In whose interest?
The people of Sindh continue to suffer due to the lack of an institutionalised process for land disposal
By Dr Noman Ahmed
In Karachi and other urban locations, land grabbing has evolved as a firm enterprise. Quasi political groups and others disguised as such can be found flexing their muscles and displaying armed strength in this quest. Major corridors of movement -- such as Super Highway, National Highway, Karachi Northern Bypass and Lyari Expressway -- have become sites of this profane enterprise that is depriving the state and other legal owners of their assets. Many experts are of the view that the weakening of land control mechanisms from the legal and administrative respects has caused anarchy in this sector.

The latest orgy of violence in Karachi needs to be understood for what it is, because it provides perhaps the most poignant warning of the civil strife that is to come if things do not change, and quickly. Amazingly most accounts of what happened on April 29 and 30 are so vague as to be almost meaningless. The prototypical news report and editorial highlights 'ethnic' and 'communal' clashes without venturing anything about the historical-political context that have given rise to these clashes. In other words, it would appear as if Karachiites of different ethnicities suddenly decided to raise arms against one another.

Of course there is a long history to ethnic discord in Karachi that can be traced back to the early 1980s. It speaks volumes about the virtual monopoly power that the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has come to acquire in the city that no contemporary accounts of ethnic violence contain any mention of the MQM's exclusivist discourse and politics, which, in my view, is the primary reason for Karachi's perennially precarious ethnic situation.

The MQM is no ordinary phenomenon. Since 1992, its undisputed leader has been in self-imposed exile yet the organisation still manages to gather crowds in the hundreds of thousands to listen to Altaf Husain deliver his by now famous telephonic addresses. The MQM is a genuinely populist party, but one which at the same time employs coercive force freely to douse any challenges to its authority.

Ideologically the MQM is statist insofar as it claims that Urdu-speaking migrants are the bearers of the Pakistan idea, and that only they have the genuine right to rule this country given the sacrifices they made by leaving behind everything and migrating to the promised land. In some of the party's literature, the 1947 migrants are even compared to the Prophet and his companions in the course of their historic migration from Mecca to Medina.

The MQM emerged only after the relative privilege in political, economic and cultural realms enjoyed by the Urdu-speaking communities of urban Sindh began to be eroded. The Muhajir consciousness was triggered by the coming to power of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972, and the latter's decision to make Sindhi the official language of Sindh province. Sindhis were given access to the state unlike at any other time in Pakistan's history. Meanwhile, broader objective changes in the Pakistani society had resulted in massive migrations of Pakhtuns and Punjabis into Karachi from the late 1960s onwards, which meant increased competition between the new migrants and the well-entrenched Muhajir community in the city.

After Zia took power, sectarian and ethnic identities were given new impetus. It is naïve to dismiss the MQM purely as a creation of the intelligence agencies, because, as I have just noted, there were broader objective factors that piqued a sense of marginalisation within the Muhahir community. Nevertheless, it is true that the military regime benefited from the emergence of, and openly patronised, the MQM because the latter -- and many other organisations that operated along parochial lines -- helped displace the expansive politics of the 1960s and 1970s in which multi-ethnic trade and student unions predominated.

The rest is history. 20 years on, the MQM exercises definitive control over the city's political life. The Pakhtuns have always represented a threat to the MQM because of the former's domination of aspects of economic life, including transport. But in recent times the antagonism has become qualitatively more pronounced. It is a known fact that on May 12, 2007, MQM goons targeted any and every political community that it felt was challenging the government's authority, and in this virtual pogrom Pakhtuns were the biggest losers. Subsequentl,y a relative peace was negotiated between the MQM and Awami National Party (ANP), which claimed to be representative of the Pakhtun voice in Karachi.

Whether or not the ANP can speak for the Pakhtun community at large -- and perhaps more importantly for Pakhtun economic interests -- is a moot point. The present spate of violence is a direct result of the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Pakhtuns from their homes in the NWFP and FATA due to the so-called 'war on terror'. A significant number of those displaced have come to Karachi to shelter with relatives or simply because there are at least some prospects of securing a livelihood there. Altaf Husain has been spewing out rhetoric about the 'Talibanisation' of Karachi since this wave of displaced Pakhtuns started flowing into the city some months ago. For all intents and purposes, the MQM leader has been exhorting Muhajirs to take action against the Pakhtun community, under the (unsaid) pretext that all Pakhtuns are Taliban.

This is xenophobia of the worst kind. It has resulted in ethnic profiling and ultimately, as happened on the night of April 29, wanton violence. Shamefully, many otherwise progressive elements in Pakistan have lauded Altaf Husain and the MQM for adopting a 'principled' position vis-a-vis the so-called 'Talibanisation'. In fact, Altaf Husain is stoking the fires of ethnic violence as he has done consistently in the past. Such rhetoric will serve only to polarise Kararchi (and society more generally) and ensure that what is called 'Talibanisation' becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It would be yet another tragedy if the Karachi violence provides an indicator of things to come in the rest of the country. If such an eventuality is to be prevented, it is absolutely essential that common people are informed about what is actually happening in the country's biggest city. Too many people for too long have remained silent in the face of the intimidation of the MQM and the permanent state apparatus with which it enjoys a symbiotic relationship.

The media must also take the initiative; otherwise, it too will be complicit in this slide towards anarchy. To put things into context, the lack of information about displacement of common Pakhtuns from the NWFP and FATA provided to the general public has been scandalous. The boat is sinking but it has not sunk yet; there is still time to save it from going under!

Dr Abdul Hameed Nayyar did his PhD in Physics and taught at Quaid-e-Azam University (QAU), Islamabad, for more than three decades before retiring about four years ago. Afterwards, he started to work on policy issues and remained associated for about 15 months with Developments in Literacy, an organisation run by Pakistani Americans to make interventions in the education sector in poor and disadvantaged areas of the country.

