history
More provinces or more power to provinces
The demand for carving out new provincial units must be seen in the context of provincial autonomy
By Dr Tahir Kamran
Provincial autonomy, being a core subject in the recently passed 18th Amendment is indicative of the maturity of the Pakistani political elite. In such a plurality as Pakistan, forging consensus among disparate groups and factions is a giant leap and that too in a right direction. Now that the sovereignty of the representative institutions have been ensured, the provinces are able to have more incentives because the concurrent list stands abolished and its subjects have been transferred to the provinces.

This is a mere opening of a public debate on the issue. The question, whether Pakistan needs new provinces, has always been seen by the ruling establishment as part of an anti-state or a separatist agenda - nothing short of an attempt to break up the country. But the question has been raised time and again in one context or the other in recent months and is going to haunt the national discourse in the days to come as well.

Why raise the question now is obviously the foremost concern: some see this as the fruit of democracy when all pent-up forces during the long period of dictatorship are thrown open; others within the ruling party find it a bane of each Pakistan People's Party government when all disruptive demands are out to "destabilise" it; still others, the likes of Taj Mohammad Langah, think the issue is being raised now because the establishment itself has taken a fancy to it.

While each explanation may contain a partial tinge of truth, it was when the eighteenth constitutional amendment sought to rename NWFP as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa that the genie came out of the bottle in the first place. The demand for a Seraiki province was quick to follow and there seems an endless body of opinion arguing for this side or that.

In this Special Report, we have attempted to initiate an academic debate on an issue which has been lying suppressed all these years. We have deliberately kept the political stakeholders out. We just wanted to revisit history in order to arrive at better conclusions for the future. The thinkers we have engaged to do that for us have pinpointed the lack of attention for language and culture in the way the provincial boundaries are drawn in the present day Pakistan. They are critical of the fact that we never attempted to redraw them both on ethno-linguistic or even or administrative grounds - two ideal ways to draw boundaries - even though the next door India that gained independence with us did that several times after partition.

It is not too difficult to judge which of the two countries has fared better as a federation.

Our experts here have dwelled too much on the questions of provincial autonomy and the allocation of resources. They remind us that the strong centre was neither willing to allocate resources nor did it allow the multiple ethnicities to flourish. The first casualty of such policies was East Pakistan that became Bangladesh. But we never learnt the lesson and an even stronger centre was advocated and a Pakistani identity forged with greater force, the 1973 constitution notwithstanding. Thus, long before the demands for a Hazara and a Seraiki province, there came an insurgency in Balochistan that still persists.

It is in this context that we begin this debate, hoping that after this public debate is over, the central question - whether Pakistan needs more provinces - is then taken to the people in the form of a referendum and their views sought on the subject. If public good is the ultimate aim of all political endeavours, people should be the final judge of what constitutes it.

The 18th amendment has righted an old wrong -- the name which the Pakhtuns wanted for their province (Pakhtunkhwa) has been given to them after over 60 years of delay. But, quite foolishly, it has been hyphenated so that we have Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa when only Pakhtunkhwa or Pakhtunistan would have sufficed.

I had suggested both names in my columns several times in the last 15 years or so. However, if this name had satisfied the people of Hazara I would have welcomed it. But the problem is that this inept naming has not satisfied the people of Hazara; in fact, they have expressed their displeasure in violent ways.

That the violence was whipped up by certain political forces is regrettably true. But it is also true that when I visited Abbottabad in 1994 for field research for my book 'Language and Politics in Pakistan', there was a Hazara Qaumi Mahaz -- and it had been there since 1987 -- which demanded Hazara to be declared a separate province (see page 214 of my book for details). Hazara, after all, has over 4.5 million people and about 60 percent of them are Hindko-speakers. Moreover, if they had income of their own, money from Tarbela Dam and tourism would be sufficient. Why then should they be denied their right of being a separate province? Or, is it because their share of income would impoverish the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, that this demand annoys the Pakhtun leaders?

The reason why the Pakistani decision-makers have a history of denying ethnic demands -- autonomy for provinces, creation of new provinces, less share of ethnic groups in political power and economic resources, lack of recognition of ethnic languages and cultures etc -- is because they have a model of a strong, unified nation-state in their minds.

