analysis
Masks of domination
Statements by our rulers highlighting their importance for the country's survival have come to increasingly sound like advertising jingles
By Rubina Saigol

In the recent past, a particular set of statements has been continually emanating from the corridors of power. Two of these oft-repeated statements are: 1) The present dispensation in Islamabad needs to continue as policy continuity is necessary for economic growth; and 2) The current government and/or set-up must continue if we are to fight extremism and terrorism, and rid the country of this scourge forever.


activism
The SC decision and democracy
Nawaz Sharif had tried to subjugate the judiciary as the prime minister, but the same judiciary has saved him from sinking into oblivion

By Muhammad Ahsan Yatu

Almost a decade ago, the Supreme Court of Pakistan building was attacked with the honourable chief justice being the target. After venting their anger, hundreds of Nawaz Sharif's supporters celebrated the 'success' with great fervour. They ate rich meals that were brought from a four-star hotel, and sang and danced on the Constitution Avenue to express their jubilation over the humiliation they had caused to the scared judges. 

Revisiting Balochistan
While the fear of secession of the province may be a very remote possibility, a perpetually trouble ridden Balochistan may not be a desirable option for any regime
By Dr Noman Ahmed

The first death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, which was observed on August 26, was an important milestone in the history of Baloch politics. The messages received from that neglected terrain are quite clear: the Baloch leadership is still resilient to the alleged hegemonic designs of the establishment. It intends to use the killing of Bugti for evolving consensus on the issue of political struggle, especially in the rapidly changing political scenario at the national level.

silent victims
A new report throws light on the dismal state of children and lays bare some hidden facts
By Ziaur Rehman

"A 12-year-old girl was stripped and made to stand in public in a village near Shehr Sultan, Muzaffargarh, by her neighbours to teach her a lesson for the sin she had never committed. As in the Meerwala case, the suspicion was that the girl's brother had illicit relations with a woman of the rival group."

extremism
All in the mind

Social-psychology of extremism -- the large-scale social instability in terms of conflict over norms and values and the concerned normative framework
By R Khan

Extremism, besides other things, is a social behaviour having violent and aggressive connotations. The recent surge in the phenomenon of extremism in Pakistan -- as evident from suicide and other violent attacks -- has many psychological reasons. 


Bitter harvest
Pickers stand at the beginning of the chain that links cotton fields in Pakistan with the global textile market. Despite this, they are paid poorly
By Karin Astrid Siegmann

In Pakistan, cotton provides livelihoods to millions of people involved in its cultivation, industrial use and trade. Cotton-picking, though a seasonal activity, represents by far the largest share of employment in the sector -- in three to five waves, running from August to February, an estimated two million cotton-pickers harvest the fuel for Pakistan's export engine.

debate
The real faultline

Until and unless ordinary Punjabis display a clear commitment to the 'other' discourses that exist in Pakistan, 'official' discourse will continue to pose as the unquestioned truth
By Aasim Sajjad Akhtar

Too often our understanding of political economy is rooted in overly state-centric analyses. In Pakistan's case, regardless of the impositions that have been made by a highly unrepresentative state on society at large, it is crucial to consider the extent to which the powers-that-be have been able to rely on either explicit or implicit legimatisation of their actions from segments of society that do not qualify as 'dominant'. That 60 years after the state's inception there are still virtually unbridgeable differences between the various communities that make up the country cannot be attributed only to the state's machinations. What is 'official discourse' is often a discourse that is ascribed to by a segment of the population, while a significant minority remains either detached, or, as is more often the case, asserts a different discourse altogether. 


No access to education
As the new academic year starts, Dir remains far behind the rest of the country with the lowest literacy rate and virtually no schools and colleges
By Delawar Jan Banori

The former Nawab of State of Dir had tyrannically banned education in his state to keep his subjects illiterate in order to continue his dictatorial rule. He banished those people who tried to surreptitiously attain education in other cities.



analysis
Masks of domination
Statements by our rulers highlighting their importance for the country's survival have come to increasingly sound like advertising jingles

By Rubina Saigol

In the recent past, a particular set of statements has been continually emanating from the corridors of power. Two of these oft-repeated statements are: 1) The present dispensation in Islamabad needs to continue as policy continuity is necessary for economic growth; and 2) The current government and/or set-up must continue if we are to fight extremism and terrorism, and rid the country of this scourge forever.

These two statements, parroted incessantly by the president, prime minister, legislators of the ruling party and the Cabinet, have been added to the old repertoire of the government that included: 1) We do everything for the sake of 'supreme national interests'; and 2) The notorious and ignominious 'doctrine of necessity'. This rhetoric needs to be deconstructed to understand the claim to power that underlies official speech. Speech is never neutral and when its source is political power, it is intended to have an effect on people -- either to create fear or desire.

Political speech in our times has come to increasingly sound like advertising. The latter, for example, says: "If you do not use X toothpaste, your teeth will fall out" (fear) or "If you want to look good and impress your beloved, you must wear X brand clothes" (desire). Advertising is fundamentally manipulative, and designed to incite primordial fears and desires to coax people into behaving in certain ways, particularly consumerist ones. This is how business creates markets for its products. When political speech mirrors advertising in statements such as "If you do not retain the current political set-up your economy will suffer, and extremism and terrorism will be rampant", a political marketplace of ideas is being created where the citizen as a consumer is made to believe that he or she is making informed and autonomous choices.

However, when one closely examines public political discourse, its claims ring hollow and the discerning eye can see that these are masks of domination. These are rhetorical devices to instill among the population fears of change and a reluctance to accept any alternative. All governments, states and ruling elites globally manufacture ideas that are fashioned to keep the rulers in power. The media and the official apparatus of information, the Information Ministry in particular, are deployed to reiterate certain ideas until they appear to be self-evident truths -- in other words, until they become hegemonic. Let us unpack some of these hegemonic 'truths' and see what lies beneath.

 

Supreme national interests

This has been the oldest trick in the government's bag. Every time an unpopular decision is to be taken, there is resort to the time-tested notion of 'supreme national interest'. When elected governments are dismissed by the military or by indirectly elected presidents, it is for 'supreme national interests'; when popular leaders are forcibly kept out of the country, it is in the name of 'supreme national interests'; when the chief justice of the country is unceremoniously suspended and manhandled by the police, 'supreme national interests' are invoked; when the government decides to lend unstinted support to a superpower in its unholy wars, it is for 'supreme national interests'; people are made to disappear mysteriously for 'supreme national interests'; and are regularly murdered in Wana or Balochistan or anywhere else for 'supreme national interests'. The list is far too long, but we are all too familiar with this device used by our rulers with increasing frequency.

