Editorial 
Talks or force
As these lines are being written, a spokesperson of the Pakistani Taliban has claimed they are withdrawing their offer of peace following the death of the group’s deputy leader Waliur Rehman in a suspected drone attack. Waliur Rehman is said to have been “more amenable to peace talks” than his senior Hakeemullah Mehsud. 
Even though the CIA has not yet confirmed that Waliur Rehman was among the seven people killed in the attack, chances are this will put the offer of talks by the TTP on hold, for some time at least. It may be worthwhile to remember that the offer of talks did not mean a ceasefire.

for
Talking the talks
It is the inflexibility of approach that has not allowed a fair 
discussion on what the path of negotiations could potentially achieve
By Farah Zia
Truth be told, the possibility of talks with the Pakistani Taliban, a favoured route for the political forces, especially those who have been voted into power in Election 2013, has received very little support from the intellectual class. The arguments against negotiations remain rigid and painfully similar, no matter how frequently they are expressed in private discussions or on the media or perhaps in matters of policy too.

The government should call TTP’s bluff
— Senior analyst Rahimullah Yusufzai
By Ather Naqvi “
The News on Sunday: The political forces/parties may have put their weight behind talks but political analysts are by and large opposed to talks. What is your rationale for arguing that the talks option with the Taliban should be explored?
Rahimullah Yusufzai: I have a number of arguments in favour of holding talks with the Taliban. A) We have a new elected government in place which has every right to pursue policies it thinks right. Political parties, such as the PTI and the PMLN, had been calling for peace talks with the militants during their election campaigns since the larger idea is to be able to improve the law and order situation and economy of the country. They may or may not succeed but they should be backed to try this option. B) The option of talks is not something new or peculiar to a certain government. Talks were also pursued during the Musharraf and the PPP governments. They were backed by the federal government and the army was fully on board. Two peace agreements in Swat were directly negotiated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the ANP-led coalition government. It didn’t work but the government tried to peacefully end the conflict.

against
The other option
Taliban can be tackled partly by talks, partly by force and partly administratively if FATA becomes a part of Pakistan under the same set of rights and laws for the rest of the country.
By Adnan Rehmat
Even the cliché that Pakistanis are yearning for peace through an end to the murderous Taliban violence is an understatement. Peace was the underlying theme of the 2013 general elections. All parties promised peace and the main parties that won at the center, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas — Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, Imran Khan’s PTI, Munawar Hassan’s JI, and the likely coalition partner Fazlur Rehman’s JUI — have said this would be achieved through talks with the Taliban.

“No government negotiates with terrorists who refuse to give up violence”
— Senior journalist Zahid Hussain
By Alefia T. Hussain
The News on Sunday: Your position does not favour negotiations with the Taliban. This despite the fact that most political parties have arrived at this conclusion. What is your rationale for not taking the talks route when we have examples from all over the world where the problem of terrorism has been resolved on the negotiating table?


 

 

 

 

 

Editorial 
Talks or force

As these lines are being written, a spokesperson of the Pakistani Taliban has claimed they are withdrawing their offer of peace following the death of the group’s deputy leader Waliur Rehman in a suspected drone attack. Waliur Rehman is said to have been “more amenable to peace talks” than his senior Hakeemullah Mehsud.

Even though the CIA has not yet confirmed that Waliur Rehman was among the seven people killed in the attack, chances are this will put the offer of talks by the TTP on hold, for some time at least. It may be worthwhile to remember that the offer of talks did not mean a ceasefire.

Meanwhile, the country stands sharply divided on the possibility of holding negotiations with the Taliban. Or at least that is how it appears if one looks at the viewpoint that is articulated by analysts on all kinds of media. The political class was in no two minds even before the election.

Of course, there was one set of political parties that was directly under attack by the Taliban and could not campaign. These parties had put their weight behind negotiations in the All Parties Conferences held months before the election. Others that were allowed to campaign peacefully declared they were in favour of tracing peace through the path of negotiations.

