MQM 25 and counting
Editorial
MQM has had many contradictory faces. Considered to be the establishment's child, it has enjoyed a love-hate-love relationship with the establishment in subsequent years. It revolutionised politics by creating an urban middle class party and leadership as opposed to the feudal and industrial classes and yet gave its leader the status of a demi-god. It called itself a democratic and secular party but could not take any criticism against itself and curbed such criticism by force, if need be. It's a party that united the Urdu-speaking mohajirs and divided them from other ethnicities by doing so. It claimed to stand for peace but resorted to shameless violence in its most anti-violent phase like on May 12, 2007.

evolution
Looking for answers
As several important aspects of the party's history and structure still appear clouded to the general public, a review of available literature in order to understand the reasons behind its meteoric rise
By Ameem Lutfi
No other party in Pakistan represents as enigmatic an image as Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Even as the hegemonic discourse about MQM outside of the party loyalist circles continues to be of 'collective violence' or, put plainly, "Ghunda gardi", the party continues to thrive. The party's continued electoral success and street strength are testimony to its continued vitality and popular support.

"This is a new image of the party"
Noman Baig is one of the leading lights amongst the new generation of scholars working on Pakistan. Having completed his masters from the University of Victoria where the subject of his research was MQM, he is currently working on his doctoral degree at The University of Texas-Austin's anthropology department, again on MQM.
In his masters' thesis titled From Mohallah to Mainstream, he sought to theorise the transformation of MQM from an ethnic to a catch-all party.
Excerpts of interview follow.
By Ameem Lutfi
The News on Sunday: In popular discourse, MQM is always linked to the issue of street violence. As an academic who has looked at the party closely, how do you look at MQM's link to urban violence?

Phase 1 Mohajir ethno-nationalism (1984--1997)Chronology
- June 11, 1978: Altaf Hussain forms the All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization (APMSO) in Karachi University to demand rights for Urdu-speaking students in educational institutions.

 

MQM

25 and counting

 

Editorial

MQM has had many contradictory faces. Considered to be the establishment's child, it has enjoyed a love-hate-love relationship with the establishment in subsequent years. It revolutionised politics by creating an urban middle class party and leadership as opposed to the feudal and industrial classes and yet gave its leader the status of a demi-god. It called itself a democratic and secular party but could not take any criticism against itself and curbed such criticism by force, if need be. It's a party that united the Urdu-speaking mohajirs and divided them from other ethnicities by doing so. It claimed to stand for peace but resorted to shameless violence in its most anti-violent phase like on May 12, 2007.

From Mohajir to Muttahida, the quest for identity is still on.

These contradictory faces have largely stayed in people's collective memory. However, the party may now find it difficult to stop the media from refreshing these contradictions. It may find it equally hard to justify the party's overt support for the Musharraf-led government till only recently and the U-turn after the Feb 18, 2008, elections.

Beyond these currents of politics, which do find a mention on the pages of newspapers in one form or the other, it is heartening to note that MQM is now a subject of serious research among Pakistani academics studying abroad. One sincerely hopes that the scope of such research is felt among the institutions within the country and is allowed as well by the party.

As the party celebrates its 25 years on the political horizon of Pakistan, we take the opportunity to do what has not been done before -- take a dispassionate look at its origin and evolution over these 25 years.

 

evolution

Looking for answers

As several important aspects of the party's history and structure still appear clouded to the general public, a review of available literature in order to understand the reasons behind its meteoric rise

By Ameem Lutfi

No other party in Pakistan represents as enigmatic an image as Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Even as the hegemonic discourse about MQM outside of the party loyalist circles continues to be of 'collective violence' or, put plainly, "Ghunda gardi", the party continues to thrive. The party's continued electoral success and street strength are testimony to its continued vitality and popular support.

Over the years, MQM has continually stayed the third or the fourth largest party (in terms of electoral votes). In fact, in the first National Assembly elections the party contested in 1988, just four years after its inception, it won 13 seats making it the third largest party. What explains this meteoric rise by a party composed of activists who had no prior formal 'political' heritage?

