analysis The political space that exists during a period of popular uprising demands the raising of radical demands and political programmes that stretch the imagination of the mass of people yearning for change. Working people across the country, particularly in urban areas, are waiting in earnest for a clear alternative to status quo. In spite of the fact that the overall political environment has become considerably more charged over the past two months, many people still wonder whether anything substantive will really change when Musharraf & co. finally abdicate. Newswatch Back in 1988 when the US authorities trapped the now
long-defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in a
money-laundering scam in Tampa, Florida, there was such a brouhaha in the
American media over the $ 14 million involved that it seemed as if BCCI -- a
Luxembourg-based international bank founded by Pakistan's Agha Hassan Abedi
-- was the only money launderer in the world. In fact, the BCCI operation was
a drop in the ocean, because the amount of money -- most of it drug money --
being laundered just through the American banking system alone at that time
was estimated at $ 250 billion a year.
More than one-third of Karachiites are condemned to live in katchi abadis (squatter settlements) and population the size of the capital city Islamabad migrates to the financial hub of Pakistan every year in search of jobs. Instead of ensuring basic amenities to these impoverished people Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is adamant to 'privatise' the coastal belt and build mega projects for the super rich. For a fair
tax system According to a latest
report by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Pakistan under the rule
of General Pervez Musharraf is still a very 'high risk country' on a number
of accounts. It notes with concern the ever-increasing military expenditure
(4.5 per cent of GDP) and huge fiscal deficit (against revenue of $20.55
billion, expenditure is $25.65 billion and public debt is alarming high at 55
per cent of GDP). Social
science community Since its inception in 2000, the Council of Social Sciences has focused on the study of state of social sciences in Pakistan and has published a number of books on the subject. A recent addition to these publications is the book under review. Edited by Dr Inayatullah, it describes and analyses the state of six associations of social scientists formed in 1950s and 60s. These associations include Pakistan Economic Association, All Pakistan Political Science Association, Pakistan Historical Society, Pakistan Philosophy Congress, Pakistan Sociological Association and Pakistan Psychological Association. This is the first booklength study on the subject. Before this, there is not even an article in a book or journal on the subject. issue For a long time, Pakistan
has topped the list of countries charged with acts of gross violation of
intellectual property rights. Despite being signatory of Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS) agreements, the government could not improve the situation and even
faced trade restrictions from major blocs like the European Union and trading
partners like the US. The other day someone asked me why there was such a difference in the political conditions of India and Pakistan. India with its established democratic norms is on the opposite end of the political spectrum to Pakistan. Again, while India had managed to get its first constitution within four years of its independence, it took Pakistan about nine years to achieve the same objective and even that was scraped within two years of its making. Is it because the Indian leadership is more sagacious than Pakistan's or is it that the people there are better than what we have in this country?
Eyewitness:
Karachi On May 12, 2007, Karachi witnessed orchestrated mayhem. Such carnage is hardly unique to Karachi or to Pakistan -- law enforcement agencies have stood by and even participated in worse massacres elsewhere, like Northern Ireland and Gujarat, India. In Karachi that day, 'only' about 46 lives were lost, and 150 or so injured.
As the current wave of politicisation happens to be coinciding with the upcoming announcement of the budget, there could be no better time than now to bring the defence budget into the spotlight By Aasim Sajjad Akhtar The political space that exists during a period of popular uprising demands the raising of radical demands and political programmes that stretch the imagination of the mass of people yearning for change. Working people across the country, particularly in urban areas, are waiting in earnest for a clear alternative to status quo. In spite of the fact that the overall political environment has become considerably more charged over the past two months, many people still wonder whether anything substantive will really change when Musharraf & co. finally abdicate. The chances of substantive change in the short-term are admittedly limited. But this of course does not mean that the political discourse cannot be radicalised so that the objective of substantive change itself dominates the longer-term agenda. And arguably the most important aspect of this process will be challenging the national security paradigm that remains the most crucial pillar of the military's political project. The current wave of politicisation happens to be coinciding with the upcoming announcement of the budget, and thus an opportunity presents itself to address several outstanding structural features of the official cost-accounting exercise. Even if we cannot address all of the closely interrelated aspects of our public income-generating and expenditure exercises, there could be no better time than now to bring the defence budget into the spotlight. One of the reasons why so much resentment has built up against this present government is the extensive -- and somewhat undisguised -- nature of the military's independent corporate activities. Ordinary working people have now come into direct conflict with the military over arbitrary land grabbing, and many other such intrusions of the men in uniform into the public sphere. Civilian bureaucrats -- including those in the upper echelons of the administrative apparatus -- despise those serving and retired military officers who have displaced them. The whole country is painfully aware of the manner in which this government has reinforced the military's growing economic power, and penetration of social life more generally (importantly an exhaustively researched book on the military's corporate empire by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa has just been released, which proves beyond a shadow of a doubt just how deeply entrenched an economic force the wardi walas actually are). However, there was a time before the creation of this vast empire when the military relied almost exclusively on the official defence budget to meet its corporate needs. And till this day, the defence budget remains a symbol of the military's domination over the economic, political and ideational structures of the polity. Much hay has been made of the fact that the share of the budget dedicated to military expenditures has decreased in recent years, but this is a function of number-fudging and other technical shenanigans rather than a reflection of a genuine reconfiguration of our allocative priorities. Much of what is spent on defence is hidden from public view (read: not reflected in the official budget) in any case, and over the past few years, pensions to military men have been shifted to the civilian pension head in the budget (it was recently reported that 80 per cent of the expenditure under this head goes to military men). Thus this is the time and place to raise again what has been a long-standing demand of many principled political and social activists in this country, namely that details of the defence budget should be presented to the general public in broad daylight and that this budget should be subject to open debate (to the extent the last few budget debates have actually been anything more than a tokenism). Perhaps more importantly there should be a clear demand for the defence budget to be slashed in accordance with the government's supposed commitment to establishing peace in the region. Indeed, a detailed investigation into what constitutes the defence budget will reveal such a significant portion of it being channeled to meet 'non-combat expenditures' that the demand for a substantive reduction in the defence budget will be stating the obvious. Even beyond this there is a need to revisit the logic of national security and the obsession that many of us continue to have with the imperative of guarding our frontiers. There is no immediate threat to our territorial sovereignty, and, as a matter of fact, there rarely has been at any stage over the past 60 years. Instead, under the guise of establishing military parity with India (which is impossible in any case given how much bigger that country is), we have totally surrendered our political and economic sovereignty by becoming economic dependencies of the US and more recently of the international financial institutions. These are all clear assertions of our political reality that need to take centrestage now. They have a direct bearing on the longer-term struggle for an end to oligarchic rule. And they do strike a chord with working people who are less and less tolerant of hyper-nationalist invocations of the 'greater national interest'. Since the 18th of May, in the middle of the working class area of the federal capital, Aab Para Chowk, a 65-year old political worker has set out his stall pledging to hunger strike till death, vowing that he will keep at it until mainstream opposition parties vow to slash the defence budget if and when they come to power. Every evening hundreds of people gather around and listen intently to the very compelling logic of this man with a cause. There are undoubtedly many more such acts of individual and collective defiance that can and will continue to come to the fore so long as the current wave of politicisation persists. It is in such an environment that the mainstream parties have been compelled to radicalise their public utterings and demonstrations of power. Things will not remain this charged indefinitely but for as long as they do, it is crucial that no opportunity to dissent against the established order is lost. The budget in particularly presents a heaven-sent opportunity to expand the base of a movement that has predominantly been viewed as a battle over the meaning of rule of law. The generals will sooner or later need to part company with Musharraf, making him the fall guy so that the military as an institution can be protected from as much of the public glare as it possibly can. But more and more people are becoming aware of the fact that the problem is not with Musharraf's person as much as it is with the military's domination of political and economic life. This needs to be said as openly as possible, in as many different ways as possible, and with as much fearlessness as has been exhibited by the thousands who have already emphatically said no to dictatorship. What better place than here, what better time than now?
