We have pegged today's Special Report on the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington on April 12-13 and the on-going NPT Review Conference being held in New York from May 3-28. Theoretically speaking, the end goal of both conferences remains the same – disarmament. Practically, the goals vary between nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, arms reduction and disarmament of course. The Nuclear Security Summit discussed an added aspect – nuclear terrorism. It was aimed at, as A.H. Nayyar describes in his piece, "raising global concerns on and countering the threat of nuclear weapons or material getting into terrorists' hands."

Nuclear disarmament is believed to be an impossible task, realistically speaking, and yet statesmen around the world keep uttering the possibility in one context or the other. The latest in this regard was the speech in Prague by none other than US President Obama who mentioned the possibility of global elimination of nuclear weapons once again.

Disarmament was institutionalised through Article VI of NPT which obligates all signatories "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control" ever since it came into force in 1970. There have been regular five yearly review conferences since then which have, by and large, remained inconsequential.

What has worked against this normative framework provided in international treaties like NPT, CTBT and FMCT is the doctrine of deterrence. Deterrence is the justification for the major powers or the nuclear-haves to focus on arms reduction instead of disarmament.

Against this larger backdrop sits the case of two antagonistic neighbours – India and Pakistan -- who are de facto nuclear powers and for whom the disarmament debate figures nowhere. What does the nuclear capability entail for these two poor countries is of course our most important concern and is pertinently addressed in Moeed Yusuf's analysis as well as Praful Bidwai's interview.

Like always, The News on Sunday sides with the idealists' worldview while the real world looks completely different.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 generated tremendous anxiety across the world. A controversial debate on the nuclear umbrella's impact on India-Pakistan relations ensued between proliferation experts. Twelve years on, while there has been no all-out conventional war, these South Asian powers have frequently found themselves embroiled in near-war crises or, in the case of Kargil, a 'mini-war'.

Many contend that this shows immaturity on the part of India and Pakistan and that their propensity for risk-taking perpetually keeps the region at the brink of a nuclear war. Such a view is too simplistic.

A deeper look at the South Asian nuclear equation suggests that while the track record since 1998 leaves much to be desired and while the future signs are also worrisome, the outcome is precisely what classic deterrence theorists would have predicted.

First, the nuclear umbrella ought to be partially credited for the absence of a full-blown conventional war. At least three serious crises occurred between 1998 and 2008 and yet, none escalated to an outright war. Nuclear weapons, among other factors of course, did play on the minds of decision makers as they chose to avoid escalation.

Second, nuclear weapons did not bring stability in the relationship. Surprising as it may seem to many who follow the popular discourse on nuclear weapons in South Asia, intrinsic to the concept of nuclear deterrence is a greater likelihood of low-level crises. The 'stability-instability paradox' -- as it is called -- holds that while nuclear weapons may keep nuclear armed rivals from launching full blown military campaigns, they will increase the possibility of either side taking advantage of obsoleteness of war and initiating limited incursions. This is even more likely if one of the two parties is revisionist in its policies, i.e. it wants to alter the status quo per se and is willing to pay a fairly high price for it.

In the South Asian context then, Pakistan's claim on Kashmir implies that it would consider low-level conflicts as permissible, rather safe, under the nuclear umbrella. This would explain Kargil. The subsequent crises were triggered by non-state actors who were operating on the same principle. In fact, Indian threats of limited retaliation in future crises are also credible only due to the nuclear umbrella.

Expecting nuclear weapons to provide stability reflects a misreading of the limits of deterrence. Stability in such adversarial relationships comes through constant efforts at conflict resolution and peace building. Addressing the core differences, continuous dialogue and confidence building measures are what bring stability, not presence of nuclear weapons. In fact, if anything, nuclear weapons make the task of conflict resolution and peace building more difficult. After all, low-level crises are the most obvious way to derail peace bids; India and Pakistan know this well from their own experience.