Dr AH Nayyar has also been associated with Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad. He first spent two years (2001-03) at the research institute while on leave from QAU. During this period, he worked primarily in the area of education reforms, looking into the curricula and textbooks taught in Pakistan with a view to show from content analysis that they were the source of most problems facing the country. The outcome of the project, a report titled The Subtle Subversion that came out in 2003, has been hotly debated in the media and academic circles since then. Basically a physicist, at SDPI he also worked in the area of energy conservation.

Dr AH Nayyyar is a known advocate of nuclear disarmament. In this connection, he is a visiting faculty member at Princeton University in the United States. For the last decade or so, he has also been teaching at other universities in the US. There, he has also helped form a South Asian group, where Indian and Pakistani scholars interact and write reports on technical issues regarding nuclear disarmament. The News on Sunday interviewed Dr AH Nayyar recently. Excerpts follow:The News on Sunday: What are some of the salient features of The Subtle Subversion, the report you co-authored with Ahmad Salim on the status of the curricula in Pakistan?

AH Nayyar: The core point was that the kind of education that was being imparted to the children in public schools was subverting our nation in many ways: by depriving our children of good education; inculcating in them negative views about the society; generating hatred in them for a certain section of not just this society but also that of other countries; creating a wrong basis for defining Pakistani nationhood by distorting history; glorifying militancy, the military, jihad and, in particular, martyrdom; and overwhelming textbooks with religious material. Therefore, what we tried to show was that the curricula and textbooks were actually contravening the country's constitution, which clearly says no child in schools would be taught or forced to learn religion other than his or her own. Interestingly, this was basically meant to protect Muslim children from being taught Christianity in missionary schools. However, now the situation has changed and the textbooks are forcing Islamic Studies on non-Muslim students, also through compulsory subjects such as social studies and Urdu. So, in short, we tried to show that this was a clear contravention of the protection that the constitution guarantees to the minorities.

TNS: Was this done deliberately?

AHN: Yes, this was done intentionally. Islamisation of the textbooks first took place during Zia-ul-Haq's era, when it was decided that the curricula needed to have a very sound religious basis. Under the banner of Islamisation of the curricula, an attempt was made by the dictator's government to redefine the Pakistani nationhood by creating hatred against Hindus. This was done in a very crude manner, which must have hurt the feelings of the Hindus living in Pakistan also. Later, when the Afghan War reached its peak, the governments of both the US and Pakistan ran the Islamisation of the curricula campaign to produce jihadists for fighting against the former USSR. The CIA prepared textbooks for Afghan children, which implored them to wage jihad against the Red Army. It was just at the same time that Pakistani textbooks also started talking about jihad. This also happened at that specific time because by then a particular political party that subscribed to such ideas about Islamisation of the curricula had taken a firm hold of the education establishment in Pakistan. So, the Islamisation of the curricula was actually done by design and it did not happen by any accident.

TNS: But the Americans certainly did not want the curricula that the CIA had prepared for the Afghan children to be taught in Pakistan. Wasn't it Ziaul-Haq's idea to introduce the same curricula in Pakistani schools?

AHN: The US was not worried about what happens to Pakistani children. It was indifferent at best and was only too happy that the Pakistani government of the time was supporting jihadi groups. A number of militant groups came into being at that time and they started to wage jihad. At that point in time, all Pakistani governments -- and not Zia-ul-Haq's -- promoted jihad in Pakistan. This policy helped many of the militant groups that are now destabilising Pakistan. This state policy defined Pakistan starting the mid-1980s. The US did not object to it at that time, because of its agenda to create jihadis to fight against the former USSR. As soon as the Soviets left, the US also packed up and left the entire region in turmoil. Because of this turmoil, the Taliban gained strength and later conquered almost the entire Afghanistan. This is, in short, the basis of all the problems that Pakistan is facing today.

TNS: Why Americans could not foresee the repercussions of such a social innovation?

AHN: It was social engineering and Americans are notorious for not been able to think in the long-term; they only look at things as situations arise, design responses accordingly, and then leave the consequences for future thinking and actions.

TNS: Do you mean to say Americans are myopic?

AHN: Actually their energies are centered on one particular point: nothing should hurt the security of America and the American people. So, they would only focus on this point only and everything else is unimportant for them.

TNS: In quantitative terms, how much have the extremist curricula been responsible for the problem of terrorism in Pakistan?

AHN: Even if the extremist curricula are not wholly responsible for the problem of terrorism in Pakistan, it has surely contributed to it. When you want something to be introduced in a society, you also need to create conducive environment for it. So, some of the things that were included in the curricula created a conducive environment for jihadi groups that became acceptable to many people with the passage of time. Let me give you the example of Lal Masjid. We all know that the group inside the mosque was involved in a number of illegal activities, such as amassing arms, illegally hosting people and doing vigilante actions outside. Therefore, action had to be taken against them and when action was taken against them they became violent. They started to kill soldiers who retaliated strongly. However, if you now ask people about the Lal Masjid episode, most of them would say that those inside the mosque had done nothing wrong. They would see nothing wrong with the illegal things in which that particular group was involved. This is what I mean by creating conducive environment -- creating mental attitudes where such things become acceptable. In most countries, such things would never have been acceptable; they became acceptable in our country only because we have been patronising extremism through the curricula. Similarly, when hatred is created against Hindus and India is painted as a Hindu country, instead of a secular one, it becomes easier for the Pakistani military to manipulate the feelings of the common people. What these things in the curricula and textbooks did was to create a milieu in which military action and petty nationalism became acceptable. This, in turn, made the militants more acceptable and powerful.

TNS: How much has been the political vacuum, as evident from frequent military interventions, responsible for extremism and terrorism in Pakistan?

AHN: Extremism and terrorism have been supported by state institutions in Pakistan, the same that have also created political vacuum in the country. So both were done by the same actors. Therefore, it goes without saying that different actions of same actors led to same consequences. I think had democracy been strong in Pakistan, these groups would not have become so strong. Repeated interruptions in democracy have been the single most devastating factor for the country in every respect: governance, economy, constitution, education, health, etc.