By Kaleem Omar Back in 1988 when the US authorities trapped the now long-defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in a money-laundering scam in Tampa, Florida, there was such a brouhaha in the American media over the $ 14 million involved that it seemed as if BCCI -- a Luxembourg-based international bank founded by Pakistan's Agha Hassan Abedi -- was the only money launderer in the world. In fact, the BCCI operation was a drop in the ocean, because the amount of money -- most of it drug money -- being laundered just through the American banking system alone at that time was estimated at $ 250 billion a year. America is by far the world's biggest market for illegal drugs. This fact is reflected in the sheer size of the US money-laundering operation. The US banking authorities occasionally slap fines of a few thousand dollars on American banks for failing to report financial transfers of $ 10,000 or more, as required under American law. Unlike BCCI, however, no American bank has ever been closed down or even threatened with closure for money laundering. This is yet another example of the double standards practiced by the United States. In the two decades since the BCCI Tampa bust, money laundering has grown exponentially. According to the International Monetary Fund, some $ 500 billion to $ 1.5 trillion a year generated by illegal activities is currently being washed through the banking system. For years governments talked tough about the problem but did little about it. When it first appeared in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) was conceived by the G-7 (now G-8) countries as a helpful, cooperative sort of organisation, which would supposedly persuade governments to combat money laundering, and offer them technical assistance to do so. Then, in 2000, according to a report in the London Economist report, FATF ran out of patience and slapped 15 countries on to a money-laundering blacklist. A year later the task force was still considering whom to add and remove from the list. The Economist report says that persistent offenders may face 'counter-measures', which at worst could mean that banks in the FATF's 29 member countries would be barred from dealing with banks based in a named location. According to the report, the FATF's strong-arm approach has had an impact, at least on legislators. Fear of being ostracised from the world's financial system has prodded most of the 15 governments into a flurry of law-making. The Bahamas has enacted 11 pieces of new money-laundering legislation in seven months. The tiny principality of Liechtenstein has not only overhauled its laws, but also set up an institute, staffed by people from KPMG, an accounting firm, to educate the territory's financiers about fighting money laundering. "The Cayman Islands and Panama have also received nods of encouragement from the FATF for their law-making efforts," says the Economist report. Panama may now be getting a pat on the back from the FATF. In December 1989, however, it was invaded by the United States in a military operation aimed at kidnapping the Panamanian president, Manuel Noriega, and transporting him to the US to stand trial for alleged violations of American law committed on his home turf -- the only world leader ever to suffer this fate. Noriega was cornered in the Panama City papal embassy and flown to Florida, where he remains in federal prison, convicted of violating the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organisations statutes. Just how Noriega was captured forms the central drama of David Harris' gripping book, 'Shooting the Moon: The True Story of an American Manhunt Unlike Any Other, Ever'. Harris reveals how a fluke drug bust did in the Panamanian dictator. As Harris reports, US involvement in Central America during the 1980s featured a level of government corruption matched by few other recent affairs. Guns to arm the counterrevolutionaries against Nicaragua's Sandinista government were flown south on airplanes owned by CIA-run 'cutout' companies, in contravention of US federal law. Cocaine was the return cargo, bound for the States courtesy of the Columbian drug cartels. Profits were laundered in between, in Panama. These events competed for headlines with a twin scandal involving arms sales to Iran, money from which also went to help the Nicaraguan contras. These criminal activities weren't just taking place under the eye of the US government. They were a government creation, and high-ranking US officials were dedicated to protecting the efforts at any cost. The late CIA Director William J. Casey, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams (who later became a senior official in George W. Bush's administration) and then-National Security Council staffer Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North together cooked up enough schemes to entertain conspiracy theorists for years. As Harris reports, the Contra intrigue and the case against Noriega were intertwined, sharing many of the same shady characters, mysterious airlines, and illicit banking arrangements. Indeed, according to Harris, Noriega's chief protectors in Washington were Casey and, initially, Abrams. Harris documents how, despite Noriega's many vices and a past littered with bodies, he had been considered a friend of the US who, among other favours, helped facilitate secret support for the Contras and, interestingly, aided an early phase of the US Drug Enforcement Agency's drug war. According to Harris, the initiation of what would become the Noriega investigation dropped out of the blue -- literally -- one day in 1985, when a light plane containing a shipment of smuggled cocaine made a forced landing on a Florida highway, nearly hitting a DEA agent's car. The pilot and proprietor of the air brokerage firm that handled the plane ultimately became informants, revealing the identity of the plane's owner, a Panamanian named Floyd Carlton. Carlton, a Noriega henchman, was apprehended -- and Dick Gregory, first assistant US attorney for the Southern District of Florida, persuaded Carlton to turn informant. It was largely from Carlton's testimony that the case against Noriega was formed. The Economist report on the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering cites as evidence of the FATF's clout the fact that on the day of Liechtenstein's blacklisting, Standard & Poor's, a credit rating agency, changed the outlook of the principality's biggest bank, LGT Bank in Liechtenstein, from stable to negative. It said that it was worried about the impact that counter-measures might have on the bank's business. The Economist report says that even where laws have been passed, it is not clear that money laundering will be beaten. The report points out that laws need to be enforced (which would seem to be self-evident), and whether they are or not is often hard to gauge. The laws typically require a bank to "know the customer", to be confident that his money is obtained by legitimate means, and to report any suspicious activity. But denouncing the practices of 15 countries, many of them small and developing, cannot begin to tackle the problem of global money laundering unless the FATF does something about the gentler treatment it affords its own members. Some of them do not fulfill all the criteria contained in the FATF's '40 recommendations', which set out what it thinks member countries should do about money laundering. The FATF even had doubts about America, where 'know your customer' laws were blocked in 2000 because of concerns about privacy. All that changed, however, after the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001. In George W. Bush's America, the right to privacy and other civil rights have been under assault for the last five years from such draconian pieces of legislation as the Patriot Act of October 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of January 2002.