First, East Bengal challenged this internal colonialist mindset. Using Bengali language as a symbol of ethnic identity the Bengalis challenged the state in 1948 and 1952 when blood was spilt on the streets of Dhaka. By 1955 Bengali was accepted as a second national language but economic exploitation remained, political domination continued and Bengalis were looked down upon by West Pakistanis. This led to a demand for autonomy expressed through the Six Points of Mujeeb ur Rahman and, when these were denied, there was a separatist movement and Bangladesh was born.

But the Pakistani elite did not learn a lesson. The demands of Balochistan were never satisfied. Every time the province erupted into militant violence the armed forces were used. Every time a solution was in sight the hardliners came in and disrupted the process. After Nawab Akbar Bugti's murder Balochistan is again in turmoil. The present government is making efforts through the NFC Award, special packages and the 18th amendment to reverse the tide. But the water threatens to go over our heads.

The point is that Pakistan is not a mono-lingual, mono-ethnic, unitary state. It is a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic federation. Indeed, it is a conglomeration of people which have been allotted borders and boundaries by forces of history. If these peoples are to become a people, a nation, then all these disparate ethnic groups must have a vested interest in the centre. This interest can be generated by creating provinces on ethno-linguistic basis wherever it is possible to do so without increasing antagonism between ethnic groups living in that province. Our major criteria should be to increase harmony and avoid bloodshed.

Also, in pursuit of the same broad goals, the provinces should be given a just share of power and resources so that they do not feel wronged and alienated. If the provinces feel they have a stake in the system they will strengthen it; they will not opt out of the federation.

Our decision-makers deny ethnicity on the wrong assumption that if they insist on only one Pakistan identity while denying ethnic identities, they will create a unified nation. This is a fallacy. Denying people their identities fans hatred; increases alienation and makes people more conscious of being dominated and marginalised than before.

Another apprehension of the majority (i.e. Punjabi power-holders) is that the Punjab will be weakened. Yes, this is entirely true. If there is a Seraiki province or other provinces cut out of the Punjab, as presently constituted, the Punjab will be smaller. But in its comparative weakness will be the strength it will gain from enhanced moral stature. Moreover, there will be less opposition to it and that will strengthen the federation. This is ultimately also in the interest of the Punjab.

I will now reiterate the suggestion I gave in the 'Conclusion' of my book Language and Politics in Pakistan. Please note that the book was published in 1996 and, therefore, I am not under the influence of any present-day political scenario or ethnic group. I suggest again -- and this is the fourth time I am doing so -- that Pakistan should be divided as far as possible into ethno-linguistic units or provinces. India serves as a possible model but our peculiar conditions must be kept in mind. There should be a Pakhtunkhwa province with the Pashto-speaking parts of Balochistan, the present-day Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Swat as a unit. The Khowar-speaking and Kalasha-speaking parts of Chitral as well as Kohistan which will become a separate province called Chitral-Kohistan. Hazara will also become a separate province by itself. Punjab will be divided into three provinces: the Seraiki province, the Punjabi province and the Pahari/Potohari province. Logically speaking, Karachi should also be a separate province and Sindh should have an alternative new port to compensate for its loss.

The aim of my proposals is to avoid conflict and promote harmony. Therefore, if the division of Sindh is not acceptable to Sindhi-speaking people a compromise solution should be sought instead. My assumption here is that the division of the Punjab would be conceded by the Punjabi majority in the interest of the country and the elite's own long-term interest. As for Pakhtunkhwa, since the new province I have proposed will be quite large and will allow most Pashto-speaking people to live in one province, I assume the separation of Hazara and Chitral would be accepted by the Pakhtun decision-makers.

In any case, there are many countries which have made smaller provinces for ease of administration or because of ethnic pressure. The Ansari Commission set up by General Ziaul Haq also advocated some re-arrangement along the lines I have proposed.

Much earlier in 1947, the Communist Party of India proposed setting up 'sovereign national constituent assemblies' in 'republics' in India. The establishment has always condemned ethnicity as 'provincialism' or anti-state agenda. In 1952 the government of the day used to blame the Communists and Indian agents for raising the Bangla language issue. Much later a secret report commented that India had not too much to fan the movement -- implying that it was a genuine demand of the people. Enemy agents do, of course, help separatists as they may be doing in Balochistan and as Pakistan did in the case of Khalistan during the 1980s. But agents cannot create the movement.