It would only be fair to say that the people voted in the parties that promised a solution of terrorism through talks. Yet the contours of the debate are sharp and the message is loud. The anti-talks argument has it all clearly laid down: this is not the right time to talk; states don’t talk to non-state actors; who exactly are we going to talk to given the loose groupings of Taliban; what is the quid pro quo; talks will legitimse the killers and violence; there’s nothing that the state can offer to the Taliban without losing a lot of its own ground.

The pro-talks side is perhaps not as clear except on one thing — talk if the dividend is peace. If you don’t talk peace, you remain in a state of war. Don’t let more people die in this senseless war. Let there be talks because people have voted in their favour. Talks, in the present scenario, mean siding with pro-democratic forces.

Today’s Special Report looks at the pros and cons of this debate. Like in all debates, truth is scattered on both sides. One hopes the leaders are able to glean this truth and bring peace to the hapless people of this region who have seen enough bloodshed for a lifetime.

 

 

   

 

 

 

for
Talking the talks
It is the inflexibility of approach that has not allowed a fair 
discussion on what the path of negotiations could potentially achieve
By Farah Zia

Truth be told, the possibility of talks with the Pakistani Taliban, a favoured route for the political forces, especially those who have been voted into power in Election 2013, has received very little support from the intellectual class. The arguments against negotiations remain rigid and painfully similar, no matter how frequently they are expressed in private discussions or on the media or perhaps in matters of policy too.

It is the inflexibility of approach that has not allowed a fair discussion on what the path of negotiations could potentially achieve. The little that has been written in favour of talks begins and ends by refuting the fears of the other side, instead of making a positive and creative case for solving Pakistan’s terrorism problem.

Often the pro-side has had to adopt a defensive position.

The contrary view, in most cases, completely rejects the possibility or utility of talks and, when asked to suggest a solution that could end violence and bring peace, postulates this is not the right time. Why? Because the Pakistani government would be talking from a position of weakness, it says. It assumes that the question of negotiations arises only when “governments are at their lowest points of leverage”. By that it means, the time is not ripe when the threat of violence hangs on our heads; negotiations must begin in a period of peace.

This is as naïve as saying that talks must take place once the Taliban accept the writ of the state and the Constitution, and agree to renounce violence. If that had happened and the Pakistani state was in a position of strength, we would all be sitting pretty, not feeling the need to undertake such an exercise.

The period of relative calm in which to begin the negotiations may well be a wishful dream. Besides, nobody talks about the position of weakness of the Taliban. In the guerilla warfare they have waged on this country, they too have to locate and recruit suicide bombers, and lose them regularly. Nobody suggests that on the table, they may step down from their stated position.

Twist the argument a bit and place it in the framework of democracy and this may look like the perfect time to start the negotiation process.

We know the original argument — that democracies don’t budge in the face of violence, they don’t legitimise terrorism and the international consensus against it, etc. etc. And yet, democratic governments have often negotiated with terrorists, Peter R. Neumann in his article “Negotiating With Terrorists” tells us.

The British government, he says, did so even after the IRA had launched a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street which almost eliminated the entire British cabinet in 1991. The Spanish government sat down with the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom after a lethal terrorist strike and even the government of Israel secretly negotiated the Oslo accords while the PLO continued its terrorist attacks.

Ours is a peculiar situation, we are told, and the extent of violence the citizens of this country and its security forces have been subjected to is unprecedented. Agreed. But then, as stated above, this may be a perfect time to talk about talks; because the government of the day has a democratic mandate to conduct negotiations. The people have exercised their democratic choice in favour of talks.

Does it not look like a position of strength — a vast majority of the country’s population, including the province of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, voting in the election to support the political process as opposed to the Shariah. The TTP cannot bring Shariah to the negotiating table after this election, can it? If anything, here is an incentive for the government to take democratic politics to its stronghold areas.

The strongholds of TTP bring one to this other predetermined idea of the anti-talks circles. They somehow assume the TTP surfaced on Pakistan’s political map out of nowhere; for them, it in fact came about after the US invasion of Afghanistan or the US drone strikes within Pakistan or/and as a consequence of the Lal Masjid operation.