As mega projects begin work in Karachi in the name of bringing huge foreign investment, people demand a halt to the privatisation of beaches that are essentially public property More than one-third of Karachiites are condemned to live in katchi abadis (squatter settlements) and population the size of the capital city Islamabad migrates to the financial hub of Pakistan every year in search of jobs. Instead of ensuring basic amenities to these impoverished people Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is adamant to 'privatise' the coastal belt and build mega projects for the super rich. "The Prime Minister was pleased to chair a meeting on 24-6-2006 on Dubai World investment plan for development of coastal area of Karachi. The Prime Minister stated that a formal joint meeting with the President and the Prime Minster will be scheduled soon and all issues need to be resolved before the said meeting," said a memo of Prime Minister's Secretariat. The memo further said that since the area indicated by Dubai World is very large, its development may be undertaken in phases. In the first phase Manora area in conjunction with Sandspit area and the area behind it in the Karachi Port Trust's (KPT) western back waters up to KPT's land limits with Hawkesbay be offered to the Group. In the second phase, while developing the Hawkesbay Beach Front, it should be ensured that beach fronts are developed in such a way that "portions are available to the general public for recreational purposes." Given the fact that the sprawling city of Karachi with an estimated population of more than 15 million people has negligible facilities for recreation, most of the parks and playgrounds already encroached upon by land mafia and law enforcement agencies, beaches alone happened to be the place where the common man could soothe his nerves after a hard day's labour. But it seems that visiting the beaches would become a part of folklore for the common man in near future. All civic agencies, including Ports and Shipping, Ministry of Defence and the Government of Sindh were directed to 'cooperate' and "make the required parcels of land available" for the venture that promises to bring large direct foreign investment to Pakistan. The secretary, defence, was asked to put in place a mechanism for shifting the Navy and cantonment board's facilities located at Manora to the Navy land at Cape Monze area. Similarly, it was made clear that Manora Island would be vacated by all agencies and handed over to KPT for the development programmes. The KPT was asked to construct at its own cost alternate accommodation and office blocks on Navy's land at Cape Monze area so as to implement the shifting process and a committee was formed to liaise and negotiate with Dubai Worlds to indicate what area could be given and the associated issues of each segment of their development programme. The committee comprises Minister for Ports and Shipping, Secretary, Ports and Shipping, Chairman, KPT, General Manager (Planning & development) KPT, and General Manager (Civil Works & estate) KPT. Other members could also be co-opted on need basis. In February 2007 it was reported that a UAE-based firm Palm Islands builders would develop a mega real estate project in Karachi, where a new waterfront project, Sugar Land City, involving an investment exceeding $68 billion. "The master plan to develop Sugar Land City at Hawkesbay on Karachi outskirts has been finalised," Syed Mustafa Kamal, the Karachi nazim was quoted to have said. The Sugar Land City alone will be spread over 60,000 acres. The owners of as many as 970 huts on Hawkesbay have already received notices of ejectment. Many of these huts are owned by multinational and national companies, embassies, affluent people and those unfortunate indigenous Baloch who have been living in the area for centuries. According to Nadir Baloch, who owns a hut at Hawkesbay, a hut in the area is valued between Rs 2-10 million. The coastal belt of Balochistan and Sindh happens to be of immense importance in terms of environment since they are home to mangrove forests that are nurseries of shrimp and different fish species. "The total area of mangrove forests in Sindh's Indus Delta is about 250,000 hectares and that of Balochistan's Makran coast is now estimated at only 7,500 hectares, i.e. 3% of the total mangrove forest coverage at the coastal areas of Pakistan. In view of their relatively small coverage, the mangroves in Balochistan could easily disappear if no proper action is taken, while those of Sindh are under severe pressure," according to the Tropical Rainforest Portfolio 1996-2001, a report compiled by the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Zeist, The Netherlands. Fishermen at Hawkesbay where one could find rich mangrove forests rightly point out that the development of Sugar Land City would not only deprive them of their livelihood but also destroy these forests. Dawood, 38, a fisherman, at Hawkesbay told TNS that deep sea trawlers have already hurt fisherfolk very badly because the catch in shallow water has been drastically reduced due to their activity. On top of that, use of fine mesh nets locally known as gujja, bhola and katra nets by unscrupulous elements have very adversely affected them because these banned nets are blatantly used and do not spare even the juvenile fish. Sandspit and Hawkesbay also happen to be the nesting ground of endangered Green Turtle and obviously they would be destroyed. Globally there are eight species of marine turtles and are all classified as endangered species. Green Turtle (Chelonia mydas) and Olive Ridley Turtle (Lepidocshelys olivacea) are the two species of marine turtles that nest along the Sandspit and Hawkesbay beaches at the Karachi coast. All species of marine turtles are listed in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Pakistan is a signatory to CITES, which prohibits trade in turtles, turtle parts and eggs. The government of Sindh has also declared marine turtles 'protected' species. The Green Turtles nest between August and January with their numbers peaking in November. Olive Ridley turtles nest between July and September. Their nesting is very scarce throughout the season Though the memo of Prime Minister's Secretariat blissfully mentions that "environmental concerns may be resolved before undertaking the project" environmentalists believe it's merely an eye wash and 'privatisation' of the coastal belt would send endangered species along with mangroves into oblivion. The privatisation of coastal belt is not confined to Hawkesbay and Sandspit. The elitist Defence Housing Authority (DHA) is reclaiming land at Karachi's Clifton beach and pursuing the multi-billion dollar Waterfront Development Project that envisages construction of theme parks, marinas, expo centres, luxury hotels, and condominiums on the 14-kilometre beach. According to press reports the project called 'Cresent Bay' is being carried on with the help of Emaar Group, a UAE-based firm that has also been awarded a contract to 'develop' Buddu and Bundal islands near Karachi. It is feared that the so called development of Buddu and Bundal islands would render tens of thousands of fishermen, who rely on shallow waters, jobless. Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and concerned citizens organised a walk at Clifton beach on April 15 to register their anger on these developments and demanded that the privatisation of beaches should be stopped forthwith because they happen to be public property and it would deprive people to their right to go to the beaches and destroy virgin, unspoilt waterfront. Thirty years hence, governments paid some heed to public outcry. Today, it seems, the only concern is to ensure the rights of the elite.
Pakistan can reduce its fiscal deficit if a comprehensive programme, scientific approach and multi-dimensional strategy is adopted for tax reforms and resource mobilisation According to a latest report by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Pakistan under the rule of General Pervez Musharraf is still a very 'high risk country' on a number of accounts. It notes with concern the ever-increasing military expenditure (4.5 per cent of GDP) and huge fiscal deficit (against revenue of $20.55 billion, expenditure is $25.65 billion and public debt is alarming high at 55 per cent of GDP). The poor segments of society, since the takeover by General Musharraf in 1999, have been subjected to a number of taxes, whereas the rich still enjoy tax exemptions. What makes the situation more painful and shocking are the unprecedented non-development expenditures. In Budget 2006, the current expenditure demand for Prime Minister Secretariat alone was 538.751 million rupees, and that of its Inspection Commission 20.250 million rupees; Staff Household and Allowances of the President 290.244 million rupees; for NAB alone 797 million rupees and National Assembly 1005.933 million rupees, just to mention a few. It is deplorable to note that for servicing domestic debts, the government requires 190.78 billion rupees, for the servicing of foreign debt 48.72 billion rupees, and for foreign loan repayment 56.35 billion rupees. Do we still need any further proof to show that our rulers wasting national revenues and resources on non-development expenditures? They have yet to learn to live within means, the figures relating to domestic debt, its servicing and new loans of billions of dollars are simply horrifying. Due to wasteful expenditure on current account and deficit financing, there emerges an artificial lack of funds for investing in social projects benefiting the poor. The Central