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analysis Newswatch terror Running
in the dark Hoping
against hope migration Need
of the hour firstperson Always
on the cards
By Aasim
Sajjad Akhtar Notwithstanding
Asif Zardari's insistence that the lawyer-led street movement played no
part in This is an important debate, especially in light of the complications and intrigue that have coloured the post-election period. It is important to bear in mind that even though the debate over transformation and transition is often posited in terms that makes the two appear as conflicting objectives, it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that attempts to transform ultimately aid the process of transition. Put in context: the street movement that has invoked increasingly radical slogans has directly facilitated the ongoing transition from unbridled military rule to some kind of quasi-democratic dispensation. Of course, it is those in favour of transformation that are increasingly skeptical about the events that are currently unfolding in Islamabad. Simply put, the transformationists suggest that the entire political system, and the state structure in particular, is obsolete and requires a radical make-over. In this calculus, the biggest impediment to change is the military given that it is the single most entrenched player in the existing political order. Thus, transformation entails directly confronting the military, and eventually banishing it completely from politics and confining it to a position of subservience to civilian authority. On the other hand, the
transitionists may or may not concede that the existing political system
is At some level, this can be thought of as a question of pragmatism versus idealism. In this age-old binary, the trade-offs are clear. In the name of pragmatism, there is all too often a tendency to reproduce status quo; whereas idealism in its most extreme form is also likely to produce no change, because there is no attempt to identify practicable means. Accordingly, it is important to evolve a healthy mix of idealism and pragmatism. In Pakistan's 60-year history, there has only ever been one conjuncture -- aside from the current one -- in which it was possible to conceive of a major shift in the balance of power away from the military-bureaucratic complex towards the people, namely the period starting from the popular movement of the 1968-69 and ending with the overthrow of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. At that point too, the impetus was provided by a mass agitation that demanded structural transformation, and the end result was an elected government that settled for a transitional approach. Bhutto's personal assistant Rafi Raza has said that the first elected prime minister of the country was ultimately resigned to the fact that the military was a permanent political player, and it was pointless to try and change this reality. Of course, Bhutto went further than any politician before or after him in attempting to reconfigure the system in favour of the people (notwithstanding his many, many digressions). However, his ultimate willingness to not only accord the military centrality in decision-making affairs but, worse still, to invoke it to suppress political dissent ultimately cost him his job and his life. In many ways then, Bhutto's refusal to put the military in its place once and for all was a major historical blunder. His belief that the military was a reality in Pakistani politics became a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is difficult to understand those who continue to claim that the fate of Pakistan's people can be meaningfully changed without a fundamental shift in the exercise of power away from the military. The argument usually centres on the proposition that times have changed and the military now recognises the limits placed on its political ambitions by the Pakistani people as well as international norms. But how does one reconcile this claim with the clear evidence to the contrary? To a large extent, this is a question about the basic vision of the post-colonial nation-building project. In typically colonial fashion, the military believes firmly that it has a paternalistic role to play in shaping Pakistan's physiological and intellectual growth. It invokes the need to ensure 'national security' and promote 'development' as a means of justifying its role. If transition does not alter this larger-than-life role in which colonial attitudes are deeply imbricated, then are we not settling for mediocrity? If the tilt towards transition is simply a function of a lack of choice, then rather than settling for mediocrity, new political alternatives need to be fashioned. To be sure, transformation does not have to mean storming the Bastille and inciting bloody war. As one after the other Latin American country is demonstrating, or as the Nepali Maoists have shown very recently, transformation can be effected through popular power as expressed on the street as well as through the ballot box. But transformation there must not be seen as a way ahead for us, because the empirical evidence clearly indicates that transition does not work in Pakistan; a colonial-type state that never willingly accommodates demands for change. Accepting the military's predominant role and eschewing the politics of transformation will serve only to reinforce the mass of people's disillusionment with politics. On February 18 people voted for some kind of change, however vague. It is important not to deny them change in the name of pragmatism and a confrontation-less transition. Granted change will take time, but people are intelligent enough to be able to distinguish between negotiations for change and negotiations for a share in power.
Newswatch Indo-Pak talks are like two sides talking to a brick wall By
Kaleem Omar Nothing is likely to come out of the forthcoming talks in Islamabad on May 20-21 between Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmud Qureshi and Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir and their Indian counterparts, because nothing ever comes out of such talks, other than an agreement to hold more talks -- and sometimes not even that. Whether it is foreign minister-level, secretary-level or summit-level talks, India and Pakistan talking to each other is like each country talking to a brick wall. Each side puts forward the same arguments and counter-arguments, restates positions that have been stated countless times before, indulges in the same brand of stonewalling on the Kashmir issue (the main bone of contention between the two sides) and then goes home to tell its own media about how the other side's intransigence had resulted in disagreement yet again. It's a pattern we have seen so many times before that we know the script by heart. Back in the summer of 2001, for instance, two days after the acting Indian high commissioner in Islamabad delivered a formal invitation to the Pakistan Foreign Office for President Pervez Musharraf to visit India for talks with then-Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, I wrote in a column in 'The News' that nothing was likely to come out of the talks, because the positions of the two countries on Kashmir were so far apart that there was no middle ground on which they could both agree. So what happened some seven weeks later in Agra? Well, as the whole world knows, of course, nothing came out of those talks, though Musharraf scored some brownie points with the Indian media for his frank and articulate explanation of the Pakistani position to a group of senior Indian journalists at a breakfast meeting. A huge contingent of Pakistani journalists accompanied Musharraf to Agra to cover the talks, but I was not one of them. A few weeks after the talks broke down, a politician friend of mine asked me why I hadn't gone to Agra with the other journalists. I told him that I felt there had been no real need for me to make the trip, as I had written a column nearly two months earlier saying that nothing was likely to come out of the talks. Everyone is always wiser after the event. The trick, however, is to be wiser BEFORE the event. So let me say it again: nothing of substance is likely to come out of the forthcoming talks beginning day after tomorrow. Or take what happened in May 2003. On May 5 that year, then-Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan told reporters in Islamabad that India had given a "positive" reply to then-Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali's invitation to Vajpayee to visit Pakistan for talks. "We have received a response -- it is a positive response," he said, though he declined to give any details or any date for the talks. "Pakistan's position is that Pakistan is ready for composite talks, including on Kashmir," Aziz Khan said. He added that Pakistan would be prepared to give up its nuclear arsenal if India did so as well. "As far as Pakistan is concerned, if India is ready to denuclearise, we would be happy to denuclearise. But it will have to