Third, nuclear weapons have not brought about a reduction in conventional arms spending. While many have argued that by making all-out war obsolete, nuclear weapons reduce the need for countries to continue expanding conventional arsenals, empirics signal otherwise. For one, those who understand military strategy would highlight, correctly, that too weak a conventional capability itself adds to instability by forcing the weaker party to maintain an extremely low nuclear threshold. Any crisis under such a scenario brings nuclear weapons into the picture very early on.

Add to this the fact that nuclear weapons are essentially non-military tools entrusted to a military task. Therefore, they are not necessarily liked -- at least not as substitutes -- by militaries whose entire training, orientation and vested interests dictate a continued emphasis on conventional weaponry. The Cold War saw this dynamic and so has South Asia. Both India and Pakistan maintain that their strategy remains predicated on conventional deterrence with nuclear weapons lurking in the background as a last resort option. The military establishments would detest any move away from the status quo.

Fourth, the India-Pakistan rivalry has assumed a purely 'relative' dimension. Both sides claim to be following a minimum credible deterrence policy but one that it is dynamic in nature -- it depends on the other's capability. Pakistan defines its minimum in relation to India while India looks towards China to make the case for further upgradation. This is a slippery slope as it inevitably leads countries to play the tit-for-tat numbers game in terms of upgradation. Yet, as the Cold War experience shows, it is virtually inevitable, especially for two traditional antagonists in the nascent stage of nuclear development.

Indeed, Pakistan and India have fallen in trap. They remain very concerned about each other's programme. Both base their fissile material, warhead and missile production decisions on what is happening across the border. Psychologically, both sides continue to be nervous and insecure about their capabilities. Neither is likely to feel comfortable till it has attained a triad and accumulated fissile material sufficient to produce warheads that are multiples of its actual requirements for minimum deterrence.

The outlook towards the nuclear programme in Pakistan and India has implications for the drive towards global disarmament. The current mindsets suggest that these two sides may be the last ones to jump on the disarmament bandwagon. The global disarmament debate, instead of pushing them to consider the option seriously has prompted them to see the next decade or so as a temporary window which may close as 'Global Zero' matures. Corollary: they will be seeking to expand their arsenals as quickly as possible in the interim.

The South Asia of 2020 will in all likelihood be a nuclear armed one; Pakistan and India would have expanded their arsenals significantly. The trend would be much the same on the conventional front. They would also continue to deflect the disarmament issue. Moreover, unless their outstanding disputes are resolved, crises and thus instability at the lower-end of the escalation spectrum shall remain commonplace.

The outside world must own up to its share of the blame for what we face in South Asia.

For one, no serious effort has been put in by the international community to help the two sides resolve their outstanding disputes. Even behind-the-scenes involvement has been intermittent and hesitant. Next, the arms race is fueled further courtesy of controversial and discriminatory engagements such as the India-US nuclear deal. Further, the non-proliferation world has failed to seriously consider a mechanism to formally bring Pakistan and India into the global nuclear regime. The NPT plus two (or three if Israel is included) option has been dismissed without due consideration. On the other hand, Pakistan is being criticised for holding up negotiations on FMCT but no one has yet made a good case to Pakistan for withdrawing its opposition; sheer pressure will certainly not do it.

Any improvement would require comforting Pakistan and India about the world's acceptance of their nuclear programmes but in a manner where neither feels discriminated against. There is also a greater need for the US and others to play a more active role in helping resolve outstanding issues, nudging the two sides to develop robust crisis prevention and management mechanisms, and remaining realistic about the disarmament potential in South Asia until disputes are alive. These steps are just as important for the future of non-proliferation as they are for Pakistan and India to avoid perpetuating an arms race and risking a catastrophe.

Praful Bidwai, a senior Indian journalist, has made his mark as a social science researcher and a human rights and peace activist. One of South Asia's most widely published and quoted columnists, his articles have appeared regularly in local and foreign publications, including India's The Times of India, Frontline, The Kashmir Times, Pakistan's The News International, Bangladesh's The Daily Star, and also The Guardian and Le Monde Diplomatique.