Fortunately, people are now beginning to ask the question: whose interests are these 'supreme national interests' that keep recurring with a haunting frequency? Who has defined what are 'supreme national interests'? How has it been defined? There is never any explanation of how the interest of one person or a particular set of rulers became supreme 'national' interest. One would presume that 'national' means 'that of the nation' and 'the nation' would include everyone -- Sindhis, Balochs, Pashtuns, Punjabis, Muslims, Hindus, Christians, women, men, labourers, farmers, workers and so on. If so, then how are the killings in Waziristan 'national'? How is the selling of the country's assets like the Pakistan Steel Mills 'national'? How are disappearances of citizens 'national'? How will the Sindhis benefit from the Kalabagh Dam and how will the selling off of the Diamond Bar Islands benefit the 'nation'?

Similarly, the word 'supreme' mystifies, confounds and misleads. It is meant to imply that these interests are above those of a specific class, group or set of rulers. In other words, such interests are over and above the narrow interests of anyone. How is the desire to re-elect one man in uniform from assemblies on the verge of ending their term a 'supreme' interest? Is it not the interest only of that one man and those who derive power from his position as COAS and president? How is the endeavour to keep out two of the most popular leaders of the country a 'supreme' interest? Is it not again only in the interest of one man and his band of toadies, who cannot face the power of popular and genuinely elected leaders?

Though frequently invoked as the justifiable arguments for actions of the government of the time, 'supreme national interests' are in reality particularistic interests that are presented as universal. People are made to believe that they are meant to benefit all, but they only serve the narrow and vested interests of a small class of rulers.

 

Doctrine of necessity

This notoriously manipulative idea is attributed to Justice Munir, but in fact goes back to colonial times. It has helped to indemnify many a martial law. It is the cover for illegal takeovers of government and a boon for all usurpers. Though it has been given the rather respectful name of 'doctrine', it is in fact merely another trick used by rulers to legitimise their illegal rules. A doctrine, however questionable it might be, at least encompasses a set of ideas, principles, values and beliefs that have been explicated and elaborated upon for years by scholars, thinkers or ecclesiastical leaders. Years of thinking may have gone into the making of a doctrine. The so-called 'doctrine of necessity' cannot even lay claim to the status of a doctrine. It is simply a device used by rulers to arm-twist a malleable or weak judiciary into capitulating to their illegal demands.

The idea of 'necessity' is again very dicey. In common parlance, the word means that some action has become indispensable, inevitable and therefore has to be taken. The implication is that there is no choice and if the said action is not taken there will be grave consequences for the country -- the invocation of fear. The question never asked of rulers and the reply never given by them is: who has decided that something, say martial law, is necessary? How has it been decided? How has its necessity been determined? What is the basis on which it has been deemed necessary? How valid are those bases? The people are, of course, never asked their opinion as it is assumed that the government knows what is best for them.

In reality this is another farce. There was never any necessity to impose martial law or emergency in the country. The only way that illegal rulers could sell it to gullible or helpless populations was by inventing some vague, ill-defined and meaningless notion like 'doctrine of necessity'. It is a marketing idea to enable suspecting and unsuspecting populations to buy and to digest something entirely unacceptable as regards law and democracy. It is good that this 'doctrine of necessity' has now been relegated to the dustbin of history. The lawyer community has purged the body politic of this monster through the ritual of burning -- quite apt and quite dramatic.

 

The myth of indispensability

The myth of indispensability is as old as dictators themselves, but it has been reinvigorated in Pakistan in recent times. Almost every dictator in history has presented his or her own continuity in power as essential and inevitable for the country. Most dictators believe that it is their destiny to lead the nation to 'prosperity and well being', and they were chosen for this task by some divine intervention. From Adolf Hitler to General Ayub to General Zia, such beliefs in destiny, predestination and indispensability have been recorded.

The main device used to engender the myth of indispensability is fear. The usual refrain is 'If I am removed, there will be dire consequences for the country; the country needs me for stability and continuity.' In case the dictator is removed, goes the argument, something terrible will happen to everyone. This myth is usually invoked when dictators are at their weakest and most vulnerable. A related and parallel argument employed in such circumstances is that there is nobody else. This is repeated so often by the sycophants and flatterers that some even come to wonder that if the present dictator goes, who will come -- suddenly all the choices seem to disappear and one face comes to the foreground as the only one. At such points, it becomes easy to forget that out of 160 million people there surely must be someone who can do a better job. It becomes equally difficult to remember that the dictator could die a natural death! What if he had a cardiac attack or an accident? Would the country collapse because all the other 160 million were incapable of handling things? When foreign powers add their voices to the myth of inevitability, the matter appears even more urgent.

The myth of indispensability blocks imagination, as it forecloses all possible options. The idea of one and only (a monotheistic idea borrowed from religion) comes to pervade national consciousness. Public political discourse centred on the inevitability and indispensability of the dictator makes people forget that history does not stop. Stability is not the norm; rather continuity is the reality of existence. The only thing that is permanent is change. Despite talk of the 'inexorable march of history', people are made to believe that history would stop if the current leader was removed. Despite the presence of a number of popular national leaders, abroad and in Pakistan, there is a daily repetition of the necessity for policy continuity and stability.

There are many problems with this argument: One, stability can very easily deteriorate into stasis and stagnation. Stability is an idea that is very popular with dictators because a fixed and frozen reality (if any such thing were ever possible) is more amenable to control and manipulation than a reality that is in a flux and is fluid. In fact, society is always in a flux and paradoxically change itself is necessary for continuity! Two, the fear of instability upon the return of popular leaders is not that something terrible will happen to the country; rather, the instability and chaos would be only for the rulers. The return of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto would not be chaotic or create disorder for the country, but only for General Musharraf and his PML (Q) cronies. Yet, people are told that if the two 'exiled' politicians return, somehow Pakistan would be in turmoil. In fact, the consequence of their return might be the exact opposite -- prosperity and a vibrant civil society and general well being. Three, it is premature to assume that the popular leaders would reverse some of the good policies of the present government. It is much more likely that they would continue the policies that they consider positive, and undo only the most destructive and unpopular policies of the present regime. So, it is completely facile to argue that there would be turmoil and turbulence upon the return of popular leaders and good policies would be replaced by bad ones.

 

Need for uniformed president

This mother of all myths is being bandied about not only by the dictator himself and his sycophantic hangers-on; it is reverberating across the major global capitals. The argument that Musharraf as a uniformed president is necessary to fight the twin menace of extremism and terrorism is seriously problematic at many levels: first, it betrays a complete ignorance of the sources and dynamics of terrorism and extremism; and second, it also reflects a total lack of understanding of the principles of parliamentary democracy.