be mutual," he stressed. Over the years, however, India has repeatedly declared that is not going to denuclearise until all the big nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) also agree to completely dismantle their nuclear arsenals. Since there is next to no chance of that happening, at least not in the foreseeable future, there's very little chance of India denuclearising either. Given this fact, plus India's superiority in conventional weapons, Pakistan, too, is not going to denuclearise. So the two sides were at an impasse yet again, even before a date had been fixed for the 2003 talks. On May 3, 2003, then-Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri was quoted by the BBC Hindi service as supposedly saying that Pakistan was "willing to resume business ties" with India even before resolving the Kashmir dispute. But then-Foreign Office spokesman Aziz Khan said the very next day that Kasuri had been misquoted and reported out of context. Aziz Khan said Pakistan's policy was "quite clear and unambiguous in this regard." He said: "It has been reiterated that Pakistan desires a meaningful and result-oriented composite dialogue on all issues, including the core issue of Kashmir. There has been no change in this policy." Meanwhile, on May 3, 2003, then-Azad Jammu and Kashmir President Muhammad Anwar Khan said during an interactive session with trainees at the Information Services Academy that though Vajpayee's initiative on "restoring peace in the region" was welcome, there would be no breakthrough on the Kashmir issue. "We should remain firm on our just and principled stance on Kashmir, and should avoid considering other options regarding its solution," he added. Over in New Delhi, meanwhile, on May 2, 2003, Vajpayee told the Indian Parliament that "this round of talks will be decisive." "I am confident I will succeed," he added, though the reason for his optimism was less than clear. He also announced plans to send a new ambassador to Pakistan and resume air traffic links. While these were welcome moves, it should be remembered that it was India that first recalled its ambassador from Pakistan and broke off air links, following an attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. Pakistan only followed suit. And it was India, again, that first deployed hundreds of thousands of troops in forward positions along the India-Pakistan border, forcing Pakistan to respond with forward deployments of its own in self-defence. When India began to scale down its deployment in October 2002, Pakistan promptly did the same. So if there is a villain of the piece, it is India. Back in the early 1960s, there were several rounds of Kashmir talks between India and Pakistan. There was no television in the subcontinent in those days, but this was how American cinema's Movietone News reported the talks on one memorable occasion: "Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met again last week for another inconclusive round of Kashmir talks." Forty-five years later, the forthcoming talks are likely to be "inconclusive" too.
The silent victims By Javed Aziz Khan Education, especially that of girls, is under serious threat in the troubled zone of the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), as schools and colleges are being bombed and set ablaze on a regular basis. Scores of incidents of torching of female educational institutions were reported recently from different areas, thanks to the poor law and order situation after the re-emergence of militant organisations. As a natural consequence, the attendance has dropped in both schools and colleges across the province and Fata, the areas where female literacy rate is already among the lowest in the country. Though efforts are still
on to sign a peace agreement with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an A few days later, a bomb exploded in a girls' higher secondary school in Bannu city, located at three-hour drive from Peshawar. In yet another related incident, a government degree college for women was blown up with six bombs in Darra Adamkhel, a town located only 35-kilometre south of the provincial metropolis. Girls' schools in Darra Adamkhel also came under attack on March 28 in Germany Kelay, on March 16 in Akhurwal and on April 2 in Kuhiwal. All these villages are located near the gun-manufacturing town of Darra Adamkhel. This trend is not confined only to Darra Adamkhel, Bannu and Swat, but also exists in Bajaur, Khyber, Mohmand and Kurram agencies, as well as Buner and Dir Upper and Dir Lower districts, where parents have stopped sending their daughters to schools and colleges following threats. The female students in these areas have been directed to wear shuttle-cock burqas while attending schools and colleges. Schools in Matani and surrounding areas, located only 15-kilometre away from Peshawar, have received similar threats and many girls' schools in the area have also been bombed in the recent past, forcing the parents to stop sending their daughters for education. The fact that so far not even a single casualty has been reported in attacks on female educational institutions shows that the terrorists do not want to harm the students; they only want them not to attend schools and colleges without wearing burqas. Whatever the motives of the terrorists may be, the fact is that the situation has had a very negative effect on girls' education in the troubled zone of the NWFP and Fata. For instance, the attendance in both government and private schools and colleges has dropped to only a few per cent of the actual enrollment in these educational institutions. "Several primary and middle schools for girls in our area have been bombed by unidentified people in the recent past. Others have also received threatening letters and that is why I have stopped sending my daughter to school," Haji Inamullah, a resident of Matani, tells The News on Sunday. His daughter Amna was studying in the fifth grade in a government school, but she has dropped out of school since December. Inamullah informs that almost all his neighbours and relatives have also stopped sending their daughters to schools and colleges. "I continued to send my daughter to a nearby private girls' school even after other people stopped doing so, but the recent wave of attacks on female educational institutions has put me under so much pressure that I too have to follow suit," laments Zahoor Khan, a teacher by profession, who resides near the Arbab Tapu area of Matani. "It is a fact that terrorist attacks on girls' schools and colleges have reduced attendance in the affected as well as the surrounding areas. We have started talks with these elements and we pray that Allah almighty may soften their hearts, so that our daughters could go to schools and colleges without any fear," NWFP Minister for Education Sardar Hussain Babak hopes. He adds that the government is committed to restoring peace in the region and ensuring a conducive environment, in which the girls could go to schools and colleges without any fear or threat. It merits a mention here that the overall literacy rate in the NWFP, according to the 1998 census, is 37 per cent; while the same for Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab is 27, 46 and 47 per cent, respectively. The female literacy rate in the NWFP is 21 per cent; 43 per cent in the urban area and only 17 per cent in the rural areas. Gender-wise, the literacy rate among rural males in the NWFP is 48 per cent against only 17 per cent among rural females. The situation in Sindh, however, is even worse: the literacy rate among rural males is 39 per cent, while the same for rural females is 13 per cent. Going by these statistics, overall Punjab is the most literate province in Pakistan, while Balochistan is the worst literate. Punjab's urban literacy rate is 66 per cent; 73 per cent for males and 57 per cent for females. Most analysts believe that the conservative society in rural Sindh and the NWFP are the main reasons for the low literacy rate among females here. In addition, the militants are now playing havoc with the female literacy rate in the troubled zone of the NWFP and Fata. The ANP-PPP coalition government in the NWFP has recently made a breakthrough in talks with the militants by ensuring a cease-fire in Swat, the worst-affected town during the recent wave of terrorism. Talks are also under way in South and North Waziristan agencies as well as other trouble-hit areas, so that peace could be restored on a permanent basis in all parts of the NWFP and Fata. But terrorist activities are still taking place in Darra Adamkhel and adjacent areas, where the latest suicide attack took place on May 14. Attacks on girls' schools in these areas have more or less continued in the past two weeks. Hope, however, is still high that committed efforts by the government would restore peace in the troubled region, and provide a safer environment to the girls to attend their schools and colleges without any fear or threat. caption Isn't getting education their right too?