Most commentators argue that the urban middle-class ethno-nationalist outlook of the party captured the aspiration of the larger middle class mohajir population which felt that it was marginalised by the Punjabis and the Pakhtoons. Ever since the capital shifted from Karachi to Islamabad, there had been a steady decline in the numbers and authority of Mohajir bureaucrats. Implementation of quota system in the government sector further loosened Mohajir communities' hold on the civil and bureaucratic setup. To add to the loss of jobs and privileged position, the Mohajir community was increasingly concerned about the growing number of migrant Pakhtoon population in urban areas of Sindh. While this explains the rise of Mohajir ethno-nationalism, it does not fully explain MQM's popularity.

In his work on MQM, titled From Mohallah to Mainstream: MQM's Transformation from an Ethnic to a Catch-All Party, Noman Baig writes: "In Pakistan's early years, Urdu-speakers supported the Muslim League, which tried to maintain its grip on power but failed to do so due to rising centrifugal forces and Punjabi hegemony. After the demise of the Muslim League as Urdu-speakers' strong political representative, Urdu-speakers shifted their allegiance to religious parties such as the JI and the JUP. However, Urdu-speakers gradually moved away from the JI and the JUP, as Punjabis gradually dominated them, and they failed to express. The ethno-militant party, MQM, thus emerged as the sole representative of Urdu-speakers and capitalised on their frustrations." This helps our understanding of MQM's rise, by linking MQM to the growing aspiration for supporting 'Mohajir' right politics. But MQM's nationalist appeal alone cannot explain its effectiveness.

Ethno-nationalist parties were nothing new in Pakistan's political sphere. Yet, no other such party received the kind of image of immediate success that MQM did. What was it about MQM that made it stand out from the other ethno-nationalist parties? Perhaps an answer to the above question can be found in the unique nature of Mohajir nationalism itself. Anthropologist Tahir H. Naqvi in his thesis, titled Interregnal Politics: Autocracy and Counternationalism in Urban Pakistan, calls the Mohajir movement led by MQM as 'Counter-nationalism'. Naqvi argues that the Mohajir ethno-nationalist movement in its discourses "made few self-authorising gestures to the territorial, cultural, linguistic or religious authenticity of it community". Indeed, for decades after independence, the Mohajirs "presented themselves as ethnically unmarked exemplars of the state's mono-cultural policies of national integration".

According the MQM discourse, the Mohajir national self was formed only in response to the 'injury' or 'counter' to the injustices it was facing at the hands of other selfish ethnic groups. While other ethno-nationalist parties that spoke of "sweetness of one's language, the blood and soil tie, and for a sense of incursions and calculability of the post-colonial modern nation state", MQM's demands were integrated in the language of "citizenship rights".

MQM's electoral success relative to other nationalist parties was then to a certain extent due to the nature of Mohajir nationalism and their demands. It could be easily integrated in modern nation state system of governmentality.

Here, it is important to note that MQM's rise came about primarily during the military rule and the quasi-democratic Zia ul Haq-led state. Quite ironically, the existence of military created the kind of spaces that allowed for MQM to establish itself as a legitimate political party. Feeling threatened by the popularity of larger national parties such as the Pakistan People's Party, the Zia government was willing to allow the new regional parties such as MQM to rise as proof of the government's democratic credentials.

In fact, the kind of governmental system in place suited MQM-style politics perfectly. Military governments in Pakistan have tried to suppress the normal mass political nation structure, by promoting a localised spread-out kind of setup like the Basic Democrat or Nazim system. MQM during its early years had maintained itself as a localised 'trouble shooting party' that dealt with the everyday issues of its constituents rather than taking national causes. MQM structures were present mostly at the local mohalla level providing important urban services that were not being met by the existing municipal authorities. This local urban politics was the only kind of politics that was tolerated by the authoritarian state.

Oskar Verkaaik, in his book Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan, offers a different argument on the reason behind MQM's popularity. He argues that the reason MQM was able to establish roots with the urban youth was because it offered a sense of purpose to a specific street culture that promoted masculinity, physicality and lack of respect for dominant discourses by weaving together youth culture, promoted by gyms, street humour, social clubs and leisure activities, into a political struggle and thus produced ethnic and religious violence. The 'fun' of these practices, Verkaaik argues, is often "self-consciously contrasted to the seriousness of state nationalism".

