"…to Whom you are going"

The life and times of Qari Hussain

By Rahimullah Yusufzai

There could be a number of trainers of suicide bombers in Pakistan but Qari Hussain is the most well-known. However, he has managed to retain his reputation as a shadowy character by avoiding the media and refusing to be photographed.

Qari Hussain is the master trainer of suicide bombers. It is not for nothing that he is referred to as the "Ustad-i-Fidayeen," or the mentor of the suicide bombers. In their parlance, a suicide bomber is described as a "fidayee," the one who is sacrificing his life for a cause. And Qari Hussain despite being a relatively young man is the "ustad," or teacher of the "fidayees."

Some time back, Qari Hussain phoned this writer and lectured him about the righteousness of the cause of Pakistani Taliban. He said their "jihad" was originally against the US and its Western allies who had occupied Afghanistan and other Islamic countries and were involved in a crusade against the Muslims. He regretted that the Pakistan government and armed forces made an alliance with the US in the so-called 'war on terror' and brought this war to Pakistan. "Now we are defending ourselves in the war being waged by Pakistan's security forces in our homes and villages at the behest of the US. We are also retaliating outside the tribal areas with bombings, including suicide attacks," Qari Hussain argued.

The mention of suicide bombings prompted this scribe to ask him why he was sending bombers to launch attacks in Pakistani cities that often kill and injure civilians. Qari Hussain defended suicide bombings and referred to a "fatwa", or decree, given by some clerics justifying the tactic. When reminded that the decree came from Afghan clerics and concerned Afghanistan where the Taliban are fighting against US-led coalition forces made up of mostly non-Muslim soldiers, he maintained that Pakistan's military too had joined hands with the Western armies and was killing its own people.

There was no use arguing with a commander of the militants known for his strong views and commitment to his cause. But Qari Hussain wanted to continue talking about suicide bombings. It appeared to be his favourite subject. He didn't want a formal interview, but was keen to explain how he motivated young men to become suicide bombers. And then he dropped a bombshell. "Yusufzai sahib, you aren't young. But you need to sit with me for half an hour and I am sure I can convince you also to become a suicide bomber!"

Laughing, this writer told Qari Hussain that this won't happen. But he was adamant and said he had turned so many normal guys into suicide bombers. He gave an invitation for a meeting somewhere in his lair, which at the time kept changing from South Waziristan to Kurram Agency to Orakzai Agency. The meeting never took place and now Qari Hussain is on the run after having fled the military operation that was launched against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in South Waziristan on October 16.

Qari Hussain is a cousin of the TTP head Hakimullah Mehsud, who replaced Baitullah Mehsud who was killed in a US drone attack on August 5. Both belong to Kotkai village, located near the former TTP stronghold of Srarogha, and now under army control.

Qari Hussain studied at a madrassa in Karachi and speaks Urdu along with his mother-tongue Pashto. He used to be an activist of the sectarian organisation, Sipah-i-Sahaba, and is known for his strong anti-Shia views. Later, he drifted towards the TTP and is now one of its top commanders.

As a most wanted man, Qari Hussain has been the target of attacks by the security forces and his tribal enemies. But he has been a great survivor. He was declared dead a few times, once by the army authorities when the troops in January 2008 advanced up to his village, Kotkai, and heavily bombed the area. During the latest military action in the Mehsud tribal territory in South Waziristan, Qari Hussain managed to escape along with Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rahman and reportedly took refuge in another tribal area, possibly North Waziristan or Orakzai Agency. These three top TTP commanders carry a head-money of Rs50 million each.

Though Qari Hussain's suicide training camp at Kotkai is no longer operational, it seems he and other TTP commanders run more than one such centre. Suicide bombings in the country's cities and against military convoys and installations have continued despite the eviction of the militants from most of their South Waziristan strongholds. This could mean that suicide bombers who were trained earlier and tasked to carry out attacks have already embarked on their mission, searching for targets and waiting for an opportunity to strike. Besides, it doesn't require a vast place or sophisticated equipment to motivate potential suicide bombers, prepare suicide vests and stuff vehicles with explosives.