Running
in the dark By Dr
Zaeemul Haq Pakistan had a
slightly different flavour of the Mothers' Day this year, thanks to some
projects It ensures that women who work outside their homes are mentally, physically and financially supported during the process of motherhood, and not penalised or discriminated against on the pretext of not being able to perform their job duties while going through this biological process. Maternity protection includes right to have paid leave without losing the job, access to proper health care both for the mother and the baby, and right to breastfeed and care for a child while working. Ensuring these rights has gained importance in the wake of growing societal changes that have been occurring in Pakistan like elsewhere. is a poor country of 160 million, almost half of them being girls and women. The growing poverty in the country, coupled with modernisation and migration to urban areas, has brought about significant changes in the life of its people in the last two to three decades. A society that considered earning the livelihood as the main responsibility of its men gradually started accepting the contribution of women towards this need. Today, in order to increase the chances of survival and to improve the quality of life of their families, more and more women are working outside their homes. The growing financial demands have brought women not only to comfortable and well-maintained offices, educational institutions, hospitals, banks, and factories, but also to the bumpy streets, bazaars and field areas. While these brave women share the financial burden, their biological workload of child-bearing cannot be shared by men. Added to this is the increasing number of nuclear families, as couples break away from extended family and move towards larger cities for the greener pastures. Thus the huge assistance in child-rearing provided by members of the extended family is also lost. These working women, therefore, need to be especially supported during the maternity period. They should be provided with means of physical well-being, mental peace and financial assistance, all served as their basic right. Ensuring complete delivery of this right is also essential to the well-being of the newborn, who requires the care and warmth that only his or her mother could provide. It requires exclusive breastfeeding for six months, which brings the best nutrition and protective substances, making the baby healthy and intelligent. It also requires bonding and attachment, which can develop only when the mother spends time with the baby during the early months of his or her life. Provisions exist under the current Pakistani laws that enable women to work and earn their livelihood, as well as avail their right to maternity protection. The Constitution of Pakistan directs the state to ensure "maternity benefits for women in employment". Laws exists for implementing this important directive. Under the Civil Servants Rules, maternity leave is admissible to a female civil servant on full pay for up to three months, outside the leave account. The West Pakistan Maternity Benefit Ordinance 1958 prohibits the work of women in factories during the six weeks following the day on which the women delivered a child. It provides that women employed in an establishment, whether industrial, commercial or otherwise, shall be entitled to, and their employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at the rate of her wages last paid. Under this law, no notice of dismissal can be given to a woman if she does not attend to her job in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance. Violation of the law is made punishable with fine. Procedures have been framed for carrying out the purposes of this ordinance. Of course, there are some lacunae in these laws and they need to be amended. Some of the commitments made by Pakistani representatives on the international forums are yet to be fulfilled. Despite being a signatory, the country has not revised its maternity laws in the light of relevant international conventions, like CEDAW and ILO 183. Apart from the duration of leave, the conventions ask the government to ensure mechanisms to offer financial facilitation to the women. Another significant weak area that has detrimental effects on the newborn is the lack of provision of nursing breaks or day-care facilities to the working women. More important than revision is the implementation of current laws in true letter and spirit. A law, if not enforced, is meaningless. For the enforcement of a law, the government needs to ensure strong implementation mechanisms. It also needs to communicate these laws to the people, so that they could enjoy the benefits provided to them. Today, most of the working women in our country are not benefitting from provisions under the maternity laws. They have to be present on their jobs till late in pregnancy and are expected to return as soon as possible after the delivery. They are not allowed to bring their babies to the workplace nor are they through with nursing breaks or day-care centres. This leads to dissatisfaction and quick change of jobs on the part of employee women. The children of these women also suffer from various diseases, more than those whose mothers stay at home to breastfeed and take care of them. An important reason why these women and their infants are deprived of their right is their ignorance of the legal recourse available to them. Most of the working women do not know that they are entitled to a 12-week maternity leave with full pay out of which six weeks should precede childbirth. In a recent research, conducted in a metropolitan city by a rights-based organisation, the respondent working mothers admitted that they did not know about the details of provisions available to them under the laws. They also informed that no such policy or regulations existed at their organisations. A significant number informed that they were allowed to go on paid leave during the maternity period, but the duration of leave and the amount of payment was variable. It appeared from the responses that those who were being allowed to avail paid leave had the impression as if it was a favour, not their right. Majority of these women, who were ignorant of their full maternity rights, were holder of at least bachelor's degree and worked in formal job settings, like schools, hospitals, banks and private companies. It can be concluded that the sate of maternity protection is poor and a basic reason of this dismal situation is women's ignorance of their right. Rights have to be demanded and knowledge of these rights is a prerequisite for making this demand. At the same time, the issue is pivotal for country's development and denial of this right cannot be justified on the premise that demand is not there. Different components of the society should realise their responsibility towards it. The state and its various functionaries, and employers of all sectors, should realise that ensuring this right is important. But to provide a steering wheel to the process, the government needs to come forward before anybody else. The laws should be amended, and rules and regulations should be formulated and made known to all. The media and civil society should realise the importance of this issue and lobby to put pressure on the government. Most important, the women themselves -- both as individuals and groups -- need to know about this right. (The writer works with Johns Hopkins University Center for Communication Programs. Email: drzaeem@hotmail.com) caption Maternity rights remain an elusive dream for women.