The conclusion one draws from his ethnographic work is that MQM's rise was not simply the result of Urdu-speakers' emergence of identity or their grievances about their decline in the state ruling structure; rather street-nationalism was an equal contributor to Mohajirin's mobilisation.

This article tries to tackle only one aspect of MQM's convoluted and nuanced history. Several important aspects of the party's history and structure still appear clouded to the general public. Even as it continues to show impressive turnouts at its jalsas and outshine all other parties electorally in urban Sindh, the party's credibility amongst the general public countrywide remains weak. Why does the party continue to have such a polarising effect on the population? It is time we started looking for an answer to this question rather than simply writing off MQM as a 'ghundon ki party'.

 

"This is a new image of the party"

Noman Baig is one of the leading lights amongst the new generation of scholars working on Pakistan. Having completed his masters from the University of Victoria where the subject of his research was MQM, he is currently working on his doctoral degree at The University of Texas-Austin's anthropology department, again on MQM.

In his masters' thesis titled From Mohallah to Mainstream, he sought to theorise the transformation of MQM from an ethnic to a catch-all party.

Excerpts of interview follow.

By Ameem Lutfi

The News on Sunday: In popular discourse, MQM is always linked to the issue of street violence. As an academic who has looked at the party closely, how do you look at MQM's link to urban violence?

Noman Baig: One of the reasons behind MQM's early 'successes' was its ability to lead a marvellous culture of street politics previously unheard of or unseen in Pakistan where politics had been confined to a drawing room space. Street politics, however, also became the biggest obstacle for MQM because the party undermined the state's legitimacy and caused conflict with non-Mohajir communities in urban Sindh. Its street politics and militancy soon came into direct clash with the strong state's army in early 1990s, resulting in thousands of deaths. The state's assault on MQM also produced factionalism within the party, which further undermined MQM's existence.

Since its transformation in 1997, MQM has, on the face of things, taken measures to distance itself from the militant culture it has been notorious for. In the last few months, though, MQM has been trying to gather its old fighters and band together its militant wing once again, to counter the so-called Talibanisation in Karachi. The party has set up checkposts and vigilantes in neighbourhoods bordering Pashtun areas such as Sohrab Goth, North Nazimabad, Old Sabzi Mandi, and Goli Mar around Lasbella. This, perhaps, is the start of another round of xenophobic politics of MQM.

TNS: In your work, you speak a lot about the shift in 1997 from ethno-militant party to a "catch-all party". What were some of the specific changes that took place in the party as result of this shift?

NB: After 1997, MQM refined and restructured its political agenda, organisational design, strategies of alliances, and social base. The party's quest to gain national appeal resulted in a downgrading of the Mohajir ideology in favour of broader, more pragmatic politics. The over-arching theme of MQM's transformation is that the party began making choices on the basis of strategy rather than ideology. After its transformation, MQM published its new philosophy of "realism and practicalism", to display its new image as a pragmatic political party that "addressed broad issues rather than spouting ideology". This new model demanded an "acceptance of reality" and a pragmatic approach to issues "rather than having [an] ideal, moral, religious or romantic approach."

In the party's political discourse, the terms muzloom (oppressed) and ghareeb (poor) substituted for Mohajir ethnicity. The organisation's mode of working shed street politics and embraced a professional party mechanism.

Also, since the transformation, party's demand for recognising Mohajirs as a distinct nationality has subsided. In fact, Altaf Hussain with his newly adopted Sindhi image now refers to Mohajirs as "Urdu-speaking Sindhis", a term hitherto rejected by MQM as oxymoronic.

TNS: How has this transformation affected the party's cadre and popular base?

NB: The newly transformed MQM did recruit non-Mohajir members in its party ranks and set up offices all over Pakistan to show that it was the national party and had the capability to move outside the narrow but strategic, confined Mohajir constituency. The party has since the transformation made frenetic efforts to get members of other nationalities in its ranks. In the general elections of 2002, in order to prove its national outlook MQM asked Sindhi and Punjabi candidates to contest seats on the party's platform in Mohajir constituencies. However, the change was very superficial in the sense that the senior party leadership still consisted of Urdu-speaking people who showed strong loyalty to their leader, Altaf Hussain.

