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peace force Battlefield
of ignorance, poverty issue Fuel
fuss Labyrinth
of extremism conflict
Time to move on After the recent LoC fiasco, there has to be long-term commitment and readiness to install shock absorbing measures as the trust grows gradually and not without dangerous chances of reversal By Raza Rumi The recent
escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan comes after an
uninterrupted peace process for two years during which both the countries
made a substantial progress in burying the hatchet and moving on. For many
cynics, hawks, and naysayers on both sides, events of 2012 were alarming.
Beyond the regular continuation of high-level parleys, three concrete
achievements were made in the bilateral relations. First, the hardline
position on terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir dispute by India and Pakistan
was pushed and amended to achieve an atmosphere conducive to dialogue.
India showed flexibility on its rigid position on the ghastly Mumbai
attacks of 2008; and Pakistan showed maturity in admitting Pakistani
citizens had crossed into India and were part of the larger plan to cause
mayhem in Mumbai. More importantly, the festering dispute of Jammu and
Kashmir was relegated to one of the more difficult issues to be dealt in
the future. Secondly, Pakistan did
the unthinkable by announcing it would grant the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN)
status to India for the purposes of trade. Satisfactory progress on this
front also took place during 2012 and the trade liberalisation is already
underway generating more and more stakes into the peace process. Third, the visa accord
signed between India and Pakistan changed the cold war culture created by
both the states since 1965. In particular, visa liberalisation for
businessman, setting up of banks in both the countries and allowing
investments was a historic landmark. By the end of 2012, it
was believed that a new beginning had been made and the peace process was
immune to the cyclical shocks, which are embedded in history and the
culture of this region. However, the start of 2013 belied this optimism
and the incidents on the Line of Control (LoC) have once again pushed the
two countries into an uncertain phase where the future trajectory of
bilateral cooperation and confidence-building seems jeopardised. Firing across the LoC
has resulted in the deaths of Pakistani and Indian soldiers. Since 2003,
when the LoC ceasefire was agreed, this comes as a serious blow to the
peace. For nearly a month, escalation has continued with confrontation
being managed by the two governments which have shown some measure of
restraint but allowed non-state institutions such as the media to blow
things of out of proportion. This is truer for the Indian side where
sections of the media, especially television channels, sensationalised the
LoC crisis and undermined the efforts of the Indian government not to let
the crisis get out of control. Several sane voices in
India itself are agitating the issue. For instance, Amitabh Mattoo, also
an active member of the Track-II initiatives wrote: “… India’s
Pakistan policy is far too important to be left to TV anchors, with their
wars over TRPs and their penchant to appeal, often, to the lowest common
denominator of public opinion. Indeed strident debates in the Indian media
— frightening in their Manichaean simplicity — reflect a total lack of
appreciation of the intricacies of the Gordian knot of bilateral
relations” (No real business plan, Hindustan Times, January 16, 2013). But that is perhaps a
reflection of the ‘national confusion’ that exists in India over
Pakistan complicated by the communal question, the nationalist narrative
which views Pakistan as a historical ‘aberration’. Pakistan’s
existential angst is defined by India though it is undergoing a historic
shift due to years of flawed security and foreign policies and the
associated misgovernance within the country. There is an opportunity there
for India to engage and help Pakistan come out if it. More so in its own
interest to have a peaceful and stable region. However, short term
considerations have always overshadowed the need for long range policy
vision. Pakistan and its media
were embroiled in an internal political turmoil when the war drums were
being beaten across the border. A fast urbanising country with increased
civilian space is grappling with a state that has moved from one crisis to
another and is now haunted by its own jihadi assets. It would be a gross
exaggeration to say that the Pakistan military is following the
business-as-usual approach with respect to India given its tacit support
to the elected government in nurturing the peace process in the recent
past. Perhaps cynicism on Indian side about Pakistan runs deeper than we
know. Having said that the
peace constituency in Pakistan has grown and solidified and despite the
recent skirmishes and cooling off, the political parties are not repeating
the old tactic of one-upmanship on India policy. The politicians, smarter
than never before, know that they would be playing into the hands of
martial lobbies if they made conflict with India a populist cause. The unprecedented
consensus on peace with India is acknowledged by the neighbour, but not
fully appreciated for its historic nature. Pakistan’s political parties
of almost all varieties, the big business, most of media and civil society
are united in their resolve not to let this historic opportunity squander.
