It was recently reported that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 'advised' the government of Pakistan to reorient its economic policies towards employment creation. Only a couple of days later the de-facto finance minister Hafeez Sheikh (who has had various stints with the World Bank) hinted that the upcoming budget would feature new (probably regressive) taxes and an increase in the power tariff. In other words, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Throughout the 1990s, the international financial institutions (IFIs) were subject to a barrage of criticism from advocates of the third world and environment for propagating a one-size-fits-all policy regime that emphasised fiscal discipline and liberalisation of trade and finance. These policies spelled disaster for one after the other third world economy and the IFIs' credibility took a beating. Thus followed an energetic public relations campaign and the unveiling of the new so-called 'poverty reduction strategies'.

As most who understand global political economy expected, the new strategy was old wine in a new bottle. Even before the poverty reduction eyewash began the IFIs had proven that they remained shamelessly committed to the interests of multinational capital -- rather than the people of the third world and a sustainable model of resource utilization -- during and after the east Asian financial crisis. A decade of poverty reduction strategies exacerbated the third world's debt crisis, notwithstanding rhetorical claims to the contrary, none more vociferous than during the Musharraf-Shaukat Aziz reign in this country.

But fittingly it has been the financial meltdown in the belly of the beast that represents the most damning indictment of the radical free market paradigm championed by the IFIs. More and more individuals within the vast bureaucracy of the IMF have actually acknowledged that there is something fundamentally wrong with what they have been doing, but in the wake of the spectacular collapse of the Greek economy, there appears to be nothing different in the IMF proposals that will accompany the hundreds of billions of dollars in loans taken on by Athens.

As for us, a sorry state of affairs just keeps getting sorrier. The IMF's exhortations to focus on employment creation are neither here nor there. It is impossible for the government to create jobs -- or at least jobs that are based on an expansion of productive activity -- when the vast majority of public expenditures are non-productive, speculative capital is completely unregulated and the cost of production for small and medium-sized agriculturalists and industrialists is unviable.

So, yet another budget farce will be staged over the next few weeks in which no substantive economic issue will actually be raised. No talk of the defence budget; no mention of the fact that the debt repayment burden is borne almost exclusively by the poor; no attempt to reinvigorate imperative reforms, such as land redistribution.

The IFIs will, as usual claim that they have consistently encouraged such agendas (much like they are presently projecting themselves as advocates of employment creation). But then military dictators always insist they are harbingers of 'genuine democracy', imperial despots never fail to invoke equality and freedom, and religious supremacists attempt to convince that they are doing what they are doing to secure eternal salvation. So, while the IFIs cannot be condemned for not pushing a structural change agenda, they can be condemned for claiming to be committed to structural change while, in fact, reinforcing dependency in the most insidious ways.

The other side of the dependency curse is of course our very own economic decision-makers. Even when anti-establishment writers and activists defend democracy and politicians they do so knowing that our mainstream political parties offer very little in the way of an economic alternative to the dictators and empire-builders and that ultimately the IFIs chart our economic futures. Democracy must be defended in spite of this tragic fact but its capitalist character cannot be accepted as the end-game. Political democracy means is a charade without economic democracy.

As ever the problem is not necessarily that our politicians cannot take up real issues but that they wish to avoid confrontation with the powers-that-be. This necessarily demeans democracy; over the past two years the combination of this unwillingness of our elected representatives to do more than engage in 'conciliatory politics' and the media rehabilitating the military's battered image has resulted in more and more ordinary people starting to look back at the Musharraf period as not so bad after all.

There is a perception amongst PPP jialas that the bureaucracy is out to thwart the earnest efforts of their leadership at all possible junctures. There is some truth to this, and there will always remain tensions between the elected and unelected institutions of state, at least so long as the neo-colonial structure of the state remains intact. But the bureaucracy cannot be blamed for economic policy paradigm that this government has chosen to pursue. It is now common practice to induct non-bureaucrats into government institutions and there are enough high-profile individuals that have been inducted by this government with a history of involvement in popular movements to be able to do the right thing.

