By the time this article is printed, the Federal Budget 2009-10 will already have been announced and will be followed quickly by analyses of what it means for different sections of the population. Unlike past years, the week or so leading up to the budget announcement was relatively quiet, undoubtedly because the country is in the grips of violent strife.

But could it be that the relative lack of interest in the budget also reflects an understanding among the common people that there is very little meaningful space in the economic policy realm? Could it be that the cynicism about formal political life that is so apparent at every level of society has become even more acute? These are important questions, perhaps more important than the answers themselves.

What really matters to the common people is that they are able to eke out a decent living for themselves, that they have jobs and access to basic services. Unfortunately, nothing of the sort can be taken for granted by a majority of people in this country. And it does not appear as if things are about to get any better.

Shaukat Tareen has told us that the growth rate has plunged to 2 percent from a double-digit rate not so long ago. Crucially, even when rapid growth was taking place, the benefits did not trickle down to working people. In fact, they were subject to arbitrary hiring and firing practices (if they were hired at all), intimidation and harassment by local police and administration (if they were engaged in subsistence-level self employment), and extortion on the part of various middlemen (if they were involved in subsistence agriculture).

Meanwhile, the cost of public services, particularly utilities, has steadily risen whereas access to basic education, health, clean drinking water and sanitation has declined. Will the forthcoming budget change anything? Not one bit. Every year the budget is said to be pro-poor and every year it becomes clear that it is just as anti-poor as it always has been.

In any case, the budget itself is hardly that important. The problem lies in the fact that there is genuinely little space within the given structure of power — both national and international — for an alternative policymaking paradigm. The story is now familiar: the international financial institutions (IFIs) ‘suggest’ policies that we dutifully adopt; these policies reinforce our indebtedness and further constrain us from autonomy in policymaking. A never-ending downward spiral!

The other side of this depressingly familiar narrative is that those who are at the wrong end of this oppressive social order generally believe that any attempt to change it will be an exercise in futility. This is a product of cumulative failures and the inculcation of parochialism within the body politic. All too often Pakistan’s dysfunction is attributed to the failure of political leadership. I disagree.

I think Pakistan’s dysfunction should be thought of as the success of the ruling class, which has succeeded in eliminating expansive political idioms of class and inclusive ethno-nationalisms and making sectarianism and exclusivist nationalism the dominant political ideologies. This success, however, must be put into perspective. The contradictions that have been generated by the state’s machinations are now rearing their ugly head, but presumably those who rule the roost still believe that the various Frankensteins can be managed.

In any case, the point is that the average Pakistani now thinks in terms of personal survival (or the survival of the nuclear family) and has lost faith — if it was there in the first place — in the idea that pursuit of the collective interest is in fact the best way to ensure personal well-being. So even though we all know that the budget will be anti-poor, or worse still that the whole decision-making process is anti-poor, there is no pretense to coming together to do anything about it, because nothing will change anyway and one is better off just trying to make it through oneself, by any and all means necessary.

The only political force that claims to be doing anything substantial for — and to a certain extent through — the poor is the religious right. But more often than not the right attributes everything that is wrong in Pakistan to the culturally corrosive influence of the ‘West’. There is little talk of the economic and political realities of imperialism, and the need to come up with a clear and coherent alternative to existing structures of power. In fact, the right very conveniently glosses over its own role in crushing the popular activism that characterised the 1960s and 1970s. By attributing everything to the ‘West’, the right also insulates our own ruling class from criticism for its role in being a willing client of imperialism.

In recent times much has been made of the emergence of ‘civil society’ as the conscience of the nation. But ‘civil society’, as it was constituted during the lawyer-led movement, does not represent the people. The impulses of ‘civil society’, in fact, distinguish it significantly from the people. Many of those in the ‘civil society’ camp are now openly supporting the indiscriminate army action in the NWFP. If ‘civil society’ did genuinely represent the people, it would not be supporting the same military establishment that it so vocally opposed until only a few months ago.

What is needed now is a sustained and informed assault on the bastions of privilege in Pakistan. There has been no attempt to revive the land reform agenda in Pakistan, or to demand accountability of the military and particularly its monopolising of public resources. There is still no meaningful resistance to the dictates of the IFIs, just lame assertions that we (as if society is a monolith) must tighten our belts.