Taliban and their predilection for violence, and hence the uselessness of talks with them decontextualises the debate altogether. Somebody at some point in time did want to exploit the concept of Jihad in a “lawless” and “Rightless” territory called Fata for their strategic objectives, giving birth to the phenomenon we now know as Taliban.

That’s when the seeds of the TTP were laid too.

And that is the nuanced distinction between the two proponents of talks who happen to be the winners of the last election. Imran Khan is not willing to look beyond 9/11 and drones; for him terrorism in this country is a reaction of foreign occupation, military operations and drones. Mian Nawaz Sharif, too, skips the context but does not fudge or bypass it. He acknowledges that terrorism has killed so many people and then says he wants an end to it.

The solution they both have arrived at is — negotiations. As elected people, they have every right to explore all possibilities for a peaceful settlement. While Khan thinks the end of military operations along with negotiations would automatically bring peace, Sharif sees the solution in economy. On the flip side, he needs the law and order situation to improve before he can improve the economy.

If they both decide to exclude the option of talks, all they are left with is force. While as governments, they might feel it their duty to protect the life of their citizens as well as soldiers.

Besides, like talks, force [read military operations] has been used before and with consequences. It means retaliatory attacks by the Taliban in settled areas and big cities; it also means Internally Displaced People (IDPs) to the tune of hundreds of thousands at the mercy of the state. Military operations equally entail loss of innocent lives, lack of information, human rights violations, and no independent media.

But why does the use of force always mean military operation for a common man: because, we have not been able to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorism mechanism which includes civilian law-enforcement too.

That brings us to the central contradiction — if the talks with the Taliban do materialise, where does the military stand, with or against the civilian dispensation? When you talk of a democratic framework, the government of the day is or ought to be the biggest stakeholder. If the mere holding of talks or their failure means the state loses its monopoly over violence and its control of territories, who is the actual loser — the civilian government or the military. That we are still unclear as to who represents the state is the crux of the matter.

 


 

The government should call TTP’s bluff
— Senior analyst Rahimullah Yusufzai
By Ather Naqvi “

The News on Sunday: The political forces/parties may have put their weight behind talks but political analysts are by and large opposed to talks. What is your rationale for arguing that the talks option with the Taliban should be explored?

Rahimullah Yusufzai: I have a number of arguments in favour of holding talks with the Taliban. A) We have a new elected government in place which has every right to pursue policies it thinks right. Political parties, such as the PTI and the PMLN, had been calling for peace talks with the militants during their election campaigns since the larger idea is to be able to improve the law and order situation and economy of the country. They may or may not succeed but they should be backed to try this option. B) The option of talks is not something new or peculiar to a certain government. Talks were also pursued during the Musharraf and the PPP governments. They were backed by the federal government and the army was fully on board. Two peace agreements in Swat were directly negotiated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the ANP-led coalition government. It didn’t work but the government tried to peacefully end the conflict.

My argument is that failure of talks is no excuse of abandoning talks. The important thing for us is that the offer of talks has come from the TTP, which says that the previous government was not serious in pursuing this option. Now, it’s not just the Taliban who have demands, the government also has certain demands. At one point during the PPP’s last government, the federal government’s position was that the TTP should first lay down arms to sit on the negotiating table while the ANP head Asfandyar Wali was ready for talks even if the TTP fighters kept their arms and not use them. Though I’m not very optimistic about the results of the talks given the overall past history but I think the government should call their bluff and see how serious the TTP is this time.

TNS: Do you think there is a war-weariness at both sides and that this is the right time to start the talks. If yes, then how long drawn this process going to be? What is your expectation?

RY: Yes, there is this element of war-weariness, but it doesn’t mean that one side would surrender and the conflict would come to an end. Holding talks and having results can be a long and torturous experience though. The talks may take quite a long time to mature. The Afghans have been fighting for the last 35 years. The US has also incurred huge losses in terms of human loss and financial cost. In Pakistan, the local Taliban have been on the retreat. They have been losing public support over the years. Many Taliban from Swat and rest of Malakand division and Bajaur and Mohmand had to cross over to Afghanistan for this very reason. But the Pakistani Taliban are still entrenched in the two Waziristans and parts of Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal regions. That said, it would still be early to underestimate their strength as they seem able to recruit as many suicide bombers and fighters as they want.