Board of Revenue (CBR), through oppressive tax measures, managed to collect a record revenue of 713.4 billion rupees during the fiscal year 2005-06. There is every likelihood of collecting 900 billion rupees during the current year. However, these big figures fail to improve the burgeoning fiscal deficit which is still over 200 billion rupees. During the fiscal year 2005-2006, the budgetary gap was 610 billion rupees and the revenue deficit was 175 billion rupees. Tragically, CBR has remained unsuccessful in improving tax-to-GDP ratio which is just 9.2 per cent. Twenty years back it was 18 per cent! Indirect taxes still account for 69 per cent of total tax collection. Tax-to-GDP ratio for direct taxes is hardly 3 per cent which is a disgrace for the policy makers and tax collectors. The most lamentable aspect of prevalent tax structure gives a free-hand to industrialists, importers, contractors and traders to charge the people an amount that is far more than what they pay as taxes. They are even passing on their income tax liability (personal tax) to clients/buyers, courtesy presumptive tax regime imprudently resorted to by CBR merely to show boastful collection. Incidentally, the high level of tax collection by CBR is mainly attributable to heavy taxes on imports and export. It is a shocking fact that even under income tax, imports and exports are subjected to presumptive tax levy, though exporters may not have taxable income due to huge depreciation allowance after massive investment in plant and machinery. The State Bank of Pakistan has given a free hand to banks to exploit account holders and borrowers. Now these exploitative money lenders are showing extraordinary profits by denying due share to deposit-holders and are paying taxes in billions to CBR instead of distributing profits to deposit-holders with whom they, under the law are maintaining accounts on 'profit and loss sharing basis'. At present, importers, contractors, retailers and even service providers (except companies) are, in fact, passing on their tax burden to consumers and clients. This erratic taxation is at the expense of equity and those poor people who are the actual victims of tax highhandedness. Fiscal policy in Pakistan has become a tool of oppression and the poor people are the real victims. Direct tax revenues have increased from Rs 40 billion in 1990-91 to over 270 billion this year, whereas in reality they have been turned into indirect tax through presumptive tax regime. In a federation like Pakistan, levying of taxes on goods and services within respective territories should lie exclusively with the provinces. Our federal government has even violated the constitutional command by levying taxes on services and property under the garb of Income Tax. This is the worst example of 'federal highhandedness' where the victims are the poor people of the less privileged provinces. The constitutional responsibility of distributive justice and social equality has been altered, only to show higher collection of tax in pursuit of fixed targets by the federation. The provinces have been made dependent by not extending due taxes rights and also being deprived of correct net tax proceeds in utter violation of formula given in the supreme law of the land. Resource mobilisation at federal and provincial levels should have been priority number one, but our rulers are looking towards foreign donors to construct big dams and are selling profitable national assets at throwaway prices to earn hefty commissions. If we want to dismantle the present exploitative tax system and remove economic inequalities, the main strategy in the forthcoming budget must be to achieve the goal of reducing/eliminating the fiscal deficit to a level of 2 per cent to 1.5 per cent of the GDP, at any cost. Our revenue collection should not be less than 2 trillion rupees in the next financial year. There is no justification whatsoever to reduce development expenditure, which is already dismally low. Fiscal adjustment through reduction in development expenditure will not solve our problems. There is a dire need to reduce non-developmental, wasteful expenditure, but the real salvation lies in resource mobilisation. Broadening of tax net is the need of the hour without forgetting that those who enjoy exemptions and concessions should be brought into net. Existing taxpayers are grossly under-reporting their incomes, should be tackled with skillful policies (carrot and stick!) by gradually making them pay taxes correctly. The rich and mighty who do not pay taxes are the real culprits. Exemptions and concessions that are prevalent in our tax laws (the whole of Second Schedule in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, most of the items of Sixth Schedule of Sales Tax Act, 1990, and innumerable SROs relating to Customs and Excise) should be done away with. There should be a level playing field for everybody. A wise step will therefore be to immediately abolish these exemptions and concessions instead of increasing incidence of taxes on the common people of Pakistan. The process of industrialisation, which alone can provide more jobs and sustainable growth, investment in unproductive sector like real estate and capital market should be heavily taxed and funds should be diverted to meaningful sectors by lowering corporate tax rates. If the government removes all these exemptions and concessions, provides proper incentives for industrial investment, brings big absentee feudal landlords into the tax net, manages to get taxes from the influential ones and succeeds in imposing GST across the board (preferably with a low rate of 2 per cent at one single point), there will be no budget deficit, rather we will have surplus in three years. This goal can only be achieved if the government simultaneously tackles issues related to tax evasion and rampant corruption in the tax machinery (by not just dismissal from service but rather by making the system workable and just). The present tax machinery is not only corrupt (part of the blame goes to the State as no reforms have been made to improve their economic lot and working conditions) but is also inefficient, incompetent and ill-equipped to increase the revenue. Radical changes are needed to: (a) Revamp the entire tax apparatus. (b) Improve both structural and financial conditions of tax machinery. (c) Make CBR and independent Board answerable to Parliament. It should be an efficient, people-friendly and service-oriented organisation aimed at solving taxpayers' problems by giving them proper guidance and counseling and not harassing them for self-aggrandisement. There should be a complete change in the image of tax machinery, which is presently considered as corrupt, inefficient, exploitative, oppressive and a callous apparatus. (d) It should be remembered that introducing irrational, harsh and unjust tax measures cannot broaden the tax base. Justice, fairness and equity, instead of fixing unreasonable budgetary targets should be the main concerns of our tax policy. Pakistan is quite capable of substantially reducing or even eliminating its fiscal deficit within a short span of time provided that a comprehensive programme, well-designed work plan, scientific approach and multi-dimensional strategy is adopted for tax reforms and resource mobilisation. We need a fair and equitable tax system which should be managed by honest professionals, who are accountable by a select committee of Parliament, and are free from governmental controls. The writers (www.huzaimaikram.com) are leading tax advisers and authors of many books and articles on taxes in Pakistan. In the first of a two part series, Dr Sarfaraz argues that the Taliban philosophy is representative of Muslim political thought, except that it is heavily influenced by tribal traditions In the last few years, our region has seen the resurgence of religious extremism or, more precisely speaking, the phenomenon called 'Talibanisation'. Although the whole country is affected in varying degrees by the phenomenon, the problem has assumed ominous proportions in the North Western part of Pakistan -- namely NWFP, FATA, and the Pakhtoon Balochistan. More recently, the Federal Capital has also fallen into the grip of clerical extremism. One of the factors that led to Talibanisation in parts of Pakistan is the country's foreign policy with regard to its immediate neighbour Afghanistan. It is now common knowledge how Pakistan supported the rise of Taliban in the late 1990s. Observers are of the view that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan serves as a model for all the contemporary extremist and Taliban groups in North Western Pakistan. However, it may also be noted that most Afghan Taliban leaders were educated in Pakistani religious seminaries. In fact, the term 'Talib' means student of a seminary. One important aspect of religious extremism and Talibanisation in Pakistan is that most of these groups have a militant orientation and thrive on 'violence', so to say. These groups appear to have an outlandish political agenda that has growingly become a threat to the peace of the whole society. Therefore, it is most pertinent that one tries to explore the political philosophy of the extremists, especially the Talibans. "We must study the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan itself, because it is here that most of our local groups (of Taliban) have got their inspiration from," opines Dr Sarfaraz Khan, former Professor School of Oriental and African Studies in London, currently teaching at Area Study Centre on Central Asia, China, Russia, Afghanistan at the University of Peshawar. He has also