A decade ago, it would
be unthinkable to write the way Pakistan’s senior editor M Ziauddin
wrote on January 23 (An ‘unpatriotic’ column, Express Tribune): “I
confess that I find it almost impossible not to agree with the position
taken by India’s government, its people at large and its media,
generally over the recent ceasefire violations across the Line of Control
(LoC). Many of my countrymen would regard me as unpatriotic for even
harbouring such a thought.” In such a political
environment, India’s resolve to stay the course would be vital. It must
not let political expediency or the lunatic fringes overtake its policy
focus. Improving sixty-five years of bitterness would not be achieved in a
few years. There has to be long-term commitment and readiness to install
shock absorbing measures as the trust grows gradually and not without
dangerous chances of reversal. I was part of a recently
concluded Track-II dialogue (by Jinnah Institute, Pakistan and Centre for
Dialogue and Reconciliation, India) which made some pertinent
recommendations for improving the bilateral relations. The joint statement
issued by legislators, former diplomats, media-persons, policy experts and
academics highlighted the pending agenda which needs urgent attention. The
key notes were: “We appreciate that
2012 was a year of progress in Indo-Pak relations during which the
robustness of India-Pakistan dialogue was tested and despite challenges to
the process, considerable headway was made on issues of trade and visa
liberalisation; The political question
of Jammu and Kashmir remains unresolved. We urge that India and Pakistan
remain engaged and the four-point formula devised in 2006-7 should be used
as a basis for further dialogue; We urge that media be
given unfettered access on both sides. The governments must allow the
circulation of newspapers, distribution of television signals and increase
in the number of accredited journalists in both the countries; We recommend that visas
for journalists and their spouses should be facilitated without
unnecessary delays; We urge both the
governments to engage on the regional implications of the Nato pullout
from Afghanistan in 2014 through dialogue on regional cooperation; We recommend that
previously agreed proposals to resolve long-standing issues such as
Siachen and Sir Creek should be accepted immediately so that both the
countries can move forward in focusing on the core issues between the two
countries; We note that recent
incidents on the Line of Control (LoC) underline the need to reinforce the
2003 ceasefire agreement and recommend that new mechanisms be devised such
as increased demilitarised zones. There is an urgent need to reduce the
eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation on the LoC; We recommend that
roaming cellular facilities should be provided to the people of both the
countries;We recommend that culture, sports and humanitarian concerns
should be prioritised by both the countries in the bilateral parleys; We demand the resumption
of the suspended bus service and cross-LoC trade on Poonch-Rawalakot
route; the stranded passengers must be allowed to return from the same
route…” Let’s hope that
dialogues in both formal and non-formal spheres continue and help the two
nations deal with their historical baggage. It would be unacceptable if
the two countries continue to behave in an irresponsible manner. More
importantly, as a Pakistani, I want my country to take the lead and
immediately announce the MFN status to India and demonstrate that it means
business. Raza Rumi is a writer
and Director, Jinnah Institute, Islamabad. His writings are archived at
www.razarumi.com caption Eyeball-to-eyeball.
Photo by Rahat Dar
force The province of
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) are
no stranger to terrorism. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late
1979, KP and the adjoining seven tribal agencies known as Fata witnessed
many terrorist acts in the form of bombing and target killing.
Fortunately, this phenomenon did not last long, nor did it spread to other
parts of the country causing any serious disruption in law and order. In
this context, when the United States attacked Afghanistan in 2001, few
would have predicted that the deadly violence would engulf the whole
country with devastating impacts. Since 2006, Pakistan has
been engaged in battling strong insurgency in Fata and many parts of KP.
An expanding terrorist campaign targeting Pakistan’s major cities is
also linked to this insurgency. The growing number of attacks on sensitive
military installations like GHQ, Mehran Base, Kamara Base and more
recently attack on Peshawar Air Base underscores the dangerous nature of
the crisis. Many innocent Pakistanis, including members of LEAs (Law
enforcement Agencies) have lost their lives in many suicide attacks across
Pakistan. It is estimated that Pakistan has suffered more than 40,000
casualties in the war on terror so far. Besides Pakistan Army
and Frontier Corps, police, Frontier Constabulary, Levies and Khasadar
force also are engaged in counterinsurgency war against the militants in
KP and Fata. In this article, sacrifices and preparedness of these LEAs in
the war against the militants will be highlighted. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
police: When the terrorist
activities started in the province soon after 9/11, the KP police, then
called the Frontier police, was totally unprepared for the emerging
conflict. As the influence of militants spread from the adjoining tribal
areas into settled districts of the province, local police found
themselves confronting an unprecedented threat. Trained to apprehend
common criminals, police officers were confronted with a large number of
well-trained and heavily armed groups. The changing tactics and
targets of the various terrorist groups posed a formidable challenge to a
police force with limited resources, poor training, and inadequate
equipment. The officers of the KP police, however, showed exemplary
courage and bravery in fighting the faceless enemy. Officers right from
the rank of constable up to the Inspector General were martyred in the
line of duty. The following table will show the sacrifices of the KP
police. Many steps were taken by
the provincial government to strengthen the capacity of the KP police. In
2007, the KP police faced severe personnel shortages, for which the
government compensated by recruiting new officials and hiring individuals
on a contract basis wherever possible. In 2007, the total strength of the
KP police was 39,147 including all ranks, which was increased to 69,867 in
2010. Similarly, budgetary allocation was also increased substantially.
New weapons and equipment were also purchased. Special police units like
Elite Force, Quick Response Force (QRF), Bomb Disposal Unit and Special
Police Force were formed. Compensation for the martyred and injured police
officers was also raised quite substantially. Despite all these
measures, police still faces many problems like shortage of manpower and
vehicles, poor infrastructure and many logistic issues. Despite all the
difficulties, the officers and jawans of the KP police are performing
their duties with unflinching commitment, to respond to the daunting
challenge. Frontier Constabulary: The Frontier
Constabulary is a Federal Paramilitary Force which is largely drawn from
the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, but operates in all the provinces of
Pakistan. Frontier Constabulary was established by amalgamating Border
Military Police (BMP) and Samana Rifles in 1913. Both of these were
militia forces guarding the border between the then settled areas of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas. Frontier Constabulary’s main
function is to police the borders of KP and the tribal areas against
tribal incursions, criminal gangs operating across the border and check
the smuggling of contraband items. Frontier Constabulary
has also been in the forefront in counterinsurgency operation. Many jawans
and officers have been martyred while fighting the militants, including
its brave commandant, the legendary Sifwat Ghayur. A total of 240 officers
and jawans of Frontier Constabulary have so for been martyred since 2007. Khasadars and Levies: Khasadars and Levies
forces have also been performing their duties in Fata and Frontier
regions. These forces have also been on the targets of the militants.
Khasadari system was introduced in tribal areas by the British government
in 1921. Khasadar force is raised, in each tribal agency, from various
tribes in the agency on quota system fixed for Qaums (Tribes) who are
responsible for maintenance of law and order in their respective areas.
