analysis In the recent past, a particular set of statements has been continually emanating from the corridors of power. Two of these oft-repeated statements are: 1) The present dispensation in Islamabad needs to continue as policy continuity is necessary for economic growth; and 2) The current government and/or set-up must continue if we are to fight extremism and terrorism, and rid the country of this scourge forever.
Almost a decade ago, the Supreme Court of Pakistan building was attacked with the honourable chief justice being the target. After venting their anger, hundreds of Nawaz Sharif's supporters celebrated the 'success' with great fervour. They ate rich meals that were brought from a four-star hotel, and sang and danced on the Constitution Avenue to express their jubilation over the humiliation they had caused to the scared judges. Revisiting
Balochistan The
first death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, which was observed on
August 26, was an important milestone in the history of Baloch politics. The
messages received from that neglected terrain are quite clear: the Baloch
leadership is still resilient to the alleged hegemonic designs of the
establishment. It intends to use the killing of Bugti for evolving consensus
on the issue of political struggle, especially in the rapidly changing
political scenario at the national level. silent
victims "A
12-year-old girl was stripped and made to stand in public in a village near
Shehr Sultan, Muzaffargarh, by her neighbours to teach her a lesson for the
sin she had never committed. As in the Meerwala case, the suspicion was that
the girl's brother had illicit relations with a woman of the rival
group." extremism Extremism, besides other things, is a social behaviour having violent and aggressive connotations. The recent surge in the phenomenon of extremism in Pakistan -- as evident from suicide and other violent attacks -- has many psychological reasons.
In
Pakistan, cotton provides livelihoods to millions of people involved in its
cultivation, industrial use and trade. Cotton-picking, though a seasonal
activity, represents by far the largest share of employment in the sector --
in three to five waves, running from August to February, an estimated two
million cotton-pickers harvest the fuel for Pakistan's export engine. debate Too often our understanding of political economy is rooted in overly state-centric analyses. In Pakistan's case, regardless of the impositions that have been made by a highly unrepresentative state on society at large, it is crucial to consider the extent to which the powers-that-be have been able to rely on either explicit or implicit legimatisation of their actions from segments of society that do not qualify as 'dominant'. That 60 years after the state's inception there are still virtually unbridgeable differences between the various communities that make up the country cannot be attributed only to the state's machinations. What is 'official discourse' is often a discourse that is ascribed to by a segment of the population, while a significant minority remains either detached, or, as is more often the case, asserts a different discourse altogether.
The
former Nawab of State of Dir had tyrannically banned education in his state
to keep his subjects illiterate in order to continue his dictatorial rule. He
banished those people who tried to surreptitiously attain education in other
cities.
Statements by our rulers highlighting their importance for the country's survival have come to increasingly sound like advertising jingles By Rubina Saigol In the recent past, a
particular set of statements has been continually emanating from the corridors
of power. Two of these oft-repeated statements are: 1) The present dispensation
in Islamabad needs to continue as policy continuity is necessary for economic
growth; and 2) The current government and/or set-up must continue if we are to
fight extremism and terrorism, and rid the country of this scourge forever. These two statements,
parroted incessantly by the president, prime minister, legislators of the
ruling party and the Cabinet, have been added to the old repertoire of the
government that included: 1) We do everything for the sake of 'supreme national
interests'; and 2) The notorious and ignominious 'doctrine of necessity'. This
rhetoric needs to be deconstructed to understand the claim to power that
underlies official speech. Speech is never neutral and when its source is
political power, it is intended to have an effect on people -- either to create
fear or desire. Political speech in our
times has come to increasingly sound like advertising. The latter, for example,
says: "If you do not use X toothpaste, your teeth will fall out"
(fear) or "If you want to look good and impress your beloved, you must
wear X brand clothes" (desire). Advertising is fundamentally manipulative,
and designed to incite primordial fears and desires to coax people into
behaving in certain ways, particularly consumerist ones. This is how business
creates markets for its products. When political speech mirrors advertising in
statements such as "If you do not retain the current political set-up your
economy will suffer, and extremism and terrorism will be rampant", a
political marketplace of ideas is being created where the citizen as a consumer
is made to believe that he or she is making informed and autonomous choices. However, when one closely
examines public political discourse, its claims ring hollow and the discerning
eye can see that these are masks of domination. These are rhetorical devices to
instill among the population fears of change and a reluctance to accept any
alternative. All governments, states and ruling elites globally manufacture
ideas that are fashioned to keep the rulers in power. The media and the
official apparatus of information, the Information Ministry in particular, are
deployed to reiterate certain ideas until they appear to be self-evident truths
-- in other words, until they become hegemonic. Let us unpack some of these
hegemonic 'truths' and see what lies beneath. Supreme national
interests This has been the oldest
trick in the government's bag. Every time an unpopular decision is to be taken,
there is resort to the time-tested notion of 'supreme national interest'. When
elected governments are dismissed by the military or by indirectly elected
presidents, it is for 'supreme national interests'; when popular leaders are
forcibly kept out of the country, it is in the name of 'supreme national
interests'; when the chief justice of the country is unceremoniously suspended
and manhandled by the police, 'supreme national interests' are invoked; when
the government decides to lend unstinted support to a superpower in its unholy
wars, it is for 'supreme national interests'; people are made to disappear
mysteriously for 'supreme national interests'; and are regularly murdered in
Wana or Balochistan or anywhere else for 'supreme national interests'. The list
is far too long, but we are all too familiar with this device used by our
rulers with increasing frequency. Fortunately, people are
now beginning to ask the question: whose interests are these 'supreme national
interests' that keep recurring with a haunting frequency? Who has defined what
are 'supreme national interests'? How has it been defined? There is never any
explanation of how the interest of one person or a particular set of rulers
became supreme 'national' interest. One would presume that 'national' means
'that of the nation' and 'the nation' would include everyone -- Sindhis,
Balochs, Pashtuns, Punjabis, Muslims, Hindus, Christians, women, men, labourers,
farmers, workers and so on. If so, then how are the killings in Waziristan
'national'? How is the selling of the country's assets like the Pakistan Steel
Mills 'national'? How are disappearances of citizens 'national'? How will the
Sindhis benefit from the Kalabagh Dam and how will the selling off of the
Diamond Bar Islands benefit the 'nation'? Similarly, the word
'supreme' mystifies, confounds and misleads. It is meant to imply that these
interests are above those of a specific class, group or set of rulers. In other
words, such interests are over and above the narrow interests of anyone. How is
the desire to re-elect one man in uniform from assemblies on the verge of
ending their term a 'supreme' interest? Is it not the interest only of that one
man and those who derive power from his position as COAS and president? How is
the endeavour to keep out two of the most popular leaders of the country a
'supreme' interest? Is it not again only in the interest of one man and his
band of toadies, who cannot face the power of popular and genuinely elected
leaders? Though frequently invoked
as the justifiable arguments for actions of the government of the time,
'supreme national interests' are in reality particularistic interests that are
presented as universal. People are made to believe that they are meant to
benefit all, but they only serve the narrow and vested interests of a small
class of rulers. Doctrine of necessity This notoriously
manipulative idea is attributed to Justice Munir, but in fact goes back to
colonial times. It has helped to indemnify many a martial law. It is the cover
for illegal takeovers of government and a boon for all usurpers. Though it has
been given the rather respectful name of 'doctrine', it is in fact merely
another trick used by rulers to legitimise their illegal rules. A doctrine,
however questionable it might be, at least encompasses a set of ideas,
principles, values and beliefs that have been explicated and elaborated upon
for years by scholars, thinkers or ecclesiastical leaders. Years of thinking
may have gone into the making of a doctrine. The so-called 'doctrine of
necessity' cannot even lay claim to the status of a doctrine. It is simply a
device used by rulers to arm-twist a malleable or weak judiciary into
capitulating to their illegal demands. The idea of 'necessity'
is again very dicey. In common parlance, the word means that some action has
become indispensable, inevitable and therefore has to be taken. The implication
is that there is no choice and if the said action is not taken there will be
grave consequences for the country -- the invocation of fear. The question
never asked of rulers and the reply never given by them is: who has decided
that something, say martial law, is necessary? How has it been decided? How has
its necessity been determined? What is the basis on which it has been deemed
necessary? How valid are those bases? The people are, of course, never asked
their opinion as it is assumed that the government knows what is best for them.