There are scattered working class struggles that do not concede to the logic of cynicism, but they require genuine support. The mainstream political parties, including those of the right, will not fill the void. Hollow statements about budgets and America will not do. Much more substantive efforts are required. And as I mentioned at the outset, as of now there are more questions than answers. But if anyone is serious about change, then these questions must be taken on.

According to the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) report for the third quarter of the current fiscal year (FY09), despite "improvement", the country’s major macroeconomic indicators show structural weaknesses that have the potential of hampering economic recovery. The SBP projections put economic growth rate for FY09 (July 2008-June 2009) between 2 and 3 percent, which is even less than the revised target of 3.4 percent.

However, even this projection seems optimistic. The Planning Commission of Pakistan estimated on May 22 that the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate for FY09 would be 2 percent and that too after revising the same for the preceding year to 4.1 percent from 5.8 percent. The major reason for the dismal performance of the economy is -7.7 percent growth of the large-scale manufacturing (LSM) sector — which accounts for 70 percent of the total manufacturing — in the first three quarters of the current fiscal year (July 2008-March 2009), compared with 5 percent and 9.1 percent in the corresponding periods of FY08 and FY07,
respectively.

A combination of domestic and external factors is responsible for the negative growth of the LSM sector. These factors include weaker domestic and foreign demand (recession in the country’s major export markets), energy shortage, high cost of credit, and continuing inflationary pressures. Since these factors are likely to persist in the coming months, prospects of improved performance of the LSM sector, as well as the GDP growth rate, are not bright. Sluggish GDP growth means loss of jobs, fall in incomes, supply-side inflation and lower public revenue. These factors, in turn, constitute a drag on economic growth and the cycle continues.

In the first three quarters of FY09, fiscal deficit was reduced to 3.1 percent of GDP from 4.7 percent in the corresponding period of the preceding year. The 3.1 percent fiscal deficit, according to the SBP, is consistent with the annual target of 4.3 percent of GDP. However, the government may miss this target for two reasons: one, the revenue target for FY09 has been reduced to Rs1.18 trillion from Rs1.30 trillion. The downward revision of the revenue target is understandable, because significant increase in public revenue is difficult to attain in the face of sluggish economic growth. Still, tax receipts in the first ten months of the current fiscal year amounted to Rs898.6 billion, 17.7 percent higher than Rs763.6 billion in the corresponding period of FY08. Two, as the so-called ‘war on terror’ intensifies, and the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) exceeds three million, the current expenditure is likely to increase considerably.

Although the fiscal deficit of 4.3 percent of GDP in FY09 will be much lower than 7.4 percent of GDP in the preceding year, this will be accomplished by reducing development expenditure to Rs219 billion from R371 billion, rather than by increasing the revenue-GDP ratio. As the SBP notes, a sharp cut in development spending is neither sustainable nor desirable, because the government is required to increase spending on human capital development and widen social safety nets as an effective antidote to extremism.

From domestic account, we move to external account and start with current account balance. In the first ten months of FY09, Pakistan exported goods worth $15.98, compared with $16.40 billion in the corresponding period of the preceding year. This means exports registered negative growth of 2.62 percent during July 2008-April 2009, compared with growth of 9.9 percent in the corresponding period of FY08. Similarly, imports ($26.77) also registered negative growth of 9.8 percent in the first ten months of FY09, compared with 28 percent growth in the corresponding period of the preceding year. Trade deficit in the first ten months of current fiscal year was $10.79 billion, 14 percent lower than $12.31 billion in the corresponding period of FY08.

Workers’ remittances were registered at $6.36 billion in the first ten months of FY09, 22 percent higher than those of $5.31 billion during July 2007-April 2008. Partly due to the decrease in trade deficit and partly due to the increase in remittances, current account deficit during July 2008-April 2009 was reduced to $8.54 billion from $11.17 billion in the corresponding period of FY08. As a percentage of GDP, trade and current account deficits in the first three quarters of FY09 were 5.7 and 4.6, respectively, compared with 6.6 and 5.7, respectively, in the corresponding period of the preceding year.

According to latest estimates, in the current fiscal year, exports are expected to grow by 18-19 percent, down from the original target of 22 percent. In FY08, experts grew by 20 percent. Similarly, imports are projected to grow by 31 percent in FY09, compared with 35 percent in the preceding year. The decline in imports is due partly to fall in world commodity, particularly oil, prices and partly to reduced domestic demand.