penned a book on the subject of the political thought in Islam, concentrating mainly on the Taliban phenomenon in the region. In an exclusive interview with TNS, Dr Sarfaraz said: "We can always have a better idea about any religio-clerical movement in the Muslim history through the written material produced by the founder leadership of a movement. For instance, we can learn about Shia Islam in Iran through a rich collection of manuscripts that throw a detailed light on the policies followed. Likewise for Sunni Islam, in Egypt, we find thinkers who have compiled a coherent body of work. In Syria, we have people like Rasheed Rida who brought out some coherent thought regarding Salafia Islam. Even certain Wahabi sects in the Middle East have their political thought spelt out well. On the contrary, we find a lack of political thought in Afghanistan, especially in the context of Taliban, due basically to the absence of an academic tradition in the country's schools and even religious madrasas." He went on to elaborate his point, "The Talibans are all rural based. They are not educated in either the so-called 'worldly' studies or religious disciplines, because none of them ever went to Deoband or any other historical house of knowledge. Besides, there are very few writings by Taliban leaders to come by. The only related literature that we find is through Rasmi Jareeda, famously known for its reproduction of the various farmaans (orders and edicts) of Amir ul Momineen Mullah Omar and the Ministry of Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkar (the promotion of virtue and the abolition of vice) and, at times, through the radio commentaries or speeches of the Taliban leaders. However, the available literature is not enough to know about political programme of Taliban." In this part of the world, writing as a category has not been recognised for centuries although the word used for Muslim school is Maktab which literally means the place where you write. But in Maktabs there has been no writing done at least after 12th century. These are, in the words of Dr Sarfaraz, 'oral societies' in that the method of teaching in their religious schools is mostly oral -- individual to individual with no use of conventional teaching aids, such as the black boards, chalks, and markers. "However, if we read the Rasmi Jareeda or listen to their official radio channel, 'Da Shariat Ghag' (Voice of Shariat), we find that they are preaching Shariah, or Islam for that matter, except that there is no coherent writing on Shariah. "It appears that by talking about an 'ideal Islam', they mean to invoke the period that saw Prophet Muhammad (SAW) or the Caliphs. That, to my mind, is only a conjecture since you cannot recreate the past, and there is always a likelihood of people ending up with disagreements and differences of opinion." Talking about the genesis of 'Talibanisation', he said: "One way to judge the Taliban philosophy is from their actions. Here one finds that their greatest emphasis has been on certain punishments for certain acts that they call the Hudood laws. However, unlike in Pakistan, their laws were without codification or procedures. "During their rule, the Taliban created the Ministry of Vice, which was based on a verse from the Holy Quran. One can simply say that there was no judicial process involved; they had certain Pashtoon tribal traditions amalgamated. "In other words, the Taliban philosophy is representative of Muslim political thought except that it is heavily influenced by the tribal traditions -- not only of the Pashtoons but also the Arabs. It is about the 'imposition' of tribal and rural values on the public at large. "Of course, they are oblivious to the realities of the modern world and the challenges posed by the international relations," he continued. "If we study the life and times of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), we find that he was very much aware of the diplomatic values and traditions of the time and used them effectively, too, such as with Najashi of Ethiopia. Which goes to show that the Taliban were not well-versed in the area that they claimed to be their 'ideal'. They were too myopic, ignorant, and maybe, too adventurous." Dr Sarfaraz highlighted another important aspect of the Taliban regime, saying that all of their leaders "came from modest financial backgrounds. This is clearly in contravention of a tenet of classical Muslim political philosophy that the Amir should be from a well-off background, which definitely has a sound administrative rationale. Apart from the Islamic traditions, even the Pashtoon traditions were violated because in a Pakhtoon society, Mullah or cleric never had a central or leadership role rather the role has always been subservient and of little significance. As far as the question whether Talibanisation is a dictatorship of clerics, Dr Sarfaraz said, "Yes, but it turned out to be the dictatorship of not all clerics but a specific brand of clerics." He explained: "It is a typical Sunni brand which is more near to Wahabism, even not very strictly Wahabi-Deobandi brand. It is like something Deobandi, something Salafi, in between Wahabism plus tribal Pakhtoon traditions. "The places facing Talibanisation include the entire Pashtoon areas. Of late, we have seen the country face a similar phenomenon, albeit at a small scale, right in the heart of Islamabad, in the shape of Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa." He also hinted at some 'significant pockets' of Taliban in Karachi. "It is important to note that what these extremists do, ask for or write. Officially there is no single organ of Taliban, apart from Taliban of Waziristan. In Dir and Swat we have TNSM which predated Taliban." There are different groups of clerics having their respective central figure dictating the group and followers. They have been unable to evolve a unified set of objectives or a political philosophy, yes the strategy and tactics of harassing the population through violence is common, he said. "It is hard to know what kind of state(s) they want to create by implementing their respective Shariahs. For instance, jailed Mullah Sufi Muhammad then and now his son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, concentrated on Malakand, then Taliban of Waziristan and Bajaur wanted to have control in their respective tribal agencies. Then the Jamia Hafsa-Lal Masjid famed Aziz brothers have their eyes on Islamabad at least as the base of their Islamic State. In fact, the outlook of Waziristans' Taliban has been so narrow and specific that they virtually turned Waziristan into a cleric state, which was referred to as Islamic State of Waziristan in the media," he concluded.
Associations
of Social Scientists: Since its inception in 2000, the Council of Social Sciences has focused on the study of state of social sciences in Pakistan and has published a number of books on the subject. A recent addition to these publications is the book under review. Edited by Dr Inayatullah, it describes and analyses the state of six associations of social scientists formed in 1950s and 60s. These associations include Pakistan Economic Association, All Pakistan Political Science Association, Pakistan Historical Society, Pakistan Philosophy Congress, Pakistan Sociological Association and Pakistan Psychological Association. This is the first booklength study on the subject. Before this, there is not even an article in a book or journal on the subject. Dr Inayatullah, in an overview of the study, presents a profile of the six associations, traces their antecedents and evolution, their activities and the role of its members. A paper by Ahmad Saleem 'The Development of Association of Social Scientists during British Rule in India' places these associations in their historical context. One conclusion of this paper is that Pakistan did not inherit any of these associations and they emerged on the initiative of Pakistani social scientists themselves. One possible exception could be the oldest association in India 'The Asiatic Society of Bengal' was renamed 'Asiatic Society of Pakistan' on January 3, 1952. The study uses a number of criteria to assess the performance of these societies. They included the number of conferences they held, the quantity and the topics of papers presented in them, the number of their publications including the proceedings of conferences and professional journals and their ability to mobilise funds for their work. All the six associations held a total of 100 conferences between 1949 and 2005. During these conferences an estimated 2400 papers were presented. Most of these papers were influenced by three major academic traditions of social sciences: British, American, and Indian Muslim tradition developed in Aligarh University. The social scientists' associations emerged in the 1950s and 60s and remained reasonably active till the separation of East Pakistan in 1971. After that, three of them, Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Pakistan Psychological Association and Pakistan Historical Society, were revived after a few years and are still active. The other three, Pakistan Economic Association, the Political Science Association and Pakistan Sociological Association are still dormant. They held their last conferences in 1972, 1992 and 1985 respectively. The book has identified a number of factors, which have directly or indirectly determined the performance of the six associations. The role of their founder presidents is the most crucial in improving it. The power struggle among various factions in associations was the most debilitating factor. Political regimes have had virtually no role in strengthening them. The book comes at a time when there is a realisation within the social sciences community of a decline in the social sciences. While a few meetings/conference have been held focusing on the state of social sciences, more needs to be done to understand the malaise and rectify the shortcomings. This study serves both ends. It contains valuable information pertaining to the professional associations, in terms of the conferences, papers, membership, and has been a result of painstaking efforts. The purpose of the book would be served if the professional associations expand their role and network for promoting social sciences; and the dormant ones are re-activated. This also calls for an effort on the part of office bearers, besides the members to play a more active and positive role. The book is a timely and commendable effort on the part of its editor Dr Inayatullah and the Council of Social Sciences to promote social sciences in Pakistan that remain in a state of neglect. One can say that the Council needs to continue its efforts in analysing and highlighting the hurdles on the way, and pushing the social scientists and professional associations to play an active role in academic and national interests. Dr. Noman Sattar is Assistant Professor at Area Study Centre for Africa, North & South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