Let us take the first fallacy! According to the purveyors of this theory, extremism and terrorism are committed only by non-state actors -- by groups and individuals who destroy the life and property of innocent civilians to further their group goals. This simplistic construction overlooks the fact that major forms of terrorism and extremism in the recent past have been committed by states, such as the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, the carpet bombing of Afghanistan, the use of bunker busters and cluster bombs, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 2006, and the frequent killings of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by Israeli shelling and bombing.

The states that are now asking Pakistan to 'do more' and fight terrorism are the very states that initially created the so-called 'Jihadis' and these states take extremist actions against civilian populations. According to one estimate, over 650,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed since March 2003.

Terrorism and extremism are in fact global problems that are rooted in the policies of conquest and colonisation through terrorist and illegal means. They are the consequences of the policies of rich countries in West and Central Asia. They cannot be wished away by a dictator 'doing more' (killing more of his own citizens), but by addressing the root causes that lie in the occupation of people's lands and the robbery of their precious resources such as oil and gas. The spectrum of terrorism runs from state to non-state actors, who commit acts of terror in response to each other. Terrorism is not an ideology or belief system like communism that has to be fought. It is merely a method, a means to address conflicts rooted in historical grievances. Supporting an illegal dictator in Pakistan to fight terrorism completely misses the point. Elected, non-military popular leaders may in fact have a greater stake in fighting terrorism because of the links of the establishment with the creation of terrorists in the past.

The second major problem with the argument that Musharraf's continuity in uniform is necessary to fight extremism, and therefore a deal between him and Benazir must be brokered, is that it flies in the face of democracy. The president in a parliamentary democracy is merely a figurehead representing the federation. It is a ceremonial post that signifies that the head of state is a non-partisan person who represents everybody. The prime minister on the other hand is a party person who is expected to forward the agenda of his own party. Both the president and the army chief in the parliamentary form of democracy are expected to be neutral and non-partisan, and the latter being a paid servant of the state cannot take part in politics as it compromises the neutrality of the state. All parliamentary democracies work on this principle of a non-partisan head of state and a party head of government. By becoming so linked with one political party while being both president and COAS, Musharraf has violated the most basic principles of democratic functioning. And being partisan, therefore, greatly reduces his capacity to fight terrorism because the militants see him as being partial instead of neutral.

The desire to dominate, control and subjugate wears many masks. It is about time that our populations, not naive and simple-minded but shrewd and discerning, see through these masks of domination to finally reveal what is hidden beneath these layers of homilies being delivered by our leaders every day.


activism
The SC decision and democracy
Nawaz Sharif had tried to subjugate the judiciary as the prime minister, but the same judiciary has saved him from sinking into oblivion

By Muhammad Ahsan Yatu

Almost a decade ago, the Supreme Court of Pakistan building was attacked with the honourable chief justice being the target. After venting their anger, hundreds of Nawaz Sharif's supporters celebrated the 'success' with great fervour. They ate rich meals that were brought from a four-star hotel, and sang and danced on the Constitution Avenue to express their jubilation over the humiliation they had caused to the scared judges.

They sang and danced again on August 23, 2007. This time they were expressing their jubilation over the liberation of their leaders from a self-selected punishment. There lies the difference -- politicians disgracing the judiciary and the judiciary protecting the genuine rights of politicians.

However, it took even the judiciary a long time of 60 years to assess its own worth and realise its full potential. In the past, it had endorsed the army's unconstitutional acts with nominal resistance and decided cases of politicians either on ethnic or opportunistic basis.

Time is changing fast and the judiciary is changing even faster. It has happened for the first time In the history of Pakistan that a judge has so openly and boldly resisted the pressure from the army and the intelligence agencies.

Though it took the judges four months to get Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry restored, their capacity to deliver speedy justice is increasing with the passing of every second. The time they took to decide the cases of missing people and Sharif brothers is perhaps a record in the modern judicial history.

The way the judiciary is taking suo motu actions is remarkable and very much constitutional. Moreover, for the time being and till such time politics is revived, there is no other way to move a stagnant and callous governing system, solve the piled up problems, and to make the state feel that the ordinary Pakistanis too are human beings.

Before General Musharraf's coup d'etat, the Sharif brothers had enjoyed immense support as far as their political and business career was concerned. The army, the bureaucracy, the rich and a majority of people had backed them tremendously. On the political side, the rightists were obviously their comrades; even many leftists portrayed them as the symbol of national bourgeoisie.

The judiciary too remained kind to the Sharif brothers. The restoration of Nawaz Sharif's dismissed government by the Supreme Court is the only example of its kind in Pakistan's judicial history. Even the verdict against him in the plane hijacking case was soft. Had he contested the judgment of the Sindh High Court in the Supreme Court, there was a great possibility that he would have been acquitted seven years ago.

As far as the establishment's support is concerned, no other politician came even closer to the Sharif brothers. But they used this support to build their political and industrial empires, and destroy the state institutions. However, they cannot be singled out in this regard -- most of the rulers before and after them had treaded the same fascist path. What pains one is that, despite the misdeeds of the Sharif brothers, the establishment provided them with unprecedented support.

Notwithstanding their deal, and friendships inside and outside Pakistan, it seemed that the exile of the Sharif brothers would not end before the committed date. However, the Supreme Court accepted their appeal and a unanimous decision went in their favour. They are lucky that the judges around were not like Malik Qayyum or Maulvi Mushtaq.

The Sharif brothers must learn the lesson -- one should not attack the protectors of the Constitution, no matter how serious one's grievances are. And if they are to stay in politics for long, they must also learn that politics is the art of managing the country's affairs, not of destroying state institutions.

All said and done, the question remains will we continue to move in a positive direction? Though it is not impossible, it cannot be left to the judiciary alone -- other state institutions will also have to play their assigned roles. The most important thing is that how early real politics takes roots in the country, as the judges have a limit too. They also have to look into the problems of the lower courts, which are faced with both human and financial resources.

We must also take into account that the judges might not be able to do for an indefinite period what they are doing right now. It is our good luck that we now have a superior judiciary that is different from the past ones. If politicians and other state institutions are given a free hand, then who else other than the judges would keep a check on them?

Also, where the Constitution is silent or abstract or appears to be contradictory, its spirit speaks through the pen of the judges. The present day scenario was summarised beautifully by MNA Qamaruz Zaman in a talk show: "The judges today are only performing their constitutional task. We call it judicial activism because we have no such examples in the past."

The politicians must act as real politicians too; the sooner they do it, the better it would be for the entire nation. The situation has become worse than the one that we had during the last years of General Ayub's rule, as the common people have lost even their last pennies to the ever-increasing inflation.