They carry their own weapons but are paid by political authorities. They
are appointed and working under control of Political Agent. The Khasadars are
enlisted from amongst the tribes who are designated by the local Maliks,
and enrolled for the purpose of guarding roads and providing safe passage
to travelers. Their most important role is as a medium of communication,
or a link, between the administration and the tribes. Khasadars provide
their own weapons. A Khasadar is paid a
salary by the government and his service is not pensionable. Due to lack
of training, and a service structure or fringe benefits at par with other
forces, they have a low level of motivation. In fact, he also owes his
allegiance to the Malik who recommended him for employment, and also the
tribe. The Khasadars are mostly
illiterate and poor. Their selection is based on nomination by the Maliks
and, obviously, without a regard to merit. Every agency had its own rules
and conventions for the Khasadar service. No induction or in-service
training is imparted and every tribal agency has the Khasadari system. There is another similar
force under the command of the Political Agent, which is called Levies.
The main difference between Khasadars and Levies is that the Khasadar is
hereditary and the incumbents carry their own weapons for the duty,
whereas Levies are provided weapons by the government. They are recruited
from amongst the indigenous tribes. Unlike Khasadar force, levy force is
better trained. Levies and Khasadars,
recruited on a tribal basis, fall under the federal government’s
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) control, and are
appointed by the PA (political agent) who is also their commanding
officer. While levies are provided small arms and limited ammunition,
Khasadars use their own weapons. Levies, who are marginally better armed,
are similarly underpaid and inadequately trained. Functions,
responsibilities and duties of Levies are almost the same as that of
Khasadars. Like army and police,
many jawans of Levies and Khasadar forces have also offered supreme
sacrifices in the ongoing war on terror. But compared to police and other
LEAs, the Levies and Khasadars are working under miserable conditions.
While fighting the militants, they are basically our second line of
defense after Army and Frontier Corps. But quite unfortunately, they are
poorly trained, ill-equipped and underpaid. In the army, police and
FC, there is a proper system of compensation for all their officers killed
or injured in the line of duty. But, unfortunately, there is no such
system in place for the Levies and Khasadar forces. They have no proper
barracks and other facilities and are expected to serve under the most
difficult and dangerous environment. Even our national media gives no
importance to any news involving Levies or Khasadar forces. The recent case of the
abduction and subsequent killing of 21 Levies personnel in the FR
(Frontier Region) of Peshawar should have been an eye-opener for the
government and the political authorities. These poor fellows had no proper
arms and ammunition to defend themseleves against the attackers. Even the
news of their abduction and subsequent killing was reported after a delay
of 22 hours despite the fact that the area is located just 25 km from
Peshawar. Till now, the government has not formalised any compensation for
these martyrs. Another problem faced by
the Levies is that they perform their duties in Frontier Regions (FR) and
Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas (Pata) like Malakand Agency which
come directly under the provincial government. But their administrative
and operational command is under the control of federal government through
ministry of SAFRON. This creates dichotomy in their command structure.
Secondly, Levies in each district or Agency needs a professional officer
as their commandant as a Political Agent or DCO, being a civilian, may not
be able to do justice with the job as commandant of these forces. If
uniformed and professional officers are appointed as commandant of these
forces, training and other needs of these forces can be looked after
properly. Law enforcement
agencies, particularly the ones operating in Fata, have to be built up to
a critical level for fighting the insurgency. They need to be provided
better salaries and basic facilities, professional training, modern
equipment and readily available forensic support. As the famous Indian
freedom fighter Vijaya Lakshmi Nehru Pandit once said that, “The more we
sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war.” The writer belongs to
Police Service of Pakistan. fidashah71@yahoo.com
Poverty breeds
violence and extremism. Fata is in the loop of the vicious cycle of
poverty-ignorance-poverty and ignorance is the constituency of orthodoxy
and exploitation. Due to its precarious circumstances, Fata should get
preferential treatment in socio-economic development initiatives of the
government. Per capita government spending here should be more than any
other areas, where private sector is strong and economic opportunities are
comparatively better. Over 67 per cent of
Fata’s population is living below poverty line. This ratio is at par
with Congo and Liberia, the poorest in the world. Fata, AJK and Gilgit
Baltistan are special areas, funded by the federal government through the
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON). The callousness of the
country’s leadership, public representatives from Fata and bureaucracy
is evident from the fact that during the last five years (2008-09 to
2012-13), Fata has been given Rs91 billion for a population of 46% against
Rs207 billion for AJK (42% population) and Rs71 billion for GB (12%
population). Forget about the preferential treatment, even if population
is taken as the sole criteria for allocation of funds, Fata should have
got Rs226 billion. Fata has been provided 60% less funds then AJK and 67%
less than GB. Noteworthy is the fact that the area of Fata is 27,220 Sq
kms and that of AJK is 13,300 Sq kms. The public sector
spending on recurrent activities in Fata is more alarming. Besides having
its own local resources, AJK has got Rs153 billion during the five years
for operational expenditure such as salaries of regular staff and
maintenance of the service delivery network, mostly education and health.
On the other hand, Fata being more than double the size of AJK and more
populous than AJK, has got Rs46 billion for salaries of regular staff and
maintenance of the service delivery network. This mean that educational,
health and other infrastructure in Fata is 3.6 times less than AJK i.e.