By Aimal Khan The NWFP government
has signed a temporary truce with the militants in Swat and attempts are The TPP is active in South and North Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies, Darra Adamkhel, and other tribal areas, besides some districts of the NWFP. Mulla Fazalullah is again on air daily on his notorious illegal FM radio in Swat and the militants have started issuing warning letters asking the people in threatening tone to follow and abide by their extremist version of Islam. To appease the militants, the NWFP government is poised to introduce Sharia regulations in the Malakand division, the third attempt of this kind since the emergence of the Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in 1994. Unfortunately, peace initiatives are dictated mainly by the 'strategic' concerns of the government, rather than the 'human' ones. As a result, it seems that the authorities are more interested in checking the attacks on security forces and government installations, rather than lessening hardships of the common people living in the conflict zone. By compromising on fundamental rights for political expediency, the government has left the common people at the mercy of the militants, who are always looking for an opportunity to impose their brand of Islam on others. The piecemeal approach adopted by the government and other channels involved in peace talks with the militants may be well thought out and coordinated, but in practice such approaches do not bring long-term results due to various limitations. In addition, sustainable peace is not possible in the region unless the country's Afghan as well as Indian policy is brought under the civilian domain. A section of the Pakistani establishment still fears that peace and stability in Afghanistan will end Pakistan's strategic influence in the war-affected country, and is, therefore, unwilling to disengage with the Afghan Taliban. Since launching military operations in the tribal areas, the government has negotiated several peace deals with the militants for bringing peace to the region, as well as for correcting its strategic errors of the past. These deals, however, have so far failed to check violence; stop cross-border terrorism; expel foreign terrorists from the Pakistani territory; and, more importantly, improve the law and order situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) and adjoining areas. In April 2003, the Pakistan Army started hunt operations in the socio-culturally backward tribal areas, where the pro-Taliban sentiments were and still very strong. The situation worsened due to the army's deployment and military operations, which showed no respect for local sensitivities and traditions. The situation in the tribal areas and some parts of the NWFP cannot be seen in isolation, as it is inter-linked with the global 'war on terror'. Being one of the hottest sectors in this war, several local and non-local state and non-state actors have got entrenched against each other on the Pakistani soil. To counter militancy, billions of dollars were poured in by the United States, but all in vain. In all, Pakistan received $ 10.56 billion from the US for military, economic and development activities from 2002 to 2007. Of this, only $ 5.8 billion were directed towards combatting terrorism in Fata and regions bordering Afghanistan. About 96 per cent of this funding to Fata and regions Afghanistan was spent on military efforts, and only one per cent on developmental assistance. The US has always remained critical of peace agreements between the Pakistani government and the militants. It keeps on pressurising Pakistan to continue fighting against the terrorists and not to disrupt the military operations aimed at destroying their safe havens. It also maintains that violence did not decrease in Afghanistan after such peace agreements; on the contrary, it increased. Striking public or secret deals with the militants are part of a government's exit strategy. Considering the fate of previous such agreements, one cannot attach high hopes with the proposed peace deal. The government can sign a deal with the militants, but its implementation and sustainability will be a big challenge. Some of the stated reasons for entering into such deals are to neutralise the local militants; to register foreign militants and subsequently ensure either their expulsion or isolation; to check attacks on government installations and personnel; and to create an enabling environment for political, economic and developmental activities to take off in the tribal areas. Such deals usually have two components: public and secret. More often than not, the secret commitments are in direct contradiction to the public ones. It will be naive to think that after the signing of any peace deal with the government, the militants will agree to expel foreign militants or stop cross-border attacks or scrap their parallel administrative structures. Keeping in mind the track record of such peace deals, the government always plays on a weak wicket while the militants gain a lot by securing the release of their prisoners, getting compensation for their material and human losses, and the freedom to run parallel administration. The government also often faces strong criticism from the US and its allies for making deals with its arch-enemies. Why the authorities need to strike deal with nearly the same elements time and again? Whether the government lacks a strategic vision or capitulates to the external pressure or appeases the militants, the deals so far have failed to check the spectre of militancy. A successful peace deal must ensure peace in the tribal area, decrease in the cross-border illegal movement, neutralise foreign militants in the tribal areas, establish the rule of law, ensure and protect citizens' fundamental rights, and scrap parallel administrative structures run by the militants. (The writer is a political observer and works with Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad.) By Atle Hetland The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in millions of people leaving the country.
Most of them remain displaced to this day, though many have also returned
to their homeland -- first in the early 1990s after the Russian
withdrawal; then after the Taliban came in power; and, more recently,
after the US-led invasion of the country. Most refugees were forced into
exile in the neighbouring The latest return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran began after March 2002, leading to what has become the biggest United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)-assisted voluntary repatriation programme in the history. More than four-and-a-half million Afghan refugees have already returned to their homeland under the programme, many to their home districts while others to major cities like Kabul. However, most of the repatriated Afghans are living in poor conditions without any basic facilities and income. Though refugee camps in their host countries were not luxurious, they may be better than many urban slums, mountain dwellings or villages in Afghanistan. Scarcity of productive land remains a major problem and so is gainful employment. Until now, more than one million Afghan refugees have returned to their homeland from Iran and about three-and-a-half million from Pakistan. While some have gone into exile again, most have remained at home despite the many day-to-day problems. In some cases, the men have returned permanently or temporarily to Afghanistan for work, while their families continue to stay in Pakistan for education, and safer and better living conditions. In some cases, the men have returned to Afghanistan to claim land or other property, which may have been taken over by neighbours or others. Legal papers may have been lost, as is common in war / post-war situations, and it may be difficult to solve land disputes. According to official figures, currently there are about one million registered Afghan refugees in Iran, while the number of unregistered ones in the country is estimated to be one-and-a-half million. Similarly, according to official figures, there are more than two million registered Afghans refugees in Pakistan, while the number of unregistered ones is estimated to be more than one million. With the help of the UNHCR, Pakistan conducted a census of Afghans living in the country in 2005, and a large-scale registration of Afghans living in the country in 2006-2007. Though the registration exercise managed to capture most Afghans, some fell through the net, because they did not want to be registered or because they could not register for practical or other reasons. Currently, less than one million registered Afghan refugees live in camps in Pakistan. Out of these, most are based near Peshawar or elsewhere in the NWFP, followed by Balochistan (near Quetta city) and Mianwali in Punjab. Many refugees and other Afghans live in urban areas in refugee-hosting cities, such as Karachi, or in smaller towns and villages. Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi still have particularly high numbers of urban refugees. The majority of the refugees always live in urban (non-camp) areas. It was only after 9/11 that Pakistan released official data, indicating that the number of Afghan refugees in the country was about 3.3 million. However, then-Labour Minister admitted that the aforementioned figure was far too low. According to most experts, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is at least between five and seven million. They also include some non-refugees or what are now termed 'mixed migrants' -- people whose de facto status may change over time or people who may have gone into exile for multiple reasons, such as education of their children. Some Afghans may stay in exile longer than 'absolutely necessary' to avoid extreme poverty and other hardships at home, including lack of quality education and health services. Whether these reasons should qualify for refugee status is questionable. In any case, it is a fact that individuals' and families' own assessment of their situation leads to their displacement and forced migration. Both Pakistan and Iran encourage the Afghan refugees to return to their home country, in conjunction with the UNHCR. On the other hand, the refugee host country (and the home country) may implement themselves more direct actions leading to repatriation. In addition, at the time of arrival of refugees, the intended host country can restrict their access and even send them back. In certain crises, the nearest host countries may be reluctant to open their borders and allow large influxes of refugees. Similarly, in last winter, Iran expelled undocumented Afghans in the midst of harsh weather; and Afghanistan was unable to cater to them upon their return home, leading to a crisis-like situation between the two countries. Pakistan has developed plans for gradual closure of refugee camps, as the voluntary repatriation continues. Those Afghans who received the Proof of Registration Card (in 2006-2007) can stay in Pakistan for up to three years (until the end of 2009), but the card does not automatically give an employment permit. It is estimated that a large number of Afghans did not register and they would be considered among undocumented Afghans living in Pakistan. Some of them may be refugees, others not ñ as many Afghans regularly travel back and forth between the two countries. The UNHCR plans to under take an exercise that will help determine the number of genuine Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Furthermore, it wants to identify where the different categories of refugees are located and what kind of assistance they need. The number of genuine refugees is expected to be a fraction of the total number. In informal discussions, UNHCR staff members suggest that possibly only 20 per cent of the current Afghan refugees in Pakistan are genuine refugees, thus being entitled to assistance provided by the global refugee agency. Some observers, especially those who are more principled as regards humanitarian aid and human rights issues, have questioned the UNHCR-assisted voluntary repatriation programme, claiming that it has been too massive and that it poses, or might pose, a risk to Afghanistan's stability. They also argue that it is has been implemented in a haste. It may be added, though, that many Afghan refugees have also returned to their homeland without getting assistance from the UNHCR. Since most repatriated Afghan refugees were poorly prepared to their homeland, without any formal education or skills, it has been argued that the process of repatriation should have been much slower and better planned. Only future research will inform us in detail and allow us to evaluate what actually took place; what corrective measures may still be taken, and what lessons can be drawn from the exercise. The opposite perspective should also be borne in mind; notably the right to return -- refugees should be permitted to return, and assisted to do so, only when they themselves consider the situation in the home country to be such that they can return. Afghanistan wants the refugees to return home, and official statements are issued every now and then to that effect. On its part, Pakistan also issues official statements indicating that it wants the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland. The international community has a huge responsibility to ensure that the return of Afghan refugees takes place with dignity. At this stage in the sad Afghan refugee history, it is important to remember that many refugees are getting elderly, therefore their health may be weakening and they are likely to be in need of increased medical services -- wherever they may live, either in exile or at home. At the end of a refugee era, there are always three solutions to choose from: a) 'repatriation', which is usually the most preferred solution; b) 'resettlement' in a third country, which is only an option for a very limited number who for security reasons can not live in the first country of asylum and who cannot return home; and c) 'local integration'. For refugees in camps, such settlements can be converted into permanent ones, but it depends on a number of factors. Refugees can also move to the nearest city or another suitable location. Some can move to other cities, towns or elsewhere in the country, including to areas and programmes specifically designated for integrating refugees. As we discuss the complex solutions to the Afghan refugee problem, let us draw attention to a few broader aspects. First, is the situation really all that complex and is the number of refugees really all that large as compared with Pakistan's (and also Iran's) total population? The UNHCR's document, entitled The State of the World's Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium, shows that Pakistan, being one of the world's largest host countries with one of the highest numbers of refugees in absolute terms, had in 2004 six refugees per 1,000 inhabitants; while Norway has 9.5 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants. Added to this, the refugees in Pakistan are overwhelmingly from a neighbouring country; while the refugees in Norway, on the other hand, come from far away countries. From that perspective, Afghanistan, with assistance from donors, should set in motion pull factors to attract refugees to return, not only from neighbouring countries but also from overseas. However, to be realistic, the hundreds of thousands of Afghans in America and Europe, Australia, New Zealand and other industrialised countries are not likely to return. When Western countries allow refugees from Third World countries to enter their countries, and they are given refugee status, it is probably known that most of them will stay for good. However, in recent years, Western countries have become less positive about receiving refugees in general, including refugees for resettlement. The number of refugees receiving resettlement offers is lower now than before the 9/11. We have the right to demand a better refugee-handling regime in future; not a leaner and meaner regime. Unfortunately, there are some signs today pointing in the direction of less positive attitude towards refugees and other groups of migrants. Henceforth, there is a need for migration researchers, students and humanitarians of all persuasions to work for better treatment of refugees, returnees and internally-displaced people. Today, the world can afford to help all refugees, and there are plenty of organisations and people with experience and knowledge to do excellent work, once the right political decisions and allocations have been made. Most causes for refugee situations are to be found in international politics and the victims, the refugees, are mostly innocent. (The writer is an international refugee and development specialist. Email: atlehetland@yahoo.com)
Safe
drinking water remains an elusive dream throughout the country By Dr Noman Ahmed The country is in
the grip of water-borne diseases. As a result, hospitals in major cities
like Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad and Gujranwala, as well as smaller cities
in Interior Sindh, are grappling with intense loads of emergencies.