Many of these individuals will claim that the imperatives of power are complex and that it is much easier to sit on the 'outside' and make demands than actually make things happen on the 'inside'. This is undoubtedly true but then government by the people, for the people, and with the people demands that difficult decisions be made and influential interests be alienated. In the days to come as the budget exercise reaches its culmination, one can only hope that more voices will not join in with the 'at least Musharraf was not this bad' brigade. If this does in fact happen, intelligent observers will understand that this is in large part due to the dictates of the IFIs and the intransigence of the military establishment. But the responsibility of our elected representatives must also be acknowledged. Otherwise things will never get better.

What is the nature of separatism and nationalism in today's Pakistan? One positive aspect of the largely flawed process of the formulation and passing of the 18th Amendment is that it is making us face this existential question we are more comfortable shirking.

Rather than abjure the democratic political process for bringing forth issues dictators may leave capped we need to reaffirm that repression is not eradication -- even when it unambiguously annihilates as it did in Nawab Akbar Bugti's last lair. Compulsive force demands hate. The freedom available in a democracy -- the manifestation and expression of demands and grievances to authorities who genuinely listen -- the civil pursuit of actual popular mutual persuasion and concession -- offer the only durable way of dispelling our existing political deprivations and grudges. Provincial alienations have been compounded over misspent years by rapacity, brutality and deliberate distortion. The issues are clouded by emotion -- how can they not be? What else is love of country and soil and the desire for liberty but a passion?

Such passion infused Pakistan that it forced its way through all the rationalities of opposition and the constraints of practicality. Has the degree of demonstrable failure -- as in the lost eastern wing -- and continuing injustice and blunder in the federating provinces bled away the passion? Or is there enough love for the currently politically incorrect concept of an impregnable space of their own for the subcontinent's Muslims, to preserve the country the sentiment forged? Like it or not, that was the engine of the Pakistan movement; the glue in the provincial bonding.

I would venture that even if Pakistan were taken off the map of the Indian subcontinent as abruptly as it was placed there, another Pakistan would constitute itself: If only because India remains (and so often appears set on becoming only the more so) a political bully. Let India answer to its Tamils, Maoists, Naxalites, Khalistanis, to say nothing of the Kashmir it dare not leave unoccupied -- our perimeter is Pakistan. But given a fissiparous trend in Indian geopolitics and Pakistan's origins, will Pakistan's own political bullying of its pared body politic stop in time?

The Hindu-Muslim divergence was the most graphic distinction in the post Raj prospect; but there was also the matter of the bullying and neglect of an Indian minority by India's majority. How comfortable are Pakistan's minorities, whether minor on the provincial comparative scale; or minor as non-Muslims in the demographic scale? So clearly negative is the answer one flinches.

Discrimination against religious minorities is a national issue, overarching provincial confine and definitions. The monolithic bigotry in which it originates is different from the variable intolerances and biases that plague inter-provincial and federal relations. Even the denial of provincial autonomy is only half the story there. The provinces also lack a sense of federal inclusion: room at the central core. The federation could not exist without its units: Do the units feel it serves some purpose of theirs, the provincial interest, to be federated? A fond argument is that they would be unviable as separate entities -- Nationalist-propelled secessionism is not practicable except as a client state, in which case why wouldn't nationalists mend fences within the federation?

But what if Pakistan itself appears reduced to a satellite state? In a free global market a wannabe client could strike a better bargain.

The resource-rich, comparatively under-populated, enticingly coastal province of Balochistan was and is a prize to cherish or covet. But from the outset Pakistan's central governments have exploited it and repeatedly subjected its people to the debasing savagery of army action in a civil context on grounds of insurgency. Balochistan's sincerely representative provincial leadership and elected governments have been over-ridden, persecuted and stigmatized by rampaging centralised 'mainstreaming' party politics and its beneficiaries. The federation has forced Baloch leaders underground. Baloch statesmen have known both exile and prison. They have died and lost children to violence and torture.