If Geographical Indication Law was in place, Pakistan would be in a much better position to claim IP rights of many products having traditional roots in the country For a long time, Pakistan has topped the list of countries charged with acts of gross violation of intellectual property rights. Despite being signatory of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreements, the government could not improve the situation and even faced trade restrictions from major blocs like the European Union and trading partners like the US. With an aim to remove this stigma and enforce intellectual property rights, an Intellectual Property Organisation (IPO) was founded in April 2005 and put under a director general whose status was equal to that of a federal secretary. The mandate given to the IPO was to work "as a focal organisation for integrated management of intellectual property and enforcement coordination" but the ground reality is that the situation is far from satisfactory. Some of the most pressing problems facing IPR implementation in Pakistan are the unnecessary delay in the registration process, lack of expertise and shortage of staff with IPO, centralisation of powers with the organisations Karachi head office, absence of separate IPR courts and delay in the long overdue supporting legislation. In addition to these, the lack of awareness among the masses about the benefits of having registered trademarks, copyrights or Geographical Indication (GI) rights at domestic and international level has also been a major impediment in this respect. Though of late, a few major developments at the international level have opened the eyes of the policymakers as well as the business community. Many of us can recall the famous Basmati rice controversy that hit newspapers in September 1997. What had happened was that a US company Rice Tec Inc., was able to win a patent on Basmati, a unique kind of aromatic rice grown in Pakistan and India. Once the patent was granted, Rice Tec labelled its rice as Basmati within the US and started exporting it as Basmati rice. Currently, both Pakistan and India are contesting for the ownership of Basmati patent and not ready to let go their right over it. Pakistan has even turned down the offer to get the patent registered jointly in the name of both Pakistan and India. Years down the road, another somewhat similar controversy has emerged where Pakistan feels stranded. Indian has set its claim over the intellectual property rights of Pashmina Kashmiri shawl in the international market. This type of shawl is manufactured in the territories of Jammu and Kashmir under the control of Pakistan and India. Pakistan claims that it also has the right to own 'Pashmina' on grounds that artisans on the Pakistan administered Kashmir also know the art of manufacturing Pashmina shawl. The application for Pashmina registration was accepted by the GI Registry in Chennai and the announcement was been made in the GI Journal. Pakistan is working out the option to challenge this decision at the competent forum. In the pipeline are similar applications for GIs on Kashmiri products like Kani shawl, Sozni embroidery (needle-work), papier Mache, walnut wood carving, Kashmiri silk carpets, Amblikar shawl, Namda or Kashmiri rugs, Katamband (wood ceilings) and Pinjrakari (latticed wood carving). The state government of Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side has applied to get 10 handicraft items patented by getting them registered under the Geographical Indication Act as traditional knowledge. Pakistan may challenge these on the same ground on which it decided to target registration of Pashmina GI. Muhammad Anum Saleem, a corporate law practitioner, tells TNS that the delay on part of the government to get passed the long-awaited Geographical Indication Law (GIL) or enact it through a presidential ordinance has led to rising of such problems. Had the law been in place, Pakistan would have been in a much better position to claim IP rights of many products having traditional roots in the country. The issue has been in government notice for long. The relevant Pakistani ministries had initially provided a list of 24 items that needed to be registered under GIs but it is expected that the list will swell with the passage of time. To mention a few, Sahiwal Cow, Shu or Chitrali Patti, Sindhi Ajrak, Sindhri Mangoes, Hunza Apricots, Hunza Water, Neem, Kamalia Khaddar and Multani Matti urgently need IP rights protection. As per widely accepted definition, "Geographical Indication in relation to goods, means, an indication which identifies such goods, as originating or manufactured or produced in a territory of a qualifying country or a region or a locality of a qualifying country, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of such goods, is essentially attributable to its geographical origin." It is feared that any further delay in the enactment of GI law in Pakistan can lead to loss of these rights or lead to long legal battles. There are reports that an Indian company has started exporting its products under brand 'Multani Matti'. This is objectionable as Multani Mitti originates from Multan district in Punjab, Pakistan and is known for its cosmetic value. This mitti has been used widely in Pakistan for facial mask for centuries. The IPO website states that the existing trademark ordinance is not sufficient to meet the requirements for claiming IP rights over the GI products. "(However) Presently the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 provides for the registration of Geographical Indications under the ambit of Collective as well as Certification Marks. However, in order to further strengthen the legal base of protection of National Geographical Indications, consultations are under way with the respective stakeholders both from public and private sectors," the website adds. Muhammad Manzoor advocate, a Lahore-based lawyer, tells TNS that registration of trademarks within the country is a must to get them registered overseas or launch brands in the international market. Claim for a GI right can be stronger if the claimant has a trademark registered in his name but unfortunately the registration process in Pakistan is too cumbersome, he says. Manzoor says that on an average it takes 2 years for an applicant to get a trademark registered, if there are no objections. In case, there are any objections the timeframe can be much longer, he adds. Manzoor alleges that on one hand the government is asking businessmen to launch brands in the international market but on the other is reluctant to streamline the system. "It takes an applicant not less than three weeks to just get an acknowledgment receipt from IPO saying it has received an application for trademark registration. Why can't the receipt be issued at the time of filing of the application?" he asks. Manzoor claims that the delay is also for the reason that IPO's whole system is centralised in Karachi. The IPO registries in all other cities are simply collection points. "The situation cannot improve till the time these registries are given powers to take independent decisions," he adds. An official at Karachi registry of IPO tells TNS that barring a few problems, the organisation is performing well and trying to achieve its objective in minimum time possible. He says, on conditions of anonymity, that the delay in registration of trade marks, copyrights etc. is for the reason that there's immense load on the organisation that is short of staff. "We have to register patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs and layout designs. Besides, we have to call for objections and solve disputes. This is not an easy task. Every single case has to be handled with extreme care and consumes lot of mental exercise, hence the delay," he adds. The official says it is a pity that no separate IPR courts exist in Pakistan and all the disputes have to be handled by the civil, district and high courts. The honourable judges of these courts are already burdened with ever-increasing caseload and must be given a break, he says. The fact that none of the convicts in cases of IP rights violation has been given jail sentence has encouraged the violation of these rights, the official adds.