TNS: The anti-talks argument holds that we do not know who to talk to and that the state must not talk to non-state actors? Are you clear who the talks are going to be with and that these will not leave out some factions?

RY: It is not the right assessment to say that we do not know who to talk to. The government has been talking to them in the past. It even talked to the TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud. If talks are to be held, these would be with the TTP because it is an umbrella group for most militant groups and is fighting the state. I think it’s not a question about talking to a non-state actor but about coming out of this situation. The fighting has been taking place since 2003 and it has taken a huge toll in terms of human lives and economic cost. It’s even wrong to compare our situation with that of Sri Lanka’s, for instance, where the ethnic and religious lines between the Sinhalese Buddhists and the Tamil Hindus were clearly drawn and the state eventually annihilated the non-state actors. Ours is a more complex situation. People here are actually divided over whether to start a military operation against the Taliban or hold talks with them.

TNS: Another argument from the anti-talks side is about talking from a position of strength or weakness? They say talking at this point will be like talking from a position of weakness. Do you agree?

RY: Theoretically, yes. The state has not been able to defeat them militarily. But we can see that the Taliban have also not been able to achieve any of their targets in terms of gaining territory, imposition of sharia laws, and so on. It would have been ideal for the government to talk from a position of strength, but that hasn’t happened despite a decade of fighting.

TNS: Related to this earlier question is the fear about the agenda of the talks. People say that there is nothing the government can give to the Taliban, neither territory nor monopoly over violence. What is your opinion?

RY: I think we should not make an attempt to pre-judge the agenda of the talks. A lot of twists and turns will take place on the negotiating table itself. But we also should not forget that the anti-democracy agenda of the Taliban has failed. It failed in Fata, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and elsewhere where elections were held and people came out in large numbers to vote despite real threats to their life and property.

TNS: The anti-talks argument is premised on the fact that the talks option has been explored earlier too in the form of peace agreements and has failed. How do you evaluate the previous agreements done with the Taliban?

RY: We should not forget that of the 12 or so agreements made with the Taliban during the last 10 years, two agreements are still intact — one was made with the group of Taliban led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan in 2006 and later renewed and the other was with the late Maulvi Nazir in Wana, South Waziristan. One can argue that both these groups are non-TTP and that they aren’t fighting the government and the military in Pakistan but are focused primarily on Afghanistan. But if they were not tackled here, they might one day join the TTP in adding to the problems of Pakistan. The point is that we can only have results when the two sides sit on the negotiating table.

TNS: Can we draw a parallel between talks with TTP and the state of Pakistan and the talks between the US and Afghan Taliban?

RY: The Afghan Taliban seem to enjoy a somewhat stronger position. They draw their legitimacy from the fact that they have been in power in Afghanistan for six years. World organisations, such as the UN and ICRC, have been dealing with them. Afghan Taliban also justify their existence on the excuse that they are fighting the foreign, non-Muslim enemy that ousted them from power and occupied Afghanistan in 2001.

TNS: Maulana Samiul Haq has hinted at a very important fact that the talks can only materialise when the army and the political government are on the same page? Is that a concern for you too? Where does the military stand on this?

RY: As I said earlier, the army and the politicians have been on the same page in earlier such attempts. We hope it would be the same this time. Military is a major stakeholder in talks because it has been doing the fighting on the ground, and has laid down lives. Let me also add that the assassination of TTP deputy leader Waliur Rahman in a US drone strike on May 29 could delay or even scuttle any chances of peace talks as he was seen as a moderate compared to his colleague and was someone with whom talks could be held due to his political background and past association with Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s JUI-F. By killing him, the Americans have sent a strong message as they did on a number of occasions in the past that they were opposed to peace talks between the Pakistan government and Pakistani Taliban.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

against
The other option
Taliban can be tackled partly by talks, partly by force and partly administratively if FATA becomes a part of Pakistan under the same set of rights and laws for the rest of the country.
By Adnan Rehmat

Even the cliché that Pakistanis are yearning for peace through an end to the murderous Taliban violence is an understatement. Peace was the underlying theme of the 2013 general elections. All parties promised peace and the main parties that won at the center, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas — Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, Imran Khan’s PTI, Munawar Hassan’s JI, and the likely coalition partner Fazlur Rehman’s JUI — have said this would be achieved through talks with the Taliban.

