The high-profile clashes between ordinary citizens protesting over increased transport fares and the police in Islamabad and Rawalpindi this past week, and similar clashes in Lahore the previous week should hopefully turn our attention away from the tired old theme of bomb blasts and religious extremism. It is conceivable that, in days and months to come, such expressions of mob behaviour and fairly predictable responses on the part of state authorities are likely to become more common, particularly given the projected electricity shortfall during the coming summer months.

Having said this, one felt quite similarly a year ago. Yet the summer passed us by without any major breakdown of law and order or even major outbursts of spontaneous protest. It is true that socio-economic conditions are deteriorating steadily and that the cumulative effects of suffocating economic policies, the inexcusable failure of long-term planning and societal fragmentation could produce more acute reactions on the part of the working or even the lower-middle class.

But the fact of the matter is that unorganised outbursts of anti-government sentiment will not force changes in the policies that cause disaffection nor impact the structures within which working people negotiate their lives. Indeed, they can quite often become counter-productive in the sense that those who come out onto the streets expend all of their energy and then sink back into apathy having discovered that very little has changed.

Let us not forget those who insist that such spontaneous mob behaviour is usually manipulated by the powers-that-be to undermine the political process. Such conspiracy theories are impossible to prove conclusively but there is nevertheless always a tinge of truth in them.

At the end of the day the recent protests will probably be little more than a flash in the pan. Perhaps they are most important for what they indicate about the political space available to genuinely anti-status quo political actors. It is a fact that none of our mainstream parties are actually interested in taking up the class question in any meaningful way. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which of course made its name by talking the language of class, has almost completely disassociated itself with working-class politics. Ethnic-nationalists refuse to nuance their politics and recognise the symbiotic link that exists between the working people of Punjab and oppressed nationalities. The religious right talks up class but in practice wants nothing to do with genuine class-based movements.

There are of course the militants who have done more than simply employ the rhetoric of class. It is now impossible to deny that the Swat Taliban exhorted landless and other relatively weak segments of Swati society to rise up against the khanate elite. That this class angle was juxtaposed on a larger jihadi narrative of course meant that, in the final analysis, the class question was heavily diluted. The vision that inspires the Islamists bears little similarity to the classless society envisioned by those who have historically been flag-bearers for the working class.

To be sure, there is every chance that those who read and write about the working class can reemerge as a political force within Pakistani society. The 20th century experience of socialism has no doubt raised important questions with regard to the nature of working class politics, and ultimately, how to build a post-capitalist society. But all attempts to improve the human condition are only building blocks towards better attempts in the future.

In the first instance, a new working-class politics in Pakistan must be based on the real struggles of working people. This is stating the obvious but, unfortunately, too many of those who claim to be committed to the emancipation of the working class spend too much of their time on the internet and in gup-shup clubs. The spontaneous protests in Islamabad and Lahore against fare increases might not have descended into wantonness if there were organisers and activists affiliated with trade unions or working class that were able to convince the protestors to move beyond the here and now and be part of a more long-term process of mobilisation.

There are, of course, many existing working-class struggles that deserve considerable attention. For example, the considerable mobilisation of textile workers in Faisalabad and Jhang is arguably the biggest such mobilisation in decades. This is no longer the age of the large factory and the classic trade union. Punjab's textile workers in 2010 are spread out in small workshops and many are simply not even formally registered as workers. But these workers have mobilised in recent years, mostly without external support. But they need to build linkages to other working-class movements extend their vision beyond the day-to-day struggle. This is why a political party of the working class is necessary.

More generally, if a working-class political party were to exist in Pakistan, there would be pressure on governments to think twice before prostrating themselves in front of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the dictates of the Empire more generally. All governments in Pakistan claim they have no choice but to accede to the global powers, including the IFIs, but this so-called lack of choice is, in fact, an indicator of the lack of a working class voice in policymaking circles.

A mass working class party would also take the wind out of the religious rights' sails. It is not a coincidence that the rise of the right has been coeval with the decline of the left. The right is able to depict itself as populist in large part because it faces no competition. The people of Pakistan know that the right is all hot air, but they also know that no other party even bothers to employ populist rhetoric. It is high time that a genuine working class alternative be built in Pakistan that not only talks the talk, but also walks the walk.

Special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing and the least developed countries (LDCs) is an important characteristic of the multilateral trading system. There are different views on whether the S&D treatment is beneficial or harmful for these countries.