Moreover, this time around a martial law will undo whatever little we have achieved as a nation. Even the army has come to know that the economy forms the basis of everything, including security, so it will avoid confrontation. However, it will never do away with the 'security first' myth on its own and only the people's pressure will work in this regard.

If the politicians are real politicians -- honest to people -- they must contest the elections highlighting the need for re-evaluating the concept of security. They must inform the people that converting the present security state into a social democratic state is the only way to ensure survival. They must tell the people that we need to reduce the defence budget drastically, as well as cut down on the off-budget military expenditure.



Revisiting Balochistan
While the fear of secession of the province may be a very remote possibility, a perpetually trouble ridden Balochistan may not be a desirable option for any regime

By Dr Noman Ahmed

The first death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, which was observed on August 26, was an important milestone in the history of Baloch politics. The messages received from that neglected terrain are quite clear: the Baloch leadership is still resilient to the alleged hegemonic designs of the establishment. It intends to use the killing of Bugti for evolving consensus on the issue of political struggle, especially in the rapidly changing political scenario at the national level.

It is also important to take notice of the general conditions of law and order in the province. Incidents of violence still rock the province, shattering all official claims of peace in the area. Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Sui and even Quetta have reverberated with different types of attacks. The murder of Abdul Raziq Bugti, spokesperson for the Balochistan government, is a leading example in this respect. While these incidents were most tragic in their status and impact, they cannot be termed isolated events. Acts of violence and sabotage have marred Balochistan for more than two years. Use of sophisticated devices and weapons, and the continuity of such acts without any break, clearly suggest that the situation is much more than a conventional law and order problem. The complex inter-relations of these events with the Baloch communities and the power structure render the course of events worthy of immediate attention.

The situation has become a topic of active research for many national and international institutions. In a recently published research paper, Frederic Grare of Carnegie Endowment has raised some concerns that are extremely important and require detailed and objective assessment. He has outlined several core reasons behind the seething unrest and resistance offered by the various factions of the nationalists. Ongoing expropriation of land and resources by other communities and state agencies; marginalisation from the mega development projects; and plans for the construction of military garrisons in Sui, Kohlu, Awaran and Gawader are the key concerns.

An expansion of federal intervention and control on the routine development and administrative affairs of the province; communal and ethnic strife in the prevailing social composition; low status of social and economic development; turbulent history of militancy and resistance towards the establishment and the present use of brute force by the regime to quell the resistance are some factors that are further compounding the situation.

The Balochistan imbroglio is now largely internationalised. Events such as the recently imposed ban on Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), abduction and killing of Chinese engineers, and briefings by Baloch legislators to the European Union officials have brought a greater focus of the international community towards the Balochistan scenario. Popular perception is that the current handling of Balochistan crisis by the establishment is not likely to yield any concrete results. It is of utmost importance that a congruent approach is adopted to develop a sustainable and acceptable solution to this grave saga in the making.

The foremost need of the hour is to stretch out genuine measures of confidence building. It has been historically observed that whenever the law and order situation worsens, the government announces vague financial doles for the development of the province. Political circles as well as the aware stakeholders normally view such moves of the regime as an attempt to divert the public attention from core matters. It is sad to note that on the site of any such event, the provincial government representatives are seldom found. What one finds are only personnel of law enforcement agencies.

In order to set the initiative, the regime must display a magnanimous attitude by announcing amnesty and cease-fire according to strategic pre-cautions. The top leaders of all factions --  including Balochistan National Movement, Jamhoori Watan Party, Baloch Students Organisation and other groups -- may also be invited to dialogue sessions under the auspices of the provincial government. All the tribal chiefs and representatives may also be invited to this moot point.

The objectives of dialogue need to focus on striking a working relationship between the government, political parties and tribal chiefs; developing a road map to stopping the violence and sabotage through acts of confidence building; and preparation of an agenda of negotiation with the federal government. This is vital because there are many matters where the provincial government does not possess jurisdiction and authority. This attempt may become ineffective if the establishment does not come forward with an open approach. Release of political detenues and help in locating the missing individuals can be the starting moves by the establishment to convince the other side about its sincerity.

There is a need to advertise the various development projects that are being announced by the federal government in Balochistan. Be it the extension of highways and railways or the construction of new cantonments, the entire portfolio of development initiatives need a careful examination. While the negotiating parties may hold on to their respective viewpoints, the sustainable benefit to the people of Balochistan should be the paramount consideration for deciding upon the final course of action.

Genuine grievances, which are becoming chronic with each passing day, must be addressed on priority. Limited or no access to military jobs, few options of employment in enterprises in the province and the overwhelmingly high number of non-residents are vital concerns. One must at least take a cue from the pre-partition British regime, which gave a participatory role to Baloch influentials in administration and developmental works. Unless the sense of ownership of development projects is not inculcated in the Baloch masses, little affiliation can be expected.

The government has been accusing the sardars for supporting the BLA and similar outfits. It also levies charges on the cheiftans for running ferari camps in different terrains of the province. There is no denying the existence of these entities, but they are effects of the simmering socio-political suffocation prevailing in Balochistan since decades. These entities can not be taken as causes. The formation of such outfits are indicators of the fact that certain stakeholder groups have found themselves alienated from the main stream political process. Therefore, in order to assert their position, they use respective clout and capacity to pressurise the administration.

In the case of BLA, the approach of pushing it to the wall can prove to be dangerous. The past experiences of dealing with National Awami Party by the Bhutto regime and Al-Zulfikar by the Zia regime in a high handed manner turned out to be damaging exercises. The need of the hour is to broker peace and stability by enhancing the mandate of current provincial government. Members of the ruling coalition must be authorised to strike peace deal with the agitators. Space and time must be allotted without interference for this process to nurture. The format and agenda can be all encompassing. Most controversial and delicate issues may also be brought for discussion and debate.

Rising number of non-Balochis in the service cadres and property acquisitions; abduction and illegal confinement of notable citizens and the commoners; development spending; provincial autonomy and re-visiting constitutional provisions; and a process of socio-political reforms in the society may form a starting point. An early announcement to this effect by the government may not be out of place to show its genuine concern for the situation. It must be realised that it will be the government that shall have to take the first step. While the fear of secession of the province may be a very remote possibility as cited by some analysts, a perpetually trouble ridden Balochistan may not be a desirable option for any regime.

 


The silent victims
A new report throws light on the dismal state of children and lays bare some hidden facts

By Ziaur Rehman

"A 12-year-old girl was stripped and made to stand in public in a village near Shehr Sultan, Muzaffargarh, by her neighbours to teach her a lesson for the sin she had never committed. As in the Meerwala case, the suspicion was that the girl's brother had illicit relations with a woman of the rival group."

