need for a pliant Afghanistan, which in turn ties up with the importance of a calm western border that will allow Islamabad to focus eastward. Finally, Pakistan's repeated demands for enhanced defense cooperation and deals like nuclear energy technology sharing are also justified by the 'right' to seek parity with the Indo-US relationship.

Finally, a word about the future is in order.

The structural premise on which the country's foreign policy is based will remain unaltered unless the India equation normalises. This demands a mutually acceptable solution to Kashmir followed by a sustained period of relative peace between the two sides. Should this happen, it will be a game changer. The imbalance between the emphasis on the security and ideology and the economic aspect will be corrected in the latter's favour. The Foreign Service bureaucracy would then also regain some of its turf from the khakis.

Barring such a change however, no paradigm shift can be expected. While pressures such as globalisation and the realisation that an India obsession can no longer be sustained may allow the policy base to become broader gradually, the move away from the status quo in this case will be a slow and limited one.

It is now clear that the biggest foreign policy challenge for the Obama administration is what is now known in the official policy-making circles as the 'Af-Pak' region.

This term has been coined due to a realisation in Washington that the two countries are intrinsically linked to each other and any strategy for one country will have repercussions for the other. The problem, however, is compounded not only by the failure of the US administration to establish a credible governing structure in Afghanistan, but also by the increasingly volatile situation in Pakistan -- a country that was famously called the most "dangerous place in the world" by the Newsweek magazine.

It is therefore not a coincidence that the Obama administration kept the issue of 'Af-Pak' its number one priority as it attempted to rectify US foreign policy disasters during the Bush administration. Some of the salient features of the new policy formulated by this administration include a military surge with a fixed timeline for July 2011, increasing counter-terrorism efforts with the Afghan and the Pakistani governments, support to the civilian set-up in Pakistan and pushing for peace between India and Pakistan.

In articulating such a policy, the Obama administration has attempted to pacify a domestic audience wary of the war and the economic crisis -- with 60 percent supporting a quick exit strategy. At the same time the surge could also act to diminish the criticism from hawks in Washington who usually tend to perceive the democratic party as being weak on 'national security'.

What is important for us in Pakistan to understand is that Washington is still failing to find a coherent policy for the region that we could rely on. It is true that the US establishment always looks at its own interests. However, that does not mean that there are no sharp policy differences on how to best pursue those goals. Even before President Obama announced his 'Af-Pak' policy in December 2009, Matthew Hoh, an official in the Obama administration, announced his resignation over his differences on the Afghan policy.

Hon argued that the hawkish policy makers in Washington are refusing to study the complications on the ground and their reckless policies would lead to a bigger problem -- the de-stablisation of nuclear-armed Pakistan.

A similar dissent was articulated by the former CIA station chief in Kabul Graham Fuller who felt that the US administration remains insensitive to local concerns and will only end up with a bigger disaster as the war spreads to Pakistan.

On the other hand, analysts like Ahmad Rashid argue that fixing a deadline will now give the Taliban an opportunity to lay low until July 2011, and a refusal to commit beyond this deadline could result in a deadly Taliban resurgence engulfing Pakistan. Ahmad Rashid had earlier also called on the US for pressuring India for peace talks with the new Pakistani government.

It is believed that a substantial peace settlement with India will encourage the Pakistani establishment to give up its 'strategic depth' policy that continues to haunt the region. Although a beleaguered Pakistani government has attempted to initiate peace talks, the Indian government has so far resisted pressure from Washington insisting that Pakistan should first dismantle the jihadi infrastructure that it blames for the Kashmir insurgency.

The sham elections held in Afghanistan under the nose of the Nato occupation and the deteriorating situation of the civilian set-up in Pakistan due to contradictions emerging within the state-apparatus are causes for more headache for Washington. Although it is claimed that the US has now learnt its lesson of not supporting military dictatorships, we should keep in mind that the national interest remains the only guideline for policy makers and all other principles are subject to change. We should not forget that Benazir Bhutto was the first Pakistani Prime Minister who was invited to address the US Congress in 1989 and the then President George H. Bush had declared America's unflinching commitment to democracy in Pakistan.

