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POSSIBLE
IS POLITICS musharraf nsc pml-q war coalition nro
Editorial As these lines are being
written, rumours abound about President Musharraf being in protective The political landscape is rather dense with a politically dead president providing an intense backdrop. A 62 point constitutional package announcement by the major political party (PPP), an almost threatening speech by PML-N leader Mian Nawaz Sharif, the American involvement in everything else besides the war of terror and a lot more add to the details of this landscape. So what does the future hold for many of these political actors, institutions and projects. Precisely, what is possible in this art of the possible? It was a futile exercise discussing Musharraf's future but one we have engaged in, for the sake of argument. Also, because we think that his fate may help determine the future political course of this country. In this context, the future of PML-Q that allied itself solely with the person and wishes of President Musharraf is an interesting case study. Another is the future of the coalition, one institution that almost everyone is skeptical about. A coalition government of two natural adversaries does appear unnatural and unsustainable only if one ignores the objective realities; here the rules of the game have to be determined first, before politics of one kind can be pitched against politics of another kind. Hence the natural adversaries must stay together to bring this power back from the powers-that-be to where it actually belongs: the people. If this coalition can manage to do that in less than five years, if it can bring about a consensus about the rules of the games, it may well be disbanded and call fresh elections. It is in this broader scheme of things then that the future of National Reconciliation Ordinance and National Security Council must be seen. The future of war on terror depends on what direction the new political incumbents are willing to take. So far both the major political parties appear to have withstood the U.S. pressure in political matters, especially the status of President Musharraf in the post-Feb 18 polity and the issue of restoration of judges. But they appear helpless in stopping the US missile attacks within the boundaries of Pakistan. Will they help the U.S. rethink its strategy according to the wishes of the people of Pakistan in an atmosphere of trust remains to be seen.
Musharraf's future was foretold a long time back. He kept sitting on the saddle as a politically dead object, no doubt. But was it because dictatorship does not provide for an exit, least of all a safe one? By Farah Zia The best line I heard in
defense of democracy came from a friend a long time ago who said he A discussion on Musharraf's future is superfluous, irrelevant already. In a way, his future has been foretold. He remained in the saddle as a politically dead object, no doubt. But was it because dictatorship does not provide an exit, least of all a safe one? Nine years in power need some kind of revisiting in order to find an answer. When Musharraf made his first coup in 1999, the wise ones amongst us warned that this was a fight between democracy and military rule and not between liberals and extremists, as we were supposed to believe. Nonetheless, the liberal sections of the media defended Musharraf as opposed to the mullahs who were ready to overtake the country in the wake of the 15th amendment that the then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif was, supposedly, all set to bring. The glass- and dog-holding Musharraf, who soon after the coup called himself chief executive, became a darling of the liberal media, the stability-loving money-makers, and lo and behold the mullahs who, in three years time, got together, solely it appears, to indemnify Musharrafís coup and other actions and to keep him president for the next five years. Those who welcomed the 1999 coup did not for a moment think that Musharraf's coming in power was fine but how and when was he going to relinquish it, if at all. The chief executive, like all dictators in the world, began to imagine himself a saviour and could not understand why he must relinquish power. The truism that dictators have no exit strategy may not have been lost on him by then and so, like others of his ilk, he began to turn the system around to his advantage. In the true spirit of the politician-bashing decade of democracy, an accountability drive was launched, new institutions created for the purpose and to what consequence. Those 'corrupt' politicians who were needed by the government were made ministers. The rest of them