TNS: Does this mean that in Pakistan certain state institutions fomented de-politicisation of the society because it suited their agenda and vested interests?

AHN: Yes, indeed. They got full powers and they tried to weaken democratic politics in the country, so that they create space for themselves. On the other hand, because of their own narrow vision of what constitutes Pakistan's security, they brought into being, nurtured and empowered militant groups. Until now, most of us are not sure that these groups are not working under the patronage of Pakistani state institutions or that the military is really trying to eliminate them.

TNS: Do you think nuclear disarmament is possible in South Asia?

AHN: I think it is possible, but leaders of South Asian countries have to be more visionary to attain that goal and not get swayed by politics of the US, Russia or other big powers. There are examples when countries actually did this. There are many nuclear weapons-free zones in the world, such as in South America. Brazil and Argentina once were proceeding rapidly towards making nuclear weapons and nobody could have stopped them. However, the two decided that this was not the way they wanted to be and they gave up their nuclear armament programmes. Similarly, many countries in the Far East can make nuclear weapons, but have resolved that they would not only acquire nuclear weapons but will not allow them to be brought into their region. Moreover, Africa is entirely a nuclear weapons-free zone.

TNS: Has Pakistani strategists wish of strategic depth in Afghanistan something to do with nuclear parity vis-à-vis India?

AHN: Strategic depth can be for nuclear reasons too. In fact, nuclear weapons increase the desire for having strategic depth. It has been a long cherished dream of Pakistan to have a friendly Afghanistan. When the Taliban came into power in the country in 1996, Pakistan saw the opportunity to fulfil its wish and our strategists fully supported the the extremist government. Pakistan wrongly thought that its western borders had become secure and it could now fully concentrate on its eastern borders.

TNS: Can Pakistani nuclear weapons fall in the hands of the militants?

AHN: I still regard it as a distant possibility. However, certain militant groups have become so well-entrenched in our society and so resourceful that they now have more access to technology.

During the last five years, Pakistan's economy has grown on average by 7 percent. The key to sustaining that high growth rate is to increase the level of savings and investment, which, as we shall see later in the article, is well below the desired level. Investment or capital formation has a two-fold role in the economy. In the short-run, it affects aggregate demand and, thus, output and employment. Investment is a component of the aggregate demand or total spending in the economy; increase in investment steps up total spending and, thus, raises the level of output and employment in the economy.

In the long-run, investment affects gross domestic product (GDP) growth. A country's rate of growth depends largely on how much it sacrifices present consumption to provide for production of capital goods. Investment is, in fact, the engine of growth. The spectacular economic performance of East Asian countries can mainly be attributed to their high investment-GDP ratio. Conversely, deficiency of capital or low investment-GDP ratio is the major failing of most of the developing countries.

Saving is the difference between disposable income -- income minus taxes -- and consumption. It depends on various factors, the most important of which is income. All said and done, saving is a luxury, which increases as income goes up. The poor do not save; rather, they dis-save by borrowing. The same goes for poor countries, which are caught in the debt trap because of low level of national income.

Investment depends on several factors, such as savings, costs, revenues and future expectations. However, savings is the most important factor underlying investment. In the case of developing countries, investment falls below the desired level, mainly because of low savings. Though a necessary condition for investment, savings in themselves are not enough to induce investment.

As a matter of principle, businesses undertake investment when expected revenues are greater than estimated costs. Costs depend on interest rates, price of inputs and corporate taxes. Revenue expectations are based on an estimate of the level of demand for the output. In case there is deficiency of potential demand for their goods or services, businesses shy away from investment. As in the case of savings, the key determinant of demand is income.

Again, in the case of developing countries, since per capita income tends to be low, demand is deficient, which restricts investment. In fact, developing countries are in a catch-22 situation. Low per capita income restricts capital formation and output, which is responsible for unemployment and underemployment. The higher the level of unemployment, the lower the level of per capita income. Increase in per capita income is, thus, essential for growth and development.

A number of instruments are available to the government to affect investment level in the economy. These include monetary, fiscal, trade and investment policies. Monetary policy pertains to money supply and credit conditions in the economy. Fall in money supply and increase in interest rates raise the cost of doing business and, thus, discourage investment. Conversely, fall in interest rates decreases the cost of doing business and encourages investment.

Fiscal policy deals with government revenue and spending. While higher corporate taxes are a drag on investment, higher government spending can both push up and push down the level of investment. When demand is depressed and corporate profits are low, the private sector cannot be counted upon to step up investment; the job has to be performed by the government. By borrowing, the government generates the funds necessary for development expenditure. Government investment increases demand for business goods and services, and businesses respond by increasing output for which they hire additional labour. The income earned by the workers is partly consumed, partly saved, which adds to both demand and savings.

Public spending can also help develop the right infrastructure necessary for encouraging the private sector to invest. Increase in government spending or an expansionary fiscal policy is not without its problems. In the first place, if increase in government spending is not accompanied by increase in government revenue, it creates public debt. In the second place, if increase in government spending is not accompanied by proportionate increase in real GDP, it creates inflation. In the third pace, higher public spending may put upward pressure on the interest rates and, thus, crowd out private sector investment.

A liberal trade policy helps businesses have access to cheaper intermediate goods -- machinery and raw materials -- and, thus, bring down the cost of inputs. A liberal investment policy, such as tax breaks and de-regulation of the economy, decreases the cost of doing business and, thus, encourages investment. It is also important that the government creates a stable political and economic environment to enhance business confidence. Having outlined the importance of savings and investment in an economy, and the factors hindering and promoting them, let us have a look at the level of savings and investment in the Pakistani economy:

Generally, increase in GDP is accompanied by increase in savings-GDP and investment-GDP ratio. However, Pakistan is a different story. In 2000-01, the economy grew at a meager rate of 1.8 percent, while investment-GDP and savings-GDP ratios were fairly reasonable at 17.2 and 16.5 percent, respectively. In 2001-02, the economic growth increased to 3.1 percent, whereas investment-GDP ratio came down to 16.8 percent. Savings-GDP ratio, however, went up to 18.6 percent. In 2002-03, GDP growth increased to 4.8 percent accompanied by increase in both investment-GDP and savings-GDP ratios to 17.2 percent and 20.8 percent, respectively.