On the other hand, the fall in exports is due partly to recession in Pakistan’s major markets, particularly the United States and European Union; partly to the precarious domestic security situation, which made foreign buyers and match-makers shy of visiting the country; and partly to strong inflationary pressures, which increased the cost of inputs.

However, this does not mean that there are no structural obstacles to export promotion. Pakistan has a very narrow export base coupled with a very limited number of export markets. Even in its traditional markets, Pakistani exporters are in danger of losing their share, mainly due to lack of understanding of and compliance with the relevant environment and consumer safety standards. Unless these factors are taken care of, which requires a lot of investment in research and development, a significant increase in exports is not likely even after the global economic crisis ends or the domestic security situation improves.

Current account is one side of balance of payments (BoP), whose other side is capital account. The 31 percent improvement in the current account balance during the first ten months of FY09 was matched by deterioration in the capital account balance, despite cash inflows from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) declined by 15.57 percent to $3.21 billion in the first three quarters of FY09 from $3.71 billion in the corresponding period of the preceding year. Again, the fall in FDI is due partly to the global financial crunch and partly to the poor law and order situation. However, thanks to the IMF assistance and reduction in import bill, foreign exchange reserves increased to $11.52 billion in the week ending May 29.

In short, on most of the key indicators, the first ten months of FY09 saw either deceleration in growth or negative growth. Exports, imports, trade deficit, current account deficit, FDI and fiscal deficit-GDP ratio have declined, while the LSM registered negative growth of 7.7 percent. No doubt, decline in current account and fiscal deficits is welcome. However, when one considers that the fiscal deficit reduction has been made possible not by significant increase in revenue but by slashing development expenditure, and that fall in trade deficit (the main item on current account) does not rest on export growth but on weaker domestic and external demand, the optimism is dampened. In simple, this means that ‘improvement’ in fiscal and external accounts does not rest on strong fundamentals. If this situation continues, dependence on foreign cash inflows will remain the only way out for Pakistan’s economic problems and it will not be able to graduate from the status of an aid-addict country.

(Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com)

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Will ‘improvement’ in figures bring about positive changes in their lives?

Amidst the haze of uncertainity, the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from some parts of Buner were given an option to return and settle in the cleared areas. The plight of IDPs has many dimensions that need serious consideration and effective response from the decision-makers. Some common damages faced by the majority of the IDPs include loss of livelihood assets and family members / relatives, physical disabilities, destruction of abodes, dispersal of clan and extended families, and hostilities of the refugee environment.

A significant number of women and children have been affected by drastic decline in nutrition status. Premature births, pregnancy complications and high prevalence of infant mortality are some other consequences. Internal feuds and conflicts have also been reported, which are a natural outcome of psychological trauma of this scale and complex profile. Whereas the intention and approach of the government is appropriate towards rehabilitation, few prerequisites are vital to be considered.

The first step that can lead to a quick healing after the turmoil is rehabilitation of livelihoods. Dialogue with a section of the IDPs reveals that many had to abandon standing crops to run for life. R Khan, a herdsman from Malam Jabba, narrates the ordeal of leaving behind his sheep herd while fleeing the terrains. Even for those who belonged to affluent and middle classes, the sense of loss shall not wither away easily. The rehabilitation can become effective with the strategic directioning of subsidies in a transparent manner.

On June 1, an official of the NWFP government announced Rs50,000 for each IDP as a compensation. However, the release of cash may not affect the lot of the displaced in an efficacious way. By resorting to basic social mobilisation through the community or clan cadres, the means of livelihood must be procured. Assistance in farming and other linked occupations, inputs in reconstruction of essential infrastructure, availability of credit on easy terms and conditions, and conflict resolution mechanism are some key mentions.

These issues have been well researched across the globe. According to a study on IDPs by Refugee Resource Centre at the University of Oxford in 2005, the focus of policies must address personal and collective sensitivities in the rehabilitation work. The yardstick of performance may be that affectees regain their former status in life in both social and economic terms. Besides this, efforts must aim at stemming the chances of relapse of factors that led to displacements. Interviews with the IDPs show that the majority of them are not convinced about the successful and everlasting eradication of militancy.