There were reports before the start of the present wave of suicide and car-bombings that more than 20 vehicles and motorcycles had been readied and stuffed with explosives in Khyber, Orakzai and Darra Adamkhel. If true, most of these vehicles and motorbikes have already been used to carry out devastating bombings, including suicide attacks. Still the number of suicide bombers seems to be quite large as there is no end to bombings. Many would-be suicide bombers have been captured and sometimes government officials claim their networks are being busted. But we haven't yet seen any appreciable drop in the number of suicide attacks. Rather, the militants are now increasingly resorting to spectacular suicide missions involving groups of bombers comprising up to 10 men and ready to die after occupying the targetted place and taking hostages. In case of failure to get their demands accepted, the suicide bombers then detonate their explosives-filled jackets and blow up everything. This obviously requires elaborate planning and more suicide bombers and the sponsors are somehow able to provide the required number of volunteers.

One militant commander who could be described as the motivator of the biggest number of suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Pakistan is none else but Mulla Dadullah. The Afghan Taliban commander was killed some two years ago in a US military operation after being betrayed by his own men who were allegedly in the pay of the Americans. He prepared videos in which he is seen addressing would-be suicide bombers, overseeing their training and bidding them farewell before heading for their mission. At one point, Dadullah claimed he had over 2,000 suicide bombers. Dadullah has become an inspiration for the new generation of Taliban militants. In Pakistan it seems Qari Hussain has followed in his footsteps, mass-producing suicide bombers by motivating young and impressionable men willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause that they consider true and holy.

Though Qari Hussain supplied his suicide bombers to TTP chapters in other tribal areas and districts after training them in South Waziristan, it seems some bombers were also enlisted and trained elsewhere in places like North Waziristan, Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, Darra Adamkhel and even Swat. The Swat Taliban commanders gave the Pashto name 'patangan,' meaning moths, to the suicide bombers to glorify their sacrifice.  Though they didn't have a large pool of bombers, there have been several suicide bombings in Swat including one recently in which Dr Shamsher Ali Khan, a member of the provincial assembly belonging to the ruling ANP, was killed.

The suicide bombers always record a message before embarking on the mission. And invariably the bomber asks his parents and family members not to cry over his death. They seek forgiveness of parents and urge them to celebrate their 'martyrdom.' Some of the videotapes follow the suicide bombers on their mission, showing them attacking and blowing up the target. Inspirational religious and patriotic Taliban chanting is record and played as the suicide mission proceeds and every attack is celebrated as a huge success. Nobody is able to know in most cases as to how the families of the young suicide bombers cope with the tragedy.

context
A deadly tale

Although some researchers have reported suicide attacks in India under the British rule in the armed resistance of 1857, it appears that large-scale suicide attacks became popular in the Muslim world in the 1980s

  By Azmat Abbas

Some call them "suicide attacks", while others refer to them as "martyrdom operations". Those committing such acts are seen by many as 'terrorists' while many consider them martyrs and freedom fighters. However, there is a consensus among the scholars working on the subject that martyrdom operations are relatively a new phenomenon in the Muslim warfare and were never seen as a legitimate tool for the religious or militant groups or outfits. Over the last few decades, more and more armed movements and organisations, a majority of them following the Muslim faith, are resorting to suicide attacks while referring to them as martyrdom operations, primarily because taking one's own life is not permitted according to the religious tenants.

It is also interesting to note how the meanings of a word change with time. The term 'terrorism' first became popular during the French Revolution. As opposed to its contemporary usage, it had positive connotations at that time.

The system or régime de la terreur of 1793-94, from which the English word came, was adopted as a means to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval following the 1789 uprising. Thus, unlike terrorism as commonly understood today, that means an anti-government or revolutionary or independence-seeking activity undertaken by non-state or sub-national entities, the régime de la terreur was an instrument of governance exercised by the state. It was designed to consolidate the new government's power by intimidating all those whom the regime considered 'enemies of the people'.

During the French Revolution, the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal were, therefore, accorded powers of arrest and judgment and public execution by guillotine  of persons convicted of treason. In this manner, a powerful message was conveyed to all who might oppose the regime.

Terrorism in its original context was also closely associated with ideals of democracy. In the words of a revolutionary leader, "Terror is nothing but justice -- prompt, severe and inflexible."

In the late 1700s, revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre announced that he had, in his possession, a new list of traitors. Fearing that their own names might be on the lists, extremists joined forces with the moderates against the regime. Robespierre and many of his followers met the fate they had afforded to more than 40,000 people. Thereafter, 'terrorism' became associated with abuse of office and power and those resorting to it were labeled terrorists.