stayed behind bars, the top leadership of the two biggest political parties remained in exile and Musharraf began his democracy project (alternate democracy, some say) as directed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In between came 9/11, that may have changed the world at large in a fairly negative way but gave a new lease of life to President Musharraf. His faith in democratic institutions was further exposed when he decided to get himself elected through a dubious referendum. This was followed by a lacklustre election, followed by the seventeenth amendment, followed by five years of a lame-duck parliament. If anything sustained Musharraf in power all these years, it was his continued support to the US-led war on terror. Pakistan's status as a rentier state, which has existed since partition in one form or the other, continued through this period as well. "We cannot survive economically without the US help" was not an empty statement; it was true and thus exploited to the hilt. The lack of space for politics and political dissent only emboldened the extremist forces within society and the 'soft image' could not be exported in the face of the hard realities confronting the country. Meanwhile the US president George W Bush's support for the general turned president remained unambiguous. "I like him... appreciate him as a strong ally of America in the war against terror... I am, of course, constantly working with him to make sure that democracy continues to advance in Pakistan." The dreamy smooth ride of Musharraf was not going to be an everlasting one. So came March 9, 2007, when the parliament was nearing the completion of its term with a third prime minister. Whatever followed is recent history and hence fresh in people's mind, more so for the violence it contained and bred. Alongside came a rebellion of the institution that was not exactly famous for this quality, meaning judiciary, more specifically the chief justice of Pakistan. The lawyers who had been the most vocal and active critics of Musharraf rule from day one found a leader on the bench in the form of a defiant chief justice, the free media (whose freedom had not really been tested so far) treated the attack on judiciary case as a test case and turned the protesting lawyers into a full-fledged lawyers' movement. The crackdown, expectedly, came in the form of various directives by PEMRA, the so-called regulatory body, the most prominent among them put a stop to live coverage of lawyersí movement. By then the damage was already done. People in all corners of the country were aware of the damage done and identified and empathised with the chief justice. That he was wronged was recognised and rectified in the July 20, 2008 judgement of the Supreme Court. But that was all Musharraf could take. The bending of rules was not possible any more and nothing short of a coup could sustain him in power. The likes of Sharifuddin Pirzada and Malik Qayyum, this countryís bane, helped him throw the constitution out of the window once again. The target of the coup was judiciary which retaliated in an unprecedented fashion. The Feb 18 elections were a clear rejection of all that Musharraf stood for. People voted against the suicide attacks, the Lal Masjid episode, Bugti killing, missing persons, militancy in North South Waziristan, Swat operation, US air strikes in FATA and a lot more. They voted in favour of their own right to change their rulers. But their biggest achievement was redeeming the political parties as the only legitimate institutions that should serve the peopleís interests. This journey of Musharraf from being an asset to a liability, from the worldís top leader to a non-entity, has cost this country rather heavily. At a time when the constitutional package is all set to clip the wings of the President, the National Security Council is destined to be obliterated from the face of the constitution Despite President
Musharraf's tomtomming about the National Security Council being a forum