"Muhammad Ashraf, a factory worker from Lahore, murdered his three minor daughters by slitting their throats. Ashraf's plea for murdering his daughters was that he was too poor to bring them up."

"A minor boy committed suicide in Lahore on May 16, 2006, after being told off by his mother. The boy's father said that his wife rebuked their 12-year-old son over a petty issue."

"A student of class VIII, resident of a village in Sindh, reported to the police that her addict farther had been molesting her for the past six years."

These black facts have been taken from Annual Report 2006 of the Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC). Every child has a right to live in an environment that is peaceful, safe, friendly and free from violence. However, it is a harsh truth that violence against children is prevalent throughout the world with varying degrees.

Violation of the children's rights to protection, despite being massive, is an under-recognised and under-reported phenomenon in Pakistan. It is a barrier to children's survival and development, besides being a human rights violation. The children subjected to violation, exploitation, abuse and neglect are at risk of death, poor physical and mental health, HIV/AIDS, displacement, homelessness, vagrancy, and poor parenting skills later in life.

"Most of the violence against children -- whether inside homes, schools, care and justice institutions, the workplace or the community -- is implicitly socially condoned and remains invisible," says Professor Paulo Pinheiro, leader of the United Nations global study on Violence against Children.

Pinheiro notes that children can suffer abuse in a variety of settings, including at schools or in detention facilities. In addition, an estimated one million children are forced to work in prostitution, child pornography or similar activities each year. "Many are forced, kidnapped, sold and deceived in these activities, or are victims of trafficking. In many different ways, children are vulnerable to multiple forms of violence that threaten their physical and psychological integrity. This is a constant phenomenon that knows no political, cultural, economic or technological boundaries," he adds.

The UN report provides a global picture of violence against children, and proposes recommendations to address this issue. The study was prepared through a participatory process that included regional, sub-regional and national consultations, experts' thematic meetings, and field visits.

Violence against children in Pakistan is a neglected, and therefore an accepted, phenomenon. Akhter Hussain Baloch, regional manager of SPARC, states: "Violence against children is widespread, as it is justified as a natural consequence of illiteracy, poverty, population explosion, poor governance and lopsided government priorities."

According to Cruel Numbers, a report published by Islamabad-based child rights organisation Sahil, in 2006, as many as 2,447 children became victims of violence throughout the country. Most of these children were abducted for sexual purposes and sodomy. This is also the major reason that an increasing number of children are committing suicides.

Rana Asif Habib, president of the Initiator Development Foundation, a Karachi-based organisaton working on street children, opines: "The main reasons behind increasing violence against children are poverty, frustration, and lack of understanding and support from parents and teachers."

Pointing out other factors that are responsible for the increasing violence against children, Akhter Baloch says: "They include easy access to and availability of arms, the rise in the power of extremists, lack of accountability at all levels, and criminalisation of the society."

The concept of violence is clearly defined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), especially in articles 19, 34 and  37; other human rights treaties; and human rights instruments, such as the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. According to Article 19 of the UNCRC, violence includes: "All forms of physical or mental violence, injury and abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, and maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse." It is also supported by the general definition of child abuse agreed by experts participating in the World Health Organisation Consultation on Child Abuse Prevention in 1999.

Violence against children may be divided into three broad categories --physical violence, sexual violence and psychological violence.  Incest, corporal punishment, vani/swara, child marriages and child trafficking are some of the other types of violence against children.

Violence against children begins even before a child is born, as we see in the rising number of foeticide cases taking place worldwide and particularly in South Asia, including Pakistan. Born a girl, the child suffers a whole set of abuse ranging from neglect and indifference to no access to basic rights such as education, recreation, love and care, nourishment, and healthcare. An early marriage, procreating before the body is ready for such a rigorous exercise, leaving home before she has outgrown her own childhood is the fate of little girl. Rape, molestation, acid throwing, assault, trafficking or girls is all too common.

Boys fare no better as far as abuse in concerned. Sexual abuse of boys is culturally accepted in certain parts of Pakistan. Besides, verbal, emotional and physical violence is also part of their life.

Extremism, besides other things, is a social behaviour having violent and aggressive connotations. The recent surge in the phenomenon of extremism in Pakistan -- as evident from suicide and other violent attacks -- has many psychological reasons.

The foremost psychological explanation for extremism in Pakistan -- especially the Northwest and rural areas -- is the large-scale social instability in terms of conflict over norms and values and the concerned normative framework. This might sounds strange to many because there is a general perception that societies in the above-mentioned areas are stable. They are traditional, personalised, social relationship-based societies with consensus on norms and values.

The fact of the matter is that due to outside contact the once so-called stable structure has become extremely destabilised -- in particular the social contact with radical Arab religious dogmas. A large number of people since 1970s have been going to Arab and Gulf countries for employment while thousand of Arabs and Central Asian came to Pakistan during Afghan war. Many of them stayed back.

The people became psychologically disturbed. They did not know which normative framework to adhere to and what goals and values to work for. It was but natural for them to become extremely frustrated and experience mass hysteria. Another reason for social instability is that the traditional social system could not functionally change with times and the onslaught of dogma was overwhelming

Generally in Pakistan the social-psychological reason for extremism is a state of normlessness technically called 'anomie'. This is the state when there is large-scale conflict over norms and values and no value-system or normative framework is so compelling as to organise the social behaviour. Conflict and frustration are outcomes of such a situation.

According to social-psychologists there are two main types of aggression: hostile and instrumental. The former is an end in itself and the latter a means towards some other end. The nature of extremism in Pakistan is that it is the combination of both types. Because hostile aggression, which is driven by hatred, has equally been the reason for extremism in Pakistan. However, by appending the pseudo-religious motives with personal anger and disaffection, a feeling is created that it is instrumental aggression.

Pakistan's society today is marked with large-scale personal ill-feeling and frustration, and that is when there is a rampage of violent extremism. Whereas, in order to attain self-justification and win sympathies of others, they present their aggression as instrumental aggression.

Elucidating the psychological roots of extremist violence Professor Dr. Aly Ahmed, a known psychologist, said: "Since the inception of human civilization aggression existed in one form or the other; terrorism is form of aggression or violence. From a psychological point of view it is an instinctive behaviour as defined by Sigmund Freud. The level of violent behaviour varies from individual to individual and society to society, even within society and families."

About development of frustration, Dr Aly said: "It all depends upon the socialisation processes. Some individuals are highly frustrated in their own family and society and become terrorists when they are invited or incidentally fall prey to terrorists or intentionally."