Adding insult to injury, after sixty years or so of Pakistan, the rest of Pakistan's common people hardly know Balochi fellow-citizens, let alone apprehend the texture of life in the province. Its size and its desert geography reinforce the isolation. We admit we guzzled Balochistan's gas before it could. And we grasp roughly, that every civic/political deficiency we have to suffer is inexcusably worse there and leave it at that; or, parrot-like, blame the sirdari system.

Despoiling of resources by a coterie at the top is not a Pakistani phenomenon exclusive to Balochistan. But now the punishments of poverty and inequity and reverberations from the regional logic of America's Af-Pak diplomacy and warring, makes it easy for a frustrated angered province to sever fruitless ties. Balochistan has to be courted and wooed; for, from the point of view of the common citizen in every province, we as a federation need that province much more than it needs us.

But conciliatory effort, let alone an abject plea for a chance to atone, lags. Security concerns presently inhibit ordinary social movement and civil contacts. As for officialdom; federal leaders still function in terms of who determines corporate contracts and which cronies and 'vested-interest'-sort locals can share and help cook up the development pie. The older federalist tradition of Baloch leadership is waning. There may soon be no emblematic Baloch leaders to speak for and to the province and carry it with them.

The 18th Amendment almost foundered over naming the NWFP Pakhtunkhwa; an old enough demand. Resentments there at complaints about interference in elected provincial government were rather older. When the NAP coalition government in Balochistan was set aside in February 1973 (law and order problems of course and naughty nationalism), the NWFP's JUI-led coalition stepped down in protest over the disregard of provincial rights and in solidarity with trans-province party allies. There was recourse to Governor's rule in Balochistan and NWFP. Yet, the doyen of NAP, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, for some time thereafter led the opposition in parliament which also means the party accepted and moved within the configuration of the federation. But that did not save Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa leaders from being deemed Pakhtunistan-minded irredentists and made answerable as such.

It is sadly illuminating to note that when the Bhutto ascendant wanes at the centre, the party uses much of the rhetoric of Sindhi nationalism/secessionism. But when it dominates federally, the emphases change. Is it edifying that initially the exigencies of pragmatic politics for Bhutto's usurper demanded truck with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa leadership as well as the heroes of Baloch nationalism? He disbanded the infamous Hyderabad Tribunal. Porous indeed is the stratification of provincial demand and central need! Politics are not invariably played by those democratically or otherwise entrenched at the federal level in the federal interest: personal survival and party advancement may have primacy. Thus, the prism on Wali Khan's heirs with Bhutto's heirs in the federation is quite different today -- as is the prism on ZAB's once indispensably talented cousin in Sindh.

This April, when the ludicrous NWFP name tag was scrapped constitutionally, the Hazara division of a nominally-changed province erupted with a demand for a new province to itself because it didn't like the new name. That is not a very substantial reason for a new province! Is any change touching upon the existing provincial equation best avoided because it might give nationalist separatism leeway? How and why do such outbursts build up and explode? But in parliament and in the media the critical point at issue remained the principle of undue presidential muscle or malicious attempts to thwart constitutional reform.

Nawaz Sharif at the eleventh hour, once again, demurred about Pakhtunkhwa and judicial tinkering but rapidly decided his protest was better made never than late. He was not strong enough to take the opprobrium of blocking the essentially desired constitutional repeal that was the centrepiece of the otherwise oft disregarded COD he and Benazir penned as partners in exile.

As things now are, the demand for a splitting of Hazara-Pakhtunkhwa in terms of provincial space and ethnic demographics is making the demand from the Seraiki belt resonate more strongly. Any embarrassment of the PML(N) in Punjab suits the provincial politics of the ruling party in the federal coalition. But it could make it harder to keep the spectre of Jinnahpur from rising. Relinquishing Karachi and some of the hinterland doesn't suit party interests in Sindh, or Sindhis for that matter.