In reality this is
another farce. There was never any necessity to impose martial law or emergency
in the country. The only way that illegal rulers could sell it to gullible or
helpless populations was by inventing some vague, ill-defined and meaningless
notion like 'doctrine of necessity'. It is a marketing idea to enable
suspecting and unsuspecting populations to buy and to digest something entirely
unacceptable as regards law and democracy. It is good that this 'doctrine of
necessity' has now been relegated to the dustbin of history. The lawyer
community has purged the body politic of this monster through the ritual of
burning -- quite apt and quite dramatic. The myth of
indispensability The myth of
indispensability is as old as dictators themselves, but it has been
reinvigorated in Pakistan in recent times. Almost every dictator in history has
presented his or her own continuity in power as essential and inevitable for
the country. Most dictators believe that it is their destiny to lead the nation
to 'prosperity and well being', and they were chosen for this task by some
divine intervention. From Adolf Hitler to General Ayub to General Zia, such
beliefs in destiny, predestination and indispensability have been recorded. The main device used to
engender the myth of indispensability is fear. The usual refrain is 'If I am
removed, there will be dire consequences for the country; the country needs me
for stability and continuity.' In case the dictator is removed, goes the
argument, something terrible will happen to everyone. This myth is usually
invoked when dictators are at their weakest and most vulnerable. A related and
parallel argument employed in such circumstances is that there is nobody else.
This is repeated so often by the sycophants and flatterers that some even come
to wonder that if the present dictator goes, who will come -- suddenly all the
choices seem to disappear and one face comes to the foreground as the only one.
At such points, it becomes easy to forget that out of 160 million people there
surely must be someone who can do a better job. It becomes equally difficult to
remember that the dictator could die a natural death! What if he had a cardiac
attack or an accident? Would the country collapse because all the other 160
million were incapable of handling things? When foreign powers add their voices
to the myth of inevitability, the matter appears even more urgent. The myth of
indispensability blocks imagination, as it forecloses all possible options. The
idea of one and only (a monotheistic idea borrowed from religion) comes to
pervade national consciousness. Public political discourse centred on the
inevitability and indispensability of the dictator makes people forget that
history does not stop. Stability is not the norm; rather continuity is the
reality of existence. The only thing that is permanent is change. Despite talk
of the 'inexorable march of history', people are made to believe that history
would stop if the current leader was removed. Despite the presence of a number
of popular national leaders, abroad and in Pakistan, there is a daily
repetition of the necessity for policy continuity and stability. There are many problems
with this argument: One, stability can very easily deteriorate into stasis and
stagnation. Stability is an idea that is very popular with dictators because a
fixed and frozen reality (if any such thing were ever possible) is more
amenable to control and manipulation than a reality that is in a flux and is
fluid. In fact, society is always in a flux and paradoxically change itself is
necessary for continuity! Two, the fear of instability upon the return of
popular leaders is not that something terrible will happen to the country;
rather, the instability and chaos would be only for the rulers. The return of
Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto would not be chaotic or create disorder for the
country, but only for General Musharraf and his PML (Q) cronies. Yet, people
are told that if the two 'exiled' politicians return, somehow Pakistan would be
in turmoil. In fact, the consequence of their return might be the exact
opposite -- prosperity and a vibrant civil society and general well being.