The transformation, though, led to some of the veteran party members to break away. For example, MQM's ideological faction, led by Amir Khan and Afaq Ahmad, dissented from the reorganisation and accused Altaf Hussain of lust for power and putting aside the Mohajir agenda.

At the lower level, the party maintained its strong base among the Urdu-speakers. It does not enjoy the same popularity as it did in the mid-1980s.

TNS: You have written in your work that since transformation the party has tried to promote a "softer image". What are some of the steps that have been taken to present this image?

NB: Right after MQM announced its transformation from an ethnic to a national party, it went through several changes such as changing the party's nomenclature from Mohajir to Muttahida. It also expelled members who were perceived to have brought a bad name to the party image. One of the most noticeable aspects of this change was the attenuation of the chauvinistic Mohajir elements of Altaf Hussain's persona. Hussain, who had been revered as a pir (saint), now became a bhai (brother). In addition to his brotherly image, Hussain emerged as a 'philosopher' who frequently organised 'philosophical gatherings' -- Fikri Nashists -- attended by the party members. In these gatherings, he delivered lessons on morality, religion, ethics, and medicine through telephonic speeches from his London apartment.

Also, as we saw in the aftermath of the earthquake in 2006, the party made obvious its intentions by popularising its aid efforts as a service to humanity, free of any ethnic prejudice, by publishing photos and stories of MQM's assistance.

In addition to expanding its social services outside urban Sindh, the MQM also started to organise cultural shows as a sign of its new ethnic openness. Party leaders invited folk singers and musicians from various ethnic groups, especially Sindhis, to participate in festivities that represented the diverse cultures of Pakistan. MQM also invited prominent media personalities to political and cultural events, along with university professors, who would present a soft image for the party and help raise its social profile.

In recent years, MQM has adopted a neo-liberal strategy of economic development by investing in Karachi's infrastructure to make the city a modern metropolis. The massive transformation of urban spaces for the sake of rapid mobility and other projects have induced anticipation in the citizens for the coming future city. MQM is, thus, equating itself with development and modernisation. This is the new image of the party.

 

Phase 1

Mohajir ethno-nationalism (1984--1997)Chronology

- June 11, 1978: Altaf Hussain forms the All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization (APMSO) in Karachi University to demand rights for Urdu-speaking students in educational institutions.

- March 18, 1984: The APMSO leaders form Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) to champion Mohajir grievances against unfair treatment in civil service and education.

- April 15, 1985: Bushra Zaidi, an Urdu-speaking student, is run over and killed by a Pathan bus driver. This leads to widespread Mohajir-Pathan clashes in Karachi which were successfully capitalised on by MQM to serve its political agenda.

- August 8, 1986: MQM holds its first public meeting in Nishtar Park. The party also aligns with the Sindhi nationalist organisation, the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM)

- November 1987: MQM wins the local municipal elections in Karachi and Hyderabad, marking its formal entry into Pakistan's political scene.

- November 16, 1988: MQM wins 13 seats in the National Assembly election and becomes the third largest political party in Pakistan. The party joins the PPP-led government at the national level and in Sindh province.

- October 31, 1988: Armed militants from another Sindhi nationalist party, the Sindhi Tarraqi Passand Party, massacre dozens of people in an MQM public congregation held in Pakka Qila in Hyderabad. MQM retaliates by killing Sindhis in Karachi.

- October 1989: The Hyderabad massacre forces MQM to quit the PPP government and join the opposition led by Nawaz Sharif's Islami Jamhoori Ittehad.

- October 24, 1990: MQM wins National and Provincial Assembly elections and becomes a coalition partner of Nawaz Sharif's IJI government.

- January 1991: MQM decides to change party name from Mohajir Qaumi Movement to Muttahida Qaumi Movement. Several senior party members dissent, with MQM delaying its decision to change the party's nomenclature.

- January 1, 1992: Altaf Hussain leaves for London for medical treatment and remains there. Since that time he has successfully controlled the party from his London outpost.

- June 19, 1992: The army launches Operation Clean-up. The army takes over Sindh to fight urban terrorism and rural banditry. The operation leads to the split within MQM with the creation of the MQM-Haqiqi. MQM leaders and cadres go underground while party's offices are sealed.

- October 6, 1993: After the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif's government, new elections are held and MQM boycotts National Assembly elections. However, MQM secures a landslide victory in provincial elections and joins the PPP in Sindh government for the second time.