Insofar, as the causes of aggression are concerned experts give three reasons: an inborn drive, natural response to frustration, a behaviour learned as part of the society. By nature people of Pakistan and particularly that of dwellers of North Western areas are relatively violent. The case of Waziristan is particularly important which has a history of displaying violent behaviour even among the Pakhtoon tribes.

In Pakistan's case general massive underdevelopment has led to extreme frustration. Pakistan being a closed society, especially in its north-western and rural areas, the social mobility, both intergenerational and intra-generational is almost negligible. The denial of ways towards this basic urge and goal -- along with the ultimate aim of socio-economic development and monetary gains -- is a great drawback. In this situation frustration is a natural corollary.

Dr. Ahmed who has also presented papers on phenomenon of terrorism in several international conferences said: "Terrorists exhibit such behaviour not only to achieve their goal but also to attract the attention of concerned society or attract international audience."

In order to offset extremism and terrorism in Pakistan the authorities and experts have to understand the nature of aggression.

Dr. Ahmed spoke about psychological techniques to prepare terrorists: "There are many causes of terrorism; the suicide attackers may have rationalised any point of view -- to give their lives or inflict pain on others is cause-oriented for them. But how they are prepared or get themselves prepares to do so is a mystery. I think probably one main psychological techniques used by the trainers is hypnotism. Brainwashing could play a very significant role. Though hypnotism is very difficult to exercise it on a certain individual but the training is given in such a manner that they consider that giving life for a cause would be beneficial somewhere else."

He viewed: "Here the trainers must be capitalising upon the economic frustration to exploit the religious values of a certain group. Terrorism may probably seek oral gratification when they kill other individual or destroy property. Some individual may also be able to get pleasure when inflicting pain on others."

Ones aspect of clerical extremism is that fundamentally it is a kind of group aggression. The clerics in these areas could only organise the aggressive behaviour of people once they got convinced of group support. Therefore, extremism in these areas could be countered by collective response. Once the aggressor is convinced that he is directly going to face the consequences it could create a balance of terror. Candidly speaking, this balance has been greatly disturbed due to various reasons.

Regarding solution Dr. Ahmed said: "We should try to listen to the main problems of terrorists, and may be there is some psychological planning to understand and guide them but not with threat. Psychologists never believe in negative reinforcement i.e. punishment but only mild punishments. Through conversation, counselling one can refocus their attention from this kind of behaviour."

Yet another way of countering this frustration is through the process called displacement which means redirection of aggression to a target other than the source of the frustration. Generally the new target is a safer or more socially acceptable target.

For rectification of the situation the foremost effort could be to address the roots of frustration and to initiate massive social and economic development initiatives by the government and US and Western countries. While on the psychological side there is a need of wide-scale societal level, government-initiated psychological planning to tame this violent behaviour by very clearly putting the message across that the kind of aimless violence the terrorists subscribe to is not the panacea for anything.

(The writer is a journalist/analyst and researcher. razapkhan@yahoo.com)



Bitter harvest
Pickers stand at the beginning of the chain that links cotton fields in Pakistan with the global textile market. Despite this, they are paid poorly

By Karin Astrid Siegmann

In Pakistan, cotton provides livelihoods to millions of people involved in its cultivation, industrial use and trade. Cotton-picking, though a seasonal activity, represents by far the largest share of employment in the sector -- in three to five waves, running from August to February, an estimated two million cotton-pickers harvest the fuel for Pakistan's export engine.

Most of these cotton-pickers are women, despite the fact that the working of women is seen as a threat to family honour in most parts of Pakistan -- yet another indication of the extent of poverty prevalent in the cotton-growing belt, outlined in detail in an earlier article of this series. Another major reason for this is that the men hailing from the cotton-growing belt, having more choices in the labour market, migrate for industrial or construction employment to urban areas.

The extreme poverty in which women cotton-pickers live compels them to sell their labour as the only productive asset they possess. The lack of alternative employment opportunities in the rural economy also leads to an oversupply of women labourers during the cotton harvesting season. Coupled with their poverty, this significantly reduces the bargaining power of women cotton-pickers in negotiations with cotton growers. Moreover, women cotton-pickers are paid by the weight of their harvest. In such a piece-rate system, wages are paid per unit of output rather than per unit of time, as in the case of daily wage labourers.

Traditionally, payment to cotton-pickers used to be in kind. In recent years, however, a vast majority of growers have moved to payment in cash. On the whole, women cotton-pickers' earnings are lower than those of the male agricultural labourers like sprayers and tractor drivers. This gender-based gap is legitimised by the societal perception of men as the household's main breadwinners and women as its supplementary income-earners.

On an average, a fast picker can harvest one maund (40 kilograms) of cotton in a day. The cotton-picking rate in Southern Punjab in 1996/97 was reported to be Rs 40 per maund, which increased to Rs 50-80 by 2005/06. This increase contrasts sharply with 42 per cent increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) between 2000/01 and 2005/06 only. The piece-rate system of payment for cotton harvesting translates into meagre daily earnings. For example, a picker who spends four to five hours in the field and gets Rs 80 for harvesting one maund of cotton would report daily earnings of just Rs 40-60. Additionally, cotton-pickers are unable to verify whether their harvest has been weighed honestly or not. Even if it has not been, they have no forum to register their protest against those in charge of weighing.

Besides poor remuneration for hard work, cotton-pickers are also exposed to serious health hazards. It is estimated that almost 80 per cent of the total pesticides consumed in Pakistan are applied on the cotton crop, so the most significant health risk cotton-pickers face is their chronic exposure to pesticide spray residuals in their working environment. The cuts and skin rashes of cotton-pickers further expose them to the hazards of pesticides. Picking cotton is also common during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which poses additional risks to the health of women labourers and their children.

Also, cotton-pickers and their family members consume water that is contaminated with pesticides. Besides, pesticides enter the food chain because of their exposure to the soil, livestock and the cotton seeds that are pressed to produce edible oil. Cotton stalks are often used as fuel-wood in cotton-growing areas. Residuals are thus inhaled by cotton-pickers and their communities. Equally hazardous effects of pesticide exposure are found among farmers as well as non-farmers during research in Southern Punjab. It comes as no surprise as all people living in a village use the same drinking water from wells situated nearby fields.

The necessity to use more and more pesticides due to the resistance developed in pests, as well as the fact that prices of pesticides have dropped considerably since the adoption of import liberalisation policy in 1995, has increased their consumption considerably in the last few years. During the same period, however, the cotton yield has not increased significantly, thus raising serious questions about the effectiveness of increased pesticide consumption.