The PPP has always held Sindh's restiveness as a party card to be played when party federal presence is imperilled. Yet, Sindhi nationalist grievance, encapsulated in the judicial murder of their icon Bhutto; and Zia's deadly use of Mohajir ethnicity in Sindh's provincial space as a counterweight to the PPP, is very real. Given perceptions of Zardari cronyism and appropriation of the Bhutto party machine, Sindhi nationalist and pre-Zardari Bhutto loyalist grievance could well increase and take the terribly conflicted form of clashing with PPP federal and thence provincial politics in Sindh!

Meanwhile, in the effort to diminish PML(N) strength in Punjab itself -- the key province in federal domination -- PPP enthusiasts and officials smirk at the trouble and unrest fomenting in that usually well-contented province. Whose book does that suit? We cannot afford a style of politicking in federal government that hunts with the hound and runs with hare for provincial party gains.

Setting out to look at nationalism turned sour in the federal republic, one ends up focusing on the general style of politics and interconnected turmoil. Pakistan's nationalist angst may only be addressed holistically. Can our public representatives persuade citizens they have the situation well in hand when many fear they may not even have grasped it?

Pervez Hoodbhoy is a familiar name among critics who see Pakistani society in the context of extremism and terrorism. A distinctively fierce critic of nuclear weapons and technology, Hoodbhoy is a professor of nuclear and high energy physics at the Department of Physics, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He has delivered lectures at US and European research centres and universities. In addition to his BS, MS, and PhD degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he has received Baker Award for Electronics and Abdus Salam Prize for Mathematics.

He was awarded UNESCO's Kalinga Prize in 2003 on science. The same year, he was invited to the Pugwash Council. He has also received the Joseph A. Burton Award from the American Physical Society.

His book, Islam and Science -- Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality, has been translated into seven languages. Understandably, Hoodbhoy is one of the most sought-after commentator on nuclear and related issues today. Recently, TNS sat with Pervez Hoodbhoy and focused on various aspects of Pakistani state, society, and regional affairs. Excerpts follow. The News on Sunday: What, in your opinion, is the root cause of religious extremism-terrorism in Pakistan?

Pervez Hoodbhoy: It came from Pakistan's foreign policy in the early 1980s. The US and Pakistan, with Saudi funding, created the deadly jihadist machinery after the USSR invaded Afghanistan. For over a decade, they armed, financed, and trained the mujahideen. Once the USSR withdrew and disintegrated, the infrastructure should have been disbanded. But then Pakistani generals, like Mirza Aslam Beg, decided to use jihadists to conquer Kashmir and establish strategic depth in Afghanistan. Those mujahideen, "assets" as they were called, are now slaughtering our soldiers and officers whenever and wherever they can.

TNS: Has Pakistan been misdirected because no political or intellectual input seems to have gone into policy making?

PH: Civilian and military governments are to be blamed for today's catastrophic situation. Although he denies it now, let us remember that Nawaz Sharif was thick with Musharraf on Kargil and had accompanied him to visit the troops there. Our insistence on Kashmir being the number one problem is the cause of many of our sorrows. We did not realise that the well-being of Pakistan, and addressing the grievances of Balochistan and Sindh, is more important than liberating Kashmir from Indian occupation.

TNS: Is there any logic on the part of our decision-makers to put Kashmir ahead of people's welfare?

PH: We have a mental block because we teach our children that Kashmir is the 'unfinished' agenda of partition and that Pakistan is incomplete without it. But this way of thinking is exactly what made the army the dominant force in Pakistan. Kashmir also made us dependent on the West because the money for creating a large fighting force could not come from anywhere else. Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO, allowing the US to heavily influence our military leaders, if not control them. We forgot that the most important thing is to educate our population and provide them with employment, housing, electricity, etc. But let us not blame the military alone for this. It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who promised war of a thousand years against India.

TNS: Do you think social alienation has made people to resort to religion in Pakistan?