Three, it is premature to assume that the popular leaders would reverse some of
the good policies of the present government. It is much more likely that they
would continue the policies that they consider positive, and undo only the most
destructive and unpopular policies of the present regime. So, it is completely
facile to argue that there would be turmoil and turbulence upon the return of
popular leaders and good policies would be replaced by bad ones. Need for uniformed
president This mother of all myths
is being bandied about not only by the dictator himself and his sycophantic
hangers-on; it is reverberating across the major global capitals. The argument
that Musharraf as a uniformed president is necessary to fight the twin menace
of extremism and terrorism is seriously problematic at many levels: first, it
betrays a complete ignorance of the sources and dynamics of terrorism and
extremism; and second, it also reflects a total lack of understanding of the
principles of parliamentary democracy. Let us take the first
fallacy! According to the purveyors of this theory, extremism and terrorism are
committed only by non-state actors -- by groups and individuals who destroy the
life and property of innocent civilians to further their group goals. This
simplistic construction overlooks the fact that major forms of terrorism and
extremism in the recent past have been committed by states, such as the US
invasion and occupation of Iraq, the carpet bombing of Afghanistan, the use of
bunker busters and cluster bombs, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 2006,
and the frequent killings of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by Israeli shelling
and bombing. The states that are now
asking Pakistan to 'do more' and fight terrorism are the very states that
initially created the so-called 'Jihadis' and these states take extremist
actions against civilian populations. According to one estimate, over 650,000
Iraqi civilians have been killed since March 2003. Terrorism and extremism
are in fact global problems that are rooted in the policies of conquest and
colonisation through terrorist and illegal means. They are the consequences of
the policies of rich countries in West and Central Asia. They cannot be wished
away by a dictator 'doing more' (killing more of his own citizens), but by
addressing the root causes that lie in the occupation of people's lands and the
robbery of their precious resources such as oil and gas. The spectrum of
terrorism runs from state to non-state actors, who commit acts of terror in
response to each other. Terrorism is not an ideology or belief system like
communism that has to be fought. It is merely a method, a means to address
conflicts rooted in historical grievances. Supporting an illegal dictator in
Pakistan to fight terrorism completely misses the point. Elected, non-military
popular leaders may in fact have a greater stake in fighting terrorism because
of the links of the establishment with the creation of terrorists in the past. The second major problem
with the argument that Musharraf's continuity in uniform is necessary to fight
extremism, and therefore a deal between him and Benazir must be brokered, is
that it flies in the face of democracy. The president in a parliamentary
democracy is merely a figurehead representing the federation. It is a
ceremonial post that signifies that the head of state is a non-partisan person
who represents everybody. The prime minister on the other hand is a party
person who is expected to forward the agenda of his own party. Both the
president and the army chief in the parliamentary form of democracy are
expected to be neutral and non-partisan, and the latter being a paid servant of
the state cannot take part in politics as it compromises the neutrality of the
state. All parliamentary democracies work on this principle of a non-partisan
head of state and a party head of government. By becoming so linked with one
political party while being both president and COAS, Musharraf has violated the
most basic principles of democratic functioning. And being partisan, therefore,
greatly reduces his capacity to fight terrorism because the militants see him
as being partial instead of neutral. The desire to dominate,
control and subjugate wears many masks. It is about time that our populations,
not naive and simple-minded but shrewd and discerning, see through these masks
of domination to finally reveal what is hidden beneath these layers of homilies
being delivered by our leaders every day. Nawaz Sharif had tried to subjugate the judiciary as the prime minister, but the same judiciary has saved him from sinking into oblivion By
Muhammad Ahsan Yatu Almost a decade ago, the
Supreme Court of Pakistan building was attacked with the honourable chief
justice being the target. After venting their anger, hundreds of Nawaz Sharif's
supporters celebrated the 'success' with great fervour. They ate rich meals
that were brought from a four-star hotel, and sang and danced on the
Constitution Avenue to express their jubilation over the humiliation they had
caused to the scared judges. They sang and danced
again on August 23, 2007. This time they were expressing their jubilation over
the liberation of their leaders from a self-selected punishment. There lies the
difference -- politicians disgracing the judiciary and the judiciary protecting
the genuine rights of politicians. However, it took even the
judiciary a long time of 60 years to assess its own worth and realise its full
potential. In the past, it had endorsed the army's unconstitutional acts with
nominal resistance and decided cases of politicians either on ethnic or
opportunistic basis. Time is changing fast and
the judiciary is changing even faster. It has happened for the first time In
the history of Pakistan that a judge has so openly and boldly resisted the
pressure from the army and the intelligence agencies. Though it took the judges
four months to get Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry restored, their
capacity to deliver speedy justice is increasing with the passing of every
second. The time they took to decide the cases of missing people and Sharif
brothers is perhaps a record in the modern judicial history. The way the judiciary is
taking suo motu actions is remarkable and very much constitutional. Moreover,
for the time being and till such time politics is revived, there is no other
way to move a stagnant and callous governing system, solve the piled up
problems, and to make the state feel that the ordinary Pakistanis too are human
beings. Before General
Musharraf's coup d'etat, the Sharif brothers had enjoyed immense support as far
as their political and business career was concerned. The army, the
bureaucracy, the rich and a majority of people had backed them tremendously. On
the political side, the rightists were obviously their comrades; even many
leftists portrayed them as the symbol of national bourgeoisie. The judiciary too
remained kind to the Sharif brothers. The restoration of Nawaz Sharif's
dismissed government by the Supreme Court is the only example of its kind in
Pakistan's judicial history. Even the verdict against him in the plane
hijacking case was soft. Had he contested the judgment of the Sindh High Court
in the Supreme Court, there was a great possibility that he would have been
acquitted seven years ago. As far as the
establishment's support is concerned, no other politician came even closer to
the Sharif brothers. But they used this support to build their political and
industrial empires, and destroy the state institutions. However, they cannot be
singled out in this regard -- most of the rulers before and after them had
treaded the same fascist path. What pains one is that, despite the misdeeds of
the Sharif brothers, the establishment provided them with unprecedented
support. Notwithstanding their
deal, and friendships inside and outside Pakistan, it seemed that the exile of
the Sharif brothers would not end before the committed date. However, the
Supreme Court accepted their appeal and a unanimous decision went in their
favour. They are lucky that the judges around were not like Malik Qayyum or
Maulvi Mushtaq. The Sharif brothers must
learn the lesson -- one should not attack the protectors of the Constitution,
no matter how serious one's grievances are. And if they are to stay in politics
for long, they must also learn that politics is the art of managing the
country's affairs, not of destroying state institutions. All said and done, the
question remains will we continue to move in a positive direction? Though it is
not impossible, it cannot be left to the judiciary alone -- other state
institutions will also have to play their assigned roles. The most important
thing is that how early real politics takes roots in the country, as the judges
have a limit too. They also have to look into the problems of the lower courts,
which are faced with both human and financial resources. We must also take into
account that the judges might not be able to do for an indefinite period what
they are doing right now. It is our good luck that we now have a superior
judiciary that is different from the past ones. If politicians and other state
institutions are given a free hand, then who else other than the judges would
keep a check on them? Also, where the
Constitution is silent or abstract or appears to be contradictory, its spirit
speaks through the pen of the judges. The present day scenario was summarised
beautifully by MNA Qamaruz Zaman in a talk show: "The judges today are
only performing their constitutional task. We call it judicial activism because
we have no such examples in the past." The politicians must act
as real politicians too; the sooner they do it, the better it would be for the
entire nation. The situation has become worse than the one that we had during
the last years of General Ayub's rule, as the common people have lost even
their last pennies to the ever-increasing inflation. Moreover, this time
around a martial law will undo whatever little we have achieved as a nation.
Even the army has come to know that the economy forms the basis of everything,
including security, so it will avoid confrontation. However, it will never do
away with the 'security first' myth on its own and only the people's pressure
will work in this regard. If the politicians are
real politicians -- honest to people -- they must contest the elections
highlighting the need for re-evaluating the concept of security. They must
inform the people that converting the present security state into a social
democratic state is the only way to ensure survival. They must tell the people
that we need to reduce the defence budget drastically, as well as cut down on
the off-budget military expenditure.