 

- February 3, 1997: Benazir Bhutto's government is dissolved on the charges of extra-judicial killings of MQM workers in fake encounters by law-enforcement personnel. MQM wins the national and provincial assembly elections with low margins and joins Nawaz Sharif's PML government for the second time.

- July 26, 1997: MQM changes its name from Mohajir Qaumi Movement to Muttahida Qaumi Movement.

- October 17, 1998: Murder of Hakim Mohammad Saeed, a famous Pakistani philanthropist, allegedly by an MQM activist, leads to the suspension of the provincial assembly in Sindh and the imposition of Governor's rule (suspension of provincial government) in Sindh province. The MQM-Sharif partnership is finally over.

- July 2001: MQM boycotts Municipal elections because it believes the military government in place in Islamabad would not conduct free elections. It later regrets its decision as Jamaat i Islami win Mayoral elections in Karachi.

- September 11, 2001: America is attacked and Pakistan becomes the frontline state in the US War on Terror. MQM expresses its full support to the military government.

- October 10, 2002: MQM becomes the coalition partner of its arch nemesis, the military government, after winning rigged national and provincial assembly elections.

- May 12, 2008: Riots break out after MQM takes out a rally in opposition to the ongoing movement for the restoration of judiciary. Rioting results in the death of at least 42 people. MQM stands out as the main culprit behind the violence.

- February 2008: MQM maintains its hold over urban Sindh, secures 20 seats in National Assembly and 39 in Sindh's Provincial Assembly, forms a coalition government in Sindh with the help of PPP.

- January 2009: MQM joins the federal cabinet with two of its leading members, Dr Farooq Sattar and Babar Ghauri, being sworn in as federal ministers.

-- Compiled by Ameem Lutfi

A show of native intelligence

As one political analyst puts it, "It's difficult to see MQM as black or white"

By Zulfiqar Shah

"Come and join us in our protest against the desecration of Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's memorial. Come and join us!" I heard loud public announcements, followed by the noise of motorbikes.

Tucked away comfortably in my bedroom, I couldn't figure out who these people would be. I had never heard any one chant PPP slogans in the entire Nazimabad area (in Karachi) where I lived -- not in the past 10 years at least.

I was in for a greater shock. From above my fifth-floor apartment I saw a group of young bikers on the street, carrying MQM flags and inviting the people to a protest rally against the desecration of Benazir's memorial in Rawalpindi. The late PPP leader's memorial had been set on fire by miscreants following Supreme Court's verdict on the Sharif brothers' disqualification and the imposition of the Governor's rule in Punjab. Eventually, MQM took out a big rally in Karachi on March 1, 2009.

MQM's loyalty to its 'allies of the time' is no secret. It went all out to side with Musharraf on the issue of judiciary and was even blamed for the bloodshed in Karachi on May 12 last year when Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was scheduled to visit the city. The March 1, 2009, rally in Karachi was another shining example of the great support MQM extended to the president of the country -- this time Mr Zardari -- with the party bringing out hundreds of thousands of supporters on the street.

According to renowned political analyst B M Kutty, "In the past, MQM's loyalty has been questioned by many including those in the PPP. In my view, the rally was part of their urge to prove their faithful side."

Kutty adds that such actions could be counter-productive and may damage the party image in general. "You don't need to go overboard in your attempt to fix a past mistake."

Many people trace MQM's origins back to General Zia's policy of divide-and-rule. Zia's 11-year regime faced fierce resistance in Sindh which remained on the forefront in their struggle for the restoration of democracy. The 'ethnic' tag is still intact as the party holds its sway only in urban Sindh, mainly Karachi and Hyderabad, and draws electoral support from an overwhelmingly Urdu-speaking population.

The party has made several attempts to dispel the impression, though. It has sought to integrate with the Sindhi population. One such major attempt was rechristening the party -- from Mohajir Qaumi Movement to Muttahida Qaumi Movement. Its attempts to open offices and operate in other provinces have largely been unsuccessful.

The party has never hesitated to play its 'Sindh card'. Of late, it threatened to break away from the coalition with PPP if the government did not take action against "those who raised slogans against Sindh and its leadership" during a PML-N and lawyers' rally in Lahore on March 15.