lesser number of schools, colleges, hospitals, water supply, sanitation
and roads etc. The government staff
strength in Fata is 51,123 (teachers, paramedics, public health and other
menial staff). This strength will raise to 186,260 persons if the
recurrent budget is brought at par with AJK only, meaning thereby, more
educational, health and allied service delivery institutions. Fata has
341,114 households. Increasing the service delivery network shall employ
one person from every household, if employment in the provincial
government of KP (20% in all employments) and Levies are factored-in. This
phenomenon could be translated into improved livelihood, more education
and reduced poverty and extremism. One would have rarely heard of suicide
by an employed person from Fata. During the said five
financial years (2008-09 to 2012-13), Fata has got Rs45 billion for
development work. The amount is 64% less than the amount provided to GB
during the same period. Fata should have got Rs124 billion instead of Rs45
billion during the five years. The phenomenal willful discrimination has
been continuing since independence. Another disgusting fact
is that AJK and GB have their own fund accounts and the funds transferred
to both the governments are non-lapsable, if remained unspent during a
financial year. On the other hand, the unspent funds of Fata are lapsed
(returned to the federal government) and never recouped. The irony is that Fata
stands nowhere in the country’s political setup. AJK has a full-fledged
political structure, with president, prime minister, ministers and local
governments. GB also enjoys similar status, despite the fact that both are
different territories. Fata is fully independent, but has no assembly, no
local government and even no bank account. The FCR (black law) is
yet to be done-away with. Why different law for Fata? Isn’t clear
violation of Article 25 of the Constitution? Why the constitution of
Pakistan, civil and criminal laws not extended to Fata? Not
understandable. Political Agents and the so called elected representatives
from Fata are responsible for the status quo in Fata. There is no place
for exploitation in an educated, enlightened and prosperous Fata.
Investment in posting of PAs in Fata and horse-trading in the elections
are open secrets. Fata will remain a
bleeding wound till its root-cause is not eradicated. Now no one takes any
notice of the bloodshed of children and women in Fata — just a ticker
runs on the television, updating the numbers of the dead and that is it. The Pakhtun belt in
general and tribal belt in particular is the international battlefield.
Billions are flooded in as “benami donations” from India, Israel,
Russia, besides the Sheikhs and Iranians as active drivers of violence.
The dual role of the agencies in Fata is an open secret. No Mullah/Qari/Hafiz has
ever committed suicide. Don’t they prefer to be bestowed with martyrdom
in the “right path”? How can a person in Fata-like terrain afford his
own militia, state-of-the-art arms and ammunition and communication
network and fight with super powers? This fight will go on until it is
uprooted through education and economic revival. People are hungry and
hence angry and falling prey to extremism. Ignorance and poverty is the
constituency of extremism. America has spent $600 billion in Afghanistan
and war in Fata. Pakistan is also spending billions on this war. This
money can change the scene if used for books and not for bombs. The situation can go
from bad to worse if status quo is maintained and policies not changed and
tribesmen not treated as human beings. The author is a
Researcher and Director in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Email: usmani_director@yahoo.com
Smugglers’ sting Besides national economy, law enforcement agencies also pay a price for smuggled goods By Alauddin Masood Security
personnel — soldiers, levies and Khasadar Jawans — performing duties
along Pakistan-Afghan border and in Fata often become target of rogue
elements. Whenever an attack of this nature takes place, it is generally
presumed that one of the Taliban groups is responsible for it. But, some
of the attacks could have been masterminded by the drug mafia and
smugglers of merchandise. Well-entrenched in this
region for the last many decades, the smugglers have been flooding
Pakistani markets with foreign goods, like black tea, cigarettes, tinned
foodstuff, spices, beverages, auto parts, tyres and tubes, cloth, electric
and electronic goods, home appliances, through 2,400-kilometre long
Pakistan-Afghanistan porous border dotted with 141 natural passes. As elsewhere, these
smugglers have their own private militias to guard their warehouses and
convoys. Sensing danger, the smugglers don’t hesitate from launching
attacks on official sleuths. Since the deployment of troops in the area
has made smuggling operations difficult, it is possible that some of the
attacks on the security check-posts or personnel might have been launched
by the rogue elements, aimed at clearing trade routes for unhindered
movement of their illicit merchandise. Due to the situation prevailing in
the tribal belt, even the cowardly acts of the smugglers are often
presumed to be the acts of the “Taliban”. Experience tells that
sometimes the staff of enforcement agencies positioned at distant places
privately recruits non-state actors to help and assist them in their work.
On complaints that the Excise staff posted on the Punjab side of the
Attock Bridge was engaged in extorting money from persons crossing the
bridge from the NWFP (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), the Senate of Pakistan
constituted a committee in mid-1990s to look into the matter. Seeing
members of the parliamentary committee arrive, the people manning the
check-post fled. Later, it transpired that all of them were private
persons hired by the local staff of a provincial agency to fleece the
travelling public. Sometimes, rivalries
push the staff of various enforcement agencies to petty disputes. When
Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB)’s Nowshera branch established
its check-post on the Khyber-Pakhtunkwa side of the Attock Bridge in the
mid-1970s, its newly-established post was attacked at midnight. On
enquiry, it revealed that the attack was masterminded by the personnel of
an enforcement agency mandated to interdict smuggling, apprehending that
PNCB post could monitor their shoddy deals. If the staff of
enforcement agencies does not collaborate, it would become impossible for
the smugglers to carry out their illicit operations. But, greed often
lures the black sheep to enter into private arrangement with the mafia
elements. What is the guarantee that non-state persons privately hired by
the local staff of official agencies would not be the moles infiltrated in
them by the smugglers? During his stay with PNCB, the scribe learnt about
instances where smugglers had, in vain, tried to plant their moles in the
PNCB just to collect information about the modus operandi of that outfit. Whatever the case may
be, the fact remains that smuggling is causing colossal revenues losses to
the national exchequers of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Just take the
case of black tea and cigarettes. According to industry sources, some 30%
of the black tea that we consume is smuggled into the country. Likewise,
over 12 billion cigarette sticks are smuggled in to Pakistan every year,
causing an annual revenue loss exceeding Rs12 billion. In fact, the
illicit trade in cigarettes has grown exponentially, registering an
increase of over 60% in the last five years. Unless the authorities
undertake a game changing action to curb the illicit trade, the smuggling
is expected to grow further. There are multiple
causes, both demand driven and supply driven, for the existence of this
phenomenon. The supply of goods depends upon their demand. So long as the
demand is there, the supply of illicit goods will continue to proliferate
despite best possible enforcement. As far as cigarettes are concerned, the
demand for cheap smuggled cigarettes is rising in Pakistan due to
ever-increasing prices of duty-paid cigarettes. Last year alone, the
prices of cigarettes rose by about 20%, which was more than the inflation
rate, hence causing pressure on the pockets of the consumers. Since
tax-evaded cigarettes sell at artificially low prices and are easily
available, the consumers seek such alternatives to avoid pressure on their
pockets. The demand for illegal
cigarettes is also rising because consumers do not want to carry local
packs with horrible health warnings printed on them. They prefer packs
which carry no health warning at all. And there is no dearth of such
cigarette packets in shops and markets across the country. Consequently,
the sale of illicit cigarettes, with no health warning, was increasing
rapidly. For instance, according
to market sources, the sale of Korean brand “Pine” has increased by
300% in the last two years. Interestingly, the company manufacturing Pine
cigarettes does not have any official dealer or representative in
Pakistan; while the Afghan authorised dealer buys nearly five billion
sticks of Pine, out of which some two billion cigarette sticks are
smuggled into Pakistan. Some smuggled items,
like tyres and tubes, air conditioners etc. have blunted the growth of our
industry and consequently creation of badly needed new jobs. While
plugging the porous borders is difficult and raids at retail outlets
carries the risk of shutter-down strikes, the remedy lies in identifying
the main distribution networks and striking at them through tactical and
calculated hits at storage points and warehouses across the country.