In 2003-04, the economy grew at an impressive rate of 7.5 percent; however, both investment-GDP and savings GDP ratios fell to 16.6 percent and 18.7 percent, respectively. GDP growth rate shot up to 8.6 percent in 2004-05. Though investment-GDP ratio increased to 18.1 percent, savings-GDP ratio fell to 15.1 percent. The year 2005-06 saw GDP growth decelerate to 6.6 percent; however, both investment-GDP and savings-GDP ratios went up by 20.0 percent and 16.4 percent, respectively. In 2006-07, the economy grew at 7 percent accompanied by increase in both investment-GDP and savings-GDP ratios to 22.9 percent and 17.8 percent, respectively. The year 2007-08 again saw GDP growth decelerate to 5.8 percent with fall in both investment-GDP and savings-GDP ratios to 21.6 percent and 13.9 percent, respectively.

The major reason for low level of savings and the resultant low level of investment is the low level of per capita income. Though per capita income in Pakistan has, according to official statistics, increased to $1,045 from $655 in 2004, the increase is nominal rather than real – thanks to a high inflation rate, which increased from 4.6 percent in 2003-04 to 12 percent in 2007-08. During the first nine months of the current fiscal year (July 2008-March 2009), average inflation was 24 percent, which is projected to be around 20 percent for the whole 2008-09. Other major causes of high consumption and, thus, low savings are consumer financing and proliferation of credit cards.

The government is adopting various measures to step up investment, such as rationalisation of tariffs, improvement in the tax refund process, removal of procedural bottlenecks, review of tax laws and tax machinery, provision of an efficient and reformed banking sector, improved governance, and effective contract enforcement. While all these measures are important, the level of savings and investment cannot be enhanced to a desirable level without an increase in the real per capita income. This requires, on the one hand, containing inflation and, on the other, developing human resource by increasing spending on heath and education.

(Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com)

Against the backdrop of some of the recent developments, it is no more relevant whether the Swat peace deal remains intact or the recently signed Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (NAR) achieves its objectives. The million-dollar questions are: how we can stop the Taliban from making further inroads in our society? Do we need drastic changes in our security doctrine and policies? Do we need an effective strategy for combatting extremism and terrorism? Should we continue to sign peace deals with banned militant organisations? Has the time come for state actors to disengage with the militants and stop patronising them in the larger national interest? Are the militants not crossing all the limits?

Unfortunately, the Taliban's advance and the recent statement of the defunct Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) chief Maulana Sufi Mohammad about superior courts and democracy directly or indirectly validate these concerns. Addressing a public gathering on April 19, Sufi Mohammad termed superior courts and democracy un-Islamic. Once again, people have started questioning his views and the tide has turned against him.

However, at the same time, Sufi Mohammad has also vowed to continue dialogue with the government for restoring peace in the troubled areas of the NWFP and FATA. But the response of the militants after the ongoing military operation ends remains to be seen. Media reports from Dir, Buner and Swat, on the other hand, suggest that the militants are going in a reaction mode.

The extremists are on a spree to challenge the religious, political and cultural basis of the country. In the name of religion, the Taliban are destroying everything by imposing their narrow and rigid Wahabi ideology, alien to the majority of Muslims in Pakistan. Moreover, their pro-jihad utterances and cross-border movements are worsening Pakistan's ties with its neighbouring countries, besides other regional and international actors.

Moving into Buner, the militants are now just 100 kilometres away from Peshawar and only a few kilometres away from some of the key strategic installations of the country. Alarm bells are ringing and it is feared that the state is on the brink of collapse, because the Taliban could take control of these strategic facilities. If not checked in time, the Taliban's advance could even invite intervention by foreign powers, who fear that Pakistan's nuclear weapons could fall in the hands of the militants.

Both the national and international media is flooded with reports pointing to the gravity of the situation, and the emerging threat to our security and integrity. Reports in the western media and recent statements by some high-ranking American officials portray a grim picture of Pakistan, and predict its collapse and overtaking by the militants. For most foreign and domestic political commentators, the peace deal with the TNSM is virtually handing over power to the militants in Swat, while signing NAR was termed government's surrender or capitulation before them.

Despite the signing of the controversial peace deal and NAR, the militants' activities have not stopped. In fact, militancy is spreading both vertically and horizontally. There are media reports that more volunteers are being enlisted and new trainings camps established, besides digging of new trenches. Moreover, the militants are entering and operating in other areas, such as Shangla, Battgram and Dir, besides Buner.

Considering the strategic importance of Buner and Shangla districts, the Taliban's advance in these areas will seriously challenge Pakistan's security. The fall of Buner will put pressure on neighbouring areas of Malakand, Swabi, Mardan, Haripur and Mansehra, bringing the Taliban closer to highly sensitive strategic facilities. With the capture of Shangla, the Taliban will be able to control the Karakoram Highway (KKH), a main supply route for Pakistani troops posted in the Northern Areas that links Pakistan to China. Shangla, Battgram, Mansehra, and Lower and Upper Dir are already vulnerable due to the militants' influence there.

The incidents of looting of private and government property, as well as other heinous crimes like kidnapping for ransom, have increased in areas controlled by the Taliban. In many parts of district Swat, a Nizam-e-Salat has been imposed, binding all believers to offer prayers and shut down businesses during prayer hours. Recently, the militants warned the shopkeepers in Mingora city of dire consequences if they entertained women customers. Similarly, the women have been advised to avoid visiting public places. The shops selling audio and video cassettes have been closed, and in some areas barbers have been warned against shaving beards.