When the CJ and other judges were restored, MQM was left with no option but to send a delegation to meet Sindh Chief Minister and, later, withdraw its ultimatum.

"The party is prone to making hasty decisions and ends up in embarrassing situations," opines Rauf Nizamani, a well known news analyst.

The party which was once bitterly against PPP for the latter's alleged involvement in the killing of a number of MQM activists during Benazir's second-term as prime minister, suddenly changed its tune in October 2007 and went on to facilitate her arrival in Karachi.

The party's popular demand that PPP should tender a public apology for the excesses committed against MQM activists during its (PPP's) second government, was suddenly forgotten.

"Altaf bhai's decision to shake hands with PPP was in the larger interest of the country, particularly the people of Sindh," says a former MPA, requesting anonymity since only a few MQM leaders are authorised to make official comments.

He also justified party's recent ultimatum on the issues of the use of abusive language against Sindh, which was later withdrawn. "We have recordings that abuses were uttered against Sindh and the Sindhis; so we can't keep quiet. It was our moral duty to raise our voice."

An informal chat with people closely linked with MQM suggests a strong resentment against Punjab. The 'big brother' is not only considered the oppressor of smaller provinces but also as someone who is against Punjab's ruling elite -- the civil military establishments.

Naturally, MQM's anti-Punjab stance works in Sindh. People in the province, particularly the Sindhi speaking population, have long considered Punjab as the oppressor.

There is a long list of contentious issues including the NFC award and Water Accord that MQM has exploited famously well.

MQM is also blamed for widening the gap between the Sindhi- and the Urdu-speaking population. But it seems the party is trying to compensate by raising its voice on issues such as Kalabagh Dam.

"MQM has recently shown signs of integration with native politics and its stance on the myriad issues of Sindh is very positive," says Rauf Nizamani.

"It's very difficult to see MQM as black or white," he infers.

An obvious analysis of the PPP-MQM coalition, particularly in Sindh, can be made in the backdrop of the PPP-Musharaf negotiations coordinated by the western powers prior to Benazir's arrival in Pakistan. MQM was a major beneficiary of the NRO.

"The US is always looking out for anti-religious groups in Pakistan, and MQM proved to be one important ally of that kind. It is the only party which has a clear anti-Taliban stand."

Kutty seconds Nizamani, "The good thing about MQM is that it has been consistent in its secular outlook and anti-talibanisation." This serves the party purpose also because Karachi has always stayed out of the extremists' shadow.

-- Dr Farooq Sattar, Deputy Convener and Parliamentary leader of

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM); former mayor of Karachi

By Murtaza Ali Shah

The News on Sunday: Looking back, could you explain as to what led to the formation of MQM, then known as Mohajir Qaumi Movement?

Dr Farooq Sattar: It was the sense of deprivation of students in various educational institutions of the urban Sindh. They felt discriminated against when it came to admissions and jobs. The descendants of those who migrated from the Muslim minority provinces of India -- and predominantly settled in urban areas -- were being denied their political, social and economic rights. Altaf Hussain was a student of B. Pharmacy at the time, in IBA, and he realised that somebody had to bell the cat and channel this anger in positive way. Hussain volunteered himself and laid the foundation of All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) on June 11, 1978. APMSO turned out to be a success and Hussain went on to form Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) on March 18, 1984.

TNS: It is said there would have been no MQM if there was no Zia ul Haq and his obsession to fragment the Pakistan People's Party?

FS: General Zia was paranoid about PPP, and all his policies and attention were fashioned to deal with that paranoia. You can say we got an opportunity to establish ourselves as a regional player in urban Sindh because Zia's PPP-phobia afforded us to fill in the empty space. But I'd strictly deny any kind of moral, material or financial support from Zia or anyone from the GHQ. It's an allegation. Why would General Zia arrest Altaf Hussain one year after the formation of the APMSO and put him behind bars for 9 months for supporting a demonstration for the repatriation of the stranded? Altaf bhai strictly stopped his mother from filing a mercy petition before Zia regime for waiving off the sentence.

Please note that not us but Jamaat e Islami, its student wing Islami Jamiat Talba and Jamait e Ulema e Pakistan were the facourites of Zia. On Feb 3, 1981, Jamiat attacked us from all over Karachi and there was no one to rescue us.

