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debate economy The
warming world goal A worried
Baloch A
fiasco called local government elections history Military
and democracy
An ideological vision A look at Muslim ‘decline’, the narrative and responses it evoked in the last two and a half centuries, and the profound bearing it had on Muslim politics leading to the creation of Pakistan By Tahir Kamran Decline’ as a
central theme of North Indian Muslim sensibility is conspicuously
reflected in literature from the late 18th century onwards. Pathos and an
overall sense of bereavement are succinctly articulated through Urdu
poetry. The befitting metaphor of ‘Karbala’ was deployed invariably in
genres such as marsiya and also ghazal — to depict the contemporary
situation. Babar Ali Anis and Mirza
Salaamat Ali Dabir elevated this particular genre of marsiya almost to a
level of perfection in 19th century Awadh. However, the theme of
‘decline’ did not remain confined only to marsiya and it was not only
used to narrate the events of Karbala — as is illustrated by Altaf
Hussain Hali’s Musaddas written in the same form. It, in fact,
transcended any genre or form of expression. Shehr-i-Ashoob (city of
mourning) was yet another leitmotif that was evident in the poetry of
maestros like Mir Taqi Mir and Mir Dard. Both of them lamented the sacking
of Delhi at the hands of Ahmad Shah Abdali and Nadir Shah. Thus, the tragedy
emanating from the objective situation of Muslim ‘decline’ from the
18th century onwards came to be the seminal feature of all literary forms.
Akbar Allahabadi’s take on decline was satirical and Iqbal’s was
philosophical. Shuddering over the
prospects of being branded ‘jejune’ or ‘simplistic’, for not
taking a nuanced view of the Muslim decline in North India, the writer
nevertheless asserts that ‘decline’ as a narrative has been
significant in the body of literature produced during the last two and
half centuries. Even when the era of Urdu prose had set in, by the closing
years of the 19th century, ‘decline’ provided an essential context to
these newly-formulated literary forms — be the letters of Ghalib or the
novels of Deputy Nazir Ahmed like ‘Mirat ul Aroos’ and ‘Taubattun
Nusooh’. ‘Decline’ and its
attendant sensibility have had a profound bearing on the course of Muslim
politics too. It became the salient feature of the Muslim politics in the
20th century. The emergence of the reform movements, with their
puritanical agendas, sowed the seeds of socio-political exclusion. The
same happened in other communities — Arya Samaj and Sangh Sabha being
good illustrations of the puritanical propensities among Hindus and Sikhs
respectively. Since this article is
solely concerned with the state of Muslims, it is not necessary to go into
the details of these movements. Suffice it to say that the reform
movements fostered respective ideologies which they tried to implement
through their peculiar educational modes. These ‘educational/
reformist modes’ can generally be classified as modernist —
represented by the Aligarh Movement, and the tradionalist exemplified by
the Deobandi variant of Islam. The former advocated emulating the West to
wriggle out of the ‘decline’ besetting Muslims, whereas the latter
accorded primacy to the foundational texts to regain lost glory. These two
modes, as is well known, were mutually exclusive but the common trait
between them was ‘exclusion’. Interestingly, both adopted different
forms of exclusion. The modernists, Sir Syed
Ahmad Khan in the vanguard, excluded themselves politically from the
Hindus and exhorted Muslims not to join the Indian National Congress.
Camaraderie with British was preferred over solidarity with Hindus, which
was a stark change punctuated with the sense of ‘decline’. The ‘exclusion’
practiced by the tradionalists was directed against fellow Muslims, with
denominational differences as the delineating factor. That sort of
‘exclusion’ ushered in an era of takfeer, which contributed
significantly in solidifying sectarian identities particularly after
Pakistan’s Independence. Another group of
luminaries who did not position themselves clearly, such as Shibli Nomani,
Altaf Hussain Hali and Hasrat Mohani, merit a mention here. As a historiographer,
Shibli was a trendsetter. Drawing inspiration from renowned British
historian Thomas Carlyle, he wrote numerous biographies of eminent
personalities, including ‘Siratul Nab’i, ‘Al Farooq’ and ‘Al
Ghazali’. His writings had a profound impact on the historical
understanding of the coming generations, while the personalities who were
the subject of his historical enquiry reflected his Hanafi denomination.
His books give primacy to ‘the personality’ as a driving force of
history and were instrumental in casting a shadow of nostalgia on the
Muslim laity. Thus, the notion of a
golden past was considerably invigorated, a notion which strengthened the
urge to relocate bygone glories into the present. Having said this, one
must be cognizant of the fact that Shibli differentiated between deen and
politics. Hali and Hasrat shared the same inclination. Their concern for
the ‘declined’ Muslims, though quite tangible in their poetry in
particular, could not be translated into their politics. Politically, they
did not practice exclusion. The common perception of
Pakistani historians is that the All India Muslim League inherited its
ideology from the Aligarh Movement, which eventually led to the formation
of a separate state for the Muslims. This is despite the fact that both
the founding fathers, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Allama Iqbal, did not go to
Aligarh for education. Both of them, nevertheless, accorded a lot of
importance to that institution. One may assert here that the prescription
to deal with the ‘decline’ would be to follow modernist Aligarh and
not regressive Deoband. Readiness to accept influences from other cultures
and communities holds the key to overturn the decline, a point that
Aligarh emphasised through word and deed. But reverting to
politics, the point worth pondering here is the ideological side of the
All India Muslim League which was essentially progressive but subsequently
transposed with the help of meaningless aphorisms and slogans. Besides
progressive ideology, the principal anchoring force for the Muslim League
was the personal charisma of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, which held it together
and drove it forward. A different ideological
vision, embedded in religion, was conjured up after Jinnah’s demise.
Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, a Deobandi alim and founder of
Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, and Abu Alla Maududi, as Vali Nasr asserts in the
context of the passage of Objective Resolution, in his book The Vanguard
of Islamic Revolution, were the main protagonists of the ideology that the
Muslim League was to embrace. This same ideology has now accorded
legitimacy to the reactionary elements who don’t regret the decimation
of humans, mosques and churches in the name of religion. The writer is a noted
Pakistani historian, currently the Iqbal Fellow at the University of
Cambridge as professor in the Centre of South Asian Studies We open our pages to further debate on this subject. Contributions are welcome. — Editor
The IMF, the elite and the poor The persistent failure of successive governments to overcome budgetary deficit has created a situation where the very economic viability of the state is at stake By Huzaima Bukhari & Dr. Ikramul Haq With meagre
three per cent growth rate, sky-rocketing inflation, continuous energy
shortage, devaluating rupee, decline in exports, increase in imports, poor
tax collection and above all worsening law and order situation, the
present regime, like its predecessors, is bound to fail in curtailing the
burgeoning fiscal deficit — mother of all economic ills faced by us. The
persistent failure of successive governments — military and civilian
alike — to overcome budgetary deficit has created a situation where the
very economic viability of the state is at stake. The Federal Board of
Revenue (FBR), without effective enforcement, will not be able to achieve
the target of Rs2475 billion — resultantly the government will not be
able to cap fiscal deficit at 5.8 per cent of the GDP as agreed with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Everybody is criticising
the IMF’s conditions under recently concluded $6.7 billion Extended Fund
Facility (EFF), but no one is ready to admit that fault lies with us.
Pakistan, entrapped in debt prison due to its own wrongdoing, approached
the IMF and not vice versa. Pakistan, as a beggar, cannot be a chooser as
well. IMF has clearly asked the government to restrict fiscal deficit to
Rs1463 billion — 5.8 per cent of GDP. The document signed with
the IMF shows that it has allowed the government to maintain deficit of
1.7 per cent in the first quarter, 1.8 per cent in the second, 1.3 per
cent in the third and just 1 per cent in the fourth quarter. Many experts
are of the view that these ratios would not work and in the end the
deficit will be as high as Rs1950 billion, if not more. The question is
whether 5.8 per cent ceiling is too “sacrosanct” to be achieved by the
government in all circumstances? The reply is obvious: IMF will relax it
as in the past! Let us stop blaming the
IMF and others for our own faults. The rich and influential in Pakistan
are not taxed according to their capacity to pay. Adding insult to injury,
they enjoy many benefits and luxuries at the expense of the taxpayers’
money. Just take a look at the huge golf clubs in the cantonment areas —
these are not meant for the ordinary lot. The civil-military elite and
“influential persons” of the city enjoy these superb facilities and
that too at subsidised rates. These facilities, funded from public money,
are meant for the rich and mighty for their personal comforts and
luxuries. If they want to avail such luxuries, they should pay from their
own pockets and not burden the already depleted national exchequer.
Although these facilities are on public lands, they are meant exclusively
for the elite — top civil and military officials. Members of militro-judicial-civil-political
complex have palatial bungalows, guest houses, luxury cars, domestic
servants, cooks, gardens, watchmen and what not. All these are funded from
taxpayers’ money. The “official” guest houses are maintained with
public money but subsidised rates are enjoyed by public servants, their
families and friends, and definitely not by any member of the public. The security provided at
the GORs shows that lives of the “sahibs” [officers] are more precious
than ordinary mortals. Government properties comprising the governor’s
houses, golf clubs, guest houses, wedding halls, even bakeries and
commercial markets in cantonments are not meant for official business yet
taxes are not levied on them on the pretext that these belong to the
state. The poor are dying of starvation, their children are undernourished
but our ruling elite, despite having cognizance, is not ready to mend its
ways. These privileged classes are not only avoiding taxes but also
enjoying luxuries created from money generated through taxes, much of
which is regressive in nature and levied on the poor ruthlessly, sparing
the rich from proper direct taxation. Indirect taxes are
pushing more and more people below the poverty line — out of total
population of 185 million their number is now 70 million. In the face of
this stark reality, pleading for more regressive taxation is criminal. The
need of the hour is to make taxes equitable — a levy of income tax with
progressive rates on all sources of income, including agricultural, if
total income exceeds Rs500,000. There should be no exemption, not even to
the president, governors, prime minister, ministers, judges and generals.
The perquisites and benefits in kind given by the state to its employees
and officeholders should be monetized and taxed. In the first three
months of the current fiscal year (July 2013-June 2014), the FBR showed
collection of Rs481 billion — the target was Rs509 billion — “amid
allegations of blocking refunds and taking money in advance to paint a
rosy picture before the IMF”. The real dilemma of the FBR is that it is
not ready to tax the rich and mighty, rather persistently squeezes the
last drop of blood from the existing taxpayers — besides relying heavily
on regressive taxes. We cannot overcome
budgetary gap unless the government stops extending tax exemptions and
benefits to the privileged classes and powerful businessmen. Even after
signing agreement with the IMF not to issue concessionary Statutory
Regulatory Orders (SROs), the government promptly did so on October 4,
2013 causing loss of billions of rupees to the national exchequer. Tax
exemption and concessions are the main source of loss to national
exchequer — if we add leakages due to corruption and inefficiency the
total figure will not be less than Rs600 billion. Unless these concessions
are withdrawn, tax gap is bridged and wasteful expenditure is drastically
cut, we will never overcome fiscal deficit but will continue to sink in
this debt quicksand. Presently, about 70 per
cent collection by the FBR is from imports and exports, contracts and
“extraordinary” profits by petroleum companies and banks. Importers,
contractors, retailers and even service providers are, in fact, passing on
their tax burden to consumers and clients, courtesy presumptive tax regime
introduced in income tax law in 1991-92 and widened manifold since then.