Only a little over a decade, the US was supplying billions of dollars to stabilise a dictatorial government in Pakistan. Even right now, the US remains the only country in the northern hemisphere to have openly supported a military coup in Honduras, which once again goes to show that noble ideals are subservient to narrow national interests.

What is important to grasp is that there are many disagreements within the US policy making circles as this region remains a conundrum in Washington. The recent declaration by Senator John McCain that drone attacks remain America's best weapon demonstrates that the only hegemonic super power may end up resorting to brutal, naked force, much like it did in Vietnam.

However, such a scenario seems unlikely due to the crippling economic crises and the American public's frustration over Washington's foreign commitments.

For us in Pakistan, it is important to realise that we must formulate a well-thought out and independent foreign policy that caters well to our interests rather than depending on support from abroad. The strengthening of democracy, an end to the disastrous strategic depth policy, peace with India and a strong commitment to fight terror should be the hallmarks of our internal and external policy without much regard to the changing strategy in Washington. After all, the US may simply walk out of the region in 2011 like it did in 1989, but if things fall apart in the region, it will be us who will be the primary victims of such a catastrophe.

The fact that Pakistan's foreign policy is obsessed with India cannot be overemphasised. This has been the determining factor in all other relations that we have cultivated with other countries over the years. Once the security and defence paradigm was laid out, it was but natural for us to turn towards the Western bloc led by the United States. We needed a strong bulwark, nothing less than a superpower, which may get us our Kashmir and build up our military's strength. In return, we were willing to play any role to further US's global or regional needs.

The current phase of Pak-US relations involves a partnership in the war on terror that both countries are actively fighting. The threats to our internal security from terrorism mean that our interests converge. Or do they?

Pakistan's relations with the United States are believed to be the best in recent years. At least one of the recent visiting US senators, Senator Liebermann, claimed that Pak-US relations have never been this better in his 21 years as a senator. The senators have described Pakistanis as good partners in the war on terror and appear particularly impressed with the military's fight against the terrorists. They have especially noted that the relations enjoyed by the two countries at government to government, military to military and people to people level have never been better.

Beyond this look-good approach on both sides, where each side claims to be working on mutual and shared interests and recognises that differences are but natural and there is tension even among friends, there is indeed a lack of trust and some grey areas.

It is true that after a long time the civilian government and the military in Pakistan are working closely in the 'war on terror' and taking decisions collectively, the US government appears to be sometimes working with the military in Pakistan (as is evident from the visiting US officials meetings); at other times it appears to be interacting directly with the people, like for instance in the recently implemented Enhanced Security Screenings for Pakistanis.

The Democrats, indeed, tried to learn from the mistakes of the Republicans and found better ways to engage with Pakistan. Despite all the military assistance given to Pakistan during the Musharraf regime, they did not get the desired results; hence the announcement of the Enhanced Partnership Act (better known as Kerry Lugar Act) to invest in the country's development needs. But the legislation itself brought to the fore the underlying tensions that were articulated in a rather crude manner. The US concerns about the "alleged diversion of military and economic assistance" and "non-transparency" in the way it was utilised earlier on were built in as monitoring and certification clauses in the Kerry Lugar Bill. Of course there was this sense in the United States that the rogue elements in the Pakistani state were not willing to eliminate terrorists.

The reaction in Pakistan from the opposition, played up by the media, was unexpected. It culminated, naturally, in the visit of no less than the US secretary of State as a damage control exercise. The issue highlighted the fissures in the various institutions of Pakistan.

United States is convinced that the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan have overlapping links and it is not possible to defeat one without the other. Even though the recently visiting senators claimed that a greater understanding developed between the two countries on this, truth is that Pakistan has not made any commitment to start a military action in North Waziristan as per the US demand.