When MQM was formed, we saw the worst kind of orchestrated ethnic violence. Zia machinery was behind the formation of Pakhtoon-Punjabi Itehad (PPI) to put communities at war with each other. Our support bases in Orangi Town, Shah Faisal Colony, and Khawaja Ajmer Nagri came under attack by the state sponsored drug mafia while the law enforcement agencies remained silent.

Our convoys were attacked on Oct 31, 1986, in Pakka Killa, Hyderabad, Sohrab Goth, Market Chowk. There is no doubt that this was the work of the state sponsored forces. This would not have happened to us if we were in the good books of Zia. We were called agents of RAW and maligned in media repeatedly.

TNS: Was the violence inflicted by MQM in self-defence or was it aimed at the opposition?

FS: Altaf Hussain has told us never to subscribe to violence even in self-defence. We strongly believe that violence begets violence and that it is counter-productive. MQM had nothing to do with the violence in the 1990s, yet everything was blamed on us. There was an unannounced ban on us and we didn't have space to operate. We were not even allowed to resort to peaceful means of protest. Thousands of our workers were killed in custody, fake encounters and torture chambers, and our core workers were forced to go underground. We were made to look like traitors so that we would not be able to expand and grow into a national party. Once an operation was announced publicly against us, we decided to change MQM's name to Muttahida Qaumi Movement. We started establishing units all over Pakistan. Altaf bhai shared the platform with Nawaz Sharif in Lahore for the same purpose, but our message against feudalism was never received well by the power circles. Hence the propaganda and operations against us.

TNS: Tell us about your love-hate relationship with the Establishment?

FS: Our critics forget the fact that General Asif Nawaz tried to crush MQM and unleashed a reign of terror on us. Do they remember what Naseerullah Babar and Abdullah Shah did to us? Have they forgotten whatever was done to create rifts within the MQM?

Pervez Muhsarraf, after three years in power, decided to take a u-turn on MQM and we obviously had to reciprocate. We did so after failing to convince the PPP to form an alliance as both parties had the requisite numbers. We negotiated with the PPP for a good 15 days. PPP was our first choice. But for some reasons Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto didn't let our party get into government. If we had a love relationship with the establishment, we would not have bothered to try and form a government with the PPP.

When we really thought that vendetta against MQM had stopped under Musharraf's rule and that his agenda against extremism and for the enlightened moderation was close to our ideals, we decided to become part of the action.

It is clear that it's not MQM but the Establishment which decided the nature of its relationship with us. I want to say it on record that we have an inherent grudge against the army, the law enforcement agencies or any of the sensitive agencies. We are as good Pakistanis as any other Pakistani and we are as a good a party as any other.

TNS: It is said that the media operating from Karachi has no choice but to ensure favourable coverage for the MQM?

FS: That's not true. We have millions of supporters. We are not a drawing-room party or a chat show driven group. We have six Senators, 25 MNAs, 51 MPAs and nazims in districts, town and cities. We are an organised party busy working all the time. We represent nearly 14 percent of Pakistani population. So our complaint is that media doesn't cover all the work that we do. It doesn't cover even 25 percent of our work. We secured 10 percent of popular vote in last election whereas our representation is 7.2 percent. Our performance at national and local level speaks for itself. Our constituents are those who are more educated, urban and middle class. They drive the engine of the growth of Pakistan. It's MQM's performance which is affecting the state of our economy.

TNS: You first supported Musharraf with conviction and now you are a staunch ally of Zardari. Don't you find it opportunistic and hypocritical?

FS: We joined Musharraf in 2002 after failing to reach an agreement with the PPP. We opposed Musharraf openly on operation in Balochistan, against big dams at the cost of federation, and his formula for the national finance commission. We kept impressing that he should implement the seven points agenda including the eradication of feudalism and grant of autonomy to the provinces. We supported his agenda of making Pakistan a forward looking, democratic polity and stop it from becoming the Pakistan of General Zia and Hameed Gul types.

Incidentally and perceptibly, Asif Ali Zardari appears to us to be the inheritor of the same secular policies in the broader ambit. When we announced to lend support to Zardari, we said that he (Zardari) has embarked on the journey that we joined five years ago!