A former Senior Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Bidwai has also been a member of the Indian Council for Social Science Research and the Central Advisory Board on Education. Besides, he is the founder-member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, an umbrella organisation of Indian peace groups, and Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament. He received the Sean MacBride International Peace Prize 2000, International Peace Bureau, Geneva and London, one of the world's oldest peace organisations. The News on Sunday recently had a telephonic interview with Bidwai excerpts from which follow.

The News on Sunday: Can we justify nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan under geo-strategic compulsions and constraints? Can we say that India and Pakistan are more secure today after conducting nuclear explosions?

Praful Bidwai: No, I don't think so. India was not under any compulsion to conduct nuclear tests either in 1974 or later in 1998. The government that came to power in 1988 was the government of the BJP that had long been obsessed with military power and nuclear weapons, regardless of India's security environment. It fulfilled that agenda as soon as it came to power nationally. It made that decision in total secrecy. The cabinet didn't discuss it. Even the army was kept in the dark about this. But the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was a party to it. In fact, it ordered the tests in keeping with its jingoism. Pakistan merely followed India in detonating nuclear bombs. It conducted as many as six nuclear explosions to 'get even with' India. In my view, Pakistan and India damaged and degraded their own security by going nuclear; the reason being that nuclear weapons don't give security. They are weapons of terror; they create great fear and insecurity. In fact, Pakistan could have seized the moral high ground by not following suit. Now the two are competing with one another and getting drawn into a nuclear arms race. This reminds us of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. The nuclear weapons went up from a few dozens to a few hundreds and then to thousands and, at the peak, exceeded 85,000 nuclear weapons. The whole world became more insure, not secure.

TNS: As one of the founding members of Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND), what do you think the movement has achieved so far? You are also one of the leading voices of Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, India. To what extent are the common people in India and Pakistan alive to the issues concerning nuclear weapons?

PB: Well, I think the ordinary Indians do not want or like nuclear weapons. According to opinion polls, more than 70 percent of all Indians are opposed to making or using nuclear weapons. I am not sure about Pakistan but I won't be surprised if the numbers are no different in Pakistan. People know that nuclear weapons lead to an arms race and higher military spending, at the expense of popular welfare, indeed bread and butter. Unfortunately, we are spending three times more on the military than we did in 1998 -- more on nuclear weapons than we do on health or education. So, people have been able to make a response but anti-nuclear weapons movements are not strong enough to make a considerable policy impact.

TNS: Do you believe India and Pakistan can cover some ground on the issue of nuclear disarmament at a time when the rest of the world seems to have failed? What, according to you, can be a roadmap to a nuclear-free South Asia (if it is a realistic approach)?

PB: See, the world is at least talking about the threat posed by nuclear weapons and thinking about reducing the number of weapons. But Pakistan and India are not even thinking about reducing their nuclear weapons; they are only adding to their nuclear arsenals. India is building new nuclear-military facilities and expanding its production of plutonium. So is Pakistan. We are one region in the world where a nuclear war could possibly break out. We came close to it in Kargil in 1999. And, in 2001, in the 10-month-long eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, we twice brandished our nuclear weapons. No lessons have been learnt by our respective leaderships so far. We remain gung-ho.

TNS: To what extent do the hawks on either side prevent the two countries from moving towards nuclear disarmament? Do they have any role?

PB: Absolutely. Hawks have played a huge role in this regard. Despite the launching of the dialogue process in 2004 and peace moves by non-government organisations, India and Pakistan never actually took their feet off the nuclear and missile accelerators. Now that does not lead you towards peace, does it? You cannot attain peace by having more nuclear weapons.

Here, civil society has to make a push. Because we know that peace is not only possible but also crucial for the region. How can nuclear weapons be a deterrent when both the countries continue to spend a huge amount of money on their conventional weapons? We can achieve a 20 percent reduction in the military budget. That can make a huge difference. I would like Manmohan Singh to fulfill the Congress Party's own promise of updating the thoughtful and very comprehensive plan which Rajiv Gandhi put forward in 1988 for the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the world.

TNS: How do you evaluate efforts aimed at nuclear security and disarmament, especially in South Asia and North Korea?