As most cotton-pickers are illiterate, they are unaware of the hazards they are exposed to. Moreover, on account of their poverty, they are vulnerable to greater health risks. These factors prevent investment in simple protective measures and make recovery from pesticide-related ailments very costly. The bargaining power of cotton-pickers vis-a-vis their employer is too weak to negotiate for protective gear. The close association between their domestic responsibilities and paid work exposes not only them but also their children, who are attended to while harvesting, to serious health hazards.

The result is chronic pesticide poisoning, with its symptoms ranging from mild headache via skin allergy to cancer of internal organs. One of the few studies conducted in Pakistan on the issue showed chronic pesticide poisoning among cotton-pickers, especially in the post-harvest period. According to the study, blood samples of only 10 per cent female cotton-pickers were in the normal range after the harvesting season. On the other hand, blood samples of 42 per cent female cotton-pickers exceeded the normal range after the harvesting season.

Cotton-pickers are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, which is fuelled by the low pay they receive and the health hazards they are exposed to. The low piece rates they earn does not allow them to use equipment that can protect them from the harmful effects of pesticides, as they believe protective gear will slow down their speed. With their low earnings they cannot afford a balanced diet, which in turn weakens their immune system and makes them vulnerable to pesticides' hazardous impacts. Once ill, they do not have the means to get proper treatment.

As a first step towards ensuring decent working conditions in the cotton fields, the role of agricultural workers, especially women, as crucial economic stakeholders needs to be acknowledged. Women workers, who represent more than one-third of the agricultural labour force, are not even mentioned separately in the National Agricultural Policy.

As extension services are provided mostly by men, they hardly reach women agricultural workers. In this scenario, existing legislation for the protection of their lives and livelihoods -- such as the 1973 Agricultural Pesticide Rules, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation's International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, and the 2005 National Environment Policy that promotes integrated pest management and discourages the use of agro-chemicals -- needs to be implemented forcefully.

Karin Astrid Siegmann works with Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad.

Too often our understanding of political economy is rooted in overly state-centric analyses. In Pakistan's case, regardless of the impositions that have been made by a highly unrepresentative state on society at large, it is crucial to consider the extent to which the powers-that-be have been able to rely on either explicit or implicit legimatisation of their actions from segments of society that do not qualify as 'dominant'. That 60 years after the state's inception there are still virtually unbridgeable differences between the various communities that make up the country cannot be attributed only to the state's machinations. What is 'official discourse' is often a discourse that is ascribed to by a segment of the population, while a significant minority remains either detached, or, as is more often the case, asserts a different discourse altogether.

This stark polarisation can be traced all the way back to the Pakistan movement. Based as it was in the Muslim-minority areas -- and in particular the UP -- the voice of a large number of those who ended up becoming Pakistanis (including the Balochs, Pakhtuns and a large numbers of Punjabi, Seraiki, Sindhi and Bengali subalterns) simply did not figure in any substantive way in the Muslim League's genesis, evolution or struggle.

Indeed, when Pakistan actually came into being many new Pakistanis were actually disputing the nature of the new state's mandate, including the very idea of a unitary nation-state with a unitary ideology built around Urdu and an official -- albeit consistently changing -- interpretation of Islam.

The defence of the new state and the symbolic Kashmir cause became the centrepiece of the 'public discourse' right from the beginning; yet this was an imperative for a small section of the society -- and unsurprisingly it was those who shared origins and interests with the high functionaries of the state. Importantly, this included both dominant and non-dominant groups, the latter comprising mostly Urdu-speaking and Punjabi migrants who had witnessed the violence of the partition. Meanwhile, the majority of Pakistanis were ranting and raving about the fact that they were excluded not only from defining what the public interest was, but were also subject to the state's wrath for decrying their exclusion. The manipulations of the state and its class allies throughout the first decade of the country's existence reflected an attempt to silence the 'other' discourse.

Finally the irreparable contradictions between the 'public' and 'other' discourses came to the fore in the form of a gory civil war, which culminated in the break-up of the state itself. This remains the only example in the history of the modern nation-state whereby the majority has seceded from the minority. In any case, it is a sad truth that the break-up of the country did not reduce the gap between the 'public' and 'other' discourses. Balochistan was bombed in the immediate aftermath of 1971, Sindh was bombed a little over a decade later. In both these cases, the 'public' discourse mandated naked state terrorism while the 'other' discourses were ruthlessly suppressed, subject to the familiar rhetoric of sedition, anti-state activities and heresy.

It is said that the current conjuncture represents a qualitative change inasmuch as the ordinary people of Punjab -- which has historically been the fountainhead of public discourse -- are now far more cognizant of the claims of 'other' discourses. So, going by this argument, Punjab is not as tolerant of the flagrant use of force in Balochistan by the state as it once was; Punjab is not as sympathetic to the military's self-anointed mandate to rule the country as it once was (there is a diverse expression of this claim in the form of popular movements against the military, such as that of landless farmers in Okara, as well as wider political mobilisations, such as that against the deposal of the chief justice); and Punjab is no longer a hotbed of anti-India sentiment.

To a certain extent, there can be little argument against the claim that the symbiotic relationship between large segments of the Punjabi and Urdu-speaking Muhajir social formations and the ruling coalition (which includes the state institutions and propertied classes) that existed until two or three decades ago is now characterised by numerous and deepening contradictions. However, it is debatable whether the fallouts in the relationship are a product of a recognition of the legitimate claims of the 'other' discourses or instead simply reflect the parochial interests of popular constituencies amongst the Punjabis and Muhajirs amidst a deepening of capitalism and the crises of resource allocation that such processes herald.

It is clear that popular Muhajir consciousness, insofar as it is represented by the MQM, has far from developed an empathy for 'other' discourses. It remains insular, condescending and myopic, unable and unwilling to see beyond its own peculiarly-constructed narratives of sacrifice and righteousness. While popular Muhajir politics may not be as consistently allied with the state as it once was, at best it wants to become a dominant force within the existing framework and at worst it wants to eliminate all 'other' discourses along the way.

Meanwhile, it is worth bearing in mind that social and political convulsions rocked Punjab in the 1960s and 1970s, and these were perceived to have altered the relationship between the state and the Punjabi social formation once and for all. Indeed, the populist period of government in the 1970s was due in large part to the support of popular social forces in Punjab. However, it was many of the same popular forces in Punjab that acquiesced to the brutalisation of the Zia years, largely looking the other way as 'others' who resisted in whatever way they were victimised.