The sense in Pakistan that it is unduly suffering for supporting the US is accentuated by the unmanned drone attacks launched by the US for the last many years to target high valued al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists who they believe are sitting in the tribal areas of Pakistan and planning attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan has asked for the drone technology so that Pakistan can itself launch these attacks; their selling point of course is that this will reduce anti-Americanism. The Americans, so far, have refused to give in.

Finally, Pakistan wants the United States to help it achieve some sort of parity with India. The US could convince India to start the composite dialogue with Pakistan again. It could mitigate Pakistan's concerns about Indian presence in Afghanistan or say or do something about India's involvement in Balochistan as alleged by Pakistan. It could respond to Indian army chief's remarks about starting a limited war with Pakistan. And lastly, it could announce a transfer of civilian nuclear technology to Pakistan the way it has done to India.

The grey areas abound and so does the willingness to move ahead together.

The News on Sunday: Who formulates Pakistan's foreign policy?

Hasan-Askari Rizvi: On key foreign policy and security issues -- like India, Afghanistan, war on terrorism, nuclear policy and the US -- the military and ISI provides the decisive input. The foreign office gives some recommendations to the security establishment (military top brass and ISI), which may be modified through mutual consultation. The security establishment resents unilateral decision making in the above areas of foreign policy by the foreign office. However, the foreign office and other civilian players have a lot of freedom in managing Pakistan's relations with African and Latin American states and, to some extent, the Middle East.

TNS: What are main concerns that shape the country's foreign policy?

HAR: Traditionally, Pakistan's foreign policy has been security-driven. External security was the major concern shaping Pakistan's foreign policy. This priority continues to dominate Pakistan's foreign policy. Now, security also covers terrorism that has become the most serious threat to the country's internal coherence and stability. Economic and social development is the second priority.

TNS: What is the role of the political government and the military establishment in defining India and US policy?

HAR: The civilian government and the military establishment have developed some differences on India and US policy. Currently, Zardari is attempting to remove the perception of the military top brass that he is unnecessarily soft towards India. The military views President Zardari as making statements that question the military-backed approach towards India. For example, President Zardari's statement in an address via satellite to a seminar in New Delhi that Pakistan would be willing to adopt the "no-first use" policy in the nuclear domain conflicted with the established Pakistani policy on the issue.

The military top brass were perturbed by military and ISI-related provisions in the Kerry-Lugar bill (US-Pakistan Enhanced Partnership Act, 2009). They thought that President Zardari and Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqqni, were instrumental in the inclusion of such provisions in the bill because they wanted to use the American cover to interfere with the military's internal organisational matters.

TNS: How would you describe Pakistan's relations with the United States and India (Kashmir) at the moment? Is there a scope for improvement there?

HAR: Pakistan and the United States have good working relations and they share many issues and goals relating to the region and the rest of the world. They do differ on some issues but this does not adversely affect the overall positive direction of their multifaceted relations.

Pakistan's relations with India are stalemated since the terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008. India has reduced the whole gamut of its Pakistan-India relations to Pakistan -- to satisfying India on terrorism, and has also used the Mumbai incident to do propaganda against Pakistan at the international level. Its attempt to get Pakistan designated as a terrorist state have not succeeded, so far. India brushes aside Pakistani suggestion to revive the composite dialogue between the two countries in eight areas, including terrorism.

TNS: What in your view are the problem areas in the relations between Pakistan and United States?

