Apprehension towards KBD

By Nusrat Khurshedi

One of the most pinching problems being faced today is the national consensus on construction of Kalabagh dam. Since the plan was first conceived in 1952, its materialisation has been frequently postponed which reveals the tragic history of division within our society and lack of understanding on national issues. The division was mostly on political lines and not letting the whole truth come out. The elected government representing all the people stood for it but the provincial politics made it difficult to proceed further than the blueprint and the project suffered due to political activism.

The proposal to build Kalabagh Dam rests on the premise that Pakistan was short of power and in order to meet the shortage various sources should be used in an optimum mix in which hydro-electricity being renewable and cheap should also contribute its share. Along this the multi-purpose Kalabagh dam would provide an additional storage of about 8 million acre feet (maf) of water and reduce irrigation shortfalls by live water storage of more than 6 maf for guaranteed, assured irrigation supplies. It would regulate and control floods in the Indus system. It would also reduce dependence on imported fossil fuel and thermal power by generating energy equivalent to 20 million barrels of oil per year.

There was no disagreement on the need to adopt measures to meet the future power gap but the political group against Kalabagh dam did not agree to commission hydro potential by constructing storage at Kalabagh which would reduce water supply to lower riparian regions of the country. Even no one disagree by the economic viability of the project but still Kalabagh dam emerged as a subject of political controversy. In this perspective it is necessary to examine the ground realities of Kalabagh dam and its impact on provinces.

For Punjab in true perspective, the Kalabagh dam has a high benefit-cost ratio. The costs are relatively small at the loss of 24,500 acres of land, including 2900 acres of irrigated land, to submersion and displacement of 48,500 persons. However, the benefits are substantial. The third dam on the Indus would substantially increase the total quantity of stored water. So that additional and timely release for irrigation purposes can be made to increase food grain production. The 272 km long, 15,000 cusecs capacity left-bank canal will lift about 6.66 maf of water annually from the dam reservoir to irrigate 380,000 acres in Mianwali, Khushab and Jhelum districts. The rabi and kharif requirements are expected to be 0.78 maf and 1.23 maf respectively. The remaining 4.65 maf will be drained into the Jhelum, upstream of Rasul Barrage, to meet shortages in the Mangla command area.

The Kalabagh dam will generate 3600mw of cheap hydro-electricity. While the reservoir will be located largely in the NWFP, the power generation station will be situated in the geographical boundaries of Punjab. As such, the royalties from hydropower generation will accrue to Punjab. Industrial activity in Punjab will also get a boost with the availability of less expensive power. The dam will also help to reduce the effects of floods by storing peak flood flows.

In case of Baluchistan, this is not part of the Indus basin and a riparian in the strict sense of the term. However, the 3400 cusecs capacity pat-feeder canal from Guddu Barrage irrigates about 300,000 acres in the province and after remodelling now the flow increases to 6000 cusecs to irrigate a further 200,000 acres. However, Baluchistan has recorded its opposition, based on its apprehension that future requests for more water from the Indus will meet with little success if the damís irrigation works upstream of Pat Feeder over stretch demand for water in the Indus river system.

The Indus River is the only source of water, either for drinking or for irrigation, available to the people of Sindh. Unlike Punjab, which gets considerable rain in the monsoon, unfortunately Sindh is a parched land getting less than an average of 5 inches (127mm) of rain per year. Further, while Punjab has a large reservoir of sweet water under its soil from which 350,000 tube wells draw as much as 40 maf of water every year, the subsoil water of most of Sindh is as saline as the sea.

The Indus is, thus, Sindhís lifeline. However, for Sindh the main concern is to remove the Indus, or dry it out and the difference between existence and extinction begins to narrow fast. Thus, Sindhís case is that there is just not enough water in the Indus River system to justify another storage dam on the Indus and that the construction of any such dam will prove to be disastrous for Sindhís economy and ecology.

For the NWFP the Kalabagh dam has a mixed benefit-cost ratio, although the costs appear to outweigh the benefits. That perhaps explains the fact that the NWFP provincial assembly has passed unanimous resolution on various occasions rejecting the Kalabagh dam. The benefit to the NWFP accrues in terms of availability of water to irrigate over two million acres of lands in D.I. Khan District. It is estimated that the 157 km long, 15,000 cusecs right-bank canal will lift about 6.21 maf of water annually from the dam reservoir to irrigate 651, 300 acres in D.I Khan beyond the CRB canal command. Another 732,500 acres will be irrigated by lifting the water 700 feet! The required technological efficiency and cost of conveying the water renders the benefits of water availability somewhat unreliable.

For NWFP the costs are substantial. Fear of water logging and salinity, because of obstruction caused by reservoir water levels to the drainage of Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi lands. Kalabagh dam also submerge the fertile land. The Mardan Salinity Control and Rehabilitation project (SCARP) will be severely affected due to SCARP drainage level being lower than the upper level of the Kalabagh dam reservoir.

Along this the 50-kilometer Attock-Nowshera road will be submerged by In four provinces, only two provinces since 50 years have been continuously showing its certain apprehension against the construction of Kalabagh dam and there concerns also easily clarified time to time. Like in response to Sindhís misgiving, studies of river flows passing downstream of Kotri barrage after construction of Tarbela dam show that on average more than 36 maf passed annually to the sea during the period 1977-78 to 1991-93. It is obvious, therefore, that there will be enough water available for storage in the Kalabagh reservoir. Even after the construction of Kalabagh dam, Sindh stands to gain (under the 1991 Water Accord) up to 2.1 maf of additional regulated rabi early kharif irrigation supply. This would help to bring about 7 lac acres of additional area under cultivation. Without Kalabagh dam, there is no source for Sindh to meet its increasing water requirements for food, fiber and power. This factor alone should dispel any fear of a reduced share for Sindh, much less of the province turning into a desert.