It is important that the largely ethnic categories outlined here can and should not be thought of as absolute. There are and always have been significant minorities within the Punjab and Urdu-speaking Muhajir areas that have sided with 'other' discourses, just as dominant elements within excluded groups have reinforced 'official' discourse. For the most part, however, one must acknowledge that the historical alignments of the various communities that comprise Pakistan do display broad patterns, and that until and unless ordinary Punjabis in particular display a clear commitment to the 'other' discourses that exist in Pakistan, 'official' discourse will continue to pose as the unquestioned truth.

The emerging situation will perhaps offer an opportunity to test the extent of the new-found dissent within Punjab. In the first instance, if, as seems increasingly likely, mainstream opposition parties do not force a rupture in the tottering military-dominated and ethnically-skewed political system and instead settle for designated space within this system, how will this be received by the hundreds of thousands of people in the Punjabi heartland who, by all accounts, are hoping for a far more substantive change? And secondly, will there be a push from the heartland for people's concerns -- which include everything from ongoing state repression in Balochistan to the military's unprecedented land grabs all over the country to bread and butter issues such as inflation and unemployment -- to take centrestage in Pakistani politics? Inevitably, the answers to such questions cannot be expected immediately. But as a totally illegitimate official discourse teeters on the brink of complete collapse, answers will be required in the not too distant future.

The former Nawab of State of Dir had tyrannically banned education in his state to keep his subjects illiterate in order to continue his dictatorial rule. He banished those people who tried to surreptitiously attain education in other cities.

The people of Dir Upper had been bearing the brunt of this unpopular ban and lagged behind the rest of the country. The district is now ranked 22nd in education in NWFP out of the 24 districts with a dismal literacy rate of 21 per cent. The female literacy rate stands at terrible 6.1 per cent. The situation in Kohistan, comprising seven union councils, is more alarming with only 7 per cent literacy rate with 0.5 per cent for females.

At least forty girls primary schools, most of them in Kohistan, were closed thanks to lack of female teachers but the UNICEF did a tremendous job to making these schools functional by providing teachers. The area has no high school for girls.

The number of out-of-school children in Dir has increased to 105,458 from 103,377 out of which 55,346 are females. The majority of out-of-school children are working in markets and in fields. Another hard fact is that the dropout rate has also surpassed 45 per cent while that for girl students is even higher. For a 0.68 million population of the district, there are 203 girls primary schools, 653 male primary schools, 23 girls middle schools, 73 middle schools for boys, only 3 girls high schools, 32 high schools for boys and 2 higher secondary schools.

The girls have little access to education, as there is no Inter or Degree College for women in the district, forcing girl students to abandon higher education. The Degree College for women was supposed to be complete by June 2006 but is still not, depriving hundreds of students from higher education.

"I have a strong desire for higher education but cannot due to absence of college. Who should I hold responsible?" asks Aasia, who had passed her HSC examination.

"It speaks volumes about the performance of the local and provincial governments," said Muhammad Rashid, a prominent lawyer. Though women form 50.2 per cent population of Dir Upper, they have 203 primary schools against 653 schools for boys. The lone high school for girls in Dir town is jam-packed with students while still more throng the school to attain education. Only three high schools for girls in the entire district expose the seriousness of the government for the cause of education.

"I am mainly concerned about female education as I personally faced problems in getting education," said Kishwar Sultan, district lady councillor, adding that government indifference towards education was condemnable.

"There is a dire need to establish more middle and high schools and colleges in the district," suggested Mir Mazharuddin, District Coordinator UNICEF. There are 318,151 illiterate women in the district out of 338,459 as only 20,308 are literate, which include those who can barely read a newspaper. The number of literate men in the district is 92,216 and the illiterate is 249,325.

Although the students have been thronging educational institutions but are not getting admissions necessarily -- because the institutions are so few. As a result, there is widespread concern among the students and their parents. The concern is coupled with frustration and anger against the government. The admission crisis has been deepening with the passage of every year and the future of thousands of students is being ruined.

As the education session for 2007-08 started in July-August, thousands of students were denied admissions in primary, middle, high and higher secondary schools and the only degree college of the district due to lack of seats and space. "Admission was denied to me in first year in my home district's college and also in other district's colleges. It is the responsibility of government to provide us opportunity for education but it is happening the other way here," said Attaullah, a student, adding he had no option but to abandon further education.

Like him more than 300 other students were compelled to abandon further education, as also last year. The executive district officer Dir Upper, Alhaaj Abdur Rehman said: "People now want to send their children to schools but the institutions are few and far between. The students had been protesting over rejection of their admissions in schools due to lack of space but we are helpless. 500 students in a two-room primary school with two teachers, forced to sit in the open with no facilities available. This cannot help improve education. Female teachers refuse to go to schools in far-off areas, which creates further problems."

The government and all NGOs, Rehman said, had been working strenuously but the literacy rate did not improve, which was a matter of concern. The provincial government is aware of the crisis, but is indifferent. More than 500 regular girl students have passed their high school certificate (HSC) examination this year besides hundreds of private candidates, but there is no inter or degree college for them in the district, depriving all of them of  higher education. The admission crisis could not be averted despite the fact that schools and college ignored all standards of education and enrolled 130-320 students in a single class.

"We teach 320 students in English and Urdu classes of first year through loud speaker while the standard class must not exceed 40 students. Taking attendance of 320 students in a 40-minute period is even impossible let alone teaching the students properly," a teacher of the Degree College Dir commented. The college also faces acute shortage of staff, as degree level teaching staff is yet to provided. More than 100 students are stuffed like chickens in grades 6 and 7 of Government Girls Higher Secondary School Dir while classes in centennial model school and GHS Rehankot are also packed to suffocation.

Actually the government did not establish adequate number of schools and colleges and is responsible for the situation. Only 33 new primary schools could be established (half of them yet to be started), 13 upgraded to middle from primary, 15 upgraded to high from middle and two upgraded to higher secondary from high school in the last five years. However, the UNICEF has established 130 Community Feeder Schools in which 11875 students, majority of them girls, were enrolled. However, the existing institutions are insufficient to meet the growing educational requirement of Dir Upper.

"We cannot bring out-of-school children to schools as our meagre educational institutions are already overcrowded," the EDO education said. He suggested the provincial government, in view of meagre resources of district government, should take immediate steps to establish more primary schools, which should not have two rooms and two teachers but better facilities if quality education was the aim. The people had been demanding the establishment of more schools and colleges but the government is unmoved.

"A new degree college is immediately needed in Dir town in view of growing number of students," the principal of Degree College Dir suggested. However, some people suggest an evening shift in the degree college to overcome the crisis at present to save the future of the students.

Secretary colleges and secretary schools and literacy (S&L) were not available for comments, however, Deputy Secretary S&L Dur Muhammad while refusing to offer comments advised to take education department's version from the relevant EDO education.

(The writer is correspondent The News Upper Dir)

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