Sufi Mohammad is faced with a dilemma because his integrity is at stake. On the one hand, he has given a commitment to the government that he would win over the militants and would convince them to lay down arms once NAR is enforced. On the other hand, the militants are giving a tough time to him by not accepting his decisions. Maulana Fazlullah, Sufi Mohammad's son-in-law and chief of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Swat, also seems helpless before the militants. In short, one faction of the militants is supporting Sufi Mohammad's peace initiative, while the other is not ready to lay down arms and stop militant activities.

Compared with 1994 and 1999, the situation this time is completely different for many reasons. First, there exists a strong armed militant force that is not hesitant of imposing its narrow brand of religion. NAR will provide it with the legal authority to impose and justify its rigid and inhumane acts in the name of Islam. Second, the government's writ is very weak and it is not in a position to rein in the militants, who are out to interpret and implement NAR in a manner that they deem appropriate.

Third, the militants are not a party to the peace deal, thus they are not bound to abide by it. In other words, they can disown the peace deal whenever they want to. One should not forget that for most of the militants the enforcement of Sharia is not possible without armed jihad. Fourth, the regional strategic equation is now different and Pakistan is under increasing international focus. The Swat peace deal and NAR were opposed by major regional and global actors, and pressure is mounting on the Pakistani government in this regard with each passing day.

Besides this, there is a difference of opinion between the government and the militants over the implementation of NAR and other procedural issues. For the government, NAR is only aimed at the provision of speedy justice; while for the militants it is Sharia, a complete code of life. Another issue is that of the appointment of qazis (judges). The government claims that it is its prerogative to appoint qazis, while Sufi Mohammad wants more say in the process. Similarly, the government considers end to violence a major prerequisite for maintenance of peace, but the militants are not willing to lay down arms. Moreover, the militants' agenda is not local; rather, they believe in global jihad and vow to 'help' Muslims all over the world.

For the first time, besides foreign actors, the majority of political parties are asking for stern action against the militants. But there are serious doubts in political observers' minds regarding whether the Pakistani establishment would completely disengage with the Taliban or those militant groups who are on a spree to impose their narrow extremist agenda by force on the people and who do not hesitate to challenge the government's writ.

For the Pakistani establishment, the militants are a 'strategic asset' that has gradually turned into a liability. Unfortunately, there are as yet no signs of completely getting rid of this liability. After every six months, we hear about the launch of decisive military action against the terrorists, but unfortunately after every operation we witness extension of Talibanisation to new areas. As a result, large swathes of land in the NWFP and FATA have come under the Taliban's direct or indirect control.

The government has completed operation against the militants in Lower Dir and fighting is still going on in Buner, as both sides continue to make conflicting claims about the causalities. Amid operations in Dir and Buner, the Taliban are going in reaction mode. A new round of operation is expected in Swat too. The Taliban have increased patrolling and are busy in erecting new check posts in Swat. If not led to its logical conclusion, the ongoing operation can further complicate and aggravate the situation.

For gaining legitimacy and restoring public confidence, the security forces should precisely target the suspected hideouts to decide the fate of militancy once for all. In short, there is a need for immediate, effective and targeted action against the militants, because repetition of half-hearted measures will push the country further towards the brink of disaster.

(The writer, a political commentator, works with Sungi Development Foundation, Islamabad.)

The missing link

A lot of debate has been generated in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world around the social and environmental impacts of climate change. Scientific estimates and frightening stories of increased flooding, irregular rains, shortening winter and long periods of drought make a string case for climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. The advocacy for the success of such measures ranges from outright denunciation of economic growth and modernity to escalating development of technological solutions for green-development.

The current thrust of 'growth stimulus' packages in the United Kingdom and United States appears to be tilted in favour of building technological solutions for low carbon intensity development path, without paying much head to the agenda of de-growth politics. However, the situation of the least-developed countries (LDCs) and developing countries in the context of these climate change debates is interesting.

In fact, the LDCs and developing countries are caught in layers of 'triple injustices'. Sajay Vishist, representing Centre for Trade and Development (Centad), argues that firstly, they are not responsible for a large part of carbon emissions; secondly, they are the worst affected (especially the people living in tropical and sub-tropical zones); and thirdly, they have the least capability to engineer and execute adaptation- and mitigation-based development models.

While there is an acceptance of global equity principle under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which calls for common but differentiated responsibilities, the thrust of global commitments is far removed from any meaningful commitment by developed countries. In fact, emissions of green-house gases have been reduced in transition economies, but major developed countries have shown an increase in emissions. The US, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and the Netherlands stand in the line of environment culprits.

In the LDCs and developing countries, the debate around climate change is dominated by de-growth environmentalists. For them, the processes of industrialisation-based economic growth did a huge disservice to the world; development in the sense of economic prosperity is an illusion, and beyond the carrying capacity and fragile ecosystems of the Earth. These arguments, however, do not take the agenda of economic change vis-a-vis climate change too far in the context of the LDCs and developing countries.

In fact, the LDCs and developing countries need a sustained economic growth path and technological capability to ensure success of adaptation strategies, both at the local community and corporate industrial levels. In other words, the agenda of climate change adaptation and mitigation needs both improved governance of economic change strategies as well as strengthening of institutional arrangements for technological capability acquisition. Such an important area of strategic intervention should not be left only to de-growth anti-modernity environmentalists.

The case in point is to mainstream climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies while developing industry, trade and technology (ITT) polices. In Pakistan, this issue is not mainstreamed as economic change and development strategies, though it can ultimately build sustainable national capacities to adapt and mitigate adverse impacts of climate change. Predominantly, these are neoliberal policies with strong liking for structural adjustment based on liberalisation, privatisation and stabilisation.

The debate around the role of the state in technological capability acquisition, which formed the core of industrial development strategy, has been set aside. Interestingly, when the UK, France, Germany, Japan and the US were at comparable levels of economic development, they were using all the 'bad policies' of infant industry protection, subsidies and investment management for human and physical asset building of local technological capability development. Most of these ladders of development have now been denied to the developing countries with imposition of conditionalities that demand monetary solutions to much more complex problems of development.