where Contrary to the popular understanding of the main political entities such as the PPP and the PML-N that have committed themselves (in the Charter of Democracy) to the activation of the cabinet's defence committee which is headed by the Prime Minister, the charter says: "National Security Council will be abolished. Defence Cabinet Committee will be headed by the prime minister and will have a permanent secretariat. The prime minister may appoint a federal security adviser to process intelligence reports for the prime minister. The efficacy of the higher defence and security structure, created two decades ago, will be reviewed. The Joint Services Command structure will be strengthened and made more effective and headed in rotation among the three services by law." At a time when the constitutional package is all set to clip the wings of the president, the NSC is also destined to be obliterated from the constitution. It is more so because the NSC has never diffused any political crisis since its act was passed by the parliament without any debate under pressure from the President in 2004. The NSC is widely seen as an effort on the part of the military commanders to legitimise their roles not only in security matters but also in governance. The idea of NSC was first floated by former Army Chief Jehangir Karamat in 1998, but it cost him his job. Later, the same was adopted by General Musharraf. Soon after he took over, Musharraf brought in NSC, dubbing it as a think tank. Later, however, many of its members were adjusted in the federal cabinet. Till 2004, when the NSC was passed in the shape of a parliamentary act in episodes of corps commanders' meetings where the actual decision was taken and later attested by the federal cabinet, the National Security Council could not really establish its institutional efficacy. The parliamentary act brought in its thirteen members headed by the president and including three services chiefs, the prime minister, the leader of the opposition, four chief ministers, chairman senate and speaker national assembly. It purported to serving as a forum for consultation to the president and the government on matters of national security, including sovereignty, integrity, defence, security of the state and crisis management. It also sought to formulate and make recommendations to the president and the government in accordance with the consultations held thereof. However, since the inception of the new coalition government, no NSC meeting has been held. Instead the army chief Gen Ashfaq Kiyani briefed the heads of the ruling coalition parties as well as the prime minister on security issues. This seems to have really put the NSC in abeyance, paving the way for its complete deletion from the constitution. --
Nadeem Iqbal The real test for the party will come now... 'After losing the Feb 18 general elections and against all popular perception that it was the end of the Pakistan Muslim League-Q, the former 'King's Party' remains very much intact and, despite some cracks and defections in the party. However, the real test for the party is yet to come. Created and sustained by
Gen (r) Musharraf, the PML-Q strangely remained committed to the PML-Q also shares the blame for decisions that were not taken by it. This has created the impression that the party cannot survive without Pervez Musharraf. It seems that the strong ties between the president and the Chaudhris kept the party together, otherwise PML-Q had already given up on its (former) two prime ministers -- namely, Zafar Ullah Jamali and Shaukat Aziz. Shaukat Aziz was not even granted the ticket to contest the elections. The disgruntled former finance and prime minister had no choice but to leave the country. Of late, the party has been thinking up a possible removal of the PML-N from the ruling coalition -- a scenario that is sure to fetch it some gains. At best, they would rather the N-league is limited to Punjab only. However, with the Sharif brothers -- Nawaz and Shahbaz -- all set to reach the corridors of power in Centre and Punjab (respectively), this does not seem too likely. A lot of Muslim Leaguers are known for switching parties if that can get them any chance to sit on the government benches in the parliament. Otherwise, as far as the party ideology is concerned, there is not much difference between the PML-N and the PML-Q. The PML-Q owes its very existence to Gen (r) Musharraf, being a beneficiary of his dictatorship, and has been positioning itself as a pro-establishment party. In stark contrast, the PML-N has opposed Musharraf vehemently, mainly because the latter ousted its leader. The reason for Chaudhris
continued loyalty to Musharraf could also be that they did not have any The party's financial health is also quite sound, compared to other parties. As per the data provided by the Election Commission of Pakistan, the PML-Q has received donations from its members as well as MPA funds and generates an income to the tune of Rs 44 million, while its expenditure is Rs 41 million. The party also has an asset worth Rs 44 million. If the party builds upon these assets, then there is a chance that after some time it will be able to cash in on the mistakes of both the PPP and the PML-N. Nothing is final in politics, and when it comes to a coalition government, everything is temporary. -- N. I.
