Land has been the primary source of power, prestige, and wealth in the Subcontinent for centuries. Conflicts over land have persisted throughout our modern history. Today, land remains a treasured resource, although its significance is now considerably different than in the past. Yet, at the same time, the perception that landed individuals and families are of high social status remains intact. Understanding the historic evolution of land as a political, economic, and even cultural resource is essential to making sense of our society and the conflicts that define it.

Amongst the major problems that the British had upon coming to India was making sense of how local people -- both dominant and subordinate classes -- conceived of land. For the British land was the primary source of wealth in Indian society. It was by working the land intensively with the aid of the newest (irrigation and other) technologies that the British planned to raise revenues as well as the exportable cash crops that would help them become the world's preeminent economic power.

Curiously, Indians did not appear to be quite so concerned with the explicitly economic value of land. Historically, dominant groups treated land as a political resource through which they could maintain their power and prestige. In part this was because there was always the danger of a labour shortage so it was impossible for landlords to maintain purely impersonal transactional relationships with their landless dependents. A shrewd historian pointed out the difference between Indians who used 'land-to-rule' and the new colonial overlords who wanted 'land-to-own'.

While the introduction of private property rights transformed Indian society, it did not necessarily lead to a displacement of the age-old conception of land as a political and cultural resource. He who controlled (or after the coming of the British, owned) land would be mortified at the notion that land could be sold if it fetched a good price on the market. A 'good' family possessed land and would never willingly disenfranchise itself of this label.

Of course, new ideas were to take root in Indian society. Urbanites were not nearly as concerned with old notions of status as they were with access to the resources of the colonial state. Nevertheless, the British themselves were wary of offending the landed gentry that was the major bulwark in their project of social and political control. When financially unscrupulous landowners started to lose their lands to moneylenders vis a vis the courts, the British themselves arrested this process by decreeing that only some Indians (agricultural castes) could be owners of land.

Such British policies permitted landed families to retain political prominence long after they might otherwise have become remnants of history. Successive martial law regimes throughout Pakistan's 63 years have propped up landed families as a means of exerting control over society in lieu of a genuinely popular mandate. Nevertheless, things have changed considerably, not least of all in terms of how land's political importance has become subservient to its economic value.

This shift is in large part explained by urbanisation and the deepening of capital within society more generally. Many relatively obscure regions hardly integrated into the market economy have become goldmines in relatively short periods of time. For example, it has been 50 years since metropolitan Rawalpindi's rural hinterland started to be developed under the guise of a new federal capital. Over time, and particularly during speculative booms such as that which took place in General Musharraf's early years, land prices in Islamabad have shot up spectacularly (at one point some years ago real estate prices in Islamabad were the third highest in Asia, after Tokyo and Hong Kong). Old-timers who would once not even contemplate parting with their land have become wheeling-dealing real estate agents earning billions of rupees through strategic buying and selling of their own, and others', land.

As recorded meticulously over the past couple of decades by Arif Hasan, Karachi too has become a den of land mafias who align themselves with various political constituencies as a means of providing cover to their illicit land deals. The capital that is exchanged in land scams is mind-boggling which is why harassment, violence, and even target killings come with the territory.

Things have changed in rural areas as well. Most obviously, there has been almost a complete shift away from tenant sharecropping to cash-rent arrangements. Aside from the fact that absentee landowners can earn large amounts of money by renting out their land, the changed tenure arrangements reflect the fact that land is no longer viewed as a political resource which guarantees a large client base (typically drawn upon during election campaigns). Landowners remain big political players but they have had to change the way they dole out patronage to their potential voters and/or they rely heavily on manipulating the coercive arms of the state (thana/katcheri).

This is not to suggest that the aura of being an owner of land has disappeared. It has not, which is why the first thing that an historically poor and vulnerable family will do upon gathering enough money is to buy land and thereby be pushed up in the social ranks. At the same time, however, it is clear that the ethics of the market are penetrating deeper and deeper into society at a particularly rapid rate. Cash is what matters, and everyone appears to know it.

The dynamic morality of the market will always seek out an equilibrium with the political and cultural logics of society, as it has been doing since before the British set foot in the Subcontinent. In the current conjuncture, this gives rise to incredibly ruthless competition and violence, even while ostensibly 'traditional' notions of honour and social standing remain intact. Whichever way one chooses to understand the political economy of land, it is clear that change is a constant and that those social and political agents that rely on land must exhibit dynamism and innovativeness if they want to thrive. Unfortunately, those who most need regular access to land just to survive -- including those who sell their labour power in rural areas and those who live in katchi abadis in urban centres -- are increasingly vulnerable to a mix of market fundamentalism and retrogressive norms. As in the past, the key to a better collective future lies with these toiling millions.