The two major forms of S&D treatment are provisions for preferential tariffs on imports from developing countries and LDCs to the markets of developed countries; and exception or relaxation granted to these countries from implementing their obligations under various WTO agreements.

The principal way by which developed countries unilaterally impose lower tariffs on imports from developing countries and LDCs than on products from other developed countries is represented by the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

The legal basis of the GSP is the "Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries". Adopted in 1979 for an indefinite period, it is also called the General Enabling Clause and forms part of the WTO Agreement. The idea behind the GSP is that preferential treatment will help less developed countries integrate in global economy, which can serve as an instrument of development.

Every developed economy has its own GSP scheme with different product coverage, preferential tariffs and criteria for benefiting from the same. For instance, under the GSP scheme of the USA, all eligible products from developing countries enter the country's market duty free. On the other hand, under the GSP scheme of the European Union (EU), eligible products enter the markets of beneficiary countries at either zero duty or a lower duty than MFN duty -- 20 percent reduction from MFN tariffs in case of textile and clothing products and 3.5 percentage points reduction from all other eligible products. All eligible exports from LDCs enter the EU duty free under an arrangement called, "Everything But Arms" (EBA).

Let's now turn to the second aspect of S&D treatment -- the exception or relaxation granted to developing countries from meeting their obligations under various WTO provisions. Some instances are:

Under the WTO normally members cannot raise their bound rates of duty or impose quantitative restrictions on imports from other members. Developing countries, including LDCs, however can adopt such restrictive measures, subject to approval of other members, to promote the development of new industries or an existing industry. The purpose of this exception is to ensure that trade liberalization does not have adverse effects on economic development of developing countries.

WTO allows both developed and developing countries to restrict imports in the face of balance of payment problems. However, developed countries have more stringent criteria to follow than developing countries while adopting such restrictive measures. For developed countries there are two criteria. One, when the threat of a serious decline in their monetary reserves is imminent; two, when the level of reserves is very low. Developing countries can adopt such measures when they think there is threat of a serious decline in their monetary reserves, even though the same may not be imminent; or if monetary reserves are too low to cover expected foreign exchange payments.

The Agreement on Subsidies and countervailing measures prohibits members from using export subsidies--subsidies which are contingent upon export performance. However, LDCs and developing countries whose per capita income does not exceed $1,000 are exempted from this prohibition.

In the Agreement on Trade in Services, developing countries are allowed to open fewer sectors or to liberalise fewer types of transactions.

In the application of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, as provided in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, members have to consider the special needs of developing countries, particularly LDCs.

The S&D provisions have been criticised for several reasons. One: these provisions conflict with the principle of non-discrimination, which forms the centerpiece of the WTO system. Two, preferential tariff treatment given to exports of developing countries in the shape of GSP is not really non-reciprocal. In return, the developing countries have to comply with the standards and conditions, at times arbitrary, imposed by the donors and the failure to do this may result in suspension of the benefits. For instance, in 1996, the USA suspended preferential benefits to Pakistan under its GSP scheme for "failure" to comply with the donor country's labour standards. Pakistan was re-admitted to the GSP scheme only after its support to anti-terrorism campaign of the US government in 2001.

Three, benefits given under the GSP are not binding, and the same can be withdrawn on grounds that are not always strong. For instance, very recently, the EU has suspended GSP treatment to Sri Lanka for alleged human right violations by Colombo. This raises the question of the link between trade preferences and human rights.

Four, donor rather than beneficiary country's interest determines the products to be extended preferential treatment under the GSP. For instance, the GSP schemes of the USA and Russia do not include textile and apparel products, partly because this sector is considered very sensitive for their domestic industry and partly because developing countries by and large have a competitive advantage in it. Similarly, several agricultural products are excluded from the GSP schemes of the EU and Japan for more or less similar reasons.

Five, non-reciprocal preferential treatment has not yielded much real benefits to developing countries. Rather it has had only a marginal effect on their export and general economic performance. There has been a strong tendency among developing countries to focus on products benefiting from GSP schemes to the neglect of industrial and agricultural diversification.

Six, unilateral preferences make it difficult for developing countries to shed off protectionism and liberalise their trade and economy. Finally, the exception or relaxation granted to developing countries from meeting their obligations obstructs rather than helps their integration into the multilateral trading system.