PH: Across the world, when all else fails people turn towards God. Lawlessness, breakdown of the social contract, the corruption of rulers, and manifest economic injustice means that there is less and less faith in the government of the day. So, people get attracted more and more to hawkers of various religious utopias. Hence the explosion of religiosity that one sees today. It has made Pakistan a totally different country from what it was in its first 30-40 years. Today, if you ask a person on the street whether he considers himself Pakistani first or Muslim first, the big majority would say 'Muslim first'. This is the completely opposite in India where a Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or a Christian would say he is an Indian first. This means that we are failing to construct a nation. A nation by definition is made of people who share common values, ideals, the same way of thinking, and who are bound together by the notion that there is common good in being together. Religion is certainly one component of Pakistan's nationhood, but just one. It is inadequate by itself because Afghans, Iranians, and Saudis would then also have to be considered Pakistanis by this definition.

TNS: This sounds realistic but do you think a significant number of us believe this?

PH: The Baloch and Sindhis are certainly a significant number, and they certainly believe that Pakistan should be more than an Islamic monoculture. Sadly, our rulers keep harping upon unity and denying diversity. That one-unit mentality, imposed by General Ayub Khan, brought about the alienation that we see today. Even the fall of Dhaka did not open the eyes of our rulers to the realisation that people's history, culture, and aspirations are just as important as religion. When shall we learn? Balochistan is in open revolt and Sindh is not far behind.

TNS: Will Pakistan stay together? And what, in your opinion, should be the collective goals of Pakistanis?

PH: Pakistan must stay together because it makes sense for us to be together as a geographical unit. If you try to separate Punjab from Sindh, it won't work. The Punjab would have no outlet into the sea and would be locked in by India. On the other hand, Sindh is definitely dependent on Punjab for water. So, I not only want Pakistan to stay together, but to thrive. This requires that we have peace with our neighbours and stop using jihad as a secret weapon. Then, we need a new federal arrangement that gives much greater powers to the provinces, a fairer taxation system, accountability of rulers, and revamping of the legal system. Above all, we must have educational system that emphasises modern knowledge and civic values rather than one which prepares us only for the hereafter.

TNS: In the backdrop of this alarming situation, don't you think there is a need of a new social contract among people and nationalities of Pakistan?

PH: The notion of a social contract is a very critical one. The citizens of a state owe allegiance to the state because they feel that in return they get protection for their lives and property, and that their legal and economic rights will be respected. So rulers can come and go, but the individual citizen's contract with the state remains intact. When rulers flout the law of the land, it signifies a serious problem. If a state cannot protect its people from internal challenges, then society starts falling apart. I am alarmed by the extent to which citizens have taken recourse to private security agencies. For example, every house in every city's housing society has multiple guards. If we could straighten out the barbed wire in our cities, it would be enough to go around the world several times.

TNS: So, it is not just the crisis of the state but also that of society?

PH: Society is indeed gripped by a crisis and has moved towards factionalisation as a protective move. It is both deeply class-ridden and sect-ridden. Entire mohallahs have only Shias, Bohris, Ismailis or Christians living within them. The rich have put enormous walls around themselves, and are increasingly putting physical barriers to prevent being visited by those from poorer parts of a city. In part, it was the state which has been responsible for creating separate abodes for the rich and the poor. Islamabad's different sectors, for instance, were designed for different socio-economic classes. Differentiation and discrimination, not integration, were built into the city's initial planning.

TNS: Is a classless society possible in Pakistan?

PH: Eventually, yes. But we have lost a lot of time, so this will not be achieved for another generation or more. Secularism and socialism alone can guarantee a prosperous and peaceful Pakistan. We have a very diverse population and cannot afford discrimination, particularly at the level of the constitution. The concept of minority, as given in the Objectives Resolution, is fundamentally incompatible with democracy and nation-building. It must be dispensed with.

TNS: Do you agree that clerics in Pakistan are playing the role clerics play elsewhere, i.e., that they become agents of the ruling class?