Simultaneously, we need to take steps for curtailing the demand for
smuggled goods through awareness campaigns and motivating people to buy
only national products while sparing no effort in smashing the network of
smugglers with an iron hand. Alauddin Masood is a
freelance columnist based at Islamabad. E-mail: alauddinmasood@gmail.com
Fuel fuss What is next for
Gas industry? Development of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) infrastructure
has a history of proven success in many Western and Asian countries. The
current market conditions in Pakistan indicate that there exists potential
for renewed and expanded need for CNG infrastructure, policies and plan. The CNG industry has an
important role to play to give energy sector security in the face of
rising oil prices and the current economic downturn in the country. Today
North America, Asia, and Europe are great natural gas market. The increasing market is
also cause of political tensions between suppliers, who exert their
resources as a political tool, and consumers, who worry about the cost and
security of this supply. This market has more distortion as natural gas is
unlike oil, which is traded at the same price everywhere. The CNG is
competing with natural gas usage in electricity generation and industrial
use. If a product or company gets more expensive or exploitative the other
always drives it out of the marketplace, which is what happened in the
Pakistan energy market. This might come true for the CNG market also as
they have increased their margin too high. Economists usually frame the
question of equity or distribution within the context of a trade-off with
efficiency or growth. Presently, in addition
to electricity the CNG sector is posing a great challenge to the
government. The doctrine of privatisation is based on the belief that
private sector will perform more efficiently than public sector and it was
pursued by the IMF and the World Bank in 1990s for Pakistan mainly for
power sector. In Pakistan, the outcome of privatisation policies has not
been very popular. The beneficiaries of privatisation policies are not
general public, but elites in business and power corridors. So many
failures leave us with a basic question that should we believe in market
economics? Pakistan tops the
countries that use the CNG as an alternate fuel for vehicles. Argentina
and Brazil are the two other countries with the largest fleets of CNG
vehicles. Many private investors also came up for investment in the sector
and Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) was also established for the
regulation between the CNG investors and the consumers. According to the
Competition Commission of Pakistan, over 2.5 million vehicles were
converted to the CNG which means 35% of the total vehicles are running on
CNG. Since the tariff of the CNG was fixed half than the petrol prices,
till last year, therefore it attracted many investors with an investment
of over 800 million dollar. The gap between demand
and supply of the gas led to a severe crisis. Pakistan’s total gas
consumption is eight billion cubic feet per day (bcfd), whereas total
production is only four bcfd — shortfall of 50 percent. The CNG dealers are
pressuring the government to increase the per kilogramme price of the gas.
It is, however, very strange that the state-run Pakistan State Oil’s
chain of retail CNG stations have also stopped supply of gas to consumers.
The Petroleum Ministry seems to be either helpless or, for that matter,
supporting the crisis in the interest of the two per cent elites of this
country. Despite attractive
investment in the sector, the question is what brought this catastrophic
situation that shook the whole sector. Whether it was myopic decision of
the government in 2004/05 to allow the CNG as an alternate fuel or was it
policy implementation failures. One of the problems, for
sure, was the issuance of licenses without a planning of demand and
supply. The gas pipelines installed in 1970s for the domestic users have
now been linked to the petrol stations and CNG stations, affecting the
efficient supply of gas. Shortage of gas needs to be tackled as early as
possible, otherwise the oil consumption will increase, causing pollution
and huge burden on national exchequer. According to sources in
the SNGPL, the current annual production of CNG is increasing by 7%
against growth in demand of nearly 40%. This shows that the annual
shortfall of CNG is more than 400%. Likewise, the total output of gas
pipeline companies in the country is around about 2,000 million cubic feet
per day (mmcfd), while consumption is 2,800mmcfd. The Author is presently
working as Chairperson of International Relations & Politics of
International Islamic University
Political sagacity, social reforms and ameliorated economy can proffer solution to the conundrum of militancy By Naseer Memon What is
unfolding in today’s Pakistan has marked resemblance to the dark ages of
Europe. Renaissance that shaped today’s Europe was actually a triumph of
pragmatism over dogmatism. Defiant souls like Martin Luther, Copernicus,
Galileo and Bruno liberated European society from clutches of clergy by
challenging the hegemony of Church that kept the society fettered for
nearly 1,500 years. When Copernicus challenged the geo-centrism of Ptolemy
with his heliocentric interpretation of universe, he actually challenged
the self-proclaimed divine wisdom of Church. Likewise, when Bruno revealed
the continuum of universe, Roman Inquisition charged him with blasphemy
and he was burnt at stake. After a long battle rationale prevailed over
the faith and modern Europe evolved from the ashes of dark ages. Obscurantism dominating
today’s Pakistan has brought it to the brink of dark ages where
enlightenment is starving and logic is trampled by faith-led dictums of
the sanctimonious minds. The pervasive rumble of extremism in Pakistan
took its roots during the formative years of its ideological stillbirth.