The above criticism of the S&D treatment is too a large extent valid. However, the problem is not with the notion of unilateral preferences or S&D treatment per se but with the way the unilateral preferences are being applied. A broader product coverage, for instance, inclusion of textile and clothing in US GSP, and absence of strict conditionalties accompanying unilateral preferences, such as labour and human rights standards, will go a long way in enhancing their usefulness. Moreover, preferential treatment should be used by less developed countries as an instrument of industrial and export growth. It should not become an obstacle to economic diversification.

It is, however, not true that non-reciprocal preferences yield only marginal benefits to recipient countries. For instance, Pakistan's export of textile products increased by $ 1 billion in three years (2002-2004) after it had been given duty free access to the EU market under the drug arrangement of the GSP scheme.

Preferential treatment does make exports of developing countries and LDCs more price-competitive and thus encourages them to pursue export led growth strategy. No doubt, the pursuit of such a strategy is also in the interest of developed countries, because this makes developing countries discard the import substitution strategy and increase their imports, which are largely supplied by developed countries. But this give-and-take situation is what international economic relations are all about.

There is, however, a strong tendency among developing countries to focus on products benefiting from GSP schemes to the neglect of the remaining products. This is a capital mistake. Preferential treatment should be an instrument of industrial and export growth. It should not become an obstacle to economic diversification.

All said and done, since less developed countries lag far behind developed countries in terms of financial, institutional, technological and human resources, they need special treatment in order to successfully integrate themselves into the multilateral trading system. However, it should also be borne in mind that S&D treatment by itself cannot make the exports of less developed countries competitive, though such treatment can serve as an instrument of export competitiveness.

E-mail: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com

firstperson

Fifty years down the road, the reign of the Green Revolution that began in the 1960s in India seems to be nearing its end. The Green Revolution pushed the production frontiers of the agriculture sector through farm mechanisation and introduction of high yielding varieties (HYVs), complemented by the construction of upstream water reservoirs. It helped farmers increase food grain and crop production at higher rates than the rates of population growth. In the following three decades (1960-80), the average yield per hectare rose at an impressive average rate of 4 percent per year. This growth was not only enough to feed a population of 85 million, growing at a fast rate of 4.12 percent per year during that period, but also generated surpluses that improved Pakistan's export performance and earned foreign exchange reserves for a cash starved economy.

Sadly, that phase of growth and ample food is no longer the prospect for Pakistanis today. In the last five years, there have been several occasions when the production of food grains (wheat and rice in particular) fell below the demand and the resultant shortfall had to be met through imports. This caused widespread food shortages and unrest on the one hand, and a serious blow to the country's scant foreign reserves and cash flows, on the other. Since 2004-05, Pakistan has imported as high as 4 million tonnes of wheat each year to meet the domestic demand. The situation is food security is worsening with every passing year and the crisis will likely turn into a disaster unless targeted and timely reforms of the agricultural system are carried out.

From a long term perspective, it is evident that agricultural productivity growth has remained dismally low in the past three decades. Since 1980, the food grain productivity has increased on an average rate of 1.79 percent per year. Over the same period, the country's population has increased at an alarmingly high rate of 2.5 percent per year. Pakistan has been able to partly bridge this gap, and by so doing defer the threat of food insecurity, by expanding the area under cultivation. This was, of course, possible only as long as cultivable land and irrigation water were available. While additional land may still be available, a long term decline in the flows of freshwater, storage capacity of reservoirs and underground water table, have depressed, if not altogether exhausted, the prospects of further land development.

The stagnation of the agricultural productivity has many causes. The key factors behind Pakistan's agricultural crisis include the distributional inefficiency and tenancy of land, ineffective management of water resources, low investment in production and technologies, and an ambitious - but highly ineffective, if not counterproductive - regulatory regime governing the agricultural factor and output markets. While all these issues are in want of reform, the issues of land distribution and tenancy are at the centre of the crises as it has been neglected by successive governments since the 1980s.

Historically, the distribution of land ownership in Pakistan has been highly unequal and concentrated in the favour of few landowners. According to the Pakistan Agricultural Census Organisation, in the year 2000 more than half of the cultivable land was possessed by less than 10 percent of the landowners - who own 20 or more acres of land. Ironically, the situation has not changed much since the 1960s when 7 percent of the landowners owned half the cultivable land in the country, each with a landholding of more than 25 acres.