The authoritarian and rentier nature of Pakistan's ruling elite has been both the cause and effect of the political conditions in which the state finds itself The other day someone asked me why there was such a difference in the political conditions of India and Pakistan. India with its established democratic norms is on the opposite end of the political spectrum to Pakistan. Again, while India had managed to get its first constitution within four years of its independence, it took Pakistan about nine years to achieve the same objective and even that was scraped within two years of its making. Is it because the Indian leadership is more sagacious than Pakistan's or is it that the people there are better than what we have in this country? The difference becomes glaring particularly when we realise that the basic chemistry of the people is similar. The common man of the two countries is almost similar or at least they started out from the same starting line. So, what went wrong with Pakistan that it never managed to establish democratic norms or strengthen civilian institutions? The answer lies in the nature of the ruling elite which in Pakistan's case was always authoritarian and rentier in nature. The nature of the elite was both the cause and effect of the political conditions in which the state found itself. The fact is that authoritarianism has always flown in the veins of the country's leadership. Although it is considered sacrilege to question the country's leadership, especially those who established the state, the fact is that none of the decisions taken in the early years reflected any sensitivity for democratic norms. The decisions to annex Kalat or to dismiss the provincial government in the frontier province or engaging the military in a conflict with India are highly questionable. According to the famous Pakistani historian, Ayesha Jalal, such decisions were necessitated by the need to consolidate a fragile country. However, the fact of the matter is that these were precisely the decisions which embarked the polity on its peculiar course from which it could never extricate itself. The leadership, which followed, was no different. The first popularly elected government that followed after thirteen years of military rule was not inclined to follow democratic principles. In fact, as soon as the 1973 Constitution was made Bhutto started introducing amendments to the constitution. Moreover, he erred by involving the military in political issues thus giving the armed forces the confidence to take over the reigns of the government again. Such authoritarianism of the ruling elite got a fillip during the early years due to the formulation of a patron-client relationship. The hostility with India required strengthening of defenses and forging alignments which could then be used to keep a belligerent bigger neighbour at bay. Perhaps, it could be argued that Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not envision hostile relations with India. He had, as sources suggest, retained his house in Bombay where he planned to return and settle down after partition. In his imagination, life would return to normal after the two countries were made. Such a plan did not reflect an appreciation of realpolitik or realities of partition. Jinnah was certainly not prepared for the carnage or for getting a Pakistan truncated due to the absence of Kashmir. The war of 1947, which was meant to complete Pakistan, had far reaching implications for the country. It not only created a festering wound for both countries, but it also created conditions which pushed Pakistan into a system of global patronage. This system refers to the patron-client relationship developed with the West. The earlier leadership including Jinnah was keen to woo the US as a balancer of power. A patron-client relationship was finally established during the end of the 1950s when Pakistan joined two US-sponsored military alliances, SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan's military had agreed to fight the Communist threat on Washington's behalf in return for money, weapons and political patronage. Issues such as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy were flagged to get American attention and to justify an alignment with the West. People were told that there was a real threat of Communism to Pakistan. Twenty three years later, a similar argument was made by Zia-ul-Haq while re-establishing a strategic alignment with Washington. In a mercenary fashion, the military and the ruling elite agreed to serve American interests as long as Washington could guarantee relatively free flow of financial and material resources. The same equation was struck by General Musharraf after 2001. There are many who argue that Pervez Musharraf should have evaluated the situation and behaved in a more constrained manner than what he eventually did. There are others who argue that a political government might have behaved a bit differently. However, both these arguments miss out on a fundamental reality that nothing would have changed the situation. Being rentier in nature, the elite has always jumped at opportunities to offer its services in return for American patronage. Of course, with international crises, which have implications for American security, the rent of Pakistan's rulers and its military always goes up. The military, in particular, is a direct beneficiary of the patron-client relationship because it is the only institution which can contribute the maximum to fulfilling American security objectives. Whether it is fighting Communism or Jihadis, or providing bases to American forces against the Soviet Union, Iran and others, Pakistan's military has always been the best option. Therefore, it is not surprising that the US has been more forthcoming in rendering support to the military and military regimes in Pakistan. The above argument raises a vital question regarding issues on which the rulers have not delivered such as rolling back the nuclear programme or handing over AQ Khan to the US. These tricky issues do not necessarily denote divergence of views, but the domestic compulsions of the rentier elite. The arrangement between the patron and the client requires for the latter to have sufficient domestic control besides having the ability to deliver according to American strategic objectives. A restless mass of people can become problematic in delivering to the external patron. The issue with domestic control, however, is that it can be ensured through a combination of coercive tactics and acquiring some political legitimacy. The latter is achieved through creating an impression that the elite can deliver certain goods and services which are fundamental to the survival of the people and the state. This means propagating military security as essential for the survival of the state or to propagate that the state and its ideology is under great threat. Pakistan's nuclear programme, its India policy or the Islamic agenda are essential ploys for gaining legitimacy at home. In the absence of commitment to socioeconomic development, such policies or popular agendas are critical in getting public support. The elite make people believe that they are getting their money's worth. Hence, these are the very issues on which a blatant comprise cannot be done. The external patrons understand the compulsions of their clients and do not push them beyond a certain point. The upshot of my argument is that the patron-client system is designed to ensure greater accountability to the external patrons instead of the domestic audience. Devoid of any sense of responsibility to the people, the ruling elite is under no pressure to introduce political accountability or ensure socioeconomic development. Consequently, domestic politics in Pakistan has become nothing but an immoral game of realpolitik which lacks the capacity of bringing substantive changes within.
A narrative of the events of 'Black Saturday' and the 'stop-the-blame-game' argument "Here in Karachi, we avoid 'name calling' and 'finger pointing' due to fear of having our knees drilled..." On May 12, 2007, Karachi witnessed orchestrated mayhem. Such carnage is hardly unique to Karachi or to Pakistan -- law enforcement agencies have stood by and even participated in worse massacres elsewhere, like Northern Ireland and Gujarat, India. In Karachi that day, 'only' about 46 lives were lost, and 150 or so injured. But this was the first time in Pakistan that live television cameras captured the situation for viewers to see: government tankers used to block off routes to the airport, police and rangers conspicuous by their absence or standing idle as armed men ran amok on the streets of Karachi, corpses and wounded bodies lying by the wayside in pools of blood. The security plans chalked out for May 12 were abandoned overnight. The Sindh home department withdrew the weapons of most law enforcement personnel in Karachi on May 12. Armed only with batons, the 15,000 or policemen deployed in the city avoided the violent areas. Rangers who were to hold key positions on the 'flyovers' on the main airport road were nowhere in sight. Instead, armed men in civilian clothes held those posts, and fired into the crowds trying to reach the airport to receive the chief justice stranded inside. At 5:00am on Saturday morning, Shahrah-e-Faisal (Drigh Road), the main airport route normally trafficked at all hours, was deserted as a journalist friend in Karachi found who was out and about early. He emailed me: "I saw something which gave me the chills -- no police or Rangers on the roads, just kids with guns guiding trucks, tankers to block the intersections, entry and exit points on the main artery of city. I saw an NLC truck also being used to block the road (picture attached). We all know NLC is Pakistan's largest trucking company, owned and managed by the army. Tie-rods were being removed from front tires so the vehicles could not be moved even by a tow truck. I thought, "What if ambulances are required to move on Shahrah-e-Faisal?" My thought was immediately answered when I saw two KKF ambulances moving freely (Khidmat-Khalq Foundation, MQM's social service wing) and MQM activists among those supervising the blockade." Getting to office took him two hours, a journey that even during rush hour takes only 45 minutes. "I told my colleagues about my fear and almost all of them told me to relax as MQM is not that stupid they will not repeat the 1992 & 94 stupidity. By 12 noon Karachi was bleeding." "There were bodies lying at every street intersection," 'Uzi', a reporter related later on her blog. "We picked up a whole bunch of them and put them inside