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Learning the
blues
As the new government's financial
managers struggle to prepare the budget for fiscal 2008-09, they are
likely to discover that there is no direct relationship between the
quality of a budgetary programme and its cost
By Kaleem Omar
The tables are empty,
The dance floor's deserted.
You play the same love song;
It's the tenth time you've heard it.
That's the beginning,
Just one of the clues,
You've had your first lesson
In
learning the blues.
-- Lyrics of a song sung by Frank Sinatra
Sinatra recorded this number back in the mid-1950s.
That era was known in some parts of the world as the "Fabulous
Fifties". In Pakistan, however, we had budget deficits even back then
– and we've still got budget deficits, of course. The only difference is
that the deficits have grown bigger and bigger with each passing year. The
forthcoming budget for fiscal 2008-09 is likely to see the deficit hitting
an all-time high. Replace the line "learning the blues" by the
line "learning the pre-budget blues" in the Sinatra song and you
could use the lyrics as a metaphor for the dilemma currently faced by our
budget-makers.
All the economic macro-indicators seem to have gone
from bad to worse in recent weeks. Last week, oil prices hit a record $135
a barrel. That's 35 per cent more than the price at the start of calendar
2008 and double the price of a year ago. Oil prices have quadrupled over
the last five years. If this rate of increase continues, prices could hit
$150 a barrel within the next few months and $200 a barrel by 2012, with
disastrous consequences for Pakistan's ever-widening trade gap. This, in
turn, would put more pressure on the country's balance of payments and
further erode foreign exchange reserves.
Pakistan has already spent $11 billion on importing
oil in the first ten months of the current fiscal year. By the end of
fiscal 2007-08 on June 30, the total annual oil import bill could be as
high as $13.3 billion – equivalent to 78.23 per cent of the country's
total current annual exports. At $150 a barrel, the annual import bill
would amount to $14.77 billion, assuming that there is no increase in the
present level of demand. At $200 a barrel, the annual import bill would be
$19.70 billion – a figure higher than Pakistan's total current exports.
So where would we find the foreign exchange for all the country's other
imports?
U sing the country's current foreign reserves of
$12.207 billion (reserves of $9.48 billion held by the State Bank as on
May 10, 2008 plus reserves of $2.359 billion held by commercial banks) to
finance imports would eat up the reserves in a year, leaving the country
bankrupt on the foreign exchange account. The only other option would be
to finance imports through foreign loans. But where are we going to get
foreign loans of over $19 billion a year, given the fact that foreign loan
inflows to the country have never totaled more than $5 billion in the
past?
That's just one of the problems that budget-makers and
the country's other economic managers are going to have to address if they
want GDP growth to continue and foreign exchange reserves not to be wiped
out. This is no theoretical scenario but a very real possibility staring
the country in the face. After all, it was only a few years ago that our
foreign exchange reserves were only a few hundred million dollars –
barely enough for two weeks worth of imports.
The only positive offsetting factor in the balance of
payments position has been a 19.53 per cent rise in remittances from
overseas Pakistanis. In the first ten months of the current fiscal year,
remittances rose to $5.319 billion from $4.450 billion in the same period
last year. This, coupled with foreign aid inflows of about $5 billion
during the current fiscal year, has eased pressure on the balance of
payments to some extent.
In this context, however, it needs to be remembered
that most of the aid inflows are in the form of loans that have to be
serviced and repaid and thus cannot be lumped under the heading of
"external resources" as budget-makers tend to do, year after
year. Loans are not "resources"; they are debts that have to be
repaid.
Moreover, the rise in remittances is not because of
government policies but is the result of many overseas Pakistanis living
in the United States not wanting to keep their savings in that country in
the years since the events of 9/11, out of fear that the US banking
authorities could freeze such funds at any time.
Furthermore, Pakistan cannot bank on aid and
remittance inflows continuing at their present rate, since the government
has no control over the quantum of such inflows continuing at their
present level. Such inflows can go down at any time due to a host of
external factors, including the uncertain political situation in the
country.