That land reforms lead to efficient utilisation of land, improved agricultural production, employment and poverty reduction is a well established argument, supported by theory and empirical evidence. China and several countries of East Asia have successfully used land reforms to reinvigorate agricultural growth, promote employment and reduce economic and social inequalities. In the case of Pakistan, a growing and vibrant agriculture sector in the 1960s marred the need for the much needed land reforms. While two formal attempts at land reform were made in 1959 and 1972, both failed to achieve their stated objectives as they were mainly meant to contain social unrest and political chaos and to gain popular support in times of crises.

A closer look at the cultivable land ownership and use statistics of Pakistan make the need for land reforms obvious. First and foremost, research shows that in much of the developing world, where agriculture is characterised by constraints to investment and mechanisation, small and medium sized farms (12 acres) are more efficient than large sized farms (20 acres). Several empirical studies demonstrate that, if the effect of capital, technology and other factors is held constant, the income per acre of land from small farms can be up to double that of large farms. This becomes possible because of a higher allocative efficiency of land in the case of medium and small sized farms and b) the lower reservation price of labour for small farms in contrast with the larger farms that have to hire labour and thus making it expensive for them.

Secondly, the Pakistan Agricultural Census shows that nearly 40 percent of the arable land (i.e., 4 million hectares) is not cultivated in a given year. Almost 2/3rd of this utilisation land is held by large landowners, who own 25 or more acres of land, pointing towards the unmanageability or inefficiencies that are associated with large and concentrated landholdings. In contrast, most small farms cultivate over 90 percent of the arable land, deriving maximum benefit per acre of land.

The third important issue pertains to the weak land tenancy in the country, where nearly one third of the cultivable area is under tenancy. Amidst an absence of tenancy regulation and social safety nets, tenants are more often than not wholly dependent on and indebted to the landlords. Often tenancies are carried from one generation to the other and so are the debts and obligations, at times taking the form of bonded labour. Tenancy contracts are mostly informal and hence not enforced legally. Jacob and Mansuri (2006), in their seminal research for the World Bank, show through their research that incomplete tenancy contracts lead to "investment holdups", where due to tenure insecurity, the tenants tend to under-invest in productivity, thus leading to inefficient and suboptimal factor productivity of land.

Fourthly, in Pakistan's "labour surplus" economy, almost 44 percent of the labour force is employed by the agriculture sector. Due to the highly concentrated distribution of land, a large part of the labour force is landless and is hired seasonally, while others work as sharecroppers or tenant families, under a wide range of contract and tenancy regimes. However, as discussed above, the efficiency losses from incomplete contracts and insecure tenancies can be overcome by means of land redistribution and private ownership, where land can be distributed to a part of this labour force thereby creating incentives to invest in productivity enhancement and conservation.

And finally, land being the most valuable asset and a symbol of social status, also serves as a source of monopolisation of political and social power. In Pakistan, unequal landholdings have led to social polarisation and exploitation of landless and smallholders by the landed elite. In the rural arena, feudal capture of political institutions, public service delivery and extension services, access to farm credit, sources of inputs and means of marketing is hard to ignore. This has not only affected agricultural productivity but also suppressed the social, political and economic progress in the country.

One may ask that, given a total failure of previous land reform efforts, is land reform a mere idea in Pakistan's context? Experts have extensively reviewed the land reforms of 1959 and 1972 and have suggested that the failure of earlier land reforms was not a "strategy failure" - i.e., land reforms as a strategy for improving factor allocative efficiency and agricultural productivity and reducing unemployment, economic inequalities, and poverty.

Studies found that reforms failed due to, a) lack of political commitment, b) loopholes in legislation, e.g., provisions for exemptions and allowance of land transfer to heirs, c) the burdensome payments that the beneficiaries had to pay for the allotted land, and d) centralised and inefficient bureaucratic administration.

Recent land reform experiences of China, East Asian economies and selected regions of South Asia provide substantive evidence that land reforms are not only possible but also lead to positive economic and social outcomes. Depending upon the political, social and economic context, base conditions and specific objectives, different countries have applied different policy instruments, strategies and management models to land reform. The choices, trade-offs and balancing acts have involved setting the ceilings for landownership, government engagement versus the use of market based approaches (e.g. incentives, penalties and taxes), allocation and pricing of expropriated land, and timeframe for implementation. Pakistan can draw upon a wealth of international experience and learning to develop its land reform strategy.