The
first death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, which was observed on
August 26, was an important milestone in the history of Baloch politics. The
messages received from that neglected terrain are quite clear: the Baloch
leadership is still resilient to the alleged hegemonic designs of the
establishment. It intends to use the killing of Bugti for evolving consensus
on the issue of political struggle, especially in the rapidly changing
political scenario at the national level. It is
also important to take notice of the general conditions of law and order in
the province. Incidents of violence still rock the province, shattering all
official claims of peace in the area. Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Sui and even Quetta
have reverberated with different types of attacks. The murder of Abdul Raziq
Bugti, spokesperson for the Balochistan government, is a leading example in
this respect. While these incidents were most tragic in their status and
impact, they cannot be termed isolated events. Acts of violence and sabotage
have marred Balochistan for more than two years. Use of sophisticated devices
and weapons, and the continuity of such acts without any break, clearly
suggest that the situation is much more than a conventional law and order
problem. The complex inter-relations of these events with the Baloch
communities and the power structure render the course of events worthy of
immediate attention. The
situation has become a topic of active research for many national and
international institutions. In a recently published research paper, Frederic
Grare of Carnegie Endowment has raised some concerns that are extremely
important and require detailed and objective assessment. He has outlined
several core reasons behind the seething unrest and resistance offered by the
various factions of the nationalists. Ongoing expropriation of land and
resources by other communities and state agencies; marginalisation from the
mega development projects; and plans for the construction of military
garrisons in Sui, Kohlu, Awaran and Gawader are the key concerns. An
expansion of federal intervention and control on the routine development and
administrative affairs of the province; communal and ethnic strife in the
prevailing social composition; low status of social and economic development;
turbulent history of militancy and resistance towards the establishment and
the present use of brute force by the regime to quell the resistance are some
factors that are further compounding the situation. The
Balochistan imbroglio is now largely internationalised. Events such as the
recently imposed ban on Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), abduction and
killing of Chinese engineers, and briefings by Baloch legislators to the
European Union officials have brought a greater focus of the international
community towards the Balochistan scenario. Popular perception is that the
current handling of Balochistan crisis by the establishment is not likely to
yield any concrete results. It is of utmost importance that a congruent
approach is adopted to develop a sustainable and acceptable solution to this
grave saga in the making. The
foremost need of the hour is to stretch out genuine measures of confidence
building. It has been historically observed that whenever the law and order
situation worsens, the government announces vague financial doles for the
development of the province. Political circles as well as the aware
stakeholders normally view such moves of the regime as an attempt to divert
the public attention from core matters. It is sad to note that on the site of
any such event, the provincial government representatives are seldom found.
What one finds are only personnel of law enforcement agencies. In order
to set the initiative, the regime must display a magnanimous attitude by
announcing amnesty and cease-fire according to strategic pre-cautions. The
top leaders of all factions -- including
Balochistan National Movement, Jamhoori Watan Party, Baloch Students
Organisation and other groups -- may also be invited to dialogue sessions
under the auspices of the provincial government. All the tribal chiefs and
representatives may also be invited to this moot point. The
objectives of dialogue need to focus on striking a working relationship
between the government, political parties and tribal chiefs; developing a
road map to stopping the violence and sabotage through acts of confidence
building; and preparation of an agenda of negotiation with the federal
government. This is vital because there are many matters where the provincial
government does not possess jurisdiction and authority. This attempt may
become ineffective if the establishment does not come forward with an open
approach. Release of political detenues and help in locating the missing
individuals can be the starting moves by the establishment to convince the
other side about its sincerity. There is
a need to advertise the various development projects that are being announced
by the federal government in Balochistan. Be it the extension of highways and
railways or the construction of new cantonments, the entire portfolio of
development initiatives need a careful examination. While the negotiating
parties may hold on to their respective viewpoints, the sustainable benefit
to the people of Balochistan should be the paramount consideration for
deciding upon the final course of action. Genuine
grievances, which are becoming chronic with each passing day, must be
addressed on priority. Limited or no access to military jobs, few options of
employment in enterprises in the province and the overwhelmingly high number
of non-residents are vital concerns. One must at least take a cue from the
pre-partition British regime, which gave a participatory role to Baloch
influentials in administration and developmental works. Unless the sense of
ownership of development projects is not inculcated in the Baloch masses,
little affiliation can be expected. The
government has been accusing the sardars for supporting the BLA and similar
outfits. It also levies charges on the cheiftans for running ferari camps in
different terrains of the province. There is no denying the existence of
these entities, but they are effects of the simmering socio-political
suffocation prevailing in Balochistan since decades. These entities can not
be taken as causes. The formation of such outfits are indicators of the fact
that certain stakeholder groups have found themselves alienated from the main
stream political process. Therefore, in order to assert their position, they
use respective clout and capacity to pressurise the administration. In the
case of BLA, the approach of pushing it to the wall can prove to be
dangerous. The past experiences of dealing with National Awami Party by the
Bhutto regime and Al-Zulfikar by the Zia regime in a high handed manner
turned out to be damaging exercises. The need of the hour is to broker peace
and stability by enhancing the mandate of current provincial government.
Members of the ruling coalition must be authorised to strike peace deal with
the agitators. Space and time must be allotted without interference for this
process to nurture. The format and agenda can be all encompassing. Most
controversial and delicate issues may also be brought for discussion and
debate. Rising
number of non-Balochis in the service cadres and property acquisitions;
abduction and illegal confinement of notable citizens and the commoners;
development spending; provincial autonomy and re-visiting constitutional
provisions; and a process of socio-political reforms in the society may form
a starting point. An early announcement to this effect by the government may
not be out of place to show its genuine concern for the situation. It must be
realised that it will be the government that shall have to take the first
step. While the fear of secession of the province may be a very remote
possibility as cited by some analysts, a perpetually trouble ridden
Balochistan may not be a desirable option for any regime.