In tems of mangroves, 95 per cent survive on salt water in the region east of Karachi and Rann of Kutch. Studies indicate that the decrease in the mangrove forests has primarily been due to:

(a)           Decrease in frequency of tidal inundation and not due to reduction in freshwater flow caused by upstream abstractions from the river, starting with the construction of Sukkar Barrage in 1932.

(b)           Uncontrolled overgrasing.

(c)           Excessive cutting pressure due to the rising population of Karachi.

There is no study proving conclusively that fish production below Kotri will be affected after construction of Kalabagh dam. On the contrary, there would be an enormous fish catch from Kalabagh reservoir every year. For them Sindhís misgivings are particularly preposterous as, without the loss of a single acre of land or the displacement of a single soul, the province would get one-third of the benefits ñ at par with Punjab, which would lose24, 500 acres of land and dislocate as many as 48,500 persons.

In terms of NWFP assertion, final project designs show that the normal reservoir water level would remain ten miles downstream of Nowshera and no protective dykes would be needed for the town. Detailed studies indicated that, even after a hundred years of sedimentation, river water level would remain unaffected, even in the event of a flood of 1929 magnitude. Even Munda dam and Swat River would provide additional protection against any flooding. Water logging and salinity could occur if the Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas were so low as to be submerged or their drainage outflow blocked by reservoir levels. However, Pabbi, with the lowest land level, would still remain at least 55 feet above the reservoir water level. There is, thus, no possibility of any submergence or blocked drainage by Kalabagh reservoir in these areas. Even the outfalls levels of the main drains of Mardan SCARP are also higher at 35 feet above Kalabagh reservoir elevation. Thus, Mardan SCARP drains would remain operational without any fear of blockage by the reservoir.

In the case of the Kalabagh dam, lands would be submerged in NWFP, but more so in Punjab. The total area submerged under maximum reservoir level for only 3 to 4 weeks in a year would be 24,500 acres or 89 per cent in Punjab and 3,000 acres or 11 per cent in NWFP. In terms of irrigated area, 2900 acres or 97 per cent in Punjab and 100 acres or 3 per cent in NWFP would be affected. Even about 1000 acres of irrigated land had been acquired permanently for Mardan SCARP and over 5000 acres of fertile lands are acquired for the Islamabad-Peshawar Motorway. Along this, out of the total land which may be affected, 114074 acres of land is already barren and saline. Also 38989 acres of land is dependent on rain which is 4.16 per cent of the total affected land. In terms of the number of people, 48,500 persons or 58 per cent in Punjab and 34,500 persons or 42 per cent in NWFP are likely to be affected.

The crux of the matter is that Kalabagh dam has been made a political issue and its advantages have been ignored altogether. Ignoring the immediate and long-term benefits of the dam for the whole of Pakistan which would certainly outweigh any disadvantages that may be there; the members of the National Assembly are divided on provincial basis instead of solving their technical and political differences by negotiations.

PHYSICAL MODEL OF KALABAGH DAM

key facts

BACK GROUND

Kalabagh dam project was designed in 1984, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme; supervised by the World Bank, for the client Water and Power Development Authority of Pakistan. Following the submission of its project planning report it was put up to the federal and provincial governments for approval of the launching of this gigantic project. In the meantime, the project teams were asked to complete the detailed designs and contract documents for making it ready to enter into the implementation stage. This task was completed in another two and half years and the project was poised for start of construction in mid 1987.

BENEFITS TO PROVINCES

Kalabagh dam would store water during flood season and release the same during the low flow periods of the year in accordance with provincial shares in the Water Accord as under:-

Province Percentage Supply

          (MAF)

NWFP          140.854

Punjab          372.257

Sindh          372.257

Balochistan          120.732

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Main objective:

 n       To compensate for the storage lost due to silting up of existing reservoirs and to provide additional storage and regulation on the Indus for management and timely supplies of water for the crops.

Secondary objective:

 n       To generate large amount of low cost hydroelectric power near major load centres.

 n       To increase the energy and power output of Tarbela Power Station as a result of conjunctive operation of Tarbela and Kalabagh reservoirs.

 n       To regulate and control the extreme flood peaks of the Indus to alleviate flood damage downstream.

PROJECT COST

 n       Initial cost and duration: It was estimated to cost $3460 million at June 1987 level and was scheduled to be completed in 6 years, with first generating unit to be commissioned in April 1993.

 n       The total project cost including contingencies, price (July 2005) escalation and interest during construction, is estimated at $6124 million. The project would take about 6 years to complete before the first power unit comes in operation.

PRINCIPAL PROJECT DATA

Indus river at site

Catchment area          110,500 sq miles

Maximum observed flood          1,200,000 cfs

Reservoir

Gross storage          7.9 MAF

Live storage          6.1 MAF

Dead storage          1.8 MAF

Retention level    915 ft SPD*

Minimum reservoir level          825 ft SPD*

Area at retention level          164 sq mile

Main dam

Crest elevation          940 ft SPD*

Crest width          50 ft

Maximum height (above river bed)          260 ft

Length 4,375 ft

Overflow spillway

Sill level          860 ft SPD*

PMF discharge          1,070,000 cfs

Orifice spillway

Sill level          785 ft SPD*

**PMF Discharge          980,000 cfs

Installed capacity          3600 MW