Every time the US State Department issues a new comment on militancy, more move over to the side of the militants By Kamila Hyat For the present, there
is some semblance of calm in the most troubled of the NWFP territories. The truth, though, is that the picture regarding the 'war on terror' is a complex one. The assessment that it is tied in to deprivation, to poverty, to injustice and to a lack of opportunity is of course accurate. It is also true that the violence we see in tribal areas is most often a simple struggle for political power and control, and has very little to do with religion, which is used simply to give it glamour and popular appeal. Granting more democratic rights to people would counter these problems in part. But the issues linked to the 'war on terror' run deeper than that. Over the past few weeks in particular the US has made it clear how strongly it feels about this war, and its perception -- however illogical it may be -- that continued warfare is essential to overcome militancy. The expansion in the terrorist threat across the Muslim world over the past few years seems to have taught the US no lessons, and no realisation as to the abject failure of the policies it has senselessly pursued. For Pakistan, this situation brings a very real threat. Already, most people in the country perceive the 'war on terror' as an American war, with little connection to the life of ordinary citizens. This trend, if permitted to continue unchecked over the coming years, would create an extremely dangerous situation. As things stand at the moment, the very real danger is that this indeed is what will happen in the future. If Pakistanis fail, as a consequence of US policies, to embrace the struggle against terror as their own, the lines dividing the fronts will become more and more strongly demarcated. On the one side will stand the pro-Western elite; on the other the majority that opposes the US and, as such, aligns itself with the militants even though there is little else in terms of ideology or political goals, to bring them together. In other words, the unabashed US intervention in Pakistan will shape the future situation, in which more and more people opt for the militants. To accommodate this, the militants too may make adjustments in their stance. They, after all, seek political gains and are superb opportunists. A mild 'moderation' in their stand, eliminating some of the most problematic aspects of their world view, is thus not impossible. The version put forward by Baitullah Mehsud some months ago that they do not kill women, has already persuaded some to yield to this image of chivalrous warriors, ignoring the fact that alleged prostitutes, couples who eloped and other women, including a school teacher, are among those who have been killed in the North over the past few months. Such a re-shaping would lead to a growth in militant support, driven by a hatred for the US. Indeed, already, each time the US State Department issues a new comment on militancy, more move over to the side of the militants. The movement of course takes place in far greater number when missiles rain down on houses and shops or the ugly shadows of Predator aircraft smudge fields and hillsides. Evidence of an increasingly orthodox mindset can be found everywhere. The incidents in cities of women being told to cover their heads or dress modestly are no longer a rarity. They reflect a shifting over to the mindset of militancy, by imposing their will regarding religious belief. The battle lines can also be seen among the young women, appearing besides unveiled mothers and aunts, who have opted to don hijab. The beard is the symbol of a similar rebellion, directed against the West and all it represents, by young men. The disappearance of the parties of the Left, who may have been able to articulate an anti-imperialist message in terms free of religious imagery, makes the likely contours of the 'war on terror' more definite. In the belief that they have no other way to express opposition for Washington, those who sympathise with the militants' cause will grow in number. The swift end to deprivation that could help check this is unlikely to occur. Indeed, the socio-economic realities may worsen, and the 'war on terror' could, at a narrow level, become a confrontation between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' at one level and an expression of growing anti-US sentiment at another.
The end of the coalition could be the beginning of yet another round of political instability in Pakistan and a major setback for democracy By Aoun Sahi The post-Feb 18
political scenario presents the broadest-ever coalition of parties the
country has These differences can be resolved or kept within manageable limits as long as they work towards consensus-building as members of a team whose success depends on contribution from each member. The coalition partners are very clear on their objectives. "The one-point agenda (of coalition) is to restore true democracy in the country and get rid of dictatorship. All the coalition partners are unanimous about achieving this goal but there may be some difference on the modus operandi to achieve this goal," says Rana Sanaullah, a senior leader of PML-N and Punjab Law Minister. According to him, political parties have learnt that in Pakistan, the future of democracy will be secure only if they develop the habit of working together even when they have differences. So far the two main parties of coalition have shown differences on crucial issues like the restoration of judiciary and