"A
12-year-old girl was stripped and made to stand in public in a village near
Shehr Sultan, Muzaffargarh, by her neighbours to teach her a lesson for the
sin she had never committed. As in the Meerwala case, the suspicion was that
the girl's brother had illicit relations with a woman of the rival
group." "Muhammad
Ashraf, a factory worker from Lahore, murdered his three minor daughters by
slitting their throats. Ashraf's plea for murdering his daughters was that he
was too poor to bring them up." "A
minor boy committed suicide in Lahore on May 16, 2006, after being told off
by his mother. The boy's father said that his wife rebuked their 12-year-old
son over a petty issue." "A
student of class VIII, resident of a village in Sindh, reported to the police
that her addict farther had been molesting her for the past six years." These
black facts have been taken from Annual Report 2006 of the Society for the
Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC). Every child has a right to
live in an environment that is peaceful, safe, friendly and free from
violence. However, it is a harsh truth that violence against children is
prevalent throughout the world with varying degrees. Violation
of the children's rights to protection, despite being massive, is an under-recognised
and under-reported phenomenon in Pakistan. It is a barrier to children's
survival and development, besides being a human rights violation. The
children subjected to violation, exploitation, abuse and neglect are at risk
of death, poor physical and mental health, HIV/AIDS, displacement,
homelessness, vagrancy, and poor parenting skills later in life. "Most
of the violence against children -- whether inside homes, schools, care and
justice institutions, the workplace or the community -- is implicitly
socially condoned and remains invisible," says Professor Paulo Pinheiro,
leader of the United Nations global study on Violence against Children. Pinheiro
notes that children can suffer abuse in a variety of settings, including at
schools or in detention facilities. In addition, an estimated one million
children are forced to work in prostitution, child pornography or similar
activities each year. "Many are forced, kidnapped, sold and deceived in
these activities, or are victims of trafficking. In many different ways,
children are vulnerable to multiple forms of violence that threaten their
physical and psychological integrity. This is a constant phenomenon that
knows no political, cultural, economic or technological boundaries," he
adds. The UN
report provides a global picture of violence against children, and proposes
recommendations to address this issue. The study was prepared through a
participatory process that included regional, sub-regional and national
consultations, experts' thematic meetings, and field visits. Violence
against children in Pakistan is a neglected, and therefore an accepted,
phenomenon. Akhter Hussain Baloch, regional manager of SPARC, states:
"Violence against children is widespread, as it is justified as a
natural consequence of illiteracy, poverty, population explosion, poor
governance and lopsided government priorities." According
to Cruel Numbers, a report published by Islamabad-based child rights
organisation Sahil, in 2006, as many as 2,447 children became victims of
violence throughout the country. Most of these children were abducted for
sexual purposes and sodomy. This is also the major reason that an increasing
number of children are committing suicides. Rana
Asif Habib, president of the Initiator Development Foundation, a
Karachi-based organisaton working on street children, opines: "The main
reasons behind increasing violence against children are poverty, frustration,
and lack of understanding and support from parents and teachers." Pointing
out other factors that are responsible for the increasing violence against
children, Akhter Baloch says: "They include easy access to and
availability of arms, the rise in the power of extremists, lack of
accountability at all levels, and criminalisation of the society." The
concept of violence is clearly defined in the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), especially in articles 19, 34 and
37; other human rights treaties; and human rights instruments, such as
the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. According
to Article 19 of the UNCRC, violence includes: "All forms of physical or
mental violence, injury and abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, and
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse." It is also
supported by the general definition of child abuse agreed by experts
participating in the World Health Organisation Consultation on Child Abuse
Prevention in 1999. Violence
against children may be divided into three broad categories --physical
violence, sexual violence and psychological violence.
Incest, corporal punishment, vani/swara, child marriages and child
trafficking are some of the other types of violence against children. Violence
against children begins even before a child is born, as we see in the rising
number of foeticide cases taking place worldwide and particularly in South
Asia, including Pakistan. Born a girl, the child suffers a whole set of abuse
ranging from neglect and indifference to no access to basic rights such as
education, recreation, love and care, nourishment, and healthcare. An early
marriage, procreating before the body is ready for such a rigorous exercise,
leaving home before she has outgrown her own childhood is the fate of little
girl. Rape, molestation, acid throwing, assault, trafficking or girls is all
too common. Boys
fare no better as far as abuse in concerned. Sexual abuse of boys is
culturally accepted in certain parts of Pakistan. Besides, verbal, emotional
and physical violence is also part of their life.
Extremism,
besides other things, is a social behaviour having violent and aggressive
connotations. The recent surge in the phenomenon of extremism in Pakistan --
as evident from suicide and other violent attacks -- has many psychological
reasons. The
foremost psychological explanation for extremism in Pakistan -- especially
the Northwest and rural areas -- is the large-scale social instability in
terms of conflict over norms and values and the concerned normative
framework. This might sounds strange to many because there is a general
perception that societies in the above-mentioned areas are stable. They are
traditional, personalised, social relationship-based societies with consensus
on norms and values. The fact
of the matter is that due to outside contact the once so-called stable
structure has become extremely destabilised -- in particular the social
contact with radical Arab religious dogmas. A large number of people since
1970s have been going to Arab and Gulf countries for employment while
thousand of Arabs and Central Asian came to Pakistan during Afghan war. Many
of them stayed back. The
people became psychologically disturbed. They did not know which normative
framework to adhere to and what goals and values to work for. It was but
natural for them to become extremely frustrated and experience mass hysteria.
Another reason for social instability is that the traditional social system
could not functionally change with times and the onslaught of dogma was
overwhelming Generally
in Pakistan the social-psychological reason for extremism is a state of
normlessness technically called 'anomie'. This is the state when there is
large-scale conflict over norms and values and no value-system or normative
framework is so compelling as to organise the social behaviour. Conflict and
frustration are outcomes of such a situation. According
to social-psychologists there are two main types of aggression: hostile and
instrumental. The former is an end in itself and the latter a means towards
some other end. The nature of extremism in Pakistan is that it is the
combination of both types. Because hostile aggression, which is driven by
hatred, has equally been the reason for extremism in Pakistan. However, by
appending the pseudo-religious motives with personal anger and disaffection,
a feeling is created that it is instrumental aggression. Pakistan's
society today is marked with large-scale personal ill-feeling and
frustration, and that is when there is a rampage of violent extremism.
Whereas, in order to attain self-justification and win sympathies of others,
they present their aggression as instrumental aggression. Elucidating
the psychological roots of extremist violence Professor Dr. Aly Ahmed, a
known psychologist, said: "Since the inception of human civilization
aggression existed in one form or the other; terrorism is form of aggression
or violence. From a psychological point of view it is an instinctive
behaviour as defined by Sigmund Freud. The level of violent behaviour varies
from individual to individual and society to society, even within society and
families." About
development of frustration, Dr Aly said: "It all depends upon the
socialisation processes. Some individuals are highly frustrated in their own
family and society and become terrorists when they are invited or
incidentally fall prey to terrorists or intentionally." Insofar,
as the causes of aggression are concerned experts give three reasons: an
inborn drive, natural response to frustration, a behaviour learned as part of
the society. By nature people of Pakistan and particularly that of dwellers
of North Western areas are relatively violent. The case of Waziristan is
particularly important which has a history of displaying violent behaviour
even among the Pakhtoon tribes. In
Pakistan's case general massive underdevelopment has led to extreme
frustration. Pakistan being a closed society, especially in its north-western
and rural areas, the social mobility, both intergenerational and
intra-generational is almost negligible. The denial of ways towards this
basic urge and goal -- along with the ultimate aim of socio-economic
development and monetary gains -- is a great drawback. In this situation
frustration is a natural corollary. Dr.