We don't support personalities but policies and programme. Today's Pakistan doesn't afford instability, we have to do out bit to maintain stability. We didn't have a problem when PPP and PML-N formed coalition government; however we made it clear we will not play the role of a second wife. But when PML-N quit the government over the emotional issue of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, we decided not to leave Zaradri alone.

TNS: What is happening with the criminal cases registered against MQM supremo Altaf Hussain?

FS: A lot of time has elapsed since these cases were fabricated and registered. Many of these cases were registered in Altaf Bhai's absence from Pakistan. His co-accused in almost 99.9 percent cases have been tried and acquitted honorably. These cases have reached their logical conclusion.

So all it will take Altaf Hussain is to ask for the application of the principle of justice when -- and if -- he retruns to Pakistan. He will have to file an application in the High Court that I should be acquitted on principle too. Cases are not a barrier to his return.

TNS: When does Altaf Hussain plan to return?

FS: Altaf Bhai has a very strong urge to lead his people directly and be amongst them but the Central Coordination Committee and party workers are strongly averse to his desire and will not allow him to come back.

There are unnatural risks to Altaf Bhai's life. There have been three attempts on his life including a planed hand grenade attack on 21 December, 1991. After witnessing and analysing what happened to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Benazir Bhutto, who was greeted by millions upon millions and was about to win landslide in 2008 vote, who in right mind will advise the MQM leader to come to Pakistan.

To his credit, Altaf Hussain has made nearly 4000 addresses to his people in 16 years and this is a world record. Not even Imam Khomaini could manage to do that.

TNS: You started organizing party units in other provinces but then went quiet. Why?

FS: We are very soon going to start active campaigning in Punjab. We got a huge boost when MQM was visible on the forefront of delivering aid to victims of 2005 Kashmir earthquake.

During our partnership with the PML-Q, I travelled to many parts of Punjab but was faced with resistance from the local leadership because they perceive us as a threat. I was bundled in Kasur, police mobiles banged into my rally, disrupted it and I was arrested. Our local offices were closed. I was scheduled to address a meeting in Sahiwal but the meetings place was watered by the local police.

But we shall soon be re-organising party structure in Punjab and if needed then in NWFP and Balochistan too.

TNS: Would you regret the killings in Karachi on May 12? Do you agree that MQM's behaviour bruised the party's image?

FS: We regretted and condemned the killings of innocent 48 people which included some14 MQM workers. Believe it or not but May 12 came in the way of our national flight. We had organised a huge rally against religious extremism one week before the May 12 and had another rally planned in Punjab against extremists. May 12 carnage was a pre-planned conspiracy against MQM to stop it from going to Punjab.

If we had planned violence, we would not have come out with our women, children and elderly. My rally was disrupted at 12 points and the violence occurred at the spur of the moment. Violence in Karachi means our reputation suffers.

TNS: How real is the threat of Talibanisation in Karachi or do you exaggerate it?

FS: It's omnipresent and very real. We have concrete evidence that Taliban are active in areas such as Sultan Abad, Mango Pir, hilly areas of Orangi Town, Quaid Abad, Mansehra Colony, Sohrab Goath, Al-Asif Square and surrounding neighbourhoods.

Four factors are hugely contributing to the rising threat of Talibanisation. There is a growing nexus between banned jihadi outfits, Taliban and al-Qaeda elements in tribal areas who are directly affected by the military operation in their safe heavens. Taliban and pro-Taleban elements are coming as refugees to Karachi without registration. Karachi has been surrounded by almost 2,000 illegal extremist madrassas and almost all students are outsiders. These madrassas have been built with the help of drug and land encroachment mafia. Mosque is the first encroachment that paves the way for further residential encroachments and these criminals share the spoils of the business and fund jihadi terror outfits.

On Sept 10, 2008 a briefing was given in Chief Minister House by Rehman Malik in the presence of all secret agencies and they confirmed that MQM's concerns were not without foundation. Even a Taliban spokesman admitted the presence of Taliban cells in Karachi and said they will not hesitate from taking over the city if needed. My question is why are we not waking up? Why are we not taking stand against forces tearing Pakistan apart in the name of religion?

The writer is an assistant editor at The News – UK edition

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