the fate of president Musharraf. They are also trying their best to save the coalition from breaking up. On May 13, the day PML-N's federal ministers resigned from the cabinet because their coalition partners had failed to meet the second deadline for the reinstatement of the deposed judges, many political analysts held the view that the coalition's days had been numbered. Earlier also, the power sharing issue between both parties in Punjab province was being seen as a big threat to the survival of the alliance. However, so far, the leadership of both parties has expressed the wish to stay together because they know that this is one opportunity for them to assert their supremacy over military, bureaucracy and intelligence agencies. They do not want to miss this golden chance. It is not an easy task and there are many internal as well as external pressures on them. Their cooperation can be badly affected by the fundamentalist elements in both parties and those hardliners that are opposed to compromises. Political analysts say that President Musharraf is a big threat to the coalition. But it can work the other way, too, as Musharraf has used the state power arbitrarily to exclude Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from the political process. Some laws were made to target them like the restriction on third-time premiership. The accountability process was also politically motivated. Hatred against Musharraf can keep both parties together which is the case today. Though both parties have great differences on judges' issue, they have succeeded in developing a consensus on the fate of Musharraf. After his meeting with Asif Ali Zardari on May 27, Nawaz Sharif announced that the leadership of both parties had agreed to oust Musharraf. Nawaz told the media in a press meet in Lahore, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Pakistan's first nuclear tests, "There is no need to give a safe exit to that man (Musharraf). He should be given the same punishment that traitors deserve under the law and the constitution." In a television interview last week, Zardari also described Musharraf as a 'relic of the past' but did not make an outright call for his resignation. Both the coalition partners so far have disagreements on re-instating judges. The PML-N wants reinstatement of judges with an executive order from the prime minister as soon as possible, while the PPP wants their reinstatement to be a part of the proposed constitutional package. The coalition partners have yet to arrive a consensus on constitutional package as the PML-N is not ready to accept complete restoration of judiciary to pro-Nov 3 position. It is said that the 62-point constitutional reform package including the restoration of judges has been drafted exclusively by the PPP, without consulting any other member of the coalition. Apparently, it provides partial or total protection to Musharraf for his Nov 3, 2007, act of imposing emergency. It is also believed, despite denials from the PPP, that the draft has been sent to Musharraf for approval. PML-N insiders claim that retention of the NRO might be acceptable to the party but any cover to Musharraf or any amendment aimed to trim the tenure of chief justice will not be acceptable to them. PPP leader Babar Awan has announced that on June 2 constitutional package will be presented to the parliament. According to him, the leadership of both parties agreed to restore the deposed judges and accommodate the existing judiciary during the Dubai talks. But, so far, the PML-N leadership has not given any policy line on constitutional package. If PML-N's leadership does not give his nod to the package, it will be posing a huge threat to the coalition because without PML-N's support it will really be difficult for PPP to manage the number in parliament needed to approve the constitutional package. The future of coalition is also very much linked with the future of Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The lawyers and many civil society groups have already announced to start street protests from June 9 if judiciary is not restored to pre-Nov 3 position. Several political parties are also expected to join them. The PML-N will certainly be in the front line if the situation turns out as such. Its leadership has announced more than once that they will not hold back from lawyers' movement. The movement will target the government, especially Musharraf and Asif Ali Zardari. Any violent clash between the pro-judges protesters and the security personnel following orders from the PPP government would be extremely unfortunate. This may make the PPP-PML-N divide unbridgeable and the coalition can break -- something which will be very harmful for the country. The end of the coalition could be the beginning of yet another round of political instability in Pakistan and a major setback for democracy. Pakistan cannot afford that. The sitting parliamentarians also being the beneficiaries of the National Reconciliation Ordinance, it seems least likely that the ordinance will be reversed By Nadeem Iqbal No substantial data is