PH: No, I do not agree. Clerics have their own interests, and often their goals coincide with those of the ruling clique. But it is an over-simplification to say that they are mere agents. The mullah's importance increases in direct proportion to the role that religion plays in society. In Pakistan's earlier years, there was less public role of religion and mullahs were relatively less important than today. Madrassas were few and far between, and often viewed with pity as places for famished students. But today they have a lot of money, fancy computers, and the maulvis look very well-fed. Rather than think of mullahs as agents of the ruling class, one sees that they are rulers in places like FATA.

TNS: Various experts point at different power centres in Pakistan. Have the clerics also emerged as a new power centre?

PH: Pakistan's power centres include the army, the elected government, and the religious establishment. The religious establishment is not entirely unified or coherent, nor does it get a sizable proportion of the popular vote (except what we saw with the MMA in NWFP, but that was an exception). However, it has a disproportionate influence upon society. The sermon before Friday prayers gives clerics the opportunity to drill ideas into a captive audience. Sometimes it is about religious affairs, but often about national and international affairs. The contents are frequently inflammatory, leading the society towards intolerance and an inability to live in peace with itself or others.

TNS: It is also said that clerics in Pakistan are also agents of depoliticisation and status quo forces?

PH: Clerics in Pakistan have their own agenda. They want to rule. Although different sects have different versions of utopia, they all believe that solving social, economic, and political problems demands returning to some imagined past. The failure of looking for solutions to new problems in old times may be clear to us but not to them. Because they are rivals of each other, they have been unable to create a coherent political platform. The day that unity happens in Pakistan I think we would be in for a revolution -- and a very bloody one.

TNS: Would you agree that political vacuum in Pakistan in terms of long years of military rule and deliberate depoliticisation has been the main cause of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan?

PH: We cannot just blame everything on the military, although it is doubtlessly guilty. It is a fact that our secular governments were corrupt, and that they also pandered to the mullah. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's concessions emboldened them. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did nothing to reverse Zia's Islamisation. Musharraf played with the jihadists until they became his sworn enemies. Weaknesses of the political leadership and its tenuous legitimacy, have strengthened religious forces.

TNS: Is there anything like Islamic socialism, such as what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had come up with?

PH: It was just rhetoric. ZAB tried to please both socialists and the Islamic parties by inventing this new thing. But it had no wings and could not fly. It is curious that ZAB spoke of socialism but there was no land reform in his tenure. His large land holdings remained intact and were inherited by his children. ZAB's attempt to forge Muslim unity worked well for a while -- or at least had that appearance. Today, even the pretence of unity has disappeared, as the Palestinians have tragically discovered.

TNS: How relevant is Marxism and Leninism to the contemporary world?

PH: Personally, I think Marx had some interesting ideas. He had an exceptionally good understanding of the social forces of his time, i.e. the Industrial Age. However, contemporary society is much more complex. He underestimated the power of ideology, religion, and ethnicity. These factors have turned out to be extremely powerful in determining world affairs. So it is not just an individual relationship with the means of production that determines consciousness. So, while I give Marx maximum credit for understanding and explaining his day and age, his predictions proved less than prophetic.

TNS: Is there a possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan?

PH: It is unlikely but one cannot rule it out. There have been four situations (1987, 1990, 1999, 2002) where there was talk of nuclear conflict and nuclear threats were hurled in both directions. People say these tense situations did not escalate into war itself because nuclear deterrence kicked in. That is, of course true. But is there a guarantee that every crisis will resolve itself peacefully? Can a conventional conflict be always prevented from escalating upwards? Certainly, there is no mathematical theorem that says this.

TNS: Why have Pakistani universities been unable to produce scientists of international repute?