This erratic taxation, at the expense of equity and poor people, is
nothing but fiscal highhandedness. Despite resorting to all kinds of
negative tactics, illogical policies and unjust withholding taxes, the FBR
has failed to improve the tax-GDP ratio, which fell to 8.5 per cent in
fiscal year 2012-13 from 9.1 per cent in the preceding year. The burden of a number
of presumptive taxes levied under the income tax law (which are nothing
but crude forms of indirect taxes) has been shifted from income earners to
consumers and clients. These presumptive taxes have not only distorted the
whole tax system, destroyed economic growth and made the consumer/client
the ultimate sufferers, but these despotic, short-term, myopic and
figure-oriented measures have even failed to bridge the fiscal deficit,
which is estimated to soar to Rs1800 billion this year. The men in power say
that 67 years of problems cannot be resolved in a few months or even
during the 5 years’ term for which they have been elected. They plead
helplessness before powerful civil-military bureaucracy. Successive governments
have been announcing unprecedented concessions for the privileged classes.
Even the politicians admit massive tax evasion and their criminal
culpability in the existing scenario. There exists an unholy alliance
between corrupt politicians and tax bureaucrats. Through legal loopholes
— for example section 111(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 — tax
bureaucrats serve their political masters and plunderers of national
wealth. If the present
government is sincere to overcome fiscal deficit it should pass
asset-seizure legislation and confiscate all ill-gotten and untaxed
assets. In the presence of such a law, resource mobilisation and tax
compliance will not be a problem anymore. The writers, tax lawyers
and partners in Huzaima & Ikram (Tax and Pakistan), are Adjunct
Professors at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)
Reports on climate say summer in Pakistan will expand to eight months and winter will squeeze to one month in the coming years By Haroon Akram Gill They claim that
they are working for sustainable development, but it is obvious that the
so-called development is harming the earth in such a way that there is a
doubt that generations to come would be able to live on the earth. And
unfortunately, our children would not have any alternative planet to live
as Mercury which is the coolest planet after earth has 167C average
temperature. According to a report,
the earth’s temperature is rising rapidly and it’s due to heavy carbon
emissions. The standard carbon rate should be 350ppm but it has crossed
400ppm globally. An authentic report tells that at present 90 million tons
carbon dioxide is being emitted daily into the air. The amount of energy
evolving in the air due to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is
400,000 times of that evolved due to the American atomic assault on
Hiroshima, Japan. The report also says that India and China are
responsible for two third of this heavy emission as their industry is
rapidly growing and half of the world population is living in this part of
the world as well. This heavy energy
emission is not only warming the globe but the arctic ice is also melting
and raising the sea level. This rise is a permanent danger to the coastal
areas and cities globally. According to another report, 10 major coastal
cities including Dhaka and Mumbai from South Asian region are endangered
to be ruined by sea water till 2070. Dhaka is encountered with another
problem that its soil has been salted and is becoming unfertilized rapidly
due to sea level rise. Earth’s temperature
has risen rapidly in last decade, particularly. It has been recorded as
the hottest decade ever. In Asia, the highest temperature had been
recorded in 2010 as 53C and it was in Mohenjo Daro, Sindh, Pakistan. This
rapidly increasing temperature is evaporating the moisture of earth and
its water level is decreasing day by day. Green fields are turning into
deserts with heavy droughts. In Pakistan, there is a
dramatic decrease in water level. Vast area of Thar has been deserted and
other areas are also threatened. This drought is a threat to human life as
it can cause food insecurity. Droughts have threatened many countries
including America, Russia, Turkey, France, South Korea and Switzerland.
According to a report, almost the whole world would be affected by
droughts till 2090. These droughts are giving birth to food insecurity at
large. Almost every part of the
world is food insecure with the exception of North & South America,
Australia and some European countries. People in Africa, Middle East and
Asia are badly hit by this particular problem. Food prices have been
increased thrice in list three years. A major reason of this food
insecurity is that farmers have not made them compatible with the changing
climate. Increasing temperature
is affecting the crops as well. Due to climate change, timings have also
changed for cultivation and harvesting. But due to lack of education and
proper training, the farmers are stuck with the conventional timings and
patterns which is resulting in low yields and food insecurity. Scientists say that one
degree rise in temperature enhances the water evaporation capacity by 7
times. These water vapours do not only increase the wind pressure heavily
but their presence causes massive climate effects also. It results in
heavy rainfall, storms and flash floods. Pakistan is among the
most vulnerable countries affected by such climate crisis; this might be
because we are the neighbouring country of the two countries that are
among the top three responsible entities of heavy carbon emissions.