HAR: Pakistan and the US share the goal of countering terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they diverge on the detailed strategies to pursue this objective. The US views Pakistan as part of the problem as well as the solution. The main problem areas in their relations are: (1) Drone aircraft attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas. (2) How to deal with the Taliban groups based in North Waziristan that focus exclusively on Afghanistan for their violent activities. The recent killing of seven CIA agents in Khost in a suicide attack by a Jordanian who was said to have linkages with Pakistan-based Taliban groups, especially the TTP leadership, has fixed American attention on North Waziristan. (3) New checking-procedures for the Pakistani arriving at US airports. Some of the passengers are subjected to humiliating inspection and questioning. (4) US insensitivity to Pakistan's concerns about India's active presence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's civilian government and the military are working closely for countering terrorism since April 2009 when they launched the security operation in Swat/Malakand. However, their priority is to first take action against the Taliban groups that directly challenge the writ of the Pakistan state and dispatch suicide bombers to urban centres in mainland Pakistan. The army does not have the capacity to stay engaged at four fronts simultaneously: keep troops on the India-Pakistan border in view of Indian pressure; fight various Taliban groups in different tribal agencies; take action against the groups identified by US in North Waziristan; and opt for tough action against the Punjab-based militant groups that either engage in sectarian violence in Pakistan or operate in Indian-administered Kashmir.

TNS: How do you view Pakistan's relations with India? How much element of truth do you see in Pakistan's allegations about India meddling in Balochistan?

HAR: The Pakistan government has not provided concrete evidence for Indian interference in Balochistan, yet. However, some of the Baloch nationalist leaders are residing in Kabul who could easily interact with India in Afghanistan and get some financial and political support. Given the nature of troubled Pakistan-India relations, India may like to score equal with Pakistan by helping dissidents' movement in Balochistan in response to Pakistani support to insurgency in Indian administered Kashmir. So, the possibility cannot be ruled out. But, Pakistan would have to give solid proof instead of merely alleging India of this.

TNS: How do you view the US policy in the region? Can it afford to deal with Pakistan and Afghanistan separately? Can it play a role in mending relations between India and Pakistan?

HAR: The US cannot separate Pakistan from Afghanistan -- for coping with terrorism in Afghanistan and stabilising that country. However, there are clear differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has more potential to become a stable and democratic country than Afghanistan. Pakistan has political and state institutions and a tradition of electoral democracy. Its institutions and processes need to be strengthened and their performance improved. In Afghanistan the state and political institutions have to be created. The US faces far more serious challenges in Afghanistan.

The US can encourage India to revive the suspended composite dialogue with Pakistan. However, there is no evidence available to suggest if the US will press India hard on this issue or accommodate Pakistani concern about Indian presence in Afghanistan.

TNS: Your views on the way Kerry Lugar Act was handled internally in Pakistan.

HAR: The Pakistan government was unable to defend the contentious provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Act and the opposition took the advantage of the prevalent anti-US sentiments in the society to malign the government. Most fears of the opposition about the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Act were misplaced and self-serving in Pakistan's domestic politics.

The News on Sunday: What in your view are the cornerstones of Pakistan's foreign policy? Is it only security-driven or do economics and development also play a part in policy formulations?

Asif Ezdi: The two foremost goals of Pakistan's foreign policy are to safeguard and strengthen national security and to promote the country's economic interests. These goals are not very different from those of other countries of the world. How a country seeks to achieve them is determined by its geopolitical environment. For Pakistan, this environment has been extremely challenging throughout our history.

The foremost external challenge that we have been facing since Independence is the threat from India. This has been a constant despite the radical changes on the geopolitical landscape over this period, such as the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and globalisation. There have been three wars with India, one of which resulted in Pakistan's dismemberment. Besides, there were also several near-war situations in 1986-87, 1999 and 2002.

Neutralising and managing this threat will remain a cornerstone of our foreign policy. But national security requires not only a credible deterrent capacity but also economic strength and resilience. We need a stable, peaceful and secure regional and international environment in which the country can achieve economic and social development.

TNS: Who is taking decisions on foreign policy? Is the foreign office working for the political government or the military establishment?

AE: Policy decisions on all matters are the responsibility of the political government and of the competent ministries. But because of the history of successive periods of army rule in Pakistan, the military came to have a lot of say in foreign policy. This is not compatible with a democratic system.

TNS: Do you see a discord between the political government and the military establishment on Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis India and United States?