So, is this possible? Or even desirable? Peace through talks is a seemingly benevolent and apparently easy way of bringing a modicum of normalcy to Pakistan as opposed to the concept of taking the war to the heart of Taliban in an attempt to irreversibly undo them. But if this were really doable, then why couldn’t a powerful government headed directly by the military (President General Pervez Musharraf) and a secular coalition government (Asif Zardari’s PPP, Asfandyar Wali’s ANP and Altaf Hussain’s MQM) able to do it in the decade preceding the May 2013 elections? They all tried hard enough.

In the 10 years that Taliban have bloodcurdlingly terrorised the country, at times overtly aided by the money and skills of Al Qaeda, killing nearly 50,000 civilians and soldiers, Pakistan has tried both talks and force to neutralise them. The net result is that despite the at-times severe setbacks to its operational capability, the Taliban still have a strong national footprint, aided by many militant groups tolerated as policy by the state, in terms of their ability to mount major attacks to devastating effect anywhere they want. In the last five years alone, they’ve killed the likes of Benazir Bhutto and Bashir Bilour as well as about 15 legislators, twice nearly killed Musharraf and managed to get into the military headquarters and naval and air bases to strike fatal blows.

So, what makes many think, in particular PML-N and PTI, which have already been ‘greeted’ by the Taliban with post-election strikes, that the Taliban will cease their violence and make themselves redundant through talks? Do Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan really think Taliban are their friends just because they made it clear to all and sundry before elections that they wanted PML-N and PTI in power and PPP, ANP and MQM consigned to oblivion? When did the Taliban undo their declared mission statement of seizing the state to enforce a caliphate by abolishing democracy, the system through which Nawaz and Imran find themselves in power with the mandate to bring peace?

There are so many ifs and buts, and logistical nightmares, to talks — even if they happen — that it makes the head spin. Who will lead the talks — the Nawaz government at the center or the Imran government in the province? Their two parties are sworn enemies. Can they talk to the Taliban together through a consensus interlocutor? Then, who is the representative at the other end that can offer ‘sovereign’ Taliban guarantees? And guarantees to whom — Nawaz Sharif (the center) or Imran (the province)?

And talk to groups that are formally outlawed by law without changing the constitution, or de-proscribing them? Talks always mean compromise. Give and take. Or ‘muk-muka’, as Imran calls it. What can Imran promise on behalf of the province? Or Nawaz on behalf of the federation? Without the consent of the elephant in the room — the military, which by force and default represents the state (not the government) — which of the two leaders with the mandate of ending terrorism and bringing peace promise concessions to the Taliban?

The bottom line is that the Pakistani state lost thousands of kilometers of territory in various swathes over the last decade to non-state actors. This is unprecedented in modern history. That this happened after Pakistan went overtly nuclear poses other fundamental questions about the nature of the state’s real capability to operate as a functional sovereign but that’s a debate for another time.

The Taliban and their supporters continue to hold territory that is seen and used by the military for their Afghanistan objectives. This is why there is no local independent media in tribal areas that can report on what is really happening there.

This brings us to the premise of the would-be compromise that the state/government (assuming Nawaz, Imran and Kayani are somehow by miracle on the same page) is willing to offer the Taliban. What is it that the Taliban want? Clearly, to hold on to territory they are holding. To get a formal declaration by the state to enforce Sharia in the tribal areas — an environment conducive to the Taliban’s influence on the local populations that can help them stay entrenched (what about the people’s right bartered away like this in reward to militant groups refusal to be scared of the state).