Pakistan has a least participation in carbon emissions, according to
Energy and Ecology report. Extreme weather events are occurring here
rapidly than any other part of the world. Although America, China,
Canada, India, Argentine, Philippine and other parts of the world have
faced heavy rainfall, flooding and storms, due to better planning and
resources the damage is lesser and the process of rehabilitation and
reconstruction is fast. In those countries, people are also being educated
and informed on the issue as well. According to an official
report by National Disaster Management Authority Pakistan more than four
million people had been affected by heavy rainfall in 2012. In 2013,
Pakistan has once again faced huge damages due to unexpected heavy rains
and flooding. Official sources report that 1.5 million people and 7841
villages have been affected till mid September, 2013 and the water has
ruined crops on 1,457,299 hectors. According to American
Climate Institute, Pakistan is among the top five most vulnerable
countries being affected by climate crisis. That report also says that in
the coming years, summer in Pakistan will expand to eight months and
winter will squeeze to one month. These dramatic climate changes will
change the whole scenario of the region. Another institute “German
Watch” working on climate change reveals that Pakistan faces a damage of
almost 21.5 billion rupees annually due to climate crisis and the damage
has reached to 5.42 per cent
of GDP which is higher than any other country in this list. These figures are
horrible, but the fact which is more horrible is that we do not have any
proper planning to cope with the issue despite having a Climate Change
Ministry and a National Climate Change Policy. Unfortunately, we do not
have this policy implemented at any level. Dr Qamar-uz-Zaman
Chaudhry, the lead author of Pakistan’s National Climate Change Policy,
believes the policy is more than comprehensive. Even if implemented 40 per
cent properly, it can take care of expected floods in the future.
Additional water storages on the main rivers have been recommended in the
policy to absorb the floodwater. Just by enhancing the capacity of large
dams these kinds of floods could be avoided, he adds. But unfortunately,
the only thing our new government has done regarding climate is to reduce
the status of Climate Change Ministry to a division and cut the budget for
climate change. The writer is a
certified climate leader and has been trained by Al Gore, former US
vice-president and activist on climate crisis
Our unsung heroines Lady health workers and vaccinators are not only playing a leading role in preventing thousands of child deaths but are also a frontline force against polio By Arshad Mahmood Our frontline
health workers including Lady Health Workers (LHWs), Community Midwives (CMWs)
and Vaccinators are the real heroes in Pakistan’s fight to prevent child
and maternal mortality in the country to be able to achieve Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) 4 & 5. MDG 4 is about two third reduction in
child mortality and MDG 5 is about three quarters reduction in maternal
mortality ratio by 2015. The progress towards
achieving MDGs remains a challenge and an elusive dream for Pakistan where
352,400 children under-5 die of preventable causes every year. The
national under-5 mortality rate is 87 per 1000 live births and the
maternal mortality rate is at an alarming 276 deaths per 100,000 live
births. There is a need to accelerate the efforts to achieve MDGs 4&5.
The LHWs and vaccinators
are not only playing a leading role in preventing thousands of preventable
child deaths but are also our frontline force against the ongoing fight in
the country for the eradication of polio. Unfortunately, however, in the
recent past we not only witnessed targeting of the LHWs and vaccinators by
the terrorists but also a cold shoulder by the government towards
resolving their issues. The last approved PC-1
of LHW Programme has targeted the expansion of LHWs from existing number
to 130,000 by 2015 with a focus on expansion to marginalised and
disadvantageous uncovered areas. The 18th Amendment has brought the
programme to a standstill owing to lack of funds. Lately, through judicial
intervention, the LHWs have been regularised throughout the country and
their rewards have also been increased. However, we still see LHWs on the
streets demanding documentation of their regularisation and implementation
of the decision in letter and spirit by the federal and provincial
governments. Lack of frontline health
workers such as LHWs and Community Midwives is one of the major reasons of
Pakistan’s slow progress towards achieving MDG 4 & 5 as currently
there are 97,639 LHWs and 3,843 Lady Health Supervisors (LHSs) in the
country covering only 60 per cent of the population against the proposed
target to increase this number to 130,000 by 2015. Following the Supreme
Court of Pakistan’s intervention, the previous government regularised
the services of LHWs, LHSs and other staff of the Family Planning &
Primary Healthcare Programme with the federal government’s full funding
for this programme up to 7th NFC Award (FY-2015) as already decided by the
Council of Common Interests. While regularising the
LHWs, the previous federal government included a stringent condition; the
posts that may become vacant as a result of resignation, losing jobs or
otherwise shall stand abolished for the purpose of federal funding and new
recruitment w.e.f. 1-7-2011 will be financed by the provincial
governments. Likewise, any new creation of posts/appointments or future
need will be financed by the provinces from their own budget/resources.
This condition resulted in decrease in the number of LHWs instead of
increasing their number i.e. in Punjab the number of LHWs decreased from
49,000 to 47,300. The incumbent federal
government should intervene and reverse this decision by allowing the
provincial governments to fill the vacant position — 1,700 positions in
Punjab to be filled immediately. The federal government should coordinate
with the provinces and support them in recruiting more LHWs and make
budgetary allocations for necessary supplies to reach the uncovered areas
and help Pakistan progress towards achieving MDGs 4 & 5. Similarly,
the provincial governments should also take responsibility and start
allocating resources for increase in the number of LHWs, CMWs and
vaccinators in the respective provinces to be able to reach out to 100 per
cent population and achieve mother and child health related targets. According to the
findings of research studies by Professor Dr. Zulfiqar A Bhutta and
others, in many countries, community health workers are now offering a
wide range of services to communities in different types of challenged
settings. Their services include conducting deliveries, conducting
counseling and health education, immunization, management of childhood
illnesses at community level such as diarrhea, malaria and pneumonia and
malnutrition. The community health workers’ services have led to
decrease in child and maternal mortality in different countries. The successive
governments since 1993 have relied on LHW Programme for the delivery of
health services to the far flung areas. The key policy instruments of
development in Pakistan over this time period have included LHW Programme
as a primary area of investment for meeting health challenges. Besides,
non-governmental initiatives such bilateral projects, UN initiatives for
child health etc have also heavily relied on LHW Programme for delivery of
services targeting the achievement of MDGs. The menu of services of
LHWs include 20 key tasks related to maternal, newborn and child
healthcare and the health indicators in LHW covered areas are
significantly better than the national averages. Research has proved that
the coverage of some key interventions for maternal and child health such
as fully immunized children, knowledge of mothers about preparation of
ORS, antenatal consultations, measures of exclusive breastfeeding have
improved in LHW covered areas. There are issues around
LHWs coverage, remuneration and operational aspects of their programme. It
is imperative that LHWs coverage is expanded to un-served rural poor
populations and urban slums and that will be possible only if their number
is increased and all the current vacant positions are filled immediately.