PH: Science and scholarship is a product of thinking minds. In our universities we don't think, we merely reproduce what is already known. There is little practice with problem solving, or dealing with new and unusual situations. Universities will not improve merely by dumping more money in them. You can fill libraries with books and labs with the best equipment, but it won't make much difference by itself. Pakistani universities today have more equipment and buildings than ever before but the quality of learning is no better. So what we need is attitudinal change, a new culture that values learning. We must stop constraining our students both intellectually as well as socially. Boys and girls are separated from each other, and our girl students are disappearing under the burqa. When I teach my class I can't see the faces of half of them. When you have girls thus hidden away, they are not going to be intellectually creative and curious. Instead they become passive note-takers.

TNS: This attitude change seems to have led to behavioral changes?

PH: Absolutely. One can see growing conservatism on the campuses. One also sees that free expression is tightly controlled by university authorities. On the one hand, despite the present government decision to lift the ban on the students' union activities, university administrations have not allowed them to work. On the other hand, the goons of Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT) rampage frequently. They recently terrorised and beat up students and teachers at Punjab University. IJT activists killed a student at Peshawar University just because he was listening to music. So, we have fascist-religious thugs who are a curse to our universities.

When Norwegians celebrate their National Day on the 17th of May, schoolchildren and adults, dressed up in their Sunday best throng to participate in processions in villages, towns and cities all over the country. People go to church and they have friendly sports competitions and other games. In recent years, the 17th of May processions and other festive activities include sizeable numbers of Pakistani children and other immigrants in the growing community of "New Norwegians".

Those who live in Oslo, have the unforgettable opportunity of passing by the Royal Palace where the King and Queen and other members of the royal family greet them from the balcony. And don't even think that a Pakistani, Somali or Afghan schoolboy or schoolgirl feels anything but entirely Norwegian on this day.

It is indeed a great day. But how are the immigrants doing in the other 364 days in the year? The short answer is that most of them are doing 'quite ok', most of the time.

Norway was a homogeneous country till the late 1960s, with most people being ethnic Germanic, save for a small Sami minority in the far north of the country. Since then, it has changed, and many immigrants have 'discovered' Norway, starting with relatively large numbers of Pakistanis in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There was no need for a visa that time. Today, there are a total of well over 30,000 Pakistani-Norwegians in the country, with about two thirds living in the capital Oslo. About a quarter of the city's 0.6 million inhabitants are immigrants, and some 15 percent are Muslims, making the city multicultural and exciting for foreigners as well as locals. In Denmark, there are about 20,000 Pakistanis, in Sweden about 6,000 and in Finland just 5,600.

In total, there are about 500,000 immigrants from various countries in Norway, in a population of 4.8 million, i.e., about 10 percent. About half of the immigrants come from outside Europe, with about 100,000 from a small group of countries, notably Pakistan and its neighbours Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, India and Turkey.

Remittances from Pakistanis abroad are essential for the economy of Pakistan. A study carried out in 2005 by NCG, a Norwegian consultancy firm, showed that the remittances from Pakistani-Norwegians were sizeable and larger than the regular Norwegian development aid to the country, although it is difficult to know the exact amount of remittances because the value of gifts and other items are not known, and money is often taken home in connection with visits. Regular transfers are registered but they only constitute a fraction of the transfers.

The number of labour migrants from Pakistan to Norway has gone down in recent years and most Pakistani newcomers today are close relatives and spouses, categorised as 'family reunification'. For all immigrants and visitors to Norway, the screening is tight.

Pakistani-Norwegians maintain close contact with their country of origin and most still marry from Pakistan, often a relative. Some marry from within the Pakistani-Norwegian community, some from Denmark where there is also a large Pakistani community, and other European countries. Pakistani-Norwegians rarely marry ethnic Norwegians. Immigrants from Iraq and neighbouring countries are less true to traditional endogamy. Unfortunately, some young people, especially women are forced, or pressurized into marriage against their own will. Norwegian law sees this as a serious crime.

Most Pakistanis are doing well in Norway and most are well integrated, but rarely assimilated into the Norwegian society. They form a stable, but slightly separate community. Many children, especially young girls do well at school and university. Young boys usually do better in business and jobs, but today they too are beginning to catch up with their sisters' education performance. There is scope for broader participation of Pakistani-Norwegians and other immigrants in politics, recruitment into senior posts in the civil service, including the foreign service, and other career jobs in the public and private sectors.