To get promises that the army, or paramilitary and civilian armed forces will not attack the Taliban first? All of this aids the Taliban in keeping what they have, plus buying time to consolidate and replenish their killing machine. A de-facto state for non-state actors in a nuclear state! Incredible!

And what can the state/government want from the Taliban? A halt to attacks on soldiers and civilians? A laying down of arms? Acceptance of the Constitution of Pakistan? Transformation of the Taliban into a political movement that can make them a bona fide stakeholder in the state and government structures? All of this that the state/government wants presupposes that the Taliban are only interested in Pakistan and not Afghanistan. That they are interested in populist politics and crave public support to serve them.

This would be extraordinarily naïve. Both Baitullah Mehsud who clubbed various armed groups into the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and his successor Hakimullah Mehsud, have often talked of representing Khorasan — the greater region comprising parts of not just Afghanistan and Iran but also Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. They have grander plans than merely being restricted to Pakistan.

While the TTP is not a monolithic unified entity, the Pakistan variety of Taliban see their destinies intertwined with those of the Afghan Taliban and beyond with other groups that see the future of the region lying in the geography of the distant past.

The Taliban in Pakistan, and indeed in Afghanistan, have created structures that reflect facsimiles of ‘normal’ states. They have a central council that serves as a policy making and governing body to implement plans on territories that they either control or have marked as need to be captured. That’s why they have local amirs and regional amirs, even in areas they don’t control. Their mission designs don’t evolve around electoral politics and public service but the creation of a regional empire that subsumes several existing sovereign states to serve as a nucleus of an eventual global caliphate. With such grand plans, the Taliban are not going to be talked into becoming a bad-looking JI or a grumpy JUI in Western Pakistan.

If talking is not an option and fighting them has failed, what’s the answer? The answer is for Pakistan to become a normal state by accepting the complete territorial and political sovereignty of Afghanistan and to give up the impractical and costly dream of ruling Kabul by proxy.

When Pakistan accorded diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government in 1990s, the given raison d etre was that history shows anyone who controls Kabul, controls Afghanistan and we must respect this mandate. So, what’s stopping the Pakistani establishment accepting the democratic and representative government of Afghanistan led by Karzai, on the same principle, or whoever succeeds him, now?

Islamabad cannot see the Afghan Taliban as good and Pakistan Taliban as bad if they want to overcome them. They are not groups but a mindset and a mission.

The Taliban will not surrender or give up their dreams through talks alone. They can be tackled partly by talks, partly by force and partly administratively if FATA becomes a part of Pakistan under the same set of rights and laws for the rest of the country. And if Pakistan stops presenting itself as a citadel of Islam. That mission has clearly been hijacked by the Taliban. If Pakistan doesn’t want the same level of sovereignty over its western border as it employs on its eastern border, talks with Taliban will merely delay the eventual use of force against them. But by then, it will become even costlier for Pakistan. Perhaps fatally!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“No government negotiates with terrorists who refuse to give up violence”
— Senior journalist Zahid Hussain
By Alefia T. Hussain

The News on Sunday: Your position does not favour negotiations with the Taliban. This despite the fact that most political parties have arrived at this conclusion. What is your rationale for not taking the talks route when we have examples from all over the world where the problem of terrorism has been resolved on the negotiating table?

Zahid Hussain: It is not whether we should talk to the Taliban, but what the conditions are. No government negotiates with terrorists who refuse to give up violence and challenge the writ of the state. The TTP’s offer for talks comes with preconditions that include enforcement of its retrogressive political and social agenda. It rejects Pakistani constitution and democracy. It justifies killing of thousands of innocent Pakistani in suicide attacks and destroying schools. It has declared war on Pakistani state and is engaged in fierce battle with Pakistani military. There is no indication that the proscribed terrorist outfit is willing to give up violence and restrict its activities to the country’s constitutional parameters. The political parties are supporting the talks with the Taliban either out of fear or because some of them subscribe to its retrogressive world outlook. The Taliban not only threaten Pakistan’s unity and its existence but is also dangerous for the regional security and stability.