available regarding the total number of beneficiaries of the National The ordinance gave immunity to politicians and bureaucrats against corruption and criminal charges filed between Jan 1, 1986, to Oct 12, 1999. The ordinance was part of the Benazir and Musharraf deal that included withdrawal of cases against her and her spouse but it benefited many others as well. In general, the ordinance says that it is enacted to "...promote national reconciliation, foster mutual trust and confidence amongst the holders of public office and remove the vestiges of political vendetta and victimisation, to make the election process more transparent etc." The NRO also provides for the establishment of the review boards by the federal and provincial governments to look through the entire record of cases, and make recommendations as to their withdrawal or otherwise. At the federal level the review board is headed by a retired judge of the Supreme Court with Attorney General and Federal Law Secretary as its members and, in case of provincial government, it is headed by a retired judge of the high court with Advocate-General and/or Prosecutor-General and Provincial Law Secretary as its members. Although Asif Ali
Zardari is the leading beneficiary along with his comrades Rehman Malik,
Zulfikar Since his contractual re-employment, Salman Farooqi has been busy working on how to resolve the power shortage crisis. Siraj Shamsuddin, on the other hand, has been made principal secretary to the prime minister. The ordinance also provides that no sitting member of the Parliament or the provincial assemblies can be arrested without taking into consideration recommendations by the Special Parliamentary Committee on ethics in the respective assemblies. As the sitting parliamentarians are also the beneficiaries of the ordinance, it seems a remote possibility that it will be reversed. Early this year, Attorney General Malik Qayyum told a Supreme Court bench hearing petitions against the ordinance that the Provisional Constitution Order protected the NRO and it did not need the parliament's approval; also that it would not lapse according to the PCO's Clause-V. The Clause-V says that an ordinance promulgated by the president or by the governor of a province shall not be subject to any time-limitation prescribed in the Constitution. Soon after its inception, the NRO was challenged by Zulfikar Bhutto's finance minister Dr Mubashir Hassan, former bureaucrat Roedad Khan, Jamaat-e-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) President Shahbaz Sharif, Insaaf Welfare Trust Chairman Dr Muhammad Aslam, and Tariq Asad. The petitioners stated that the NRO was a 'misnomer' since it had resulted from a 'deal' aiming at 'personal reconciliation for personal gains' between the federation and some selected political parties. A four-member SC bench, headed by the then CJ Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, on Oct 12, 2007, declined to stay the NRO, but ruled that no one could benefit from it before a final decision of the court was given. Later, a Supreme Court Bench headed by Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar quashed the stay order against the NRO and restored the authority of courts as well as other concerned offices to hear and decide cases under the said ordinance. This is why the NRO has also proved to be an irritant in the way of the restoration of pre-Nov 3 judiciary that failed to provide any relief to the main beneficiaries of the NRO since Musharraf took over in 1999. Zardari's stand that the present judges will remain intact is also being seen in the context of the NRO. Although all details of the proposed constitutional package are not out, it seems the NRO will also be protected through an act of the parliament.
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custody. Whether he will be a part of the political landscape of Pakistan
in the coming days and weeks is not yet clear. But one thing is clear: he
will be a part of the political discussion for a long time.
preferred democracy because it lays down the rules to change the rulers,
which dictatorship doesn't. He had, of course, put it rather simply,
making no fuss about it being the rule of, for and by the people.
the army chief
(as its head) can freely express his views -- which actually makes the
Council a safety net against the future military dictatorships --
Musharraf never really tested its viability and credibility in defusing
the political crisis.
president even though the retired generals are becoming increasingly
unpopular by the day.
other option except to sit in the opposition and stick to the increasingly
weak presidency. Otherwise, in the Feb 18 elections, the PML-Q has won a
substantial number of seats: In the National Assembly, its tally is 54, in
Punjab it's 86, in Sindh 9, in NWFP 6 and in Balochistan it has 20 seats.
Ceasefire agreements and a policy of dialogue, rather than conquest alone,
have brought some peace. The ANP government hopes that this lull in
fighting, this breathing space, will give it time to put in place other
measures, including development initiatives and talks with tribals, which
can see -- in the longer-term -- a move away from militancy.
ever seen
and no mean achievement indeed. It seems that the coalition partners have
understood that their own, individual gains are secondary and an agreed
political agenda must take precedence. Though, it is likely that the
coalition partners will develop differences on policy issues as they have
different ideologies.
Reconciliation Ordinance that was promulgated by President Musharraf on
Oct 5, 2007, a day before his controversial election as president.
However, it seems the NRO has served its purpose. The only fear is, the
future superior courts may not reopen these cases.
Mirza, Agha
Siraj Durrani, Salman Farooqi, Pir Mazharul Haq, Jahangir Badr, Malik
Mushtaq Awan and Naveed Qamar who have been exonerated under the
ordinance. NRO's beneficiaries have also included Aftab Sherpao and a host
of MQM leaders.