Quaid’s vision for the future state oscillated between a secular
progressive republic and a homeland for Muslims. However, he amply
demystified his thoughts during his first presidential address on 11th
August 1947 when he overtly detached religion from the state business. Long before this, in
1934, Allama Iqbal rescinded the concept of Pakistan attributed to him. In
his rejoinder to Prof. Thompson, he unequivocally mentioned that he was
not the protagonist of the scheme called Pakistan as he envisioned it only
as a Muslim province within Indian Federation. Maulana Maududi too was
ferociously against creation of Pakistan. However, he was later escorted
by the army to the newly-established country where somersault of his
Shariat lobby assumed custodianship of self-righteous ideology of
Pakistan. It is widely believed that Liaqat Ali Khan pronounced Objective
Resolution in 1949 that eventually deflected the country from Quaid’s
envisioned destiny. Myopic policies of the
cold war era also coddled orthodoxy in the country. Spook of “Red
Scare” kept spigot of US and UK coffers loose for ultra right elements.
Ironically, liberal and secular elements were termed traitors and
religious zealots became darling of the right block. The then USIS office
was assigned the task to promote Islamic ideology to contain ripples of
communism. It was probably not in the wildest imagination of the anti-left
forcers that one day they will fall in the trench dug with their own
spade. The same streak of
self-centered policies led US and West to cajole every successive
dictatorial regime in Pakistan and isolate relatively progressive and
liberal leadership in the country. Quintessential victim was ZA Bhutto who
was detested for his democratic and liberal policies. Beleaguered Bhutto
was left with no choice but to capitulate before the fury of fanatics. In
a bid to appease them, he went extra miles to declare Qadianis as
non-Muslim, prohibited alcohol and made Friday a public holiday.
Constitution of 1973 first time required a public office holder to take
oath of striving to preserve the Islamic Ideology that was the basis for
the creation of Pakistan. However, all this gamut yielded no fruit to him
and he was left high and dry by the champions of today’s free world. The deadly dye was cast
by Zia. He injected venom of extremism in every vein of the society.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became a heaven-sent opportunity for his
despotic expediency. He along with his coterie sealed the fate of this
country and descended it into the deep mire of religiosity. These bonanza
years of extremism institutionalised the lunacy of religious and sectarian
bigotry, which eventually stung its proponents after a decade. Making Pakistan a
surrogate battlefield of Afghan war mutilated the social fabric of the
country beyond recognition. Gen Zia even distorted Quaid’s motto of
Unity, Faith and Discipline by replacing it with Iman, Taqva and Jihad-fi-sabeelillah.
According to Shuja Nawaz, the author of “Crossed Swords”, Zia even
allowed fundamentalists to preach at Pakistan Military Academy. Tablighi
Jamaat representatives would deliver Friday Sermon at PMA in routine. The
practice was forbidden later by Major General Asif Nawaz. Zia smacked
orthodox brand of religion in various forms. From retrogressive
legislation to public retribution, he exercised every technique to
debilitate minds of citizens. Profusion of religious seminaries injected
orthodoxy among the young generation as well, which eventually harboured
Taliban in the years to follow. According to a report of
the Crisis Group, the country had only 137 madrasas in 1947. The number
increased to 1,745 in 1979 and by 1988 it rose to 3,000. The momentum
sustained after Zia’s death, and in 2003 official estimates put the
number of madrasas at 10,430. Number of unregistered seminaries is any
one’s guess. During Afghan war, these
seminaries were converted into nurseries of crusaders. Little wonder that
madrasa later earned the status of jihadi training camps. This madrasa
boom was obviously not without the financial and technical patronisation
of foreign powers — both Islamic and secular. An article by Joe Stephens
and David B. Ottaway, “The ABC of Jihad in Afghanistan” appeared in
The Washington Post, 23 March, 2002, revealed that special text books were
published in Dari and Pashtu to promote jihadi values and militant
training. These books were designed by the Centre for Afghanistan Studies
at the University of Nebraska-Omaha. Over 13 million books were
distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas. The jihad
bequeathed this legacy to Pakistan. Afghan war was over but
the landmines of extremism remained strewn in Pakistan. Disengagement by
US after the Soviet retreat was the shear mistake that America belatedly
regretted. The decades-long
indoctrination of orthodoxy has now culminated into a society devoid of
tolerance and abhorrence for other’s belief. The fault lines across
religions and sects have now fragmented Pakistani society in all
directions. From a cowed war partner
to option-less frontline fighter, Pakistani citizens have paid exorbitant
price for shenanigans of obnoxious international interests, malevolent
local dictators and anachronistic religiosity. The labyrinth of extremism
has confounded every one. Political sagacity, social reforms and
ameliorated economy can proffer solution to the conundrum. This in turn
requires some breathing space for democracy in the country. If international powers
are sincerely committed to extricate this region from the millstone of
extremism, democracy in Pakistan holds the key. After trying dictatorships
for six decades, evolving democracy deserved a chance for couple of
decades. Let people of this country decide their own destiny to make this
country and region hospitable to humanity. The writer is the chief
executive of the Strengthening Participatory Organisation. nmemon@spopk.org)
conflict With the federal
and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa governments as well as the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) having agreed for negotiations — albeit with some
conditions — there cannot be a better time to discuss the pros and cons
of this process. What, at all, are the
chances of this dialogue? What are the respective demands/conditions of
both sides? What are the obstacles and how could these conflicting
differences be bridged in a way that is acceptable to both the parties?