AE: I would put it differently. There are two problems. First, Zardari has assumed decision-making power over matters that under the constitution lie with the prime minister who is the head of government. Second, Zardari decides on these matters, including policy towards India and US, not through the established institutions that exist for this purpose but in consultation with a small circle of close personal friends. This means that the views of the foreign ministry and the defence establishment on vital foreign and security policy issues are often not sought or taken into account. The result is the kind of muddle we saw following the terrorist attacks in Bombay and over the Kerry-Lugar Act. This is not good governance.

The mess over the handling of the Kerry-Lugar Act was caused by the fact that the foreign ministry and the defence establishment were deliberately bypassed by Zardari, while the prime minister abdicated his responsibility and left matters to Zardari. There was also plenty of incompetence in evidence. We have an embassy in Washington and a very well-paid lobbyist there. They seem to have been either in the dark about the discussions on the Act in Washington or they failed to inform Islamabad. So we had the spectacle of the government first acclaiming the Act, then declaring it to be unsatisfactory and then once again saying that it is an excellent piece of legislation, all in quick succession, although not a comma in the law was changed. The whole episode reflects poorly on the government.

TNS: There is a view that the nascent political setup must not meddle in foreign policy issues and concentrate on strengthening the political institutions instead. Is it possible to separate foreign policy from the situation internally?

AE: Foreign policy is as much a responsibility of the political government as domestic policy is. The government cannot surrender this task to an unelected institution. But sound decision-making requires that the government should give due consideration to the views and inputs of all concerned institutions. The present government has often not done so.

TNS: How do you view Pakistan's relations with US and India?

AE: Pakistan's relations with US have gone through ups and downs, depending on what role Pakistan can play in Washington's pursuit of its global and regional policy goals. At present, these relations are not bad at all. This is because of US involvement in Afghanistan. TheUS needs Pakistan's cooperation to win this war, which is a matter of the highest priority for Washington. That is why it has been willing to provide economic assistance. Obama has also offered a long-term strategic partnership of great potential to Pakistan. As long as this war is going on, Pakistan has a certain importance for the US. We must use this temporary leverage to gain some long-term advantage. The government should be pressing Washington for a deal on civilian nuclear cooperation of the kind Bush gave to India.

As regards our relations with India, I am not very optimistic. India is not willing to give the Kashmiri people their right to self-determination. Moreover, India now aspires to playing the role of a global power. For this purpose, it seeks first to dominate its neighbours. Unless India changes this attitude, I do not see much chance of a normal good-neighbourly relationship between Pakistan and India. That is an unfortunate fact of life but it is not tragic. Pakistan has the strength and resilience to hold its ground. We are also a country with great economic potential if the country's human resources are properly harnessed.

TNS: Do you think Pakistan's foreign policy is US and India-centric? Is it sufficiently focused on China and the Muslim world?

AE: The US is a superpower with a global presence and reach. It has recently been taking a heightened interest in South Asia. Today, it is also engaged in a difficult war in our immediate neighbourhood. Our ties with Washington are therefore very important for us. India is a large neighbour with regional and global ambitions. Managing our relations with Delhi to moderate its hostility is a matter of high priority. That does not make our policy US-centric or India-centric.

It is also not correct to say that we have not focused sufficiently on China and the Muslim world. Our relationship with China has been a keystone of our foreign policy. It is a very important factor for the stability of South Asia and will remain so. During his visit to China last year, the US president also indirectly acknowledged China's stabilising role in our region.

Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world, which are founded in our common faith, have been close. There is considerable potential for the expansion of our economic ties that needs to be tapped, especially investment by the Gulf States.

-- TNS interview

Neighbourhood woes

The Indian border security forces recently claimed to have repelled another firing foray from the Pakistan side of the international border in the Indian Occupied Kashmir. No wonder, given the knee-jerk reactions the two countries are prone to, the incident happens to be the fourth since the beginning of 2010. This incident can be taken as a microcosm of the broad contours of foreign policy the two countries formulate regarding each other. Hence, the question: Is Pakistan's foreign policy India-specific?