The problems are real and they are the products of wrong policies and practices. When a country's own policies change the ethnic-nationalist response also changes. Enemy agents cannot succeed in the face of real justice and good governance. So, to hide behind the excuse of 'foreign hand' is a recipe for disaster because then we do not inspect our own follies, cruelties and faults.

To conclude, the idea of creating new provinces along ethno-linguistic lines is potentially a good idea. However, every idea should be measured from the yardstick of public good. This idea should also be measured from this point of view. If it can reduce ethnic tension and provide greater justice it may be considered in the interest of the people of this country. And perhaps one way of measuring this may be by holding referendums after allowing public debate on the issue.

Recently, the Jamaat-e-Islami announced its support for increasing the number of provinces in the country after the renaming of NWFP as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Their political opportunism aside, the truth is that historically all the political parties have limited themselves to populist sloganeering for or against issues of provincial autonomy and, now, for possibly more provinces. Admittedly, the renaming of NWFP is simply a symbolic change. However, for a country whose politics thrives on the symbolic and with little or no questioning of the practical worth of manifestos or policies, a reaction of alarm on the renaming is strange. In any case, surely it is appropriate to rename a province whose identity depended on its geographical location rather than its people -- even if the name reflects some and not all of the sub-nationalities.

On the possibility of more provinces, the argument is more layered. The grand narrative theory speculates there is no point to such symbolic demands since there is no material base to make a difference to people's lives. The over-active mind of the conspiracy theorist suggests such demands are part of a grand plan to break up Pakistan into very small pieces which will make it easier to control through provincial conflict. However, beyond this, what hasn't been discussed or debated are the fundamentals of a new relationship between provincial and universal rights of citizenship. The lazy mind tends to dismiss any such effort as an intellectual exercise. Instead, such non-visionaries romanticise service delivery and poverty alleviation, as if this will take care of struggles of identity and representation, too.

The central concern regarding the autonomy of a people, however organised in societies, revolves around the notion of citizenship rights. In our case, conflicts often arise over the competing notions of individual versus group rights. Over the years, in the vacuum of democratic representation, group rights have galvanised around ethnic formations. When competing collective categories, such as gender or class conscious or minority ethnic groups challenge the 'majoritarian' ethnic group, this has threatened the social normative of the dominant group.

It became more complicated when individual women, member(s) of a minority group or lower classes challenge their own ethnic power base. This leads to accusation of treachery to the collective, ethnicity-defined order. This creates internecine tension and the insecurity justifies the need to sacrifice individual rights to protect the 'honour' and very existence of a collective culture and traditions.

In principle, the right of minorities to organise themselves on the basis of their cultures, ethnicities or religious beliefs, is a central concern for human rights advocates. Equally so is the question of whether an increase in the number of provinces will bolster or, instead, threaten precarious individual rights even further within the new cultural boundaries of the imagined provinces.

History shows that women and minorities tend to be repositories and symbols of identities in the formation of new nation states, and often their individual rights are deferred for the sake of the male-dominated collective. The most striking example of this is seen in the political dynamics in postcolonial, Muslim-majority nation states. In several such states, the forced imposition or stripping off of the veil became the most visible signifier of a new-born identity. In the fervour of such movements, the individual choices of women were not the concern, just the symbolic value of this piece of cloth for the new founded collective (Muslim) identity. Today, the veil has created massive confusion within the discussion of human rights simply because of a failure to resolve the place of individual and collective and, indeed, private and public freedoms.

A constructive, thought-through assertion of group identity and demands for recognition is not a threatening or dangerous step. However, if the centre insists on approaching provincial autonomy as a bargain amongst elite leadership in the existing provinces, then simply increasing the number of provinces will remain as hollow an exercise as devolution, if it is not implemented substantively and responsibly by the centre.

After all that the JI, as dominant member of the MMA, did to the province that was NWFP during the Musharraf years, it should be embarrassed to issue any statement regarding the political future of the provincial question. By altering the very culture of the then NWFP, by decimating individual rights, at times disallowing the universal right to vote and over-all suffocating the sub-cultural expression of minorities and women, the MMA killed all promises that suggested that provincial autonomy could mean a thriving, diverse and dignified life for its people. Instead, those years under the MMA rule showed that if the federal centre abdicates its duty to guarantee constitutional, fundamental human rights and allows political opportunists to manipulate people's ethnic sentiments for its own power trip, then more provinces could simply become hubs for future power-mongers rather than constituencies for collective rights and individual diversity simultaneously.