TNS: The Taliban track record in honouring previous peace agreements in Fata and Swat is believed to have been unsatisfactory. Yet, the pro-talks experts argue that reconciliation with Taliban has not been sufficiently explored. Your view?

ZH: It is very clear that the TTP is not interested in peace. The main reason for peace talk offer is to gain legitimacy. Pakistani authorities have signed at least ten peace deals in the past ten years, but all violated by them. The Taliban used those agreements to gain time and space to reorganise itself. The last peace deal in Swat in 2009 fell through after the militants advanced close to Islamabad. They killed hundreds of political activists opposed to their retrogressive rule. They closed down female education. That forced the government to launch a military operation. More than two million people had to leave their homes. It is completely wrong that reconciliation with the Taliban was not fully explored. Do we want to go though the Swat experience once again? Certainly not!

TNS: Should we assume that, in your view, cracking down on the insurgents operating from sanctuaries inside the Pakistan’s territories is the solution to the problem?

ZH: I am not saying that the military operation is the only solution to the militancy. But use of force becomes necessary when other means fail. The military operation became imperative after peace deals fail and the insurgents continue their attacks on the security agencies. Besides, no country can allow its territory to be used as sanctuaries for across the border attacks. The militants have also been using Pakistani tribal areas to plot attacks on the Western countries with grave consequence for Pakistan.

TNS: There has been a lot of talk about talking from the position of strength or weakness. In your view, can the state of Pakistan only negotiate with the Taliban from a position of weakness, and the talks will only give them legitimacy or a chance to regroup?

ZH: The military operations since 2009 have driven out the Taliban from their strongholds of Swat, South Waziristan, and other tribal areas. The setback has greatly reduced the capacity of the Taliban to launch major terrorist attacks. But it does not mean that the militants have been defeated. The attack on ANP rallies in the election campaign shows that they are still capable of spreading fear. The TTP’s offer for talks indicates that the militant outfit and its allies want to buy some time to reorganise themselves. We should be careful not to fall in the trap. The talks should be only conducted after the militants agree to give up violence and accept the country’s constitution. Any talks without these preconditions would be taken as the weakness of the state.

TNS: Related to the earlier question, do you have a problem with the agenda of talks, the quid pro quo for both sides so to speak? What are your fears? Isn’t a ceasefire good for the state of Pakistan, too, to be able to think and strategise?

ZH: The TTP is not willing to a ceasefire. While offering peace negotiations it has continued terrorist attacks. It targeted political parties which stood up against militant violence. It called for the boycott of the elections declaring democracy un-Islamic. We should not be under any illusion that the militants are sincere in talking peace.

TNS: Maulana Samiul Haq has hinted at a very important fact that the talks can only materialise when the army and the political government are on the same page? Is that a concern for you too? Where does the military stand on this?

ZH: Thousands of Pakistani soldiers have given their lives fighting the insurgents and terrorists threatening the security of our country. That supreme sacrifice cannot be compromised. General Kayani has clearly stated that the war against terrorism is our war. He also specified the preconditions for peace negotiations. I think ultimately the civil and military leadership will be on the same page in dealing with the militancy and terrorism. We all know who Samiul Haq is. He certainly cannot deliver peace.

TNS: The pro-talk analysts point to the fact that if the Americans can talk to the Afghan Taliban after all their losses, why can’t we? What is your take?

ZH: It is a lame argument. Americans are occupation forces and need to talk to the Afghan resistance groups that could allow them a safe exit. But Pakistani Taliban is not fighting against any occupation forces. What are the TTP’s demands which are to be negotiated? Are we prepared to accept its demand to enforce its twisted version of Sharia? And finally what about thousands of innocent people who lost their lives in the suicide bombings? These are two completely different situations.

TNS: The pro-talks side builds its argument on the single premise —talk if the dividend is peace. What do you think shall we lose in this process and why should we not avail this chance, especially when the pro-talks political forces — PTI and PML-N — have been voted into power?

ZH: How can they ensure that negotiations could produce peace? Did peace deal in Swat bring peace or more violence? Peace can only be achieved if the Taliban renounce violence and accept the rule of law.  Once they do it there is no harm talking to them.