Similarly, it is important to ensure that they are provided with the
required stock of medicines and equipment, their terms of reference are
reviewed and routine immunization is formally incorporated. The monitoring
mechanisms should be strengthened as well to ensure effective utilisation
of this vital human resource. It is crucial that the
provincial governments take a leadership role, with the support of the
federal government, and strengthen the programme at the provincial levels.
The programme should be structured in such a way that the staff is
satisfied and are able to concentrate on performing their job which is
critical for Pakistan’s progress. The writer is a
development practitioner and child rights activist and tweets @amahmood72
A
worried Baloch “We have to
deliver in the first year,” Dr Abdul Malik Baloch said, adding “sweet
talk won’t satisfy the people.” Dr Baloch is the
first-ever commoner to become the chief minister of the area-wise largest
Balochistan province since the troubled area gained provincial status
after the end of one unit. However, his dream to turn Balochistan into one
of the most educated regions of Pakistan, faces multiple challenges:
haughty officials of the security establishment, jealous tribal
chieftains, heavily armed insurgents and religious extremists, and highly
corrupt bureaucracy. Concern was written
large on the face of the medic from Mekran, even before the earthquake of
September 24 killed over 400, injured more than a thousand and left 25,000
people homeless in a poor but insurgency-torn Awaran district of
Balochistan. He was the most worried Baloch on earth. Dr Baloch was in London,
along with Senator Hasil Bizenjo. The two were invited to the UK capital
as the main speakers at the Faiz Mela, organised by the Faiz Cultural
Foundation and sponsored by the Jang Group of Newspapers. However, the political
degradation in Balochistan against the backdrop of unmitigated militancy
and accompanying suffering of the people was evident at the Faiz Mela. In
the past, the Baloch showed up in large numbers at such events as the
Pakistani progressives were considered to be the best allies of the Baloch
in their long drawn struggle marked by blood and tears over six decades.
However, the Baloch intellectuals in London were conspicuous by their
absence at the Faiz Mela, indicating of high level of Baloch estrangement
with Pakistan. “Our coalition has
been named the government of four bald men as it includes myself, Hasil
Bizenjo, Mehmood Khan Achakzai and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,” Dr
Baloch said in a lighter vein. In spite of having more members in the
Balochistan parliament, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif agreed to give Dr
Baloch the chief minister’s slot in a province where traditionally
tribal leaders and their close family members have held sway. Dr Baloch’s elevation
to the position marks the healthy transition of the middle class in
positions of political prominence, much to the chagrin of the parasitical
sardars or feudal despots of Balochistan. “It is apparent the middle
class will now call the political shots,” said Dr Haider Baloch, a
former health minister from Turbat, who is now a Briton. But an even bigger
achievement for Dr Baloch is the go-ahead given to him by the All Parties
Conference, along with the consent of the omnipotent military GHQ — the
main power in Balochistan — to initiate talks with the Baloch militants.
This marks a softening of the military stance, but the Baloch militants
have adopted a hardline position and have rejected the idea of talks. This
shows the political immaturity of Baloch militants, many of whom are
egotistical sons of feudal lords. Generally, it is the government that
refuses to talk to the militants, like in the case of Turkey and Kurds. “I like to see the
Ireland-type solution in Balochistan, not the Sri Lankan solution,” he
reiterates his political line of action. In his private discussions, Dr
Baloch made public confessions of the political mistakes he committed in
the past. “We sided with Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, not with Mir Ghous
Bakhsh Bizenjo, after the National Awami Party split in 1977,” Dr Malik
Baloch said. The youth at that time, including Dr Baloch, rejected
Bizenjo’s politics and adopted the Marri line of militant struggle.
However, this line of action failed to stand the test of time. “We
decided to go into mainstream politics ten years later, adopting
Bizenjo’s stance of 1977, when the Balochistan National Youth Movement
was launched in December 1987.” At the Jang forum in
London, Dr Baloch appealed to the powers-that-be for an end to the
extrajudicial killing of Baloch youths. He advocates following the due
course of law and putting the suspects in jail. “Jail ended a solid
party like the National Awami Party,” he recalled. At least 400 Baloch have
fallen prey to militant bullets in the last decade. Dr Baloch himself
survived at least two assassination attempts on his life carried out by
the Baloch Republican Army, which is led by Geneva-based Brahumdagh Bugti.