As a result, a major casualty in the LDCs and developing countries are public sector development programmes, which are central to the development push in these countries. For example, rather than increasing and streamlining opportunities of relevant human capital formation through state action, funds for the Higher Education Commission (HEC) have recently been reduced in Pakistan. In short, a strong resolve by the state has been the missing link since the country started experimenting with structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) about three decades ago.

In direct contrast to the 'dictated' approach of the LDCs and developing countries, US President Barack Obama advised his economic managers to "think of what's happening in countries like Spain, Germany and Japan, where they're making real investments in renewable energy." He argued that "they're surging ahead of us, poised to take the lead in these new industries. This is not because they are smarter than us, or work harder than us, or are more innovative than we are. It is because their governments have harnessed their people's hard work and ingenuity with bold investments -- investments that are paying off in good, high-wage jobs."

Similarly, the Center for American Progress, a think-tank with close ties to the Obama administration, called last year for the government to spend $100 billion on various green initiatives. The reward, it calculated, would be two million jobs. In a sharp contrast, even conservative estimates claim that the current SAPs in Pakistan will render at least two million people jobless or below the poverty line in the next couple of years.

In a bid to reduce fiscal deficit, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has asked the Pakistani government to restrain public expenditures, the burden of which will naturally fall on the poor. It has asked for reduction in the country's fiscal deficit from 7.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 4.2 percent, through lowering public expenditure, gradually eliminating energy subsidies, raising electricity tariffs by 18 percent and eliminating tax exemptions. Similarly, in Hungary, the IMF has targeted fiscal deficit reductions from 3.4 percent of GDP to 2.5 percent through a fiscal consolidation plan, which involves freezing public sector wages, placing a cap on pension payments and postponing social benefits.

Dr Ha-Joon Chang, in his recent articles in the Guardian, has clearly identified this approach as "economics of hypocrisy"; in the US, the state has nationalised the 'sick' banking industry while providing 'growth stimulus' under protectionist 'Buy America' policy. Such measures will increase the fiscal deficit of the US to about 5 percent of GDP. These are primarily 'bad policies', forbidden for the LDCs and developing countries. The same were also denied to East Asian countries during the 1997-98 economic crisis, when they were asked to keep surplus budgets and let their banks go down the drain.

The IMF claims to have increased social safety nets under a new SAP in Pakistan. However, Bhumika Muchhala, who works with the Third World Network, argues that "in Pakistan the cumulative increase in social spending is 0.3 percent of GDP, whereas the reduction in public spending amounts to 3.2 percent of GDP. While the IMF can accurately say that social safety spending is being doubled in Pakistan, from 0.3 percent to 0.6 percent of GDP, it is overshadowed by the fiscal deficit reduction required by the IMF, from 7.4 percent to 4.2 percent of GDP."

Considering economic change strategies with weak (and skewed) public sector development programmes, increasing poverty and lack of an independent ITT policy, the chances that the state and society will be able to respond effectively to the challenges of climate change are rather bleak. However, the dark forces of 'triple injustices' mentioned above can be converted into opportunities if governments in the LDCs and developing countries invest in the development of technology acquisition platforms for green technological capabilities under climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies, because a way to go beyond de-growth environmentalism is also embedded in this approach.

(The write is visiting faculty at Sustainable Development Policy Institute and Iqra University, Islamabad.

Email: abbasi.zubair@gmail.com)

planning

There is a recurring dream that I have. In it, I possess the ability to fly by manipulating my body through the air. However, as soon as I have achieved some elevation, I encounter a vast network of cables. I struggle and pull apart the wires to go through with great difficulty, only to find another crisscrossing web blocking my ascent. Though one may derive many interpretations of this flight of fancy, a real life association that one can make is with the extensive electrical power grid and wire-based distribution system. It is this cage-like structure that has trapped us in our pursuit for freely harnessing energy.

Since the global industrialisation phase and ever since urban electrical consumption became a norm, the demand for electrical energy has been undergoing a meteoric rise: large metropolitan cities pulsating with light from neon signboards, floodlit stadiums where thousands of gung ho spectators watch their teams battle it out in all sorts of sporting events; etc. The commercial electrical grid has served as the overarching backbone for addressing this surging thirst for power.

Societies across the world have been so attuned to consuming electricity via the wired distribution system that it is hard for them to imagine receiving current via any alternate mode. Industrialised nations take pride in miles upon miles of transmission lines emanating from gargantuan power generation systems and stretching to every end of the country. Aptly, electrical utility companies are viewed as the driving engines of progress and development.

However, it is due to the very existence of and the reliance on this interconnected system of electricity transmission and distribution that individuals have been paying for their power usage. But then one would beg to ask that if consumers were not to pay their electricity tariffs, how else would this utility be regulated? Moreover, others might conclude that the rates that they end up paying eventually go towards covering the operating costs of the electricity provision, which would not be possible by any other means.

Well, for starters the global market for electricity is close to a trillion dollars. No surprise that the United States has the largest share of this market with 39 percent consumption. Furthermore, it supports several other industries such as gas, oil and coal that are the primary fuels for power generation units as well as copper, aluminum and steel. Such a huge amount of business potential was realised towards the end of the nineteenth century.

In 1880, Industrialist tycoon JP Morgan along with the famous Vanderbilt family invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in the Edison Electric Light Company, that later grew into the General Electric Company, one of the ten largest companies in the world today. The purpose was to develop a commercially efficient and economical business upon the more than 200 patents that Thomas Edison had received around that time.

Most of these were based upon his refinements of the generation, transmission and metering of electric current. In 1882, the earliest workable model entailed an installation of a central generating plant with copper wire connections to nearby buildings, each of which were monitored by the electricity meter also developed by Edison's company. Yet the kind of current that we are used to light up our buildings, entertain and cool ourselves to death is Alternating Current (AC) and not the Direct Current (DC) that was the quintessential life force of the Edison-based electricity distribution system. AC was adopted soon after, albeit in a so-called 'war of currents', as the viable choice due to its characteristic of being transmitted over large distances from the generation point.