The Norwegian government and civil society play active roles in realising further integration and diversity, together with the Pakistani-Norwegians and other immigrant groups themselves. This is important to do because young immigrants are getting impatient, wishing for faster integration, career opportunities and a greater say in society. This is also important for resident Norwegians, who need to live in harmony with the "New Norwegians".

Today, there is debate about the degree of the best integration and diversity in the Norwegian society. Questions are being raised about dual citizenship, for example, which Norway does not allow. In the future, it is likely that the Norwegian society will be more diverse and therefore richer, and if all goes well, the majority of "old Norwegians" will realise that the "new Norwegians" actually make important contributions to the country. Resident Norwegians can indeed benefit from cultural, entrepreneurial, and business inputs from the immigrants, for example from Pakistanis, who are more business-minded than average Norwegians.

Unfortunately, a small group of Pakistani-Norwegians have some major social and behavioural problems and a relatively high dropout rate at secondary school, which is free but not compulsory. There is high crime rate in some Pakistani sub-groups and immigrant neigbourhoods in the capital, higher than in the average Norwegian society. Some Pakistani-Norwegians and other immigrants live in poor residential enclaves. It is essential to seek innovative ways and means to integrate immigrants in the mainstream society, or in positive, relatively large sub-groups. The new Department of Integration and Diversity (IMDI) plays an active role in this work. When the Deputy Director General S. Fjeldvaer visited Pakistan last week, she expressed optimism as for the role of the Pakistani-Norwegians in the country.

In the years to come, closer cultural, trade and institutional linkages, and people-to-people contact should be expanded and deepened between Norway and Pakistan, and with Afghanistan and other countries in the region. How can this be done? How can the happiest and most beneficial integration and diversity take place in Norway, at a time of internationalisation and globalisation -- at a time, too, when people's needs for growing roots and feeling belonging again are being realised?

Two new research projects will shed light on key aspects -- one on integration and diversity in the suburbs of Oslo, coordinated by Professor Thomas Hylland-Eriksen, University of Oslo, and one in the sending areas in Gujrat, coordinated by Dr. Fauzia Maqsood, University of Gujrat. That latter will investigate what it was that attracted Pakistanis to migrate to far-away and cold country of Norway in the far north, and the researchers will look at the existing linkages between the people in both countries, because linkages must be maintained and strengthened.

As Norwegians, either we are old ones or new citizens, we are beginning to realise that we receive valuable cultural and other inputs from the "New Norwegians". At the same time, not least as we celebrate the Norwegian National Day, we appreciate the Norwegian values of equality, fairness, inclusiveness and equal opportunities for all. Gender equality is taken for granted today, well, to the extent that we men sometimes almost become disadvantaged. We don't have to like everything that the 'old Norwegians' like, or all ways of the new ones. Often, many 'old Norwegians' may have developed international taste, too, and learnt a few things from foreigners and immigrants. In other words, Norwegians are not totally Norwegian any more.

I believe that the Norwegian National Day, the 17th of May is the day to celebrate not only the values of the 'old Norwegians', but also the inputs that the newcomers make to the Norwegian society. I hope that we all can see that immigrants and refugees are assets to the new culture they become part of -- without having to accept all aspects of the life in the new land, but accepting most of it and the best of it. The way Pakistani-Norwegian school children behave on the National Day, not only taking full part in it, but also taking obvious ownership of the celebrations, promises well for a small country's greater future. I believe all Norwegians, including immigrants, are proud of their country. And I hope, too, that Pakistani-Norwegians are proud of sharing some traditions from Kharian, Lalamusa or elsewhere in Pakistan with the inhabitants in their new homeland, 'old Norwegians' and immigrants from elsewhere in the world.

The writer is a Norwegian Social Scientist currently based in Islamabad.

Email: atlehetland@yahoo.com