Dr Baloch’s party, the National Party, has lost at least six active
workers to attacks by the BRA and the Baloch Liberation Front, which is
led by a 20-year junior medic fellow from Bolan Medical College in Quetta,
Dr Allah Nazar Baloch. Abdul Haleem Tareen, a
London-based Balochistan notable, met Dr Baloch during his London visit
but complained that he was kept away from Balochistan natives. Tareen
shared some of the concerns of Dr Baloch. “This is the first time in
Baloch political history that the Baloch have turned their guns on each
other. Brothers and cousins are at each other’s throat,” Tareen said. The Baloch have lost
some of their best youths to militancy, Dr Baloch said. He called for a
national debate among the Baloch over what they got and what they lost
during more than 12 years of strife. Dr Baloch and Hasil
Bizenjo refused to accept any protocol during their five-day stay in
London. Instead of staying at the luxury Dorchester Hotel, usual residence
for Pakistan dignitaries, the two stayed at the middle class Hilton London
Metropole Hotel. The hotel lobby became the meeting place, where any
Pakistani could walk in and talk to the chief minister. As if the political
tremors were not enough, an earthquake struck Balochistan, forcing Dr
Baloch to cut his visit short and camp in Awaran, a hotbed of the
insurgent movement. The writer, who was in
London to attend the Faiz Mela, is a senior Baloch journalist based in
Washington DC area. He can be reached at ahmar_scribe@yahoo.com
A
fiasco called local government elections At the moment, a
tug of war is taking place between the provincial governments and the
echelons of superior judiciary. The provincial governments are being
reminded by the Supreme Court to fulfil their constitutional
responsibility — of holding elections to the respective local bodies as
per proviso of Article 140A of the Constitution. The provincial
governments have not been able to meet the deadline set by the superior
court. The matter is closely observed by the top judges who cited
displeasure on the delaying tactics adopted by provincial administrations.
The political parties,
with a few exceptions, consider local governments as an institutional
residue of military dictatorships. They also do not wish to create fresh
cadres of legitimate leadership which can develop populist associations
with vote banks. However, this is myopic thinking. If parties wish to
genuinely take the leadership development to the masses, local governments
are the best option. This can at least offer an option against hereditary
claims to control of political power. There are many examples pertinent to
ordinary councillors, women/labour councillors, union council nazims,
town/tehsil/taluka level leaders and district level representatives who
were able to win offices purely on merit — and later proved their
popularity through re-election. These dedicated public
representatives made determined effort to address pressing problems
related to education, health, social welfare and area management. Some of
them were even devoid of any political affiliation and had to face the
wrath of both right and left wing parties. The two elections during 2001
and 2005 were reasonable tests for their performance evaluation,
malfunctioning of electoral process notwithstanding. Political culture cannot
be nurtured without a practice in voting on party basis. Ordinary people have
ordinary problems that warrant solutions at the lowest level — not in
headquarters of mighty organisations. Besides, people need an efficient
service delivery mechanism and complaint redressal system for routines
such as attestation, verification and certification. Local institutions
and their elected members are normally forthcoming in such tasks.
Small-scale development schemes, maintenance and repair projects are also
important works that require immediate attention. If the decision-making
apparatus is centralised in the person of chief ministers of provinces,
little progress can be estimated. Expectation from bureaucrats alone to be
sympathetic to the local issues may not be realistic. A well-functioning local
government system in urban and rural domains has to be strengthened after
removing the various handicaps that it has faced. Problems identified
during the past several years include poor quality of human resource,
paucity of operational budgets, weak mechanism of monitoring, absence of
effective audit and accounts procedures, financial dependence on the
provincial/federal government, lack of control over police force, tutelage
exercised by federal/provincial institutions and inability to generate
development finance for local scale works. The city of Karachi is
being cleansed through a planned operation. But every operation needs
post-surgical care. The relationship of local-scale policing and
maintenance of peace and harmony among the ranks of various interest
groups can be facilitated through an efficient local government. While the
provincial status of the police department may remain intact, some local
autonomy can be negotiated among the politicians and civil society to
carve out a workable solution. For the residents of
Karachi, who have been held hostage to target killings and turf wars which
has taken no more than 6000 lives between 2003 and 2012, local bodies are
even more important. So, a political solution in the form of a local
governance formula could be an effective answer. The political parties
should evolve a fresh strategy by using elected local governments to serve
their clearly pronounced manifestoes. Capacity building in the local
service delivery, notification and creation of bodies such as public
safety commissions, citizen community boards or finance commissions,
municipal services and taxes to generate local revenue are some basic
steps. There are many institutional arms, think tanks and non-governmental
organisations that have garnered enough experience to transform the
political objectives into a proper workable blue print for the future form
of local government. The new local governments should bring peace and
harmony to the province, not generate further divisions in the already
divided ranks in the society.
The history of Bahawalpur state Since the Nawabs of Bahawalpur were not ‘kings’ in the normative sense of the word, being of the Abbasid lineage allowed them to see themselves as a part of the ‘Caliph’ style of rulership, deriving their primary legitimacy from religious sanction By Yaqoob Khan Bangash Recently, South
Punjab and the erstwhile Bahawalpur state have been in the news. The
‘Seraiki suba’ movement had gained so much currency this year that
seemed that a new province might be carved out of the Punjab, till the
general elections fizzled out the movement. A lot of the claims of the
separate province movement are based on historical claims of the
‘separateness’ of the Seraiki people — in terms of language,
customs, governance — from the rest of the Punjab. While it is impossible
to assess all the claims of the movement in this space presently, I want
to trace the foundation of Bahawalpur state here, which until recently was
the ‘Seraiki’ bridgehead. My choice of Bahawalpur is important since
it was the only Seraiki speaking province/state in recent memory, and
because it was in fact the merger of Bahawalpur in the Punjab at the
dissolution of the One Unit in 1970, which sparked the separate Seraiki
suba movement in earnest. In the context of Pakistan, Bahawalpur is
further significant since it was the only princely state in Pakistan which
had some regal claims and airs. The Nawabs of Bahawalpur,
the Abbasi Daudputras, were very conscious of their status and claimed
descent from the family of the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. For the Nawabs
of Bahawalpur, this claim brought a certain degree of legitimacy and
religious authority to their rule, especially in a Muslim majority state.