The inventor of the multi-phase AC was the great Austrian genius Nikola Tesla. With support from his financial backer George Westinghouse, Tesla pioneered the first commercially successful means of generating and relaying AC power. One of his inventions was the Warden-clyffe Tower in 1900 that was planned to be situated on Long Island in New York.

Initially proposed to be a tower that would transmit telecommunications signals across the Atlantic, the project attracted an investment of $150,000 from JP Morgan. However, Tesla soon revealed that he would also be able to use the tower as an efficient electricity generation and transmission system. In his own words, "electrical energy can be economically transmitted without wires to any terrestrial distance in unlimited amounts, with a loss not exceeding a small fraction of one percent in the transmission, even to the greatest distance, twelve thousand miles -- to the opposite end of the globe".

When this revelation came to JP Morgan's knowledge, he is said to have asked, "Where can I put a metre?" Tesla explained that the tower would be able to tap into the vast reserves of static electricity in the planet's atmosphere and the current would be received wirelessly at homes by merely "ramming a stick (antenna of sorts) in the earth in your backyard". After the initial setup cost, because there would be negligible operating costs incurred, people everywhere would have free access to all the electricity they require.

Well JP Morgan would have none of that, because he realised that the future of his profitable venture – the newly formed General Electric Company – would be jeopardised and pulled back his funding of the Warden-clyffe tower. Today, GE has a total asset worth of close to $800 billion and was ranked at first place by Forbes in its list of world's biggest companies this year. Due to the lack of funding, in 1915 Tesla was forced to sell off the Warden-clyffe property to pay piling back debts. In 1917, during World War 1, the US government blew up the tower under the pretext that German spies were using it to guide their submarines.

We as the human race have come to understand electrification through only the snaking copper or aluminum cables. Yet, in fact, they are the very fetters that are used to squeeze exorbitant amounts out of the unsuspecting masses. Tesla dreamed of a world developing freely through unmetred access to electricity. Yet we have millions who suffer in sweltering climates and are unable to get operated upon due to frequent power outages and have been left far behind in the so-called globalisation race.

One perceives advancement as the creation of technologies that go towards further improving our quality of life over the previous ones. Yet when one comes to learn of age-old existing methods that can significantly alleviate our basic problems, one is forced to question the credibility of the claims of our political and industrial leaders. Are they really ushering in a new era of 'change' and 'prosperity' or furthering a time-tested system of profiteering through technological enslavement?

It took the students of Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) the untimely death of one of their own to spill out onto the streets for protesting against the stupor that Pakistan's policing system seems to be in. It took the death of a college girl in Karachi for most of the country's newspapers to bring the issue of traffic mismanagement to their front pages. These incidents are not the first of their kind. They reinforce the fact that, despite millions being pumped into the development of infrastructure, urban traffic is a growing nightmare. But it is only when it touches a nerve that the government is asked questions that should have been raised long ago.

Consider the Lahore Ring Road Project, started over two decades ago. In 1992, the actual cost of the 77-km six-lane project stood at Rs7 billion. Now, it is touching Rs150 billion. Why? The project has already experienced delays four times due to design changes to cater to the whims of one important personality or the other. Allocated about Rs40 billion already and expecting as much more money in the near future, its construction started only four years ago, the most developed part of which connects the Motorway (M2) to Lahore City through the Bund Road.

The extension of that road leading towards Shahdra is just a turbulent, jolting ride, equivalent to some of the finest engineering in Western amusement park rides. To boot, there are no overhead pedestrian bridges. Many of the deaths caused along this route are tucked away into the inner pages of city news, still others not even reported.

Here is another favourite of the urban planners. The Asian Development Bank (ADB)-sponsored Lahore Rapid Mass Transit System Project (LRMTS) is estimated to cost $2.4 billion for the Green Line. The Orange Line, currently under construction, is estimated at $2.1 billion. The feasibility study of the project alone has already cost the Government of the Punjab Rs768 million. Remarkably, however, no PC-1 can be traced down for this initiative.

According to a 2003 study by Imran and Low, the master plan drawn up by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) on Lahore's transportation system in 1992 first envisioned the establishment of the Light Rail Transit system (a predecessor of the LRMTS) by 2010. In nominal terms then, when $1 converted to Rs21.70, the fare by 2010 was estimated to hover at Rs30. Now, the Urban Unit believes it can recover its monumental costs by charging fares as high as Rs120-130 per person in 2009 terms.

In which year the project will be completed is still a mystery! But in the face of crashing purchasing power, inadequate compensation for those whose homes must be razed and public agitation at having to pay even Rs40 on the local bus, just how much deliverance can be expected from this project? It is not just fancy projects that speak of the poor health of urban traffic. According to the Urban Gazette, published by the Urban Unit in Lahore, an estimated 610,000 people travel along the Ferozepur Road, where only 218 buses were reported to be running.

What the Gazette would not tell the average reader is the way these buses race each other, often breaking their side mirrors and windshields; or that the female compartments constitute only a third of a bus, whereas women use buses as frequently as men and usually travel with children; or even that the overhead handrail is too high for women, which is why they generally crowd around the entrance pole. And if the Taliban had a good look at the way male conductors jostle themselves through the women packed into buses, they would not be very pleased. On this occasion, even the women would side with them.

According to the local government, the introduction of 2,400 traffic wardens in Lahore ought to solve the problem. But in a study conducted by this scribe, though lead concentration in blood samples of these traffic wardens do not exceed the internationally prescribed limit of 10 microgram / deciliter, current levels range from 6-7; this too, after only two years in service. Another study conducted a few years ago on the members of the previous traffic police service found the average concentration hovered at 35 micrograms / deciliter of blood. Such alarming figures only point in the direction that the health of the current young and fresh batch of traffic police is headed in a few years' time.