Currently, the management of water faces many serious challenges:
unavailability of adequate quantity for irrigation purposes, apportionment
disputes, decreasing levels of rivers during peak demand period,
fluctuating levels of dams and reservoirs, dubious feasibility studies of
announced dam projects, flood management, and inadequate human resource to
run day-to-day affairs, etc. The most serious challenge, however, is to
provide safe drinking It may be noted that drinking water accounts for only two per cent of the total water consumed in the country. Despite the preparation and launch of several policy documents, this issue continues to haunt the country, including the major cities. Karachi makes an important case study in this connection, because of its size and the peculiarity of its water supply problems. The situation of water supply, as well as its quality, is dismal in most unplanned (and even planned) settlements of the city. A test conducted in different city locations showed that 97 per cent samples of water were unfit for drinking. These samples required appropriate treatment. Due to more awareness about public health and better purchasing power, the middle- and upper-income groups either obtain bottled water or resort to filtration. The poor, on the other hand, neither possess awareness nor the means to make water safe for consumption, and ultimately bear the brunt. Conventionally, piped water supply is the usual mode through which households in both planned and unplanned localities access the facility. Baring a few very remote locations, the network of pipes exists in other parts of Karachi. This network has been laid down by multiple agencies through various formats. Poor quality of work, dubious area choices, lack of prevention from hazards such as adjoining sewers / drains, and inappropriate connections with secondary or main supply lines are common ailments. As a consequence, the water quality is severely affected by the mixing of impurities of lethal nature. Similarly, the underground piping system has well passed its designed life in the southern and central parts of the city. A sizable amount of water is lost due to seepage and leakage, as there is no concept of periodic maintenance. The use of sub-standard construction materials in repair work, uneven carpeting of roads and rampant increase in the number of connections also result in the loss of water. A few years ago, for instance, Orangi was inundated due to mass-scale leakages in the distribution lines. Water vending is a booming business in the city. What evolved as an emergency service by the Karachi Water Supply Board (KWSB) to serve its clientelle has become a full-fledged enterprise awaiting official recognition. According to the Karachi Water Tanker Association, more than 8.5 million gallon water is distributed through 50,000 tanker trips each day. Water deficient neighbourhoods, peripheral squatters, construction sites, industrial enterprises, temporary congregations and special locations such as sacrificial animal market are the routine clients. Water from vending is at least 23 times more expensive than piped water. Besides, the city has dozens of illegal bore-holes / hydrants that supply saline or brackish water for non-drinking purposes. Because of shortage, some people are forced to use this water for drinking as well. Water theft is an organised enterprise and has many types: puncturing main siphons in the eastern suburbs, illegal connections in the distribution lines, stealing from bulk consumer lines and using high-power suction devices, etc. A former managing director of the KWSB had admitted that 35 per cent water is lost due to leakage and theft during supply. There is no system or schedule to distribute water at the lane or sub-neighbourhood level. Usually the theft points are such locations that are physically invisible; thus, ditches, nullahs and other depression points constitute ideal choices. These spots are normally filled with dirt, thereby causing automatic injection of impurities into the water supply. Operation and maintenance of piped infrastructure is a major reason behind the loss of water quality. Infrastructural components are laid down in bits and pieces by different agencies. Whereas pipelines are laid down in various localities, they are not a guarantee to water supply. As a result, residents are forced to use illegal means. The use of suction pumps, in particular, is found to be an easy solution. Moreover, water mains are broken to obtain illegal connections, which affects the water pressure and hampers its appropriate supply. Substandard pipes and construction components are another reason for the operational water losses and decline in the quality of water. It has been found that the construction work is mostly executed through contractors, and monitoring and quality supervision in public works is often negligible. Besides, due to low rates of tenders, the contractors use sub-standard materials, resulting in instant decay of the system. Technical or performance audit, which is a usual norm of civil / construction works, is not conducted except for posh areas, such as Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Defence Society or Clifton. In addition, no routine is followed for the regular maintenance of the water supply infrastructure. Procedures and systems for this purpose have also not been defined. So, in effect, repair works are undertaken only during crisis situations. Water lines are usually laid in the same trenches from where the sewerage lines are either passing or are to be laid afterwards. Due to soil settlement, unequal pressure of fluids and damages due to movement of traffic or construction / excavation on the site or in a nearby location, the sewerage and drinking water lines are broken, leading to mixing of both the types. This also happens because water is either pumped by the authority or the suction pumps installed in various houses, which creates a greater thrust for drinking water to move. Many scientific choices are available for water quality management. Organisations like the International Water Association and the World Bank have developed performance indicator-based toolkits to monitor the characteristics of a supply system, including the quality of water. Obviously, in large cities such as Karachi, nature of pollutants varies. From faecal coliforms and other bacterial contaminants to chemical / industrial pollutants, the range is wide. A remedial, therefore, can only be worked out when the cause is specifically determined. It may be remembered that water supply is an extremely sensitive service.
firstperson By Zaman Khan The News on Sunday: What are your views about the new coalition government in Pakistan? Kuldip Nayar: I am very optimist, because whatever one may say, rigging in the recent general elections was minimal. Therefore, probably for the first time in Pakistan's history, genuinely elected people's representative have majority in the National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies. This is a very positive development and India was also hoping for the same. It is because of this reason that I am very optimist. TNS: Do you think it will have a positive impact on Indo-Pak relations? KN: Definitely. I
personally think India should have done more than it has actually done.
Had I been There, however, are two major limitations. One, the government of Manmohan Singh has only one year to go. Therefore, whatever the outcome of dialogue may be, it may not be acceptable to the next Indian government. I mean to say that even if Pakistan and India reach an agreement now, nothing concrete will come out of it because the latter right now is waiting for the next elections. Two, the Pakistani coalition government is unstable at the moment and no one is really sure about its future. My feeling, therefore, is that the composite dialogue will be just another exercise in futility and nothing else. TNS: How do you look at the Indian politics in the context of the next elections? Would the two-party system continue? KN: My feeling is that many parties, including both national and regional, will win seats in the next elections, but they will join hands soon thereafter to form government. TNS: Do you see emergence of a third mainstream party, like the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), after the next elections? KN: An alliance of the communist parties, who are basically all anti-BJP, is in the offing. Now there is need for understanding between Mulayum Singh Yadav and Lalu Parsad Yadav's parties. There are also other regional as well as leftist parties that are essentially non-BJP. If all of them can get together, they can have a majority in the Lok Sabha. TNS: Would you like to tell us about the new party, consisting of civil society organisations, that you are helping to form? KN: We are in fact meeting in Jaipur on July 12-13. All like-minded people whose approach is pluralistic have been invited to attend. We, however, do not