What are the minimum requirements that will have to be fulfilled and the
confidence-building measures that need to be taken by both the government
and the TTP to create a conducive atmosphere for dialogue? Who among the
Taliban should the government talk to and who should comprise the official
or intermediary peace-body for negotiations? Which are the other national,
regional and global stakeholders that need to be taken on board during the
process? What should be the agenda of talks? Who will be the guarantors of
any accord that is reached? What, are the chances of its success in
bringing about peace in the volatile region? And what should be the
subsequent options if the talks fail for intransigence? Questions such as these
and others need to be focussed on and discussed at length for working out
a viable agenda and a conducive atmosphere for talks towards sustainable
peace in the region. The ANP Chief, Asfandyar
Wali Khan, and the KP government recently said they were sincere in
holding talks with the militants and that negotiations would be held
before elections. However, no dialogue process has begun as yet. One hopes
the talks are held and are successful in bringing about the much needed
peace in the region. Bakht Raziq, a political
activist, is optimistic about the prospects of dialogue. “No problem
could ever be solved by the use of power alone. To bring the war to a
responsible close and for a lasting peace in the region, a political
settlement is absolutely essential.” That the provincial
government has only two months left to start/complete the lengthy peace
process and that the militants and the government have sharp differences
of opinion has led some experts to be sceptical of the process. Brigadier (Retd) Mehmood
Shah, a security and tribal affairs’ expert, thinks the process is a
non-starter and only a time-buying tactic on the part of the government.
“Despite offers of talks from both sides, there is still no plan as to
when, with whom and how the dialogue would be held.” Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao,
ex-Interior Minister and Chief of the Qaumi Watan Party, also thinks talks
are hardly possible as the government has only four weeks to go. “The
ANP government has been in for five years but failed to curb militancy and
bring peace. Still the dialogue must be given a fair chance. With
elections due shortly, the Taliban would also like to wait till the next
government is installed. They had stalled attacks against the incumbent
ANP-led government for four months when it came to power five years
ago.” There are other factors
that show dialogue is still possible, even if a bit later. The US is
holding negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. The Pakistani military
establishment has changed the focus of its security doctrine from external
to internal threats. Pakistan has released, and is releasing, the Afghan
Taliban prisoners. It is reluctant to launch a military operation in North
Waziristan (NWA) despite demands from the US. The successors of Maulvi
Nazir in NWA have vowed to continue the truce with the Pakistan Army while
the TTP too has pledged to abide by it. The incumbent regime is almost at
the end of its term and with general elections at hand, the militants may
halt their attacks and prefer to adopt await-and-see policy till a new
government is installed after elections. Mehmood Shah opines that
as dialogue with terrorists is not acceptable to the world, “the
government will certainly ask the militants to accept Pakistan’s
constitution, shun militancy, lay down arms and stop interference in
Afghanistan before coming to the negotiating table.” They, on the other
hand, would urge the release of their mates, withdrawal of army from the
tribal belt, enforcement of Shariah and end to alliance with the US, says
Shah. Sherpao says though
parties differ in their priorities, these can be bridged or else the
differences be kept aside for the time being. “The Taliban would
obviously demand the enforcement of Sharia, end of support to America,
release of their prisoners, cessation of war policy in Pakistan, payment
of compensation etc. They would also ask for guarantors to supervise the
implementation of an accord. But these problems can be discussed and
sorted out later.” The first question would be how to bring the
contending parties to the negotiation table, says Sherpao. He thinks these
differences should not be made an excuse to stop or derail the negotiation
process. “After all talks between the US, the Afghan government and
insurgents, including the Taliban, are held despite the fact that Taliban
don’t accept the Afghan constitution/government, have killed many Afghan
leaders and closed girl schools.” Some experts are of the
view that Pakistani Taliban are an extension of the Afghan Taliban. So
talks with the Pakistani Taliban cannot be held in isolation. The two and
other regional and global elements must be taken on board. Afghanistan president
Hamid Karzai and Pakistani and American establishments still suspect each
other. Each of them has its own list of enemies and friends. The friend of
one is often the enemy for the other. Bridging this conflict of interest
is essential. Whether the US would discontinue its drone programme inside
Pakistan is still uncertain. An attack could spoil the entire peace
process in no time. All stakeholders —
Pakistan, Iran, US, Afghan government and Taliban along with other groups
there, TTP, political parties — of the conflict will have to be taken on
board during the peace process. The next government in
Pakistan will have to own the process that begins today. For this, a
national consensus between the stakeholders — political/religious
parties, the security establishment, civil society — about the enemy,
the ailment and the solution is needed. “The government will
have to form a peace council/ reconciliatory commission that should be
acceptable to all stakeholders. This reconciliatory body would be given
‘Waak’ (authority of representing and deciding on behalf of a party in
a conflict) by the sides. It will first conduct negotiations and then
supervise the implementation of the agreed decisions,” says Sherpao. To bridge the huge gap
between the opposing views of the Taliban and the government, a mediator
would be required. But an arbiter usually starts work on mutual request or
at least upon the consent of the parties involved in a dispute. Again, an
arbiter should be a neutral person or a body of people respected by all
the parties concerned. He must be given authority or ‘Waak’ in Pushto.
Has any Waak been given to a third party or arbitrator? “The militants are
practically divided into several groups that are separate and independent
from the TTP. For example, Maulana Fazlullah-led Swat Taliban and Maulvi
Faqir-led Bajaur factions are not under the operational control of TTP.
Then there are sharp differences on dealing with al Qaeda, Tajik, Uzbek
and other foreign militants,” states Shah. caption What if talks fail?