On May 15, international credit rating agency Standard
& Poor's (S&P) cut Pakistan's sovereign rating to 'B' from 'B +
and its long-term local currency rating from "BB' to "BB –',
citing pressure from expanding budget and trade deficits against a
volatile political setting. On Friday, May 23, international credit rating
agency Moody's followed suit for similar reasons, including deteriorating
fundamentals and policy paralysis in Pakistan's economy.
These cuts in sovereign ratings are going to make it
harder for Pakistan to raise money from the international bond market.
Pakistan last ventured into the international debt market in 2007.
Political turmoil, including the lawyers' movement triggered by the
judges' issue, has already forced the country to put plans for another
sovereign bond issue this year on the backburner. "The outlook is
negative," S&P said in a statement.
Moreover, these cuts in sovereign ratings may force
the government to consider asking the multilateral donor agencies such as
the International Monetary Fund for more funding, including budget
support, since raising money from international and domestic markets is
going to be a lot more expensive. Requesting the IMF for funds is certain
to revive the conditionalities imposed by the agency on Pakistan in the
past, putting the country's economy into a straitjacket.
One element of any such straitjacket is likely to be
pressure from the IMF to do away with subsidies, especially to the
agricultural sector, and increase electricity and gas tariffs. This would
make Pakistan's electricity prices, already the highest in the world, even
more expensive, which, in turn, would increase manufacturing costs and
make the country's goods less competitive in export markets.
The resulting decline in foreign exchange earnings
would further increase the country's ever-widening trade gap, which,
fueled by soaring imported oil prices and stagnant levels of exports, is
currently running at about $1.6 billion a month, or $19 billion a year on
an annualised basis.
Faced with the worst inflation since the 1970s, the
State Bank of Pakistan raised interest rates on May 22, sending the
benchmark KSE-100 share index crashing down from the recent highs by
625.26 points, or 4.52 per cent, on May 23, wiping out Rs 187 billion of
market capitalisation in panic-selling triggered by a 1.5 hike in the
discount rate to 12 per cent, which obviously will make borrowing more
expensive.
To make matters worse, the State Bank last week
imposed a 35 per cent margin on the opening of letters of credit for
imports. Previously, there was no such mandatory requirement and banks
were free to open LCs even on zero margins depending on their own
assessment of their clients' credit-worthiness. The imposition of a
mandatory margin of 35 per cent is going to hit industry badly, especially
factories that depend on imported raw materials.
Having to pay such a high margin is going to impose a
severe strain on these factories working capital, forcing them to cutback
sharply on their quantum of imports. Since many such factories use
imported raw materials to manufacture goods for export, any drop in their
production is bound to reduce the quantity of goods they can make for
export, with a consequent drop in foreign exchange earnings. This, in
turn, will further widen the country's trade gap and put even greater
pressure on the balance of payments.
Business community leaders have criticised the
measures taken by the State Bank under the pretext of curbing inflation.
They said these measures would hurt businesses that are already under
severe pressure owing to the high cost of doing business and tough global
competition.
However, 38 products have been exempted from the 35
per cent LC-margin requirement, including food items, petroleum products
and machinery used in industry and agriculture. Most of these items,
however, do not contribute significantly to exports. Also, this list of
excluded products is likely to open the door to more corruption, since it
will give the concerned government officials discretionary powers to
include or exclude particular products from the list.
As if all this were not bad enough, there is also a
view that the State Bank's effort to curb inflation through higher
interest rates is likely to fail, just like previous such attempts,
because inflation in the country in recent years has been caused mainly by
soaring imported oil prices which, of course, are not affected by
increases in interest rates.
Credit disbursement to the industrial sector is
already on the decline. Many industrial units are under immense financial
pressure and are finding it increasingly difficult to stay afloat. The
State Bank's policy of keeping interest rates high in order to curb
inflation has slowed down industrial growth, which, in turn, has adversely
affected exports and foreign exchange earnings.
Import costs have also risen due to the fall in the
value of the rupee against the dollar, which is currently trading at over
70 rupees to the dollar. According to some analysts, the cost of imports
has risen by 10 to 12 per cent in recent months due to the fall in the
value of the rupee.
Given all this, the lyrics of the song "Learning
the Blues" seem particularly apt. I wonder whether officials in the
Ministry of Finance know the song. If they don't, I'd be happy to provide
them with the full text of the lyrics.
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