Ahmed who has also presented papers on phenomenon of terrorism in several
international conferences said: "Terrorists exhibit such behaviour not
only to achieve their goal but also to attract the attention of concerned
society or attract international audience." In order
to offset extremism and terrorism in Pakistan the authorities and experts
have to understand the nature of aggression. Dr.
Ahmed spoke about psychological techniques to prepare terrorists: "There
are many causes of terrorism; the suicide attackers may have rationalised any
point of view -- to give their lives or inflict pain on others is
cause-oriented for them. But how they are prepared or get themselves prepares
to do so is a mystery. I think probably one main psychological techniques
used by the trainers is hypnotism. Brainwashing could play a very significant
role. Though hypnotism is very difficult to exercise it on a certain
individual but the training is given in such a manner that they consider that
giving life for a cause would be beneficial somewhere else." He
viewed: "Here the trainers must be capitalising upon the economic
frustration to exploit the religious values of a certain group. Terrorism may
probably seek oral gratification when they kill other individual or destroy
property. Some individual may also be able to get pleasure when inflicting
pain on others." Ones
aspect of clerical extremism is that fundamentally it is a kind of group
aggression. The clerics in these areas could only organise the aggressive
behaviour of people once they got convinced of group support. Therefore,
extremism in these areas could be countered by collective response. Once the
aggressor is convinced that he is directly going to face the consequences it
could create a balance of terror. Candidly speaking, this balance has been
greatly disturbed due to various reasons. Regarding
solution Dr. Ahmed said: "We should try to listen to the main problems
of terrorists, and may be there is some psychological planning to understand
and guide them but not with threat. Psychologists never believe in negative
reinforcement i.e. punishment but only mild punishments. Through
conversation, counselling one can refocus their attention from this kind of
behaviour." Yet
another way of countering this frustration is through the process called
displacement which means redirection of aggression to a target other than the
source of the frustration. Generally the new target is a safer or more
socially acceptable target. For
rectification of the situation the foremost effort could be to address the
roots of frustration and to initiate massive social and economic development
initiatives by the government and US and Western countries. While on the
psychological side there is a need of wide-scale societal level,
government-initiated psychological planning to tame this violent behaviour by
very clearly putting the message across that the kind of aimless violence the
terrorists subscribe to is not the panacea for anything. (The writer is a journalist/analyst and researcher.
razapkhan@yahoo.com)
In
Pakistan, cotton provides livelihoods to millions of people involved in its
cultivation, industrial use and trade. Cotton-picking, though a seasonal
activity, represents by far the largest share of employment in the sector --
in three to five waves, running from August to February, an estimated two
million cotton-pickers harvest the fuel for Pakistan's export engine. Most of
these cotton-pickers are women, despite the fact that the working of women is
seen as a threat to family honour in most parts of Pakistan -- yet another
indication of the extent of poverty prevalent in the cotton-growing belt,
outlined in detail in an earlier article of this series. Another major reason
for this is that the men hailing from the cotton-growing belt, having more
choices in the labour market, migrate for industrial or construction
employment to urban areas. The
extreme poverty in which women cotton-pickers live compels them to sell their
labour as the only productive asset they possess. The lack of alternative
employment opportunities in the rural economy also leads to an oversupply of
women labourers during the cotton harvesting season. Coupled with their
poverty, this significantly reduces the bargaining power of women
cotton-pickers in negotiations with cotton growers. Moreover, women
cotton-pickers are paid by the weight of their harvest. In such a piece-rate
system, wages are paid per unit of output rather than per unit of time, as in
the case of daily wage labourers. Traditionally,
payment to cotton-pickers used to be in kind. In recent years, however, a
vast majority of growers have moved to payment in cash. On the whole, women
cotton-pickers' earnings are lower than those of the male agricultural
labourers like sprayers and tractor drivers. This gender-based gap is
legitimised by the societal perception of men as the household's main
breadwinners and women as its supplementary income-earners. On an
average, a fast picker can harvest one maund (40 kilograms) of cotton in a
day. The cotton-picking rate in Southern Punjab in 1996/97 was reported to be
Rs 40 per maund, which increased to Rs 50-80 by 2005/06. This increase
contrasts sharply with 42 per cent increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
between 2000/01 and 2005/06 only. The piece-rate system of payment for cotton
harvesting translates into meagre daily earnings. For example, a picker who
spends four to five hours in the field and gets Rs 80 for harvesting one
maund of cotton would report daily earnings of just Rs 40-60. Additionally,
cotton-pickers are unable to verify whether their harvest has been weighed
honestly or not. Even if it has not been, they have no forum to register
their protest against those in charge of weighing. Besides
poor remuneration for hard work, cotton-pickers are also exposed to serious
health hazards. It is estimated that almost 80 per cent of the total
pesticides consumed in Pakistan are applied on the cotton crop, so the most
significant health risk cotton-pickers face is their chronic exposure to
pesticide spray residuals in their working environment. The cuts and skin
rashes of cotton-pickers further expose them to the hazards of pesticides.
Picking cotton is also common during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which poses
additional risks to the health of women labourers and their children. Also,
cotton-pickers and their family members consume water that is contaminated
with pesticides. Besides, pesticides enter the food chain because of their
exposure to the soil, livestock and the cotton seeds that are pressed to
produce edible oil. Cotton stalks are often used as fuel-wood in
cotton-growing areas. Residuals are thus inhaled by cotton-pickers and their
communities. Equally hazardous effects of pesticide exposure are found among
farmers as well as non-farmers during research in Southern Punjab. It comes
as no surprise as all people living in a village use the same drinking water
from wells situated nearby fields. The
necessity to use more and more pesticides due to the resistance developed in
pests, as well as the fact that prices of pesticides have dropped
considerably since the adoption of import liberalisation policy in 1995, has
increased their consumption considerably in the last few years. During the
same period, however, the cotton yield has not increased significantly, thus
raising serious questions about the effectiveness of increased pesticide
consumption. As most
cotton-pickers are illiterate, they are unaware of the hazards they are
exposed to. Moreover, on account of their poverty, they are vulnerable to
greater health risks. These factors prevent investment in simple protective
measures and make recovery from pesticide-related ailments very costly. The
bargaining power of cotton-pickers vis-a-vis their employer is too weak to
negotiate for protective gear. The close association between their domestic
responsibilities and paid work exposes not only them but also their children,
who are attended to while harvesting, to serious health hazards. The
result is chronic pesticide poisoning, with its symptoms ranging from mild
headache via skin allergy to cancer of internal organs. One of the few
studies conducted in Pakistan on the issue showed chronic pesticide poisoning
among cotton-pickers, especially in the post-harvest period. According to the
study, blood samples of only 10 per cent female cotton-pickers were in the
normal range after the harvesting season. On the other hand, blood samples of
42 per cent female cotton-pickers exceeded the normal range after the
harvesting season. Cotton-pickers
are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, which is fuelled by the low pay
they receive and the health hazards they are exposed to. The low piece rates
they earn does not allow them to use equipment that can protect them from the
harmful effects of pesticides, as they believe protective gear will slow down
their speed. With their low earnings they cannot afford a balanced diet,
which in turn weakens their immune system and makes them vulnerable to
pesticides' hazardous impacts. Once ill, they do not have the means to get
proper treatment. As a
first step towards ensuring decent working conditions in the cotton fields,
the role of agricultural workers, especially women, as crucial economic
stakeholders needs to be acknowledged. Women workers, who represent more than
one-third of the agricultural labour force, are not even mentioned separately
in the National Agricultural Policy. As
extension services are provided mostly by men, they hardly reach women
agricultural workers. In this scenario, existing legislation for the
protection of their lives and livelihoods -- such as the 1973 Agricultural
Pesticide Rules, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation's
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, and
the 2005 National Environment Policy that promotes integrated pest management
and discourages the use of agro-chemicals -- needs to be implemented
forcefully. Karin
Astrid Siegmann works with Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI),
Islamabad.