This claim was similar to the foundation myths of some Hindu princes who
claimed descent from Hindu deities. The Muslim rulers of states like
Hyderabad or Bhopal did not claim legitimacy from descent from Muslim
caliphs, as such an assertion would have gained them little praise from a
Hindu majority population. The myth of their
descent from the Abbasid caliphs formed a major part of the regal claim of
the Bahawalpur Nawabs and was widely disseminated by courtiers and
sympathetic writers. The first history of Bahawalpur written in English in
1848 traced in detail the origins of the Nawabs, but in the end gave two
rather different accounts of their ancestry. The first was the typical
story of the descent from the Abbasid caliphs. In The History of
Bahawalpur, the author, Shahamet Ali, traces the fortunes of the Abbasid
caliphate in Baghdad from the conquest of Sindh by the Umayyads in the
seventh century to the caliphate’s demise at the hands of the Mongols in
the thirteenth century. Then Shahamet Ali carefully recounts the direct
descent of the Abbasid caliphs and their subsequent move to Egypt. He
notes: ‘…that there were fifty two Califs of the house of Abbas, that
thirty seven ruled over Bagdad, and that the period of their combined
reign extended to a somewhat less period than 524 years. The other branch
consisted of fifteen individuals; one of them was Sultan Ahmed, son of
Sultan Tahir, who on the fall of the Abbaside dynasty at Bagdad, emigrated
to Egypt, where he was received by the government with open arms, and at
once proclaimed the ruler of the country in Hijra 659 [1260 AD].’ Shahamet Ali then
continues to show how the Abbasids arrived in the Indian subcontinent by
stating: Ali further narrates
that after peacefully acquiring territory in Mekran, Ahmed began to be
known by the title of ‘Ameer’. The Abbasids then moved eastwards
during the chiefship of Cheenee Khan, who had achieved high office under
the governorship of Prince Morad [son of Emperor Akbar] and acquired a
jagir in Sindh, with the additional responsibility of collecting taxes
from the whole province of Sindh. Shahamet Ali’s
meticulous account describes the generations that followed, arguing that
the name ‘Daudputra’ came from the Daud Khan-II, one of the
descendants of Cheenee Khan. He notes: ‘[Daud Khan] had many children,
and lived to an age of more than two hundred years. It is from the
circumstances of his extraordinary age, that he is called the “Great
Grandfather;” and from him is derived the name Daudputras...’ Proceeding to the reign
of Nadir Shah, Ali notes the tripartite division of the province of Sindh
with ‘Shikarpur, Surkana, Sewistan, and Kachee, as far as the town of
Choter, were given to the Daudputras.’ It is from this first grant of
land that the later descendants of the family consolidated their power,
first under Nadir Shah and then under Ahmed Shah Durrani in the eighteenth
century. As the Durrani Empire
crumbled at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the rulers of
Bahawalpur achieved de-facto independence of their suzerain in Kabul. The
subsequent rise of Sikh power under Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Lahore led
the rulers of Bahawalpur to make several overtures to the East India
Company for relations, but these were rebuffed until a treaty was signed
in 1833 whereby Bahawalpur accepted the paramountcy of the Company. This first extant
‘History of Bahawalpur’ is a very curious work. Even though it
primarily attests the official myth of the descent of the ruling house of
Bahawalpur from the Abbasid caliphs, it still introduces a different
account of their origins — an account which claims that they were
nothing more than mere working class progeny. In the ‘Supplementary
Account of the Daudputras,’ at the end of the main text it states:
‘The Daudputras, especially that branch of the tribe of which Bahawal
Khan is the head, claim descent from Hazrat Abbas, the uncle of Prophet
Muhammad. Their real origin is to be traced to a very different source.
Their progenitor, Daood, was the resident of Shikarpur of the class called
Juhalas, or weavers. He is said to have five sons, Arab, Abbas, Hussun,
Hasib and Casim; from the four first are descended the Arbanee, Abbassee,
Husseinee and Hisbanee Daudputras.’ There is no author cited
for the text, perhaps because dissenting from the official version of the
origin of the ruling family might have proved dangerous. The fact that the
book was published in London, rather than in India, also suggests that it
might not have indeed been possible to include such a ‘supplementary
account’ if the book were published in India; only in distant England
could it have been inserted at the end of a book affirming the official
version. This notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that in the main text the
author began with the first Muslim conquest of parts of Sindh and Multan,
since this was a critical marker in the self-perception of the ruling
family of Bahawalpur. The Nawabs of Bahawalpur
distinguished themselves from other Muslim rulers of India since their
origins lay with the foundations of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, from
the family of the uncle of the Muslim prophet. The detailed generational
account of the Abbasids from their move from Baghdad to Egypt and beyond,
and the succession chart from Muhammad’s uncle Abbas to the current [in
1848] Nawab Bahawal Khan III at the end of the book, illustrated the
importance of this myth for the ruling family of Bahawalpur for it gave
them a claim to nobility, even holiness, and provided a major legitimising
factor to the mainly Muslim population of the state. The notion that the
Daudputras were descendants of the Abbasid caliphs was central in their
imagination of themselves as rulers. Since the Nawabs of Bahawalpur were
not ‘kings’ in the normative sense of the word, being of the Abbasid
lineage allowed them to see themselves as a part of the ‘Caliph’ style
of rulership, deriving their primary legitimacy from religious sanction.