Now it is up to ANP to recover intra-provincial harmony in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. But this can only be done by calling upon the rest of the Pakistanis who all have an opinion on its name but now need to contribute to the rebuilding and substantive development of the province with regard to health, education, political rights or cultural activities.

Otherwise, if the current apathy towards our existing provinces is any measure to go by, those who support the argument for more provinces should re-consider the wisdom of whether more provinces will guarantee any rights at all -- individual, group or universal.

At the outset it has to be clarified that exploring the economic viability of new provinces is an exercise in futuristic imagination. The existing provinces have recently moved halfway in getting some control over their resources through the NFC award and the 18th amendment, after a long struggle of 60-plus years. As such, the need for political mobilisation by those who want smaller provinces on ethno-linguistic basis will have to be substantial and sustained if new provinces are to be formed. Also, in terms of viability of new provinces, their political and institutional arrangements with the centre will be more important that their economic viability.

Economic viability of new provinces -- or, for that matter, existing ones -- should not be seen merely from the narrow lens of their share in agriculture and industry and in a closed economy model. The contemporary world and that of the future is one where regions will compete with each other on the basis of their geography, the premiums they can extract on their natural resources and their ability to trade in a globalised economic milieu. In the Pakistani context, nationalists in several regions are well aware of these realities and make the case for their socio-economic viability based on the 'natural resource rents' their respective areas can potentially command.

The new provinces proposed at this point in time are four: i)province of Hazara (to be carved out from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa); ii)the Seraiki province (from Punjab); iii)partitioning of the Pakhtun area from Balochistan and iv)the separation of Karachi from Sindh. Based on the model of natural resource rents mentioned above as well as keeping the existing economic base of the regions in mind we can check for the economic viability of the four newly imagined provinces.

Hazara appears to be a viable province. It is home to Tarbela dam and, in Hattar, it has a substantial and relatively robust industrial base. Based on royalties from Tarbela, the industrial base as well as a relatively developed urban centre of Abbottabad, the province has the ability to raise a substantial amount of revenue for itself. It is however, the lower riparian to both Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as well as Gilgit Baltistan (but the upper riparian to Punjab and Sindh). Depending on how the terms are negotiated with both upper and lower riparians, the net benefit of revenue from Tarbela will not be as substantial (if at all) than would appear at first sight.

If Hazara does become another province, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa will, on the face of it, suffer a net economic loss. Its main source of revenue from Tarbela and from industry in the Hazara region will be affected. However, it can charge a large premium on Hazara as the upper riparian. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has some mineral wealth (notably in Swat) which can fetch a larger premium and in a changed provincial milieu that will be created, the incentive to develop a revenue base on minerals will be enhanced.

The economic viability of the Pakhtun area of Balochistan is possible but will be at the cost of foregoing the much more lucrative potential of being part of larger Balochistan. Virtually, all of the mineral wealth of Balochistan (iron ore, copper, gold, iron stone and gas) as well as the port are located in Baloch areas. The economy of the Pakhtun belt of Balochistan is primarily based on trade with Afghanistan through the Chaman border. This belt also has coal reserves in the Loralai and Zhob regions, estimated at roughly 200 million tonnes (compared to known reserves of 9 billion tonnes in the Thar region in Sindh). If ethnic homogeneity is considered important enough for Balochistan's Pakhtuns, then their best bet is to merge with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Otherwise the medium-to-long-run economic prospects of a status quo Balochistan will benefit the Pakhtuns of the region also.

Separation of Karachi from Sindh on the basis of lingo-ethnic identity poses a demographic problem, even if we abstract from the violent conflict that it may create. Karachi is a melting pot of all ethnicities because of its large industrial and service sector economic base. Census documents show that the share of the Urdu speaking community has been declining consistently since the 1970s. In fact, according to the 1998 census, their share in the Karachi population was 48.52 percent. Moreover, their population dynamics also demonstrate a declining trend, proportionately. There is no new influx of Urdu speakers from the rest of the world; in fact, their rate of emigration from the country is also amongst the highest. The fertility rate of Urdu speakers is also lower than that of other communities living in the city.