A transporter who used to ply between Mingora and Peshawar reveals that the inability of police to quell ordinary crimes eventually led to total diffusion of the government’s writ in the Malakand division. He was unsure whether normalcy would ever return to the troubled regions, given the breakdown of the institutional capacity. "We are in for a painful transition that may last for over two decades," he concludes.

Doing correct assessment of damage and destruction to the assets is a crucial task. This can be done in two stages. Baseline information can be gathered from the IDPs while they wait in the camps. When some semblance of peace returns, the veracity of the claims can be worked out by means of scientific surveys. Information technology can be employed to reduce time.

Many packages of high resolution satellite maps can be analysed by geographical information system (GIS) experts to prepare accurate estimates. For instance, hundreds of school buildings have been blown up or damaged due to shelling. Map analysis followed by on-site verification can help prepare cost effective plans for reconstruction. It may also be noted that modified approaches can be adopted to incorporate needs of the people into the reconstruction phase. The people must be involved so that their preferences can be known. This will also positively impact their state of trauma.

A rehabilitation programme is context specific. Each episode has its own peculiarities. When citizens of Burundi were displaced after a tragic civil war in the late 1990s, many innovative solutions were devised by refugee administrators. Introduction of art- and culture-based methods for psychotherapy, innovative procedures for educational programmes, and exclusive assistance options for elderly, orphans and destitute were some vital arrangements.

In the NWFP, the role of religion shall be vital in the rehabilitation work. The IDPs may be encouraged and facilitated to perform rituals and practices. Places of worship and congregation must be repaired and re-constructed on a priority basis. At the same time, the state can promote the welfare and cooperative dimension of Islam where helping each other in times of need is a worthy dead. Cultural sensitivities must be upheld to prevent any extremist element from exploiting any shortcomings on this count.

Rehabilitation and redevelopment needs a proper institution with clear mandate. A rehabilitation authority may be considered as a viable option. The government may enact a body on the lines of the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) after discounting all the handicaps and weaknesses. This shall ensure a continuous input of the federal government with coordination and assistance from provincial and local governments. It may be noted that the rehabilitation work may not finish in a few years; the time span may be much longer. Therefore, only by following a scientific approach, useful results can be obtained on a sustainable basis.

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For how long the IDPs will have to stay in these camps is a million dollar question.

For Pakistan’s rural population, livestock is the second major source of income generation after agriculture. Livestock meets a household’s nutritional needs, and it is also a safety net for providing security against shocks and stresses. Thus, for the landless population in the country’s rural areas, livestock ownership and rearing is the most effective source of livelihood.

The World Bank estimates that livestock is the main livelihood asset for up to 200 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in arid and semi-arid environments worldwide. The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2007-8 estimates that about 30-35 million people in rural areas are dependent on livestock alone as a means of their livelihood. Over the years, the people living in rural areas have adopted ingenious practices of livestock rearing to get maximum benefits from this asset. In the following discussion, we examine the rural livestock asset base of Pakistan and its significance for the country’s rural households:

Livestock as a sub-sector of agriculture

People’s livelihood strategies vary with their ownership of resources, access to services, level of skills base and the local environmental conditions. In the rural context, people’s economic status is determined by complex asset mix and their ingenious asset ownership. For survival, the people in rural areas combine their scant resource base with ingenious skills to maximise their life options and increase security.

It is no surprise that for agrarian rural economies such as Pakistan, livelihood strategies based on agricultural practices are intertwined with livestock rearing. The two are interlinked in Pakistan’s economy to an extent that while agriculture contributed 21 percent to gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007-8, the livestock accounted for 11 percent. In addition to its contribution to GDP, livestock accounts for 52.1 percent of agriculture as its sub-sector.

Small farmers and landless livestock producers derive 10-25 percent of their income from livestock. The people in rural areas benefit from livestock in many other ways too: it is used for food and draught power; hides are used for housing and clothing; and dung is used for fuel and manure. In particular, livestock is a key asset in many dry land environments. For poor families with just a few chickens or goats, livestock-derived foods, such as eggs and milk, are also an important source of nutrition, especially for children and mothers.

Asset base of a rural household

It is no wonder that for the rural population of Pakistan, the comprehension of assets is in terms of mal, janwar and dangar (literally translating into livestock: cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep, poultry, camels and horses). For these people, income is no doubt a tool for consumption and a source of cash accumulation. However, livestock rearing and animal husbandry remains the major source of wealth accumulation.