Since foreign policy making is explained as an objective exercise by a representative government for safeguarding interests of the state, the definition may not hold completely true in case of Pak-India relations where the baggage of history, nationalism, radicalism, and military regimes etc, have reflected on the making of foreign policy.

A more recent example of how vulnerable foreign policy options for India and Pakistan governments are is the statement by Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor that the Indian military was ready to take on both China and Pakistan simultaneously. Whether the assertion was quoted out of context or whether it, as some Pakistani hawks would have us believe, blew the lid off India's intentions is debatable. But it has proved one thing, shaping of foreign policy on either side of the border is not solely determined by the respective foreign ministries.

Another comparatively recent factor of foreign policy in Pakistan, which also takes India in its fold, is terrorism. Understandably, Pakistan's policy options with respect to India seem to be deeply linked with whatever is happening in Afghanistan. Recently, Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani conveyed his reservations to the visiting British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in Islamabad about the inclusion of India in the Afghan Council proposed by UK, saying India might use it for "subversive activities in Pakistan".

While Pakistan sees India's involvement in helping the Taliban, India traces footprints of Pakistan's secret services in the attack on its diplomatic mission in Kabul. The blame game continues -- to limit foreign policy options for both the countries. In this picture, China sits well with Pakistan and manages to exert great influence in forming its policies vis-à-vis India.

So, who is actually in charge when it comes to relations with India or China? In theory, it is the foreign office and the ministry for foreign affairs; in practice that may not be the case. There are various factors at work when the two countries are framing their policies. For instance, there is a general consensus that the thaw in relations between India and Pakistan in the early 1999 created an environment whereby the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Lahore and talked peace at a time when Pakistan had tested its nuclear weapons in May 1998, closely following India. A few months later, the same year, the two countries fought each other in a fierce battle at Kargil.

How far we are dependent on foreign powers in making our foreign policy decisions about India is amply illustrated by the fact that we have more than once called for mediation by a third party in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. While India has always balked at the idea, we have been dangling between the UN resolutions and, when that seems a distant possibility, a third party role such as the US that can help the two sides resolve the decades-old issue. The potential of bilateral trade is put on the back-burner.

From the start, Kashmir has remained the cornerstone of the two countries' foreign policies, more so for Pakistan where elected representatives have had little say in the making of foreign policy. Jinnah, to begin with, was well aware of the centrality of Kashmir in the development of friendly relations, or otherwise, between the two South Asian states. Whether he was able to exercise influence over the changes that took place in Kashmir immediately before and after the creation of Pakistan is another debate.

Pakistan's foreign policy for India is determined, or at least influenced, by the 'establishment' having the army and secret agencies in its fold. Some would go as far as establishing a direct link between the Pentagon and the GHQ in formulating policies related to the security of the state, even if that means bypassing or ignoring the foreign office.

While military regimes, such as those of General Ayub Khan and General Musharraf, tried to leave their imprint on Pakistan's relations with India -- in the Tashkent Declaration (January 1966), and Agra Summit (July 2001) -- political leaders have also taken major foreign policy steps with regard to India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, for instance, in his capacity as the President of Pakistan had inked Simla Agreement with India in 1972.

In retrospect, it appears each step taken to mend fences with India through foreign policy decisions actually produced the opposite results. For example, attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 took place only a few months after the Agra Summit and followed by troops surge at the international border between India and Pakistan. Mumbai attack was certainly another attempt by non-state actors to dictate foreign policy decisions to both the states.

In such a situation, there is all the more reason for the two countries to be on guard against war-mongers and abstain from self-contradictory statements. President Asif Ali Zardari, soon after he took oath as the President of Pakistan in September 2008, promised some "good news" on the Kashmir issue. Hardly a year and a few months later, he is determined to fight a war over Kashmir for "a thousand years". Claim over water and the issue of dams are also major determinants of foreign policy. The elected leadership of these two countries will have to remain persistent in trying to regain their independence in foreign policy making. Consistency is the key here.