Too
often our understanding of political economy is rooted in overly
state-centric analyses. In Pakistan's case, regardless of the impositions
that have been made by a highly unrepresentative state on society at large,
it is crucial to consider the extent to which the powers-that-be have been
able to rely on either explicit or implicit legimatisation of their actions
from segments of society that do not qualify as 'dominant'. That 60 years
after the state's inception there are still virtually unbridgeable
differences between the various communities that make up the country cannot
be attributed only to the state's machinations. What is 'official discourse'
is often a discourse that is ascribed to by a segment of the population,
while a significant minority remains either detached, or, as is more often
the case, asserts a different discourse altogether. This
stark polarisation can be traced all the way back to the Pakistan movement.
Based as it was in the Muslim-minority areas -- and in particular the UP --
the voice of a large number of those who ended up becoming Pakistanis
(including the Balochs, Pakhtuns and a large numbers of Punjabi, Seraiki,
Sindhi and Bengali subalterns) simply did not figure in any substantive way
in the Muslim League's genesis, evolution or struggle. Indeed,
when Pakistan actually came into being many new Pakistanis were actually
disputing the nature of the new state's mandate, including the very idea of a
unitary nation-state with a unitary ideology built around Urdu and an
official -- albeit consistently changing -- interpretation of Islam. The
defence of the new state and the symbolic Kashmir cause became the
centrepiece of the 'public discourse' right from the beginning; yet this was
an imperative for a small section of the society -- and unsurprisingly it was
those who shared origins and interests with the high functionaries of the
state. Importantly, this included both dominant and non-dominant groups, the
latter comprising mostly Urdu-speaking and Punjabi migrants who had witnessed
the violence of the partition. Meanwhile, the majority of Pakistanis were
ranting and raving about the fact that they were excluded not only from
defining what the public interest was, but were also subject to the state's
wrath for decrying their exclusion. The manipulations of the state and its
class allies throughout the first decade of the country's existence reflected
an attempt to silence the 'other' discourse. Finally
the irreparable contradictions between the 'public' and 'other' discourses
came to the fore in the form of a gory civil war, which culminated in the
break-up of the state itself. This remains the only example in the history of
the modern nation-state whereby the majority has seceded from the minority.
In any case, it is a sad truth that the break-up of the country did not
reduce the gap between the 'public' and 'other' discourses. Balochistan was
bombed in the immediate aftermath of 1971, Sindh was bombed a little over a
decade later. In both these cases, the 'public' discourse mandated naked
state terrorism while the 'other' discourses were ruthlessly suppressed,
subject to the familiar rhetoric of sedition, anti-state activities and
heresy. It is
said that the current conjuncture represents a qualitative change inasmuch as
the ordinary people of Punjab -- which has historically been the fountainhead
of public discourse -- are now far more cognizant of the claims of 'other'
discourses. So, going by this argument, Punjab is not as tolerant of the
flagrant use of force in Balochistan by the state as it once was; Punjab is
not as sympathetic to the military's self-anointed mandate to rule the
country as it once was (there is a diverse expression of this claim in the
form of popular movements against the military, such as that of landless
farmers in Okara, as well as wider political mobilisations, such as that
against the deposal of the chief justice); and Punjab is no longer a hotbed
of anti-India sentiment. To a
certain extent, there can be little argument against the claim that the
symbiotic relationship between large segments of the Punjabi and
Urdu-speaking Muhajir social formations and the ruling coalition (which
includes the state institutions and propertied classes) that existed until
two or three decades ago is now characterised by numerous and deepening
contradictions. However, it is debatable whether the fallouts in the
relationship are a product of a recognition of the legitimate claims of the
'other' discourses or instead simply reflect the parochial interests of
popular constituencies amongst the Punjabis and Muhajirs amidst a deepening
of capitalism and the crises of resource allocation that such processes
herald. It is
clear that popular Muhajir consciousness, insofar as it is represented by the
MQM, has far from developed an empathy for 'other' discourses. It remains
insular, condescending and myopic, unable and unwilling to see beyond its own
peculiarly-constructed narratives of sacrifice and righteousness. While
popular Muhajir politics may not be as consistently allied with the state as
it once was, at best it wants to become a dominant force within the existing
framework and at worst it wants to eliminate all 'other' discourses along the
way. Meanwhile,
it is worth bearing in mind that social and political convulsions rocked
Punjab in the 1960s and 1970s, and these were perceived to have altered the
relationship between the state and the Punjabi social formation once and for
all. Indeed, the populist period of government in the 1970s was due in large
part to the support of popular social forces in Punjab. However, it was many
of the same popular forces in Punjab that acquiesced to the brutalisation of
the Zia years, largely looking the other way as 'others' who resisted in
whatever way they were victimised. It is
important that the largely ethnic categories outlined here can and should not
be thought of as absolute. There are and always have been significant
minorities within the Punjab and Urdu-speaking Muhajir areas that have sided
with 'other' discourses, just as dominant elements within excluded groups
have reinforced 'official' discourse. For the most part, however, one must
acknowledge that the historical alignments of the various communities that
comprise Pakistan do display broad patterns, and that until and unless
ordinary Punjabis in particular display a clear commitment to the 'other'
discourses that exist in Pakistan, 'official' discourse will continue to pose
as the unquestioned truth. The
emerging situation will perhaps offer an opportunity to test the extent of
the new-found dissent within Punjab. In the first instance, if, as seems
increasingly likely, mainstream opposition parties do not force a rupture in
the tottering military-dominated and ethnically-skewed political system and
instead settle for designated space within this system, how will this be
received by the hundreds of thousands of people in the Punjabi heartland who,
by all accounts, are hoping for a far more substantive change? And secondly,
will there be a push from the heartland for people's concerns -- which
include everything from ongoing state repression in Balochistan to the
military's unprecedented land grabs all over the country to bread and butter
issues such as inflation and unemployment -- to take centrestage in Pakistani
politics? Inevitably, the answers to such questions cannot be expected
immediately. But as a totally illegitimate official discourse teeters on the
brink of complete collapse, answers will be required in the not too distant
future.