want people like Lal Krishna Advani or Narendra Modi to be there. Secondly, the new party that we are thinking of forming will be anti-globalisation. We believe that human rights activists and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as followers of Gandhi and Jaiprakash Narain, need to get together. We think that globalisation has shackled India and the East India Company has come through the back door once again. Though India's growth is a high 10 per cent, disparities are increasing. According to a latest report, 20 per cent of India's population has no resources or income, while 70 per cent live on less than $ 20 a month. Gandhi and Nehru thought of some welfare state, still you find so much poverty and destitution in the country. We are hoping that this new party will be like the Green Party of Europe. We are all pro-environment, pro-poor, pro-minorities and pro-Dalits. TNS: Do you think you can sell this idea to the people of India? KN: We are not hoping that we will win many seats in the next elections. We think that even if succeed in winning 10 seats out of a total of 542, we would have a voice in the parliament. The proposed party is like a movement and we are hoping that many other movements, like that of workers, will join it in due course of time. Therefore, it will be combination of movements. TNS: Do Congress Party and the BJP have the same agenda? KN: Yes, they have a very similar agenda and the difference is only that of percentage. For instance, look at the Congress Party! Though it claims to be a secular party, we saw in Gujarat that all those who did not get BJP tickets joined it and got tickets. So what is the difference? Yesterday, a person was in the BJP and today he is in the Congress Party. I don't think that there is any difference between the two. TNS: Do you also plan to establish a museum on the subcontinent's partition? If yes, would you like to tell us more about it? KN: It is difficult to say who was more to blame for the tragic events of the partition -- Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs. In my view, there was no difference. All communities killed each other in the name of religion. I want that the coming generations remember these tragic events. My idea is that the proposed museum should rise above religion. I do not want to say so many Sikhs or Hindus or Muslims were killed. I only want to say look so many people were killed, though they were all neighbours and friends. TNS: Where do you plan to establish this museum? KN: In India, but it will be a joint venture. It will not be run by the government, but by the people, tough we may seek financial assistance from the governments of India and Pakistan. TNS: Is this idea practicable? KN: I have already talked to the chief minister of Punjab in this regard and he has agreed to donate a piece of land near the Wagha border for this purpose at the earliest. I am yet to talk to people in Pakistan about this idea, but I plan to discuss it with Asif Ali Zardari and Mian Nawaz Sharif during my next visit to Pakistan. I want this museum to be much better than those in Europe. I want some architect to think of an innovative design for it. TNS: How the idea of holding a Punjabi conference came to your mind? KN: According to a UNESCO study, some languages face extinction or near extinction 50 years from now. Unfortunately, Punjabi is also included among those languages. If we do not think about Punjabi now, it either will become extinct or will be near extinction after 50 years. Therefore, the conference was organised to emphasise that we must at least speak Punjabi, even if we cannot write it. TNS: Do you also advocate a free market between the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs? KN: I have a dream that one day this whole region, from Afghanistan to Myanmar (formerly Burma), will be a free market. Why can't the two Punjabs have a common market? If this experience works, it can set an example for other parts of the two countries also. TNS: What are your views on a free visa regime? KN: I believe in no visa. Just show your passport and enter Punjab. I am suggesting this initially for Punjab, because we Punjabis have a common language, history and habits. Therefore, I stress let us start from Punjab! TNS: Are you happy with the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan? KN: Yes, I am happy. TNS: What are your views about Sarbajit Singh's death sentence? KN: I am of the view that the death penalty should be abolished altogether. God has given us life and I personally think that man has no right to take it. TNS: Don't you think that India and Pakistan should have modalities for exchange of prisoners? KN: I think a committee comprising three retired judges each from the two countries should be formed, and those prisoners who have done their sentence should be released immediately. Veteran journalist and peace activist Kuldip Nayar is a household name on both sides of the Indo-Pak border. He was born at Sialkot on August 14, 1923, in a Sikh Khatri family. He had his early schooling at the Ganda Singh High School in Sialkot. After school, Kuldip Nayar studied at a number of institutions, including Murray College (Sialkot), FC College (Lahore), Law College (Lahore) and Medill School of Journalism (Evanston, Illinois, US). His degrees include BA (Hons), LLB, MSc (in Journalism) and PhD (in Philosophy). Kuldip Nayar has been many things in his life -- reporter, editor, detainee during the Indian Emergency (1975-77), high commissioner to Great Britain, peacenik, Rajya Sabha member -- but what he does best is to explore the Bysantine mase of Indian politics to provide amplification and clarity of events, issues and personalities. He served as India's high commissioner to the United Kingdom in 1990 and then a member of the country's delegation to the United Nations in 1996. He was appointed High Commissioner to Great Britain in 1990 and nominated to the upper house of Indian Parliament, Rajya Sabha, in August 1997. Since 1985, Kuldip Nayar has written a syndicated column that runs in 80 publications in 14 languages, both overseas and at home, including some of India's most influential newspapers and magazines. He was also the first India journalist to gain access to Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan. Kuldip Nayar is also the author of 11 books, including Between the Lines, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent, India after Nehru, Wall at Wagah: India-Pakistan Relationship, The Martyr and India House. Kuldip Nayar has now dedicated himself to the cause of peace. He is president of the HindDosti Manch, which besides organising other functions holds vigils on the Wagha border each year on August 14 and 15. The organisation recently invited about two dozens Pakistanis to Patiala University to participate in a Punjabi Conference. The News on Sunday interviewed Kuldip Nayar on the sidelines of the conference. Excerpts follow: caption Veteran journalist and peace activist Kuldip Nayar. Photos by the writer.
The
recent devaluation of the Pakistani rupee did not come as The myth about the strength of the Pakistani rupee was shattered last week, as the nation witnessed an unprecedented depreciation in the value of the local currency after four years of stability. The devaluation of the Pakistani rupee is being attributed to the heavy speculative buying of the US dollar, due mainly to an extraordinary surge in its demand. Senior bankers, however, contend that the devaluation of the Pakistani rupee was expected since much earlier, because of widening gap between the country's exports and imports, and the high inflation rate domestically. The political turmoil, in particular riots after the assassination of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Chairperson Benazir Bhutto, and the recent general elections are being cited as the main reasons for the depreciation in the value of the Pakistani rupee. The increasing oil prices in the international market, the country's widening trade gap and the high inflation rate domestically further speeded up the downward slide of the Pakistani rupee, whose value earlier perhaps was kept intact artificially. The country's burgeoning trade gap also put an additional burden on its foreign exchange reserves, which are gradually dwindling after touching record heights a couple of years ago. The unresolved judicial
and political crises, coupled with the ever-increasing prices of