The majority of animals are owned by families with small herds, while large herds constitute only a small portion of the overall animal population. This is in sharp contrast to the pattern of land ownership in Pakistan: a huge number of small landowners occupy a fraction of the total cultivated land and a few landlords own large areas. The national livestock herd comprises about 24 million buffaloes, 22 million cattle, 37 million sheep, 50 million goats, 380 million poultry and one million camels.

In a baseline survey conducted by the Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Livestock (Minfal) — under its Strengthening of Livestock Services Project (SLSP) being undertaken in 30 districts of the country, including Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the Northern Areas and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata) — it was found that livestock owners derive 43 percent of their income from the sale of livestock and livestock products, followed by remittances (34 percent) and crops (20 percent).

Households’ dependence on livestock is so entrenched in the rural economies that one can even find an anecdotal narrative in Thomas Hardy’s famous novel titled Far From the Madding Crowd. When Gabriel Oak, Bathsheba’s first suitor, finds all his ewes dead after jumping off the cliff, he says: "Thank God I am not married. What would she have done in the poverty now coming upon me?" Such is the implication of livestock-based livelihood!

Ingenious livestock ownership models

We all have heard of crop sharing, an exchange of labour for wheat grain during the crop’s harvest. Likewise, in many parts of rural Pakistan, livestock sharing is a common phenomenon. In most villages of Pakistan, people rear livestock that is not necessarily owned by them. This mechanism works on a relatively equitable exchange deal between the two parties: the creditor (livestock owner) and the client (livestock grazier). In Southern Punjab, this practice is known as aadh laapi or plavee, while in the Northern Areas as yowki (translating into English as share in upbringing).

To reduce costs on livestock upkeep, medium to large livestock owners (mostly of buffaloes and cows) loan their calf to a poorer household that takes cares of it. When the calf is fully bred, it is sold in the market, and its sale proceeds are shared by both the owner and the caretaker. Here it is pertinent to mention that this mechanism works for both female and male calf. In the case of female calf, until the time they are sold, their milk is consumed by the client and the creditor does not have any right on it.

However, the market price for a fully bred buffalo or cow is evaluated by the creditor. It is his or her discretion whether the buffalo or cow is to be sold, or would he or she be the one who pays half-price to the client, or would the client be the one who pays half-price the creditor for acquiring complete ownership of the buffalo or cow. This mechanism cannot be challenged by the client, and is followed without any apprehensions and qualms by the two parties.

If a buffalo or cow dies during rearing, this would not affect the relationship between the creditor and the client, because "the system that prevails in villages is based on trust. Moreover, communal networks are very strong in villages. It also goes on to show that in our rural areas social capital is regarded as supreme over monetary forms of capital," explains Muhammad Qaswar Abbas, who owns a medium herd of buffaloes in Tehsil Jatoi of District Muzaffargarh. In rural areas, livestock is the most important asset, and any pilfering or deceit surely does not pass unnoticed. "Although there is no proper documentation of this exchange, yet no party dares to breach the verbal agreement," Abbas says.

It is also pertinent to note that the majority of poor households invest in livestock with their hard labour as graziers, to derive benefits from an increase in their ownership of livestock. This method of livestock sharing is adopted for large ruminants, while the ownership of small ruminants is not covered in this local mechanism. Though there are rural households that rear herds of large ruminants for commercial purposes, they keep flocks of small ruminants for meeting their household’s nutritional needs. The practice is especially dominant among the female-headed households. Many rural women benefit from this practice, which ensures to them steady supply of milk on a daily basis.

Most rural areas also have special offerings to make when it comes to dairy products. For instance, travelling to Tehsil Jatoi, Alipur and Muzafaragarh in District Muzafargarh, one finds innumerable roadside stalls selling milk cake or ‘khoya’. This dairy product is used in local confectioneries and it is being sold in the nearby metropolises. The people selling khoya do not necessarily own the livestock; rather, they purchase milk from the people living across the riverine belt. After value-addition (making of khoya), they sell it in the city centre.

The multinationals that have set up their milk collection points still have not been able to reach these riverine areas. The local people, hence, have continued with their indigenous methods of benefiting from the milk produce, though losing on its full potential. Interestingly enough, the affluent households also make milk cakes, but for their own consumption only.