The News on Sunday: What do you feel are the reasons that women studies could not grow as an academic discipline in Pakistan?

Nighat Said Khan: We cannot single out women studies as a discipline that was not able to develop inside Pakistan. This holds true for almost all areas in social sciences as the Pakistani state was always apprehensive of any serious scholarly attempts to study and analyse Pakistani society. Natural sciences were able to flourish because they did not pose a direct threat to the status quo while social science had the potential of formulating a critique of the existing state of affairs. Therefore, the government not only refused to fund any serious research by eminent scholars, but often suppressed those thinkers who dared to express dissenting points of view. So I think our state is essentially against critical thinking as that could help expose its own failure in crafting a viable project for its citizens.

Women studies are even more controversial for the state as a radical feminist approach is critical of certain basic notions held by our state and society. Most states are obsessed with moulding a woman's body according to its own conceptions of morality and ethics. Since the 1980s, the Pakistani state has attempted to curb the freedom of women and has increasingly invoked religious rhetoric to justify its ideological position. Women studies can provide a radical critique of conservative institutions such as the family, the judiciary and the state as sites of oppression for women. This in turns threatens the whole of foundation of our state and society which is why this academic discipline was neither promoted nor tolerated by any government.

TNS: Do you think it is difficult to apply Western feminist theory in a conservative culture such as ours?

NSK: I think this dichotomy of "Western" and "Eastern" feminism is a false one to begin with. Feminism is a critique of the structures of patriarchy that exist in any society and it aims at removing such structures that suppress women. Hence there is no Eastern or Western feminism, nor did the conception of women rights originate in any particular geographical location. Our region has witnessed a long list of women who challenged this unjust order. In fact, you should bear in mind that the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan was the first constitution in the world that provided women with an affirmative action. Women were given special women seats throughout the country and a woman could vote twice: one for the reserved seats and one for the general seat. The American constitution does not even mention women. So this demonstrates that the concept of women liberation is not being borrowed from any part of the world, but it rises as a response to this patriarchal order.

The only things that change with each geographical location are the particular characteristics of this oppression. So for example, for us, it will no longer be an issue to have a female head of state while this remains part of the agenda for feminists in the US. We oppose the restrictions imposed on the female body while Western feminists critique the exploitation of a woman's body as a sexual object. So while the nature of this exploitation is different, the basic premise remains the same i.e. a patriarchal order that marginalises women.

We should also remember that liberation struggles, such as those in Vietnam and Nicaragua, were able to incorporate the issue of women rights as part of the larger agenda of national liberation against imperialism. Indian feminists have also been successful in articulating a feminist critique of their own society. Hence, I feel feminist theory is not a Western monopoly and there is no reason why we must fail to develop such an analytical approach towards the problems we face in Pakistan.

TNS: How would you analyse the achievements and failures of the women rights movement in Pakistan, especially the role of the Women Action Forum?

NSK: We can divide the women rights movement in Pakistan in three broad phases. The first started with the creation of Pakistan as prominent women during the Pakistan movement worked with the Pakistani state to improve the status of women. The belief here was that it was possible to work within the contours of a mainstream framework and place pressure on the Pakistani government to grant more rights to women. This changed radically with the advent of General Zia's draconian regime and the push for Islamisation that followed. That period witnessed the emergence of WAF which held the position that it was no longer possible to talk to this state and that this entire structure needs to change. WAF was able to emerge as one of the most vocal critics of the Zia regime and consistently opposed his government's policies.

With Zia's death and the advent of Benazir Bhutto's government, a third phase started for the movement. Radical politics had received a setback all over the world and this was an era of accommodation and compromise for radical movements around the world. The women's movement in Pakistan could not keep itself immune from this global trend and adopted the same tactics to further its cause.

TNS: Critics believe that a major reason for the failure of the women's rights movement in Pakistan was that it failed to mobilise ordinary women. In other words, the movement was led by the elite who were alien to the local cultural and political dynamics.

NSK: I don't take this criticism seriously as I feel it is unnecessarily harsh towards our movement. The truth of the matter is that most movements, political parties, NGOs and media groups are led by the elite in this country. Why do we have to single out the women's rights movement? I think it is an old tactic used by the religious right to distract others from the content of the movement and the demands we have raised while living in an extremely patriarchal society. We should focus on the positions taken by organisations such as WAF, rather than placing needless focus on their leadership.