Karachi's economic prowess lies in it being the largest single industrial city in the country as well the financial hub of the country. Bulk of the existing revenue base of Sindh (taking NFC transfer of sales tax on services into account) is from Karachi. However, the interior of Sindh supplies 70 percent of gas to the rest of the country and has the potential to become the major electricity supplier if Thar coal deposits are appropriately utilised. Karachi also depends for its fresh water supplies on Sindh and Balochistan. As such, there can be an argument that the major source of economic revenue in the future will be from the rest of Sindh rather than Karachi. On the flip side, it can be argued that Karachi can still develop on the pattern of Singapore, based on the port, industry and the financial sector. While this may be a possibility, it has to be remembered that Singapore is a nation-state in its own right whereas Karachi will only be a province in the larger entity of Pakistan.

Perhaps, the least economically viable prospects are for a Seraiki province. Apart from some coal and limited reserves of uranium in Dera Ghazi Khan, the region is the quintessential agrarian economy. Its large agricultural base, however, depends on water reserves from the northern regions of the country. Its lower riparian status to upper Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa for water flows will have to be balanced with rents it can acquire from Sindh, to whom it is the upper riparian. In any case, the prospects of the Seraiki economy changing from agriculture as its mainstay remain slim. The area is also the recipient of remittances from its population working in the rest of the country and abroad. Its revenue base, however, is expected to remain narrow for the simple reason that lack of natural resource rents and its landlocked status will mean that it will have to buy electricity, gas and other services from the rest of the country in exchange for agricultural products. Agricultural products, in turn, have a more flat price trajectory in the global economy than goods that the imagined Seraiki province will have to import.

Finally, as we imagine the viability of new provinces, it is important to also consider the requisite bureaucratic infrastructure that will be required to collect revenues, negotiate with other provinces and the centre as well as carry out development work. A good measure of this critical bottleneck will be put to a reality test soon in the smaller provinces after the abolition of the concurrent list and the partial control over natural resources that the provinces have acquired through the 18th amendment.

Provincial autonomy, being a core subject in the recently passed 18th Amendment is indicative of the maturity of the Pakistani political elite. In such a plurality as Pakistan, forging consensus among disparate groups and factions is a giant leap and that too in a right direction. Now that the sovereignty of the representative institutions have been ensured, the provinces are able to have more incentives because the concurrent list stands abolished and its subjects have been transferred to the provinces.

For ensuring the provincial autonomy the amendment bill has recommended 25 ministries to be handed over to provinces. Thereby the parochial, secessionist and centrifugal forces would, hopefully be snuffed out of their legitimacy if not existence. The provinces will be given 57.7 percent from the federal divisible pool and the federal government will keep 42.3 percent. Thus, the federation will lose on Rs 216 billion. The distribution of resources will be 42 percent according to population, 10.6 percent according to poverty and backwardness, 5 percent on revenue collection and 3 percent according to area. The collection charges have been reduced from 5 percent to 1 percent. More so, the powers of collection of sales tax on services will be given to the provinces by next year.

All these statistics epitomise the shift of power and resources from the centre to the provinces. Such autonomy was the aspiration in a history that goes back to several decades. It would be interesting to retreat into the past to contextualise the issue of provincial autonomy for the benefit of the reader. In the lines to follow we will also reflect on the demands for carving out new provincial units and overall fall out of that re-drawing of the provincial boundaries.

The initial traces of provincial autonomy can be discerned in the Montague-Chelmsford Report (1917) that deemed "largest measure of independence in legislative, administrative and financial fields" to the provinces as sine qua non for the introduction of the responsible government in India. Through Montague-Chelmsford reforms (1919) the system of dyarchy was promulgated in the provinces by dividing the provincial subjects into "Reserved" and "Transferred". Reserved subjects which were 36 in number had been the responsibility of the Governor and its executive council, responsible to the Government of India. The "Transferred" subjects were 20 in number that included education, agriculture, public health and local government etc. These departments were to be managed by the provincial government responsible to the provincial legislature.

In economic matters also, the provincial dependency on the centre was reduced by dividing the revenue resources between the centre and the provinces. However, the provincial autonomy failed to bear desirable fruit. The powers of Governor-General and Provincial Governor were extremely vast. Mehrunisa Ali, professor of Political Science at Karachi University, is spot on when she says that "even with regard to the transferred matters the Governor-General in-Council had vast powers to supervise, direct and control the provincial government."

Muslim League not content with the quantum of the autonomy, envisaged in the reforms of 1919, moved a resolution on 24-25 may 1924, and demanded:

"The existing provinces of India shall all be united under a common Government on a federal basis so that each province shall have full and complete provincial autonomy, the functions of the central government being confined to such matters only as are of general and common concern."