Grey
areas in politics Many parties in
Pakistan operate in a ‘grey area’ between formal compliance and de
facto noncompliance with rules, particularly in relation to internal
democracy and finance. This has been concluded
in a recently launched report “Political Parties in Pakistan
Organisation & Power Structure” conducted by Lahore University of
Management Sciences (LUMS) in collaboration with Asia Foundation and DFID
UK. The study seeks to build a systematic knowledge of political parties
in contemporary Pakistan. The research examines
Pakistan’s key political parties, their structures and their operational
pursuits hoping to explore the ways in which parties can be strengthened
so that they can become more effective players on the political stage. The
report aims at providing a comparative perspective on various facets of a
typical political party in Pakistan: its organisation, its activity as an
election entity and its leadership. It focuses on the mechanisms adopted
by parties internally and tries to know where and with whom rests the
party power. The research, covering
24 main political, regional and religio-political parties, is based on an
understanding of the significance of political parties as important actors
in the current process of democratisation as well as in the next
elections. The study is an attempt to look beyond the general perspective
on political parties in Pakistan as mere election entities to examine the
realities of their power structures. It shows the way in which political
parties have developed over the time and the way in which they act and the
way in which Pakistan is governed at every level. The study is undertaken
at a crucial time in Pakistan’s political development as — barring as
yet unforeseen intervention — one elected civilian government hands over
power to its elected civilian successor. The study suggests that the
‘grey areas’ explain the distance between the supra-party legal
edifice and the operational dynamics of political parties. The two most obvious
fields in which this grey area operates are in relation to internal party
democracy and party finances. Internal party democracy is a legal
pre-requisite of party functioning and electoral participation. However,
in the majority of parties, internal elections either do not occur or
disguise a selection process dominated by the party leadership. This
pattern reflects the emphasis on centralised decision-making and
leadership control. Parties struggle with
the concept of internal democracy, seeking to meet an internal desire for
taking control from the leaderships and push for influence from the lower
tiers of the party — the activists and workers. However, the current
landscape sees the parties’ central leadership winning this struggle and
increasing levels of frustration at the grassroots level. This central
control, and the resulting grassroots alienation, can be identified in
areas of party decision-making, coalition formation and candidate
selection. “There are no
meaningful intra-party elections except in a couple of parties. Mostly,
elections are a formality, especially for the party president. The
election of the second tier leadership is most often directed by the party
high command. The party office-holders are frequently public
office-holders as well. That means a loss of oversight of the government
from the party leadership that makes the parliamentary party caucuses
ineffective. Personality-based structures have led to internal party
differences being resolved not by policy-based accommodation, but by
factionalisation.” These patterns of party
typography, characterised by centralised control over decision making
about coalition formation, has negative implications for the relationship
between party leadership and party membership. Formation of a coalition
becomes an elite-based tactical strategy leaving the lower tiers confused
and clueless. The study observes that
there has been a gross institutional imbalance in favour of the
postcolonial state apparatuses of army and bureaucracy against political
parties and parliament from Independence onwards. The former — the state
institutions — were characterised by a hierarchical organisation,
permanent tenure of service, pool of talent and administrative experience
for nearly a century. The latter — the political institutions — lagged
behind in all this by a big margin. Furthermore, the
political institutions atrophied into factions in the absence of national
elections on the basis of adult franchise for a quarter of a century. The
study reads that this history has led to a political landscape in which
parties have come to represent the various fragmented interests within
Pakistan, rather than distinct policy positions. Parties have developed to
reflect and accommodate the various fissures in broader Pakistani society:
religion; sectarianism; ethno-regionalism; and linguistic differences.
Parties in contemporary Pakistan reflect these factors of ‘identity
politics’. Emphasis on identity politics and a lack of policy
orientation has created a space within parties through which leadership
has become a dominant factor in party identification. Essentially, and
with few exceptions, this has led to ‘deification’ of party leaders,
both as individuals and, in the longer term, as family dynasties. Several workers
reinforced this perspective by expressing frustration with a system that
fails to reward party work and loyalty, and is often weighted in favour of
the rich and the resourceful. The most substantive part of this report is
related to party organisation. The leadership of political parties in
Pakistan, like in India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, is the ultimate source
of party identification for the voting public, in the absence of issue
salience, clear policy orientations and crystallized ideological
positions. The study, overall, does
not see a pattern of evaluation of performance of party leaders and
workers operating in a systematic way, except in the case of a very few.
The study also notes that women are virtually absent from the party
dynamics, be it organisational hierarchy, policy discussion, contact with
the voting public or constituency service among the lower strata. Party
members generally attributed female political inactivity to cultural
factors, the bad security situation and a lack of resources for contesting
elections. The low policy
orientation of party politics reflects through the lack of interest in the
preparation, dissemination and reception of party manifestos in varying
degrees. Party manifestos tend to represent long wish lists that transcend
the ability to deliver, given the meagre national resources. Election
expenses typically go beyond the stipulated limit imposed by the Election
Commission. The adoption of a quota
of seat reservations at both the federal and the provincial levels has, to
some extent, ensured levels of female representation. It appears
impressive in comparison with global trends. However, the reality in terms
of real decision-making is less promising, both in governmental and party
terms. Very few women are elected to the national and provincial
assemblies on general seats because the level of nomination of women’s
party tickets on general seats remains extremely low. Inclusion of women on
the party lists for reserved seats is rarely based on merit or
participation in decision-making. Instead, parties frequently select women
for inclusion as proxies for their male relatives who are excluded from
the electoral contest (sometimes by educational requirements imposed on
candidates) or as a reward for the political activities of male family
members. Almost all the parties have established women’s wings, through
which women participate in the general party organisation that is
dominated by men. The rationale for this approach is based on the cultural
position of women and the need to address the issue of the reluctance of
women to attend and participate effectively in mixed gatherings. There is no real link
between the women’s wings and mainstream decision-making. Few women have
any influence within the party but, surprisingly, women as voters are
rarely seen as a priority for political parties. vaqargillani@gmail.com
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