The assumption of the title ‘Ameer’ by the Nawab in 1947, was a part
of this perception and followed directly from the title of the Muslim
caliphs, that of ‘Ameer al-Momineen,’ i.e. leader/commander of the
faithful. Thus, the Nawabs of Bahawalpur, lacking kingly titles, were
still ‘leaders/commanders’ of the people, just like the Muslim
caliphs, who were not mere rulers but vicegerents of God on earth. Nawab Sadiq Mohammad
Khan Abbasi-V, who reigned from 1907 until the state was merged with West
Pakistan, even imitated the Muslim caliphs by secretly going around his
state in disguise. As noted in a post-merger history of the state:
‘…he keeps himself well informed about whatever happens in his State.
To find out facts about the agitation in which his Hindu subjects were
involved, he went to Bahawalpur from Dera Nawab Sahib during one cold
night disguised as an ordinary camel driver.’ This incident clearly
hearkened back to the caliphs of the early Muslim period where they would
often go around their states like common men to ascertain conditions.
Nawab Mohammad Khan Abbasi-V certainly wanted to be seen as one descended
from that noble lineage. The above story of
descent of the Bahawalpur Nawabs is interesting since it explains the
continued importance of the family, and the different nature of Bahawalpur
state, which many people in the region still remember as a ‘better’
time. Foundational myths are important, whether true or otherwise, since
they bestow legitimacy, create respect, and are long lasting. In the case
of Bahawalpur, the foundational myth of the Nawabs linked them to the
great Muslims Abbasid Caliphate which not only bestowed on them the right
to rule and legitimacy, but also a religious duty to govern. As we think about
reorganising the Punjab, it is important to be at least aware of the
history of the different regions which make up this diverse country.
Identities are multilayered and take centuries to crystalise, but are
still important parts one’s life. Therefore, let us cherish and learn
from them. The writer is the
Chairperson of the Department of History, Forman Christian College, and
tweets at @BangashYK. He can be contacted at:yaqoob.bangash@gmail.com
The more military officials get involved in issues of politics, governance, and national interest, the more blurred the line between national interest and hawkish national security becomes By Dr Nyla Ali Khan The road to
Kabul from India and Pakistan runs through Kashmir, my homeland. Central
and Southern Kashmir shares borders with India, Pakistan, and China.
Pakistan-administered Northwest Kashmir shares a border with Afghanistan
and China. China administers the Northeast Aksai Chin and Trans-Karakoram
tract in the northeast. Various territorial disputes persist. Thus, a
crucial step to winning the peace in Afghanistan is to ensure the
empowerment and stability of Kashmir’s culture, economy, and democratic
institutions. The state of Jammu and
Kashmir is so geographically located that it depends for its economic
growth on an unhindered flow of trade to both countries. Kashmiri arts and
crafts have found flourishing markets in India for decades. At the same
time, the rivers and roads of Kashmir stretch into Pakistan. Prior to the
partition of India in 1947, Rawalpindi, now in Pakistan, used to be
Kashmir’s railhead, and Kashmiri traders would use Karachi, part of
Pakistan, as the seaport for overseas trade. Jammu and Kashmir has
been marred by a long history of violent political and ethnic struggles.
On September 25, at least nine people were killed when militants attacked
a police station and an army camp. As Kashmir is vigorously
discussed at the United Nations General Assembly by Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, I am of the firm
opinion that the welfare of the people of the state can be guaranteed by
securing the goodwill of the political establishments of both India and
Pakistan, and by the display of military discipline and efficiency at the
borders. The forte of the armed forces of a country, to the best of my
knowledge, is national security, not national interest or foreign policy. I recall a conversation
that I had with an interlocutor nominated by the government of India about
the role of the Indian Army in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. I asked
rather acerbically how the army had become a stakeholder in the Kashmir
imbroglio, and she hurriedly and just as acerbically replied that,
“there are good stakeholders and there are bad stakeholders, and armed
forces are, inevitably, stakeholders in an insurgent zone.” I was rather
ticked off by that response because I believed that a mediator should be
open to diplomacy and peaceful negotiations to further the India-Pakistan
peace process. If the political
evolution of a society is nipped in the bud by an all-powerful military
establishment, state policies always fall short of becoming coherent. The
more the military establishment makes incursions into democratic spaces,
the more shaky institutions of state remain and the more fragmented the
polity becomes. The “sovereign” role played by the GHQ in Pakistan is
an example of such a scenario. The more military officials get involved in
issues of politics, governance, and national interest, the more blurred
the line between national interest and hawkish national security becomes. Instead of deterring the
growth of democracy, the goal should be to empower the populace of the
state of Jammu and Kashmir sufficiently so that a disempowered populace
does not succumb to ministrations of destructive political ideologies. In
addition to addressing the political aspect of democracy, it is important
to take cognizance of its economic aspect as well. In order to restore
peace in Jammu and Kashmir, people must learn to work together across
ethnic and ideological divides and insist that everyone be included in
democratic decision-making and be given full access to basic social
services. It is an egregious mistake and one that has severe ramifications
to allow the military of a nation-state to bludgeon its democratic
processes. The writer is a faculty
member at the University of Oklahoma and a member of the Scholars Strategy
Network
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‘For five generations, the succession was maintained in Egypt in the
direct line, commencing with Sultan Ahmed; but the last Sultan, Ahmed,
having first given up his throne in favour of his heir, set out on a
expedition to Sindh at the head of a body of 12,000 horses, chiefly
consisting of the Abbas race. He made Mekran the point of invasion.’ 