TNS: So why do you think that the movement failed to achieve anything substantial?

NSK: Again, I think it's pretty harsh to suggest that we were unable to achieve anything substantial. The late 1960s witnessed the political awakening of the masses in Pakistan and women were not far behind men in this regard. During Bhutto's rise to power, the issue of female emancipation was often articulated within the PPP, especially by Nusrat Bhutto. Since the 1980s, we have tried to direct this energy in such a way that women become conscious of their oppression not only as members of the working class or of a political party, but also as women. Such a radical discourse has certainly affected the internal structure of political parties that are at least forced to pay lip service for advancing women rights. The constitution guarantees them affirmative action and many women are now holding important positions in the country. Perhaps one of the greatest victories for us was when the Pakistani public overwhelmingly voted for a female as the Prime minister. After 11 years of indoctrination and absurd laws against women, this was a slap for those who thought they confine women to their homes.

It's true that we have been unable to construct an ideal society, but that's true for almost all societies in the world. Besides, the women's movement is not the only movement that has so far been unable to achieve its radical agenda. The labour movements, the peasant movement, the student movement and other struggles have also so far failed to achieve their aim of radically transforming our society.

TNS: Since the war on terror began, the issue of female emancipation has again become a contested territory. Do you feel feminists like yourself can benefit from the US presence in the region for furthering the cause of women rights?

NSK: I don't think we should fool ourselves into believing that the US is here to advance the rights of women, or to strengthen democracy in the region. This is an extremely important geo-strategic location, and different powers are trying to position themselves for a hegemonic role in this part of the world. I recently met a senior official of the State Department in Washington and I categorically told him that I will completely believe your rhetoric of liberty and freedom if you today impose sanctions on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Of course, they will not do it because the Saudi regime, despite the terrible treatment meted out to women, is a trusted ally of the US in the Middle East. So instead of attempting to dislodge the monstrous regime in Riyadh, thousands of American soldiers have been placed inside the country to protect the decadent Royal family. We also remember that when we were protesting the policies of the Zia regime, it was the US that was pumping in billions of dollars to keep that government afloat. So all talk of achieving female emancipation with the aid of the Empire, which has almost always intervened in the Third World to advance its own goals at the expense of the indigenous population, is a futile exercise.

On the other hand, I am alarmed by the fact that progressive elements in the country have been unable to formulate a response that is different from the discourse of the religious right. The inability to do so has led to some bizarre alliances between the two. It is important that we critique the US for its imperialist character, i.e. the inherent tendency to exploit the resources and labour of weaker nations as part of its own capitalist development and we should articulate our response based on that premise. On the other hand, the religious right has a reactionary cultural critique of the US with emphasis on the liberal, modern ethos of the West. The right is incapable of presenting an emancipatory alternative, which is why it is imperative for the left to clarify the difference between the two positions.

TNS: How do you view the performance of the current government in addressing the concerns of women?

NSK: The current coalition, with the exception of the JUI, has an essential openness towards women. I would especially like to mention the positive impact of the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). The government's decision to give the money to women will have the result of empowering these women within their households. Also, this has already prompted many households to obtain Identity Cards for women so that they are eligible for the BISP. This automatically provides citizenship rights to these women who had thus far been denied even this basic right. So, in the ideological sphere, this has the potential of opening up new avenues for marginalized women.

We must acknowledge, however, that the current bourgeois-feudal set-up has certain limitations and we should not expect a radical transformation of society from them. It is also essential to realise that there exists no substitute for popular movements, which require patient and focused work, if we are to ever achieve the goal of equality for women.

Despite being a port city of immense strategic value, Karachi could boast of few industrial units at the time of the creation of Pakistan. Most of the left-wing leadership in Pakistan, comprising of Hindus and Sikhs, migrated to India after communal riots erupted during the partition. However, Sobho Gianchandani was an exception.

The trade union movement grew slowly but steadily in the financial hub of Pakistan. Unlike Lahore, where it was led by committed Marxist leader Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim, who held sway at the Pakistan Railways, it was a weak show in Karachi.

The major chunk of trade unions in Karachi was in the hands of M.A. Khateeb, a liberal but an undisputed leader of Karachi Port Trust (KPT) union for almost 20 years. Communists did play a role in organising trade unions in Karachi but they were weak right from the beginning.