commodities, In this scenario, the exporters are holding their remittances in anticipation of further appreciation of the US dollar, resulting in an increased demand for the currency. Pakistan's soaring import bill, due to oil payments and import of food items, including wheat, has further increased the demand for the US dollar. This situation has forced the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to intervene in the market, by pumping US dollars to save the value of the Pakistani rupee. The central bank convened an emergency meeting of leading foreign currency exchange companies, in a bid to halt further devaluation of the local currency and to take other necessary steps. Besides extending support to the Pakistani rupee, the SBP has also adopted other administrative / policy measures to restrict the free flow of US dollars from the country. For instance, it has asked the private sector foreign exchange companies to transfer foreign currency from their 'nostro' accounts held outside Pakistan to the commercial banks in the country, in addition to closing all 'nostro' accounts abroad. The central bank has also reminded these companies of their role in promoting home remittances; most of them were actually busy in transferring funds from Pakistan to abroad. Economic experts and senior bankers blame the SBP for the devaluation of the Pakistani rupee. They accuse the central bank of initially ignoring depreciation in the value of the local currency. "We are cooperating with the government, but the SBP has failed to control the Interbank exchange rate, which is fixed by the commercial banks," said Malik Bostan, president of the Forex Association of Pakistan. He, however, is optimistic that the Pakistani rupee will regain its lost value soon. According to Bostan, the exchange rate will return to its previous levels of Rs 62-64 to a US dollar by the end of the current financial year (June 30). He dispels the impression that the foreign exchange companies are manipulating the exchange rate. "We have ourselves suffered huge losses because of the devaluation of the Pakistani rupee," he reasons. Bostan, instead, blames the banks for the same. SBP Governor Dr Shamshad is also apparently unhappy with the banks. In a recent meeting with heads of leading commercial banks, she said she urged the banks to play a proactive role in killing negative sentiments in the market. Since the SBP has adopted a floating exchange rate regime, under which the demand and supply of foreign currency sets the market exchange rate, there is no direct control of the central bank over the exchange rate. However, by pumping US dollars in the market, it indirectly controls the exchange rate. "We have enhanced our vigilance of the Interbank and kerb markets. This vigilance is unearthing some issues that are being addressed. Had we not intervened effectively, the exchange rate would have been at a different level, but the current level does not reflect fundamentals either," Dr Shamshad said in a recent statement. In order to meet the growing demand for foreign currencies within Pakistan, the exchange companies have also been directed to surrender their surplus to the SBP. Earlier, exchange companies were exporting most of the foreign currency, except US dollars, abroad. Now, besides US dollars, they will not be able to export pound sterling, euro and UAE dirham. Senior bankers, however, doubt that the SBP will be able to continue its intervention in the market for a longer period, in view of the country's depleting foreign exchange reserves -- Pakistan's liquid foreign exchange reserves declined from $ 16.49 billion in October 2007 to $ 12.25 billion in May. Of this, $ 9.93 billion are held by the SBP, while the remaining $ 2.3 billion are with the banks. "The SBP should allow the local currency to devalue to the extent of Rs 72 to a US dollar. This will discourage the speculative buyers, as they would stop buying US dollars at such a high rate," views Dr Shahid Hasan Siddiqui, chairman of the Research Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance. Fortunately, he adds, the US dollar itself is devaluing in the international market; otherwise, the situation in Pakistan would have been even worse. According to Dr Siddiqui, the exporters are already earning at the rate of Rs 72 to a US dollar, in the form of various kinds of subsidies available to them. He adds that, because of the high inflation rate in the country, the benefits of the Pakistani rupee's devaluation will be minimal as far as the exports are concerned. Majyd Aziz, former president of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, predicts that the US dollar will soon cross Rs 70 in the open market. He also expects the country's trade deficit to grow further and cross $ 20 billion by the end of current financial year. The SBP governor, on the other hand, is optimistic that the situation will soon improve. According to her, the country will receive about $ 3 billion in a couple of months, which will help improve its foreign exchange position. Dr Siddiqui, however, says most of this money will have to be repaid, which would badly hit the next federal budget. In short, the devaluation of the local currency will not only increase Pakistan's import bill in rupee terms, but will also have a negative effect on the country's overall economy, with an increase in the already-high inflation rate. caption Not much to rejoice! For comments and feedback: Email: editorpe@gmail.com
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undermining military dictatorship and ushering in a semblance of
democracy, it is common knowledge that until March 2007, there was little
sign that the status quo in Islamabad was under threat. It is a measure of
the influence of the popular agitation that the most compelling debate
that has taken place in Pakistan's intellectual circles over the past year
or so has to with the competing merits of political strategies aimed at
transformation and transition. In other words only because of the
agitation has the question even arisen that there can exist in Pakistan,
in this day and age, a politics of transformation.
wracked by contradictions and is incapable of delivering a pro-people
dispensation. They simply emphasise the futility of trying to effect
transformation, because they believe that any attempt to evict the
military from its position of power will necessarily invite a reaction and
thus set the polity back. They, instead, argue in favour of democratic
forces' negotiating for an increased share of power.
umbrella organisation of the Pakistan-based militant groups, attacks on
girls' schools have shot up during the past few weeks. The first reported
incident in this month was the setting on fire of a government girls' high
school in Charbagh area of Swat Valley, where nine rooms and a veranda
were reduced to ashes. Another school was attacked during the same week in
Sher Palam, a village of the picturesque Swat valley that was once popular
as tourists' paradise.
working on maternal health. There was a mention of large number of women
dying during pregnancy and delivery, and how they could be saved. A very
important issue of how to support working mothers during maternity and
give them their right during this significant period, however, remained on
the sidelines. Maternity protection is the mechanism to ensure health and
well-being of women workers who are pregnant or have given birth, and that
of their baby.
under way to resume peace talks with the militants in tribal areas as
well. The fresh peace initiatives are yet to materialise, but the plight
of the common people is only worsening, as the militants are bent upon
pursuing their rigid agenda. After initial contacts between the government
and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organisation of
different militant groups, the extremists are once again out to enforce
their brand of Sharia on others.
countries of Pakistan and Iran, though Afghans are spread throughout the
world in more than 60 countries. The transnational character of
Afghanistan's migration pattern includes refugees, as well as other
voluntary and forced migrants, including trafficked and smuggled people.
Similarly, ages-old migration patterns, sometimes periodic or semi-nomadic
in nature, also exist to this day.
water to both urban and rural populations, as this is one of the basic
human rights also.
in power, I would have sent a goodwill mission to Pakistan as soon as the
election results were announced, to congratulate the people of the country
on having done something good. So, one can say that India has been slow.
Still, I am sure that the outcome will be positive. India's foreign
minister is visiting Pakistan next week and I also know that Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh is very keen to go there. Some kind of
rapprochement seems to be on the cards.
have created a catastrophic situation for the country, as a result of
which almost all economic indicators have suffered a serious setback. The
declining foreign direct investment (FDI) and the stalled privatisation
process have put additional pressures on the Pakistani rupee, which went
as low as 69.70/69.80 to a US dollar last week, the lowest ever in
history, on panic buying by importers and speculative currency investors.
The Pakistani rupee, however, gained slightly after touching the crest,
but the US dollar is still hovering around Rs 68-69. This week, it was
quoted at Rs 68.90/69.20 to a US dollar in the open market. The Interbank
rates were also the same.