What the government can do instead, for a change, is listen to its people. The people, too, must start talking. Tell the government that the city needs pedestrian-friendly facilities, not as elaborate as the ones on Jail Road. It needs the strict enforcement of a carpool and bus-lane policy, especially for schools. It needs a balancing act between increasing the number of buses on the road and congestion-taxing vehicles above a particular engine size.

It needs simple three-inch high footpaths running along the main arteries of the city. It needs to grant traffic warden stations autonomy from police stations, so that civilians can stop associating traffic policemen with crime and corruption. But more important than any of these suggestions is the one that says the government needs to let architects, town planners, urban designers, economists and environmental scientists do their job. We know that politics and pennies certainly have not. The world acknowledges the existence of inner-city slums in all urban cities. But if the traffic planning policies in Lahore are anything to go by, we might soon all have to don the label of Slumdog Urbannaires.

In whose interest?

In Karachi and other urban locations, land grabbing has evolved as a firm enterprise. Quasi political groups and others disguised as such can be found flexing their muscles and displaying armed strength in this quest. Major corridors of movement -- such as Super Highway, National Highway, Karachi Northern Bypass and Lyari Expressway -- have become sites of this profane enterprise that is depriving the state and other legal owners of their assets. Many experts are of the view that the weakening of land control mechanisms from the legal and administrative respects has caused anarchy in this sector.

A useful statute in this respect was the Sindh Disposal of Urban Land Ordinance 2002, which was repealed by the previous Sindh Assembly in 2006. Therefore, no institutionalised process for land disposal and grant exists in the province. It has led to widespread adhocism, out of book disposals and clandestine transactions. As the present regime is a politically strong coalition, it will be in the best interest of Karachi and the province to evolve a potent legal and administrative mechanism to protect land reserves.

Land is a finite resource. Sindh, as a province, had considerable reserves of state land that later fell within the limits of urban areas. Historically, this land was considered as an asset. It was carefully utilised for residential, commercial, agricultural, recreational, industrial and other purposes. The outlook has changed considerably. Instead of an asset, land was viewed as a tradable commodity. This gave rise to evolution of a land market that was entirely uncontrolled, discretionary and haywire. In short, nascent market forces determined the utilisation and transaction of land, as opposed to rational public choices. Without realising the social, ecological and even long-term economic consequences, the sale and transaction of land has continued unabated.

The commodification of land has been a direct outcome of the neo-liberal political doctrine that was adopted under the western influence. Donor agencies have been pressurising various government departments to auction land assets, either for retiring existing debts or improving their financial positions. In Sindh, this meant distribution of land following a market-driven approach without long- or short-term planning prescriptions. In many cases, the landuses could not be planned or properly ascertained. Such short sightedness gave rise to unscientific prioritisation of land for sale and development.

Land disposal schemes mostly developed as a clandestine marriage of convenience, rather than a transparent and equal opportunity enterprise. The attempts made in this respect have been severely criticised by the users, media and analysts. Political interest has been one of the prime factors that determined the procedure of land supply. This interest superseded the urban and regional planning considerations, objectives and policies of the administration, fiscal liabilities, and even legal limitations. Whereas the upper tiers of government were largely involved in this process, successive Sindh chief ministers played the key role in land allotment due to the infinite authority vested in their office, as well as the political clout that they enjoyed in the national and provincial politics.

Bypassing the laws, regulations and norms thus became a routine exercise that did not let any land supply mechanism to function. In brief, land parcels were allotted due to political pressure from the influentials / party workers and bullies of various kinds. Political bribes were also given in the form of land. The announcement and cancellation of housing schemes was done on the same basis. Government departments, law enforcing agencies, financial institutions and urban development authorities simply became carriers of orders in that working setup.

Traditionally, existing pattern of land ownership has a direct bearing on its transition in the urban scenario. The clan influences, appropriation and possession of land were the important factors that governed the directions of development. When land was in private ownership under traditional landlords, they lobbied with the public sector officials to devise the development policies / priorities to maximise their benefits. Planning and development of communication schemes, transportation projects and investment in infrastructure schemes were largely manipulated on the same basis. The fringes of large cities are the most important choices in this regard. The north western outskirts of Karachi are one of the main locations where local landlords have traditionally benefited from the growth of the city.

The existing patterns of land supply created a visible disparity between the privileged and non-privileged classes. As mentioned earlier, land was procured, developed and sold through the priorities and conditions laid down by the public sector agencies in liaison with the powerful interest groups. These groups attempted to maximise their respective profits by moulding the decision-making in their favour. Land supply was one such prerogative. Thus, the unprivileged had to fend for themselves in the informal locations as per availability of land. Many negative repercussions have developed in the course. The inner city ring of Karachi between 0-10 km radius has most of the upper income groups residing in the area. Squatters and low-income localities are far away, making the poor to commute long distances to their places of work in dilapidated transport systems.

In the procedures of land development and supply, the distinction between formal and informal sector is swiftly diminishing due to the incapability of the formal sector to control the overall factors that affect land market. The concepts and implementation mechanisms of the public sector have begun accepting the existence of informal sector operations to a considerable extent. This is evident from the fact that evictions of informal settlements have been taken after cautions and the government regularises them in the usual working norms.

De-facto ownership of land is now given due regard in the development operations and is often temporarily recognised. Besides, direct transaction of raw land from the Board of Revenue to the user groups is another citation in this respect where the conventional water tight authority is not extended towards such activities. In fact, the acceptance (at least at the conceptual level) of the incremental housing development proves that the government recognises squatting as an option if it is guided through some basic plan.

Keeping a soft attitude towards land grabbers and violators of law shall only dilute the writ of the government. It will not help any political group or party in the long-term. A rational option is to investigate the trends in a scientific manner, analyse the situation and apply the acquired feedback towards formulation of workable legal and administrative mechanisms for land management. Otherwise, the common people of Karachi and the province shall be the ultimate losers!