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Deep concerns
about interim monetary measures
The federal government’s decision to have a cabinet of 60-plus
members and frequent visits of high officials abroad at a cost of millions
of dollars hardly gives the impression that we are a nation facing an
economic crisis
By M. Sharif
SBP raising discount rate by 200 basic points
from 13.0 per cent to 15.0 per cent has strengthened the fears that IMF
package will have hard conditionalities to be met. Although, the
government was trying to play-down by saying that we will have the loan on
so called ‘our terms’ but that was for public consumption only and in
reality tough conditionalities were being accepted. Now, it is abundantly
clear that fiscal and monetary policies are being tailored by tightening
them well before the announcement of bail out package so as to dilute its
impact for public consumption well before time. There is hardly any other
rationale to justify increase in interest rate a few days before the
package is to be announced. Why this spontaneous and hurried action?
The opposite viewpoint being that it is time to ease
monetary policy that is already tight. A tight monetary policy did not
achieve its main target of containing inflation during past more than two
and half a year, even if one is to give weight to other factors that
fuelled inflation.
Rationale of the inevitable
Inevitable, that is, IMF package with tough
conditionalities has started showing up even before the package has
officially been agreed to and signed. It is no secret that in these hard
times IMF as a lender has stuck to its guns to lend. It has not eased its
conditionalities and they are being imposed on countries seeking its
credit line with equal focus on improving macro-economic stability and
enabling them to pay back lender’s money. Ukraine, Hungry and Iceland,
the three countries that have sought IMF lending a few weeks earlier have
hiked discount rates. Iceland had to give a jump of 600 basic points, from
12.0 per cent to 18.0 per cent. Hike in interest rate is relatively soft
for Pakistan because as authentic press reports indicate, IMF was
insistent to hike discount rate by 5.0 per cent. Agreement has already
reached for 3.5 per cent, to be executed in two phases; phase–I of 2.0
per cent hike is already implemented and phase-II of 1.5 per cent hike is
to be implemented in January, 09.
One understands that hiking interest rates is the most
unpleasant decision particularly when economy is in downturn mode,
inflation has surged to 30-year high at 25.0 per cent, country is under
debt burden of more than Rs3.2 trillion with foreign debt of $47 billion,
poverty is up, forex reserves have depleted by $5.0 billion and are
depleting at a rate of $1.0 billion per month and current account deficit
during first five months of current fiscal year has increased to $5.9
billion. But, what is more unpleasant than that is the way interim
monetary policy justifies hike in discount rates. There is a lot of truth
when the statement says, “diagnostics of Pakistan economic situation is
different from global and regional development, therefore policy responses
have to be different.” But, have policy responses catered to address
real issues faced by the economy?
Fiscal measures include end of subsidies on petroleum
products and electricity tariff and 1.0 per cent increase in GST.
Government’s borrowing from the SBP from July to 8 Nov, 08 stood at
Rs369 billion, imports have increased by 35.2 per cent and trade deficit
was registered, $7.45 billion.
The report states, “In contrast, Pakistan hit by the
global price shock and given the delay in pass through of this price
effect, witnessed a growth in its fiscal and external current account
deficits that reached unsustainable levels and alarmingly high inflation
-- since there are significant differences in ‘diagnostics’ among
Pakistan and other countries, thus it must be recognised that policy
solutions will also be different.” There could be hardly any difference
about the diagnostics; the reservations of the many stakeholders and
analysts are about the solutions that monetary measures cater for.
Real issues of economy are: high demand and low
supply, high cost of inputs of production of industrial products and
agriculture commodities, high inflation and depleted forex reserves.
Over-all effect of these issues on economy is high rate of unemployment,
low productivity resulting into depressed economic growth. To address
these issues monetary and fiscal policies have to work in tandem with each
other; they hardly worked the way they should have worked so far. This has
also been implicitly accepted in the report.
The measure to hike discount rate, once again, is an
exclusive measure taken for the reasons already stated. Public support to
the policies of the SBP and government is essential for their successful
implementation. It can be safely concluded that, to start with, things are
not moving in the right direction.
Implications
How would making capital expensive by 2.0 per cent
whose impact in banking sector will be ballooned to no less than 5.0 per
cent that would raise discount rate of commercial banks to more than 20.0
per cent, help to contain cost of inputs, increase productivity and
contain inflation?
Economy is already in recession and increase in
discount rate coupled with cut in PSDP is likely to constrain economic
growth further. Pakistan has already experienced low growth of 3.2 per
cent from 2000 to 2003 primarily because of IMF conditionalities. It will
be repeating history and issues like poverty alleviation and social sector
development will be relegated in the background.
What should have been done?
It is certain that efforts were made to convince IMF
officials during negotiations in Dubai, not to push for hiking interest
rates that are already high. IMF officials should have been further
convinced to wait at least till finalisation of the package. The
government has limited options. SBP and the government can initiate
austerity measures simultaneously to convey a strong message to
stakeholders in particular and the public at large that they are not alone
during this hard time.
The
latter should initiate austerity measures at all tiers of the government
and public life to create a national urgency that ‘we are in trouble’
and need to act in as ‘one nation.’ Federal government’s decision to
have a cabinet of 60 plus members and too frequent visits of high
officials abroad that cost huge foreign exchange hardly gives the
impression that we are a nation facing worst economic crisis.
It is estimated that expatriates and rich citizens of
the country have around $200 billion in their accounts abroad. They should
be inspired by removing credibility deficit and fears that are perhaps at
their peek at present, to come forward to help the country. In such a
crisis leaders are to rise to the occasion.
Conclusion
Interim monetary measure of hiking discount rate is a
red signal. How to make it green? The government and the SBP should come
up with fiscal and monetary incentives to improve productivity and reduce
bank spreads. They should go all out to reduce credibility deficit and win
confidence of the people. That is how the South Koreans succeeded to beat
the financial crisis of 1997-98. We need to emulate them.
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