The
former Nawab of State of Dir had tyrannically banned education in his state
to keep his subjects illiterate in order to continue his dictatorial rule. He
banished those people who tried to surreptitiously attain education in other
cities. The
people of Dir Upper had been bearing the brunt of this unpopular ban and
lagged behind the rest of the country. The district is now ranked 22nd in
education in NWFP out of the 24 districts with a dismal literacy rate of 21
per cent. The female literacy rate stands at terrible 6.1 per cent. The
situation in Kohistan, comprising seven union councils, is more alarming with
only 7 per cent literacy rate with 0.5 per cent for females. At least
forty girls primary schools, most of them in Kohistan, were closed thanks to
lack of female teachers but the UNICEF did a tremendous job to making these
schools functional by providing teachers. The area has no high school for
girls. The
number of out-of-school children in Dir has increased to 105,458 from 103,377
out of which 55,346 are females. The majority of out-of-school children are
working in markets and in fields. Another hard fact is that the dropout rate
has also surpassed 45 per cent while that for girl students is even higher.
For a 0.68 million population of the district, there are 203 girls primary
schools, 653 male primary schools, 23 girls middle schools, 73 middle schools
for boys, only 3 girls high schools, 32 high schools for boys and 2 higher
secondary schools. The
girls have little access to education, as there is no Inter or Degree College
for women in the district, forcing girl students to abandon higher education.
The Degree College for women was supposed to be complete by June 2006 but is
still not, depriving hundreds of students from higher education. "I
have a strong desire for higher education but cannot due to absence of
college. Who should I hold responsible?" asks Aasia, who had passed her
HSC examination. "It
speaks volumes about the performance of the local and provincial
governments," said Muhammad Rashid, a prominent lawyer. Though women
form 50.2 per cent population of Dir Upper, they have 203 primary schools
against 653 schools for boys. The lone high school for girls in Dir town is
jam-packed with students while still more throng the school to attain
education. Only three high schools for girls in the entire district expose
the seriousness of the government for the cause of education. "I
am mainly concerned about female education as I personally faced problems in
getting education," said Kishwar Sultan, district lady councillor,
adding that government indifference towards education was condemnable. "There
is a dire need to establish more middle and high schools and colleges in the
district," suggested Mir Mazharuddin, District Coordinator UNICEF. There
are 318,151 illiterate women in the district out of 338,459 as only 20,308
are literate, which include those who can barely read a newspaper. The number
of literate men in the district is 92,216 and the illiterate is 249,325. Although
the students have been thronging educational institutions but are not getting
admissions necessarily -- because the institutions are so few. As a result,
there is widespread concern among the students and their parents. The concern
is coupled with frustration and anger against the government. The admission
crisis has been deepening with the passage of every year and the future of
thousands of students is being ruined. As the
education session for 2007-08 started in July-August, thousands of students
were denied admissions in primary, middle, high and higher secondary schools
and the only degree college of the district due to lack of seats and space.
"Admission was denied to me in first year in my home district's college
and also in other district's colleges. It is the responsibility of government
to provide us opportunity for education but it is happening the other way
here," said Attaullah, a student, adding he had no option but to abandon
further education. Like him
more than 300 other students were compelled to abandon further education, as
also last year. The executive district officer Dir Upper, Alhaaj Abdur Rehman
said: "People now want to send their children to schools but the
institutions are few and far between. The students had been protesting over
rejection of their admissions in schools due to lack of space but we are
helpless. 500 students in a two-room primary school with two teachers, forced
to sit in the open with no facilities available. This cannot help improve
education. Female teachers refuse to go to schools in far-off areas, which
creates further problems." The
government and all NGOs, Rehman said, had been working strenuously but the
literacy rate did not improve, which was a matter of concern. The provincial
government is aware of the crisis, but is indifferent. More than 500 regular
girl students have passed their high school certificate (HSC) examination
this year besides hundreds of private candidates, but there is no inter or
degree college for them in the district, depriving all of them of
higher education. The admission crisis could not be averted despite
the fact that schools and college ignored all standards of education and
enrolled 130-320 students in a single class. "We
teach 320 students in English and Urdu classes of first year through loud
speaker while the standard class must not exceed 40 students. Taking
attendance of 320 students in a 40-minute period is even impossible let alone
teaching the students properly," a teacher of the Degree College Dir
commented. The college also faces acute shortage of staff, as degree level
teaching staff is yet to provided. More than 100 students are stuffed like
chickens in grades 6 and 7 of Government Girls Higher Secondary School Dir
while classes in centennial model school and GHS Rehankot are also packed to
suffocation. Actually
the government did not establish adequate number of schools and colleges and
is responsible for the situation. Only 33 new primary schools could be
established (half of them yet to be started), 13 upgraded to middle from
primary, 15 upgraded to high from middle and two upgraded to higher secondary
from high school in the last five years. However, the UNICEF has established
130 Community Feeder Schools in which 11875 students, majority of them girls,
were enrolled. However, the existing institutions are insufficient to meet
the growing educational requirement of Dir Upper. "We
cannot bring out-of-school children to schools as our meagre educational
institutions are already overcrowded," the EDO education said. He
suggested the provincial government, in view of meagre resources of district
government, should take immediate steps to establish more primary schools,
which should not have two rooms and two teachers but better facilities if
quality education was the aim. The people had been demanding the
establishment of more schools and colleges but the government is unmoved. "A
new degree college is immediately needed in Dir town in view of growing
number of students," the principal of Degree College Dir suggested.
However, some people suggest an evening shift in the degree college to
overcome the crisis at present to save the future of the students. Secretary
colleges and secretary schools and literacy (S&L) were not available for
comments, however, Deputy Secretary S&L Dur Muhammad while refusing to
offer comments advised to take education department's version from the
relevant EDO education. (The writer is correspondent The News Upper Dir)
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