The influx of Urdu-speaking migrants from different parts of India to Karachi too had an impact on the trade union movement and changed the complexion of the city. Though a substantial number of these migrants hailed from industrial centers of India and were skilled workers, traditionally Muslims had been averse to education as well as trade union activity.

Secondly, eminent intellectual and doyen of Progressive Writers' Movement (PWA) Syed Sajjad Zaheer was sent to Pakistan after the 1948 Congress of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and was given the task of organising the independent Communist Party of Pakistan as well as the trade union movement but he had no roots in Pakistan. On the top of that, indigenous communist leadership in Pakistan resented him right from the beginning.

Right from the beginning, the fragile communist movement and its politics, trade union, students, peasant and peace fronts were seen with suspicion by the ruling elite. "In 1963, industrial workers were crushed in Karachi by the administration. It was a continuation of the policy adopted by Pakistan in 1951. Prior to 1951, the Communist Party of Pakistan had unions in Dalmia Cement Factory besides a tramway union," says a veteran trade union leader Usman Baloch.

"In those days, the law permitted that five people could serve a notice to the management after forming a union. The Trade Union Act of 1926 said explicitly that police would not be used against workers. The colonial masters had devised flexible laws keeping in view the Great October Socialist Revolution that was influencing the entire third world," says Baloch. "There were the Workman Compensation Act, Factory Act, and Shops and Establishment Act. The workers enjoyed a dignified position due to these acts," he adds.

He makes it clear that these laws were tolerated only till 1951, "The ruling elite looked with contempt towards workers and peasants and considered them 'kammi' (inferior). Communist leaders such as Sobho Gianchandani were cornered and trade union leaders such as Malik and Khateeb were patronised by the government to confront communist trade union leaders like Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim," he says.

"Narian Das Bechar and Abdullah Baloch who lived in Mauripur dominated progressive trade unions till 1957," says Baloch adding, "after the imposition of Martial Law in 1958, new labour laws were promulgated in 1959 and industrial dispute ordinance was enacted. People such as Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Narain Das Bechar, and Abdullah Baloch who didn't work in factories were trade union leaders in those days. A condition was imposed by the government that trade union leadership must comprise of workers who were on the payroll of a factory and thus left-wing trade union leadership was isolated."

"Workers were barred from going on a strike until and unless they served notice. In case negotiations were going on with the labour department, they were not allowed to go on a strike. If a worker was involved in trade union activity he was usually transferred to the night shift and was often arrested by police on fake charges of vandalism. Thereafter, he would be sacked from his job," recounts Baloch.

Urdu-speaking workers were usually skilled since originally many of them hailed from Bombay (now Mumbai), Meerut, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad Deccan and other industrial centers. "They were enlightened and had close connections with the progressive movement. These people resisted elements that were after evacuee property," Baloch says, adding, "In 1963 a large number of Pushtoons were shifted to Karachi, but the movement at that time was devoid of ethnicity."

The membership of the Communist Party of Pakistan in its formative years was merely 600 but it had a firm hold on trade unions, peasants and students' front, according to eminent lawyer and political leader Abid Hasan Manto.

The year 1963 was a landmark in the trade union movement in Karachi when tobacco workers, under the leadership of Nayyab Naqvi, won a battle against the British management of the tobacco industry and local administration despite odds.

Another landmark was the 1968-69 democratic upsurge against military dictator Gen. The so called "Pakistan ideology" coined by the right-wing Jamaat-e-Islami in 1970 elections was nullified. Why military operation was launched against Bengali Muslims that emerged victorious in 1970 elections held under adult franchise? ZA Bhutto was so anxious to reach the corridors of power that he hailed the military operation in East Pakistan.

A demoralised army, after a humiliating defeat, handed him power but hardly had Bhutto assumed power when industrial workers were fired upon in Karachi's Landhi industrial area. The rest is history since ZAB ruled Pakistan during 1972-77 and had the gall to say that he had done more to contain the onslaught of communism in Pakistan than the Americans.

The Zia era (1977-88) was the worst period in the history of Pakistan. All rights were put in abeyance and ethnicity was promoted to weaken the PPP in Sindh. With the advent of the Afghan War, the society was brutalised with the easy availability of Kalashnikov and drugs. Working class areas in Karachi, such as Lyari, were transformed into ghettoes where gangsters ruled the roost.

Today, as we witness the war on terror and the subservient ruling elite, Pakistan seems to be headed towards a journey to the unknown while industrial workers are fighting the battle of survival due to rampant inflation and unemployment. The trade union movement is in a state of disarray.