Relevance of local practices for market and civil society

Local practices of livestock rearing are reflective of people’s dependence on their herds to pay for essential consumption needs, to maintain a buffer against any unforeseen expenses and to attain a respectable status in society. The key is to understand that what and which practices prevail in the contemporary local and social environment. For meaningful impact on people’s lives, this analysis is critical for development of need-based and area-specific livelihood programmes. Otherwise, results will be a chaos and wastage of resources.

There are numerous examples of failed development practices of non-governmental organisations’ livelihood programmes in the earthquake-affected areas. Many development organisations had distributed a large number of livestock (cows and goats) in the mountainous earthquake-affected areas. Results of such distributions were that livestock could not acclimatise to weather conditions. As a result, people sold livestock to abattoirs to raise cash income. The reason for this was: a) livestock was acquired from Punjab; b) need was not community-driven; and c) lack of livestock rearing knowledge among the communities.

The traditional community practices should be evaluated on their merits and demerits, and people should be encouraged to improve upon and augment the ingenious need-based models. The aadh laapi model adopted in rural areas shows that how people in our rural areas "bargain, exchange and transact" their skills on relatively equal terms. There is no denying the fact that traditional practices are sometime skewed in favour of people owning more resources; yet it does give development organisations a chance to innovate their services for rural people within their context. The key is to contextualise people’s lives, their needs, resources and skills vis-à-vis the development programmes offered by the state and NGOs.

The News on Sunday: How did your association with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto develop over the years?

Barrister Masood Kausar: During student days, I used to actively participate in extra-curricular activities. I was a popular student of the college. I remained president of the Khyber Union in Islamia College Peshawar, which was considered to be an honour for a student. Later, I became the first elected general secretary of University of Peshawar Students’ Union. However, our student politics was beyond any political affiliation. After the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the Inns of Court Pakistan Society at Lincoln’s Inn invited Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for a lecture. At that time, Jameel Sarkar of East Pakistan was the society’s president, while I was its general secretary. In this capacity, I was sent to escort Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from Dorchester Hotel, London. It was our first meeting. The very first sentence that he uttered as he sat in the car was: "Shah Sahib, we have to save East Pakistan. It is slipping out of our hands." After Bhutto discussed Pakistan’s political situation in detail during the lecture and later during interaction with us, I was among those who suggested to the charismatic leader to launch his own political party. We also expressed our apprehension that when he returned to the country he would be sacked by Ayub Khan. After this meeting, we developed an association and I remained in touch with him thereafter. Later, in due course of time, Bhutto launched the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). When I returned from England, Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao — who was my senior in Islamia College — brought me into the folds of the PPP. Ever since, I have struggled for restoration of democracy and independence of judiciary. Like millions of other young people, I too was inspired to struggle for what Bhutto symbolised. His valiant leadership has always mesmerised the Pakistani youth, whether in the country or abroad. This is one of the most striking features of his larger than life personality.

TNS: How do you see the future of the PPP?

SMK: After the judicial murder of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the dictatorial regime of Gen Zia-ul-Haq tried all inhuman acts, such as torture and coercion, to subdue the PPP’s leadership and suppress the party. However, nothing could be done in this regard. The PPP was an incarnated shape of democracy, justice and equality; and it was this spirit that the party’s leaders as well as workers imbibed. During the Zia regime, I myself was jailed for three years on different occasions because I was part of the struggle for democracy. When my father died, I was in jail. When one of my brothers died, I was in jail. The same is true for most PPP leaders and workers. However, no one budged from the ideals that Bhutto had inculcated in the rank and file of the PPP. In short, Gen Zia could not eliminate the PPP despite exhausting 11 years of his dictatorship on this nefarious agenda. Similarly, the tactics applied by another dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf can also be termed abortive attempts to suppress the PPP. They only thing these dictators did was to inflict heavy losses on the body politic of Pakistan, for which the whole nation is now paying a heavy price. Obviously, the vacuum created by the death of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was not possible to fill, but the PPP under Benazir Bhutto stood the ground. Now the history is again repeating itself. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto was tragic as well as unexpected. It was a thunderbolt for her family, and PPP leaders and workers. She laid down her life for democracy, justice and equality. However, this does not mean that what the father and daughter symbolised will remain dormant. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated during the election campaign. After this tragic event, senior party leaders were left in a lurch and some of them even lost interest in politics. As a result, the election campaign was left halfway and elections were contested only to save Pakistan, because "democracy is the best revenge" according to Benazir Bhutto. The assumption that, in the absence of Benazir Bhutto, the PPP would split into many factions has already been proved wrong. Asif Ali Zardari is doing well as co-chairperson of the party, which will surely rise to the occasion. Rest assured, the PPP will put Pakistan on the path of peace and prosperity. One also needs to remember that the party was not handed a bed of roses in the shape of government.