If designed well and implemented through market based instruments, implementing a land reform policy will not require very large budgetary commitments. The requirements can be met by re-appropriating the existing budgets and resources of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Federal Board of Revenue, Provincial and District Administrations and the relevant line departments. Given the centrality of agriculture to Pakistan's economy, concessionary development financing from multilateral and bilateral institutions may also be forthcoming.

To delay land reforms is no longer an option today, given the current state and impending prospects of food insecurity, agricultural productivity and economic growth. If the issue is not addressed on a priority basis, it won't be long when we will be faced with a large food-starved population, high unemployment and unsustainable inequalities which can push the country into chaos, political turmoil, and jeopardise the gains from years of, albeit very slow, progress.

aman ki asha

After holding seven solo exhibitions and taking part in over 100 group exhibitions, Ghalib Baqar, 53, happens to be one of the few notable water colour artists in Pakistan. His first solo exhibition was held at BM Gallery in 1983 and it was inaugurated by noted scientist, intellectual, and painter Dr. Salimuzaman Siddiqui. In 1991, Baqar had a solo exhibition at Indus Art Gallery managed by Pakistan's leading artist Ali Imam. Baqar has over 20 years of teaching experience at Balochistan Art Council, Karachi Grammar School, and the Visual Studies Department of the University of Karachi. He bagged first prize at Biennial International Competition of SAARC countries in 1988. Baqar was born in Karachi on April 14, 1956. He earned his diploma in Fine Arts in 1975 from Karachi School of Art and was the youngest diploma holder at that time. Baqar shifted to Quetta and joined Balochistan Art Council in 1978 as a teacher. However, he returned to Karachi in 1981.

In an interview with TNS Baqar believes art needs to be exchanged between Pakistan and India and the later should show some grace and openness in providing talented artists from Pakistan opportunities to hold exhibitions, enabling them not only to introduce themselves in a market of one billion people but also to strengthen peace in the subcontinent through the medium of art. Excerpts of the interview follow:

The News on Sunday: What role can exchange of art between Pakistan and India play in strengthening the peace process between the two countries?

Ghalib Baqar: Like India, Pakistan has produced some great artists such as Chughtai, Shakir Ali, Sadequain, Bashir Mirza, Jamil Naqsh, Ahmed Pervez, Zahin Ahmed, Maher Afroze, Nahid Ali, Mansoor Rahi, and sculptor Shahid Sajjad to name a few, but, sadly, people in India do not seem to be well acquainted about them. Today, when the Cold War has long ended and Europe has established a European Union that transcends borders, we need to learn and learn very quickly. We have to shun war and jingoism. We should know that we are inheritors of a great civilization. This can be done by going through an inward journey and allow exchange of art between Pakistan and India. I think exchange will pay rich dividends. Art is not nuclear science that can harm anybody or should remain hidden. Art is like fragrance that transcends borders.

TNS: We have started exchanging films. Why have we lagged behind in exchanging art?

GB: The ban on Indian films in Pakistan after the 1965 war, for instance, was a wrong decision. It was the beginning of the end of our film industry since there was no competition between the two countries. It is good that Pakistani viewers now have access to some good Indian films. But there is a need to expand cooperation between Pakistan and India in various fields. The decision-making should not remain confined to the governments. There is need to give a new boost to people-to-people contacts. For the last 62 years governments have been making decisions about war and peace and they have failed miserably to resolve issues. Now the common man in both the countries should be allowed to take decisions.

TNS: Do you agree that exchange of art between the two countries will also help in containing sectarianism and terrorism?

GB: Certainly. These negative trends have taken roots in India and Pakistan because we failed to magnify positive things around us, like Fine Arts, for instance. We allowed fundamentalists to play the nasty game and kept quiet. Now they are threatening the very social fabric of our societies. But the forces of progress and enlightenment never die. These positive forces go into hibernation when the atmosphere is not conducive. But the undercurrents are always there. And when the time is ripe we see new leaves. In India, unlike Pakistan, the communist and progressive forces are still powerful despite the dismemberment of Soviet Union and the socialist empire. They even influence governments. This is because progressive thought is rooted in the masses there. Similarly, Pakistan has lots of enlightened and progressive people. They have played a vital role in promoting peace between the two neighbours despite odds and can do so in future through exchange of ideas, films, art, and literature.