PB: After George W Bush came to power, all efforts aimed at reconciliation between North and South Korea were sabotaged. Obama has not changed the policy laid down by his predecessor. In this backdrop, I don't see Asia stabilising for some time. And I don't see Pakistan and India reaching reconciliation on this issue. What we seem to fail to understand is that if there is a nuclear accident, say in South Asia, the radiation fallout is not going to remain confined to the borders. It will spread in the entire region and beyond. So, all the countries should be deeply concerned about this. Forums like SAARC will not work unless all the countries of the region, our neighbours, feel secure and safe.

TNS: How do you view the role of IAEA in trying to make it a nuclear-free world?

PB: The IAEA has a very limited legitimate role. It has been used selectively. It has often compiled wrong reports. It remains only an account keeper of nuclear weapons. And I oppose it because it allows use of nuclear energy. I believe if it allows countries to use nuclear energy for producing electricity there is every possibility that the technology will be used to make nuclear bombs eventually.

The Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington DC on April 12-13, needs to be seen in the light of a series of events in recent months around the issue of nuclear weapons. It started with President Obama's speech in Prague on US's nuclear policy. Then there were the revised American nuclear posture, the new agreement between USA and Russia on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the USA, the US declaration of nuclear weapons in its stocks, and the continuing Review Conference of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and now even Russia's intent to remove opacity from her nuclear arsenal. In Prague, Obama even talked of global elimination of nuclear weapons. These steps point to a shift in the US policy away from the aggressive posture adopted by the Bush administration. This is good news for the world.

The bad news is that the US actions still speak more of adherence to the old arms control policies than actual steps towards disarmament.

The Prague speech had two significant points: restarting negotiations with Russia on arms reduction and showing a resolve to secure all materials related to nuclear weapons in the world.

In the reviewed nuclear posture, the US for the first time removed a nuclear first strike from any retaliation to a non-nuclear WMD attack on the US soil or forces.

The START-like agreement with Russia envisages a one third cut in the deployed strategic weapons on both the sides. Some circles believe that this is a significant cut, although many believe that the cut could easily have been much deeper without compromising any deterrent value.

Removal of opacity from the size of nuclear arsenal is another first coming from the USA. From amongst the nuclear weapon states, both de jure and de facto, USA is only the second nation after Britain to openly declare the size of its arsenal.

What, however, stands out as the dominating theme in the US statements and initiatives is that arms control rather than abolition remains the central focus of the US policy.

Moves against nuclear weapons come in three forms: nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, arms reduction, and disarmament. The first limits the spread of nuclear weapons technology to those countries that do not already have nuclear weapons. International treaties which militate against proliferation are the NPT, the CTBT and the treaty being negotiated on ending production of fissile materials (FMCT). Establishment of nuclear weapons free zones, when the zones do not include any weapon states, also falls in this category. All these agreements are also essential for nuclear disarmament, but are looked at suspiciously as a ruse by weapon states to stop others from entering the nuclear club.

Arms reduction agreements are also seen as essential moves in the direction of disarmament. Yet they are more managing nuclear arsenals and deterrence than eliminating nuclear weapons. An arms reduction agreement cannot be regarded as a sure step in the direction of disarmament. After all, some of the arms reduction agreements have been around for decades, yet the total abolition is not in sight.

Notwithstanding all exhortations from Obama for a world free of nuclear weapons, none of the steps taken since the Prague speech assures an early abolition of nuclear weapons. Use of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of the US policy. First use also remains a US policy. To nuclear abolitionists, supporting and pushing for preserving the NPT, for reaching an agreement on ceasing production of fissile materials and asking other countries to join nuclear weapon free zones seem mere arms control exercises.

The nuclear security summit brought out a new aspect in the arms control exercise. It aimed at raising global concerns on and countering the threat of nuclear weapons or material getting into terrorists' hands.

Obama hosted the summit with the purpose of seeking an international cooperation against nuclear terrorism. Securing nuclear materials and preventing illicit trade in nuclear materials were taken to be the central point of this cooperation.