police mobiles parked nearby." As for the police and the Rangers: "They did NOTHING! They stood around and LOITERED while my city was tainted with blood." The areas she covered were the second bloodiest that day. It took her nearly an hour to get to Jinnah's mausoleum (Mazar-e-Quaid), normally a 15-20 minute drive from her house. At Kashmir Road the cab driver couldn't go any further and she walked the remaining distance. At around 01:00pm, she was stopped by a political worker who put a TT pistol to her forehead ("NOT the temple, the FOREHEAD"). She was allowed to proceed after showing her press card. Over at the Sindh High Court, lawyer Ayesha Tammy Haq sent this text message around 5 pm Karachi time: "In the High court. Things getting worse. Judges will not leave as there will be a rampage..." (Later in an interview, General Musharraf denied such plans and reasserted his commitment to democratic politics. But then, he has also justified what happened in Karachi as 'the political activity' of a political party attempting to show its strength to its constituency -- interview with Talat Hussain, Aaj TV, May 18, 2007) Another lawyer emailed: "Not only was the Sindh High Court under virtual siege by armed activists, but lawyers attempting to enter the Court were repeatedly beaten and roughed up. The armed activists did not even spare the Judges of the High Court." One judge was held at gun point and his car damaged. "While holding me at gun point, the youth called someone and stated 'Yeh bolta hai kay High Court ka judge hai...kya karun is ka?...achaa theek hai, phir janay daita houn.' (He says he's a judge of the High Court. What should I do with him? Ok then, will let him go)." Many judges, unable to drive to the Sindh High Court, had to leave their official 'flag' cars and make their way through menacing crowds and climb over the court's back wall in order to reach their chambers. Munir A. Malik, one of the 25 lawyers accompanying Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry from Islamabad to Karachi, narrates how they were forced to remain inside the airport. The Sindh government representatives offered to transport the Chief Justice by helicopter but this offer was for him alone. Since the lawyers with him had already foiled the attempts of 'two uniformed people' to "snatch the CJP and take him from the other side," he refused. ('Story at the Airport', The News on Sunday, Special Report, May 20, 2007) Armed men attacked lawyers at Malir District Bar, Iftikhar Chaudhry's scheduled first stop in Karachi, killing a lawyer and injuring several others, including female lawyers. The CJP and his team, of course, were 'externed' to Islamabad after several hours. Late that night, residents in the low-income Ranchore Lines mohalla were awakened by loud banging on their doors. One resident relates that it was two young boys distributing freshly cooked biryani and suji in plastic bags: "Yeh chief justice ki wapsi ki khushi mein hai" (This is to celebrate the chief justice's return [to Islamabad]). On the Karachi streets, Uzi's press card had saved her again at around 05:00 p.m. as she and a colleague tried to reach the Rangers Headquarters in Dawood College. "A car chockfull of ammunition passed in front of us, stopped, backed up and stopped in front of us, Kalashnikovs pointing at the two of us from the windows. We showed our press cards and the car moved on. NEVER in my LIFE have I felt more grateful to my press card than I did yesterday." At around 06:00 p.m., she and her colleague were trapped by gunshots all around. "Short of climbing the walls and entering one of the houses around, there really was no other place for us to go." They stopped a police mobile and asked which way would be safe to go. The answer, accompanied by laughter: "You can be killed wherever you go. Choose your place." In published reports, journalists prudently avoided naming the parties involved. "Young men toting flags and banners had set up camp outside the airport departure lounge. They hid, however, when policemen came by. Reporters in the vicinity were asked whether they had seen any political activists around. Munawar Pirzada (from Daily Times) said that he had seen some nearby. After the policemen had left, the activists came up to the reporter, dragged him by the hair and took him aside. They then proceeded to threaten him with dire consequences if he said anything the next time the policemen came around" (Urooj Zia, Daily Times, May 14). But the affiliation of these gangs was visible in the live coverage provided by several private television channels, which showed plainclothes men brandishing weapons on the deserted roads, using government tankers as cover, exchanging gunfire with unseen opponents, the tri-colour MQM flag visible on their motorcycles. After Aaj TV's continuous live coverage of such scenes, armed men attacked the television station, firing at it for several hours. Instead of stopping the coverage, Aaj showed live footage of reporters ducking behind a desk, shots being fired at their office, as anchor Talat Hussain provided an account of the situation on the phone. Reporters in the area asked the Rangers posted nearby to help the Aaj workers trapped inside their building. The answer: "We're helpless. We can't do anything unless we have orders from above." Aaj TV's refusal to suspend its live coverage emboldened the new breed of 'citizen journalists'. "My faith in independent media was restored and I was confident that I am not alone," wrote one blogger. He had hesitated to post out the testimony of a doctor at a Karachi hospital who witnessed armed political workers turn up to finish off an injured political worker. Encouraged by the Aaj re-broadcasting of images that clearly showed the involvement of MQM workers in the violence, he published the testimony with a disclaimer that "it was an anonymously posted comment and could be entirely false, you be a judge for yourself." There is a story behind each of those who were killed, some belonging to one or other political party, and others just because they were there. Masked men stopped ambulances and sprayed them with bullets, killing an Edhi Ambulance driver, Faizur Rahman Khan, 65, when he refused to throw out a wounded person he was transporting to hospital from near the airport; the wounded man was also shot again. Armed gangs herded passers-by into an alley and shot dead a young overlock machine operator along with another man, in front of two colleagues who were also shot but survived to tell the tale ("They shot us one by one..." by Munawar Pirzada, Daily Times, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\05\14\story_14-5-2007_pg12_3). There have been reports about an SHO who guided a procession into an ambush and a pregnant woman who had to deliver her baby in the car when armed men refused to let her proceed to the hospital with her husband. The Pakistan Press Foundation (PPF) reports that several journalists were manhandled and nine wounded. Some TV cameramen were beaten and their cameras snatched or damaged. In all these stories of horror, there is at least one amusing aside: the stranded reporter Uzi had the thrill of getting to ride a motorbike when her editors sent a senior reporter to pick her up. "You couldn't use a car etc, because on a bike your press card was visible, and that was a kind of immunity. In a car or a van, they'd shoot at you on sight. So yeah, I got to ride pillion on a bike, and I didn't sit sideways either, like women usually do here. :D I sat like guys usually do -- 'handsfree mode'. :D Initially I was scared shitless, but then I got used to it, and it was AWESOME -- like flying! MQM-waalahs on the way kept turning and staring at the weird Chick who was riding pillion like guys do and didn't have to hold on to anything to maintain her balance. :D AWESOME, it was! I want a bike now! :P" Karachi educationist, Anwar Abbas, later emailed: "My son-in-law and daughter who live in a building adjoining Baloch colony flyover had a good look at the 'thugs' in action from their rooftop. Their only regret is that they did not have a camera to capture the ghastly scenes." They returned to their flat because their little daughter was alone with the maid and because the thugs had also climbed the roofs of adjoining buildings in order to obtain an aerial view of their targets and shoot at random. He added: "It is not important which group they belonged to; it is important that they could behave the way they did in complete disregard to the rule of law; if indeed the law was awake or not in collusion with the 'thugs'." Many others, including Aaj TV's Talat Hussain and MQM's Dr. Farooq Sattar have also suggested that the 'blame game' be avoided. But a lawyer friend, 'angry and distressed in Karachi', argues that "If we avoid 'name calling' and 'finger pointing', we will simply be brushing the events of last Saturday under the carpet of indifference. Here in Karachi, we avoid 'name calling' and 'finger pointing' due to fear of having our knees drilled. Even Urdu speaking lawyers, while talking of last Saturday's events at the Sindh High Court look over their shoulders and speak in hushed tones when mentioning the name of MQM... "As we try to understand the carnage of 12th May, we have to ask the following question: Which political group stands to lose the most in a Musharraf ouster? Not the PML (Q). The Chaudhrys and their ilk will merely disperse and filter back into the PML (N) or the PPP. The unprecedented power and privilege of the MQM however is firmly tied with Musharraf's hold in Islamabad. It was the threat to their benefactor from the supporters of the Chief Justice, which unleashed the gunmen on 12th May." Zaffar Abbas is correct when he writes that Karachi was only at peace for the past many years because it suited its militants ('Back to the future?' Dawn, May 14, 2007)... "'Finger pointing' is necessary, because throughout our history, instead of a catharsis, we simply go through a 'jo ho gaya ab bhool jaao, aagay daikho' (forget what has happened) attitude. Already, with the President's pat on the back at the emergency meeting of the ruling party in Islamabad (on Monday) the MQM is back on the front foot... "Although it is unlikely that the perpetrators of Saturday's violence will ever be brought to justice, at least they should continue to be exposed before the entire country. More importantly, they should face the consequence of such exposure. Public image is very important to the MQM and the national outrage at their conduct may be the best prospect of compelling them to change their ways."
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