Quaid-i-Azam also put forward the demand for provincial autonomy, saying in his famous fourteen points, "uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces". He reiterated the same at the first Round Table Conference, in 1930, proposing before the Sub-Committee on Federal Structure that "only the Defense, Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces should be the responsibility of the Central Government".

Contrary to the Quaid's proposal, the Government of India Act 1935 provided quasi federal structure. Whatever federal part of the Act there was, it was never implemented. Elections were held in the provinces under the provincial part of the Act. On November 8, 1943, Quaid-i-Azam succinctly stated, while deliberating on the form of government in Pakistan, "The theory of Pakistan guarantees that federated units of the National Government would have all the autonomy..."

Cabinet Mission also provided a structure that can at best be described as loose federation with a weak centre, an arrangement that did not suit the aspirations of Nehru and Patel. Hence it was shelved, though Quaid agreed to give it a try.

When Pakistan came into being it had no constitution of its own. Therefore, by effect of section 8 of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act 1935, along with certain amendments, as its interim constitution. The protracted effort to draft Pakistan's own constitution saw Objectives Resolution to be hurriedly passed through the Constituent Assembly, after the death of Quaid, stipulating for future constitution abstract ideas like sovereignty of God over the entire universe. That resolution, in 1949, paved the way for some other abstractions like the ideology of Pakistan to find their way into the mainstream political discourse.

Such 'abstract' ideas were, in fact, instruments of forging homogeneity. The way the issue of language in East Bengal was handled was a case in point. If, constitutionally, cultural and social diversity was tried to be accommodated, politically it was denied to the cultural and political factions, other than those reposing unflinching faith in homogeneity of every sort.

One unit scheme, conjured up just to deny the rightful share of the Bengalis in representation and economic resources, was extremely detrimental to the cultural and social plurality that formed the essence of Pakistan. It evoked a sharp reaction from different quarters but no heed was paid to any such responses.

Not only was an anti-One Unit formed by Ghaffar Khan and G M Syed but NAP (National Awami Party) was also constituted primarily to register the dissent. Ironically, Iskander Mirza, instead bragged, "stream roller of one unit would crush opposition like pebbles". Such statements demonstrate the mindset which was not ready to accept difference whether cultural or political. One unit was not implemented but imposed in an arbitrary manner. Bengal was under Governor Raj. Hence public assent could hardly be ascertained or gauged. In Sindh Sattar Pirzada was replaced by Ayub Khoru as the head of the province because the former failed to muster enough support for One Unit. Same was the fate of Abdul Rashid's ministry in NWFP (presently Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) Ayub's era pushed the process of centralisation to an extreme.

In particular, his rule foreclosed all prospects of any constructive participation of the Bengalis in that hapless polity. The martial law succeeding Ayub rule sharpened the provincial contradictions and conflict leading to the secession of East Pakistan. The 1973 Constitution at least provided a new beginning to the federation of Pakistan whom Akbar Bugti described as merely a good beginning. Zia ul Haq's Islamisation unleashed a new set of conflicts instead of finding any amicable resolution to the ones already plaguing Pakistan. Minorities were crushed and Shia-Sunni divide got exacerbated beyond measure. Strong centralised rule of Zia muzzled any dissenting voice. In that scenario, provincial autonomy could be nothing but an unrealisable dream.

The pattern continued into the 21st century. Pervez Musharaf was no different. Instead of granting provincial autonomy he emphasised on district government, a pattern somewhat similar to the Basic Democracies of Ayub Khan. It is common with military dictators who, instead of addressing the problem of provincial autonomy, resort to re-designing the political system of the country either by introducing basic democracies or district governments.

In the light of Pakistan's not so enviable past, one can say things have changed for the better after the passage of the 18th amendment. However, new responsibilities on the provincial governments would prove daunting, to say the least. Indeed, it is going to be an acid test for them. Our national leadership must look sagaciously into the demands for more provinces from certain quarters. They should consider whether it is advisable to create Hazara province at this point, or slice South Punjab without taking into account the inner dissention within Seraiki 'leadership'. If these provinces are created, no one can stop a province for the mohajirs from coming up, which may end up in a civil war, particularly when Mumtaz Bhutto says that, "in order to have a province of your own, you need to have a land of your own, too".