The summit was regarded a success because it added a new point to the global nuclear agenda and generated a global consensus on the issue. The world leaders also agreed on various points of action in this regard, including strengthening the security of nuclear materials within their territories and reducing the stocks of fissile materials to reduce the possibility of getting them into wrong hands. The leaders agreed on a time frame of four years to completely secure the entire nuclear material. In order to achieve this, the participating countries agreed to share best practices among themselves.

On the sidelines, the Obama administration sought international help in dealing with Iran. The US has been mustering support for enhancing sanctions against Iran. This was not a part of the main agenda but it allowed the US administration an opportunity to bring about key world leaders to its viewpoint on the matter. It is believed that the US attempt did not succeed, at least not in this summit.

Pakistan went into the meeting on the defensive. It knew that the focus of the meeting could be on Pakistan for possessing nuclear weapons and being simultaneously threatened internally by a rampant and brutal insurgency with links to international terrorism.

India did intend to make life difficult for Pakistan by highlighting the vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear programme, and to push for a global censure of the country.

Surprisingly, Pakistan escaped any scrutiny of security of its nuclear material and arsenal because the US administration seemed to have complete confidence in the security system Pakistan has built around its nuclear installations. Some of the highest US officials, from the Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and even President Barrak Obama openly expressed their satisfaction with Pakistani arrangements.

How could Pakistan manage the coup?

This was possible because over the years Pakistan found itself compelled into opening up the design of the security system around its nuclear installations to outsiders, mainly the USA and Europe. Ever since the A Q Khan affair in 2004, when hard evidences from Iran and Libya caused severe embarrassment to the country's nuclear establishment, and in the face of the consequent pressure from outside, the Pakistani nuclear establishment went through an elaborate exercise of tightening the security system around its nuclear installations, possibly also with the help of security technology received from the West.

Pakistan needed to do this in order to assure the world that it had effectively eliminated the possibility of illicit trade in nuclear technology.

The question, however, remains if the country's fissile material or even nuclear weapons are secure from Islamic militants now rampaging all over the country.

The danger was quite real during the time the state was on the retreat and the Pakistani Taliban were capturing and establishing their rule over district after district. What if the Taliban had captured an area that contained nuclear material or weapon storage sites? Wouldn't they get control over these also, and then make such weapons available to international terrorists? It may have been our good fortune that no such facility existed in Swat, Bajaur, Buner and Shangla, all potential areas for such a storage, in view of Pakistani establishment's concerns for securing nuclear arsenals from a pre-emptive Indian attack, and for strategic depth.

The Pakistani establishment may have succeeded in assuring the American and European leadership on the security of Pakistani nuclear establishments, material and arsenal, but the citizens know that sympathisers of extremist ideologies are found everywhere, including the nuclear establishment. If anger against the US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq continues, and the plight of Palestinians remains unattended, it would be within the realm of possibilities for the extremists to win over personnel with access to nuclear weapons and materials. Nuclear terrorism is indeed a possibility, and guarding against it indeed calls for a global action.

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament."

-- President John F. Kennedy's speech before the UN in 1963

More than four decades after the signing of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is time to ponder on what President Kennedy said around 50 years ago. With 189 national signatories and the on-going review conference being held in New York to be termed as "nuclear Copenhagen", one should not expect any major breakthrough in terms of nuclear disarmament. Yet, as remarked by Des Browne, former British defense secretary, and reported in the current issue of The Guardian Weekly, "…this will be the most important conference in our lifetime on disarmament and non-proliferation" as the focus in the so-called brainstorming sessions in New York seem to be on the Middle East.

Since 1970 when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into existence, regular five yearly NPT review conferences have been held primarily to pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament. The 1995 review conference had extended the NPT indefinitely but what it failed to achieve was preventing horizontal proliferation. Since 1998, India and Pakistan emerged as de facto nuclear states; whereas, North Korea withdrew from NPT in 2003 and followed the nuclear path. The recent debacle of NPT is the perceived Iranian nuclear programme which regardless of denials on the part of Tehran, is suspected as a consistent attempt to secure nuclear weapons. The last NPT review conference held in 2005 consumed too much of its time on Iran while overlooking nuclear ambitions of other countries in the Middle East, primarily Egypt.