TNS: How do you assess the performance of the current PPP-led coalition government in the Centre?

SMK: The PPP lost its chairperson during the election campaign. Both party leaders and workers lost interest in the election campaign after this, because they were in a state of shock and agony. Thus, the PPP contested the elections without the required campaign, yet it managed to win a considerable number of seats in the National Assembly and in the four provincial assemblies. All this happened after the Musharraf regime had wreaked havoc on the country for more than eight years. Musharraf inflicted on the country whatever ills he could to extend his unconstitutional hold on power. He mutilated the constitution and wrecked the superior judiciary. A chief justice who was dispensing justice to the masses was unconstitutionally removed and emergency was imposed in the country. Judges of the superior courts were harassed and coerced. The economic indicators were tampered with and the people of the country were misguided through catchphrases like ‘economic turnaround’. The Musharraf regime’s policies on other fronts proved disastrous too. As a result, Pakistan suffered a lot during his regime. The PPP was handed over the reins of power at a time when not only the country but the whole region was passing through turbulent times. It was something like an ‘inheritance of loss’. However, despite these apparent problems, the PPP formed a democratic government to rescue Pakistan out of the crisis. Everyone knows that it is not possible for a new government to clear in a few days or months the mess created in the eight years of Musharraf.

TNS: What is expected with regard to the seventeenth amendment?

SMK: Throughout the chequered history of Pakistan, the unconstitutional military regimes have left behind enough mess for the succeeding political dispensations. In this regard, as stated earlier, the previous dark era of Musharraf was no exception. The PPP will restore the 1973 Constitution in its letter and spirit. It will also further establish the supremacy of the Parliament. The party is already in the process of developing a broad-based consensus on the seventeenth amendment.

TNS: Considering that the military operation in the Malakand division has entered a decisive phase, how should the process of rebuilding be carried out?

SMK: While rebuilding anything, one must keep in mind the root cause of destruction. This implies that one must focus on the real issue, which is the rampant oppression in out society. We will have to root out injustices in all forms and manifestations. We will have to create social and economic opportunities, and quash the sense of deprivation among the people. In Europe, in the first half of the twentieth century, there were unprecedented wars followed by matchless destruction. But the people of the continent altered the situation with the help of justice and rule of law in their societies. Europeans learnt that lesson while passing through the hard and harsh filter of history, and they turned mature in the process. In short, they realised their roles and responsibilities. They mastered the lesson that ‘prevention is the best cure’. We can also rebuild the Malakand division with justice, sense of responsibility and honesty. For this, we will have to present an attractive future for the youth of the region.

TNS: How do you analyse the situation in Balochistan?

SMK: One of our major problems is that we do not learn anything from history. For example, we did not learn anything from the East Pakistan debacle. I think the government should stop half-hearted measures in connection with the Balochistan issue. An All Parties Conference with a speedy follow up should tackle the same. It is not that difficult, provided there is a will on the part of the stakeholders. One must stop wasting time in unnecessary bureaucratic labyrinth and sit on the table until the issue is addressed. An honest analysis regarding Balochistan is required because facts remain facts, no matter how much they are distorted. Balochs are Pakistanis and addressing their genuine concerns or demands is the prime responsibility of the federation. There is no room for any cosmetic measures in the given scenario.

TNS: Would you like to tell us about your meeting with Benazir Bhutto just one day before her assassination?

SMK: Yes, I met her while she was visiting Peshawar as part of the election campaign. She was enthusiastic about the elections. We discussed at length the future of the PPP in the NWFP. We were discussing this on the stage in the Arbab Niaz Stadium, where she was to address the gathering. She asked me how she should speak to the people who had gathered from various parts of the province to listen to her after a long period. However, I did find this brave and bold leader of the PPP more committed and robust to play her due role in the politics of Pakistan. From her body language, it was apparent that she had willingly shouldered the Herculean task of putting Pakistan on the right track to salvation through the wheels of democracy.