Three fundamental questions are raised in the light of the ongoing debate taking place in the NPT review conference. First, how far the present conference is different from the earliest ones? Second, why the de jure nuclear powers are unable to drastically cut their own nuclear arsenal? Third, why India and Pakistan, the two declared nuclear states, are able to get away despite the threats which were made by the permanent members of the UN Security Council to deny Islamabad and New Delhi any nuclear status? The present NPT review conference also faces a daunting task of dealing with four countries who are not a part of NPT but possess nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan and Israel are not signatories to the NPT whereas North Korea withdrew in 2003. Iran signed the NPT but like North Korea, it can quit the treaty and emerge as a declared nuclear state.

The present NPT review conference is different from the earlier ones, because it is being held at a time when there is a change in the tone of the US administration on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

It seems, in the present NPT review conference, the United States will play a leadership role in moving ahead in the area of nuclear arms control. For that matter, the Obama administration must take steps to pursue Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which is no doubt a major fault line in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Secondly, if nuclear weapons are eliminated, what will be the fate of deterrence which, from any standpoint, contributed to the avoidance of the third world war? More than their desire to retain their nuclear arsenal as a show of power and prestige, nuclear haves do realise the fact that the world will be vulnerable to the outbreak of global war if nuclear deterrence ceases to exist. De jure nuclear powers, particularly the United States and Russia, are unable to drastically cut their nuclear stockpile because of the predictable erosion of their power.

Thirdly, a major fault line in the NPT regime is its failure to prevent further proliferation. It was primarily the moral obligation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to take meaningful steps to deny India and Pakistan any further space in the nuclear arena. But unfortunately, the sanctions which were imposed on the two South Asian countries following their nuclear tests in May 1998 were lifted after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington DC. As a result, the two countries not only felt encouraged to further deepen their nuclear programmes by advancing missile tests but also gave inspiration to countries like North Korea and Iran to deepen their nuclear ambitions.

The NPT regime is composed of 189 countries but the major players remain the US and Russia. Until the two nuclear giants are able to reach a consensus on a drastic cut in their nuclear arsenal, there cannot be any possibility of denying or deterring other countries from going nuclear.

The ongoing NPT review conference must focus on four issues which still threaten the world of a nuclear holocaust. First, plausible efforts should be made by the conference participants to urge India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea to join the NPT because without their participation, it will be impossible to proceed in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. It is a major weakness on the part of so-called champions of NPT regime that they are unable to take any step which can compel these four countries to adhere to the NPT and roll back their nuclear weapons' programme. There should not be a 'sacred cow' either in the name of security, interests or sovereignty as a policy of covering up things and compromises has played a havoc as far as the cause of nuclear disarmament is concerned. Second, NPT review conference must provide a deadline for at least 60 percent cut in the nuclear arsenal of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, who also happen to be de jure nuclear powers. The U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control talks are fine but a clear message should be sent to the world that both powers want business and will seriously proceed for a drastic cut in all categories of nuclear weapons. Third, the NPT review conference must agree on giving a practical shape to the idea of nuclear-free Middle East. As long as Israel retains its nuclear arsenal, one cannot expect other regional countries stretching from Morocco to Iran to follow a non-nuclear road. Already, enough damage has been done to the credibility of the so-called NPT regime by not persuading Israel to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclear arsenal.

Knowing that nuclear disarmament is an impossible task, there is no shortcut to seeking nuclear arms control in the days to come. What is required is an even-handed policy on the part of the nuclear haves to dismantle their nuclear arsenal. After all, countries like Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Byelorussia also successfully liquidated their nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Countries like South Africa, Brazil and Argentina also decided not to pursue their nuclear programmes. The onus is on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council that instead of using NPT review conference against Iran or any other state, they should themselves act above contradictions and proceed for a nuclear-free world. Others would certainly follow, accordingly.