Similarly, an incident where suicide bombers were used to achieve a target can be traced back to the late 1800s. In March 1881, a group succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II after eight failed attempts. The initial failures led the group to resort to extraordinary measures to ensure success. The group deployed four volunteers with bombs along the routes from where the Tsar was expected to pass. One of the terrorists hurled his bomb at the passing entourage missing the target and in the process injured bystanders. The soldiers seized the culprit. But, as the Tsar descended from his sleigh to check on the bystanders, a second bomber emerged from the crowd and detonated the bomb, killing both himself and the Tsar.

Since September 11, attacks on the US, followed by the war on terror, the frequency of occurrence of suicide attacks has been on the rise, especially in the Muslim world, Pakistan and Iraq topping the list. These operations have their roots in classical jihadi literature but, fundamentally, are seen as a by-product of widespread frustration and perceived humiliation on the part of the Muslims.

One should also note that "martyrdom operations" are fundamentally different from other activities permitted in warfare. Such operations differ from 'classical' jihad in that they necessitate a greater degree of reliance upon factors such as the intention of the attacker in order to judge the purity of the motivation. Similarly, in the recent past, a majority of such operations have been directed towards non-military targets, which is in direct conflict if we look at them from the perspective of the jihadi literature.

Interestingly, it is rare to find examples of Muslims who committed suicide. In the Islamic history there is no equivalent to the `noble suicide' tradition, as is found in modern Europe or Japan, where there is a widespread cultural understanding, if not religious, of the people who take their own lives. No one tries to justify such suicides, but everyone is familiar with the incidents of senior government officers or businessmen committing suicide as a result of professional or political failure or as a result of some scandal. However, it has no equivalent in the Muslim history and until the contemporary times it is difficult to point out even a single prominent Muslim who committed suicide for personal failure. Abdul Hakeem Amer, the commander of Egyptian army in the 1967 war against Israel, is one such exception. He committed suicide following the defeat of his forces, but some researchers dispute the fact, claiming that Amer committed suicide to avoid a treason trial.

In the modern history, Muslim groups have used suicide attacks as a weapon since the early 1980s. Although, some researchers have reported suicide attacks in India under the British rule in the armed resistance of 1857, it appears that large-scale suicide attacks became popular in the Muslim world in the 1980s.

Lebanon is one rare example where suicide attacks resulted in achieving the goals of the perpetrators of the acts. The Shia resistance groups in Lebanon introduced the 'tool' in 1983 against the American and Israeli troops. These attacks continued for over a decade until the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Lebanese occupied territories in the year 2000. Still, suicide attacks or suicide martyrdom activity was seen as a marginal, predominantly Shia weapon and not a legitimate tool for the Sunnis. However, in the years to come, one finds that suicide attacks conducted by Shia groups were against military targets while a majority of attacks carried out by the Sunni organisations have focused largely on civilian targets.

Among the Sunni groups, in 1994, the Islamic Jihad followed by Hamas in West Bank and Gaza started using "martyrdom operations" against the Israeli forces and civilians. Later, the practice spread to militant groups in Algeria, Kashmir, Chechnya etc with remarkably little or no religious or legal opposition. Pakistan-based organisations including Laskhar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, have carried out suicide missions in Indian-held Kashmir and other parts of the country. In the past few years Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan have faced a wave of suicide bombing carried out by transnational organisations having the support of local militant outfits.

It is also an interesting fact that none of the jihadi literature that came out from Afghanistan during the `jihad' against Russian forces speaks of "martyrdom operations". Also, a few other groups including the Kurds in Iraq and Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have used suicide attacks.

Suicide attacks, according to a research, are qualitatively different from other attacks in that they preclude any form of retribution against the attacker. Thus, the population absorbing the attacks is denied any form of action that could channel its anger into an institutional form, with a likelihood of provoking a revenge attack.

"Martyrdom operations" do not occur in an intellectual vacuum, explains Albert Bergesen, Professor of Sociology at University of Arizona. They have some basis in all the Abrahimic religions. "In my opinion," he says, "it would be helpful to find ways to deal with the situation if we all accept the fact that Jews, Christians and Muslims have, to some degree, utilised terror in different periods of their history to further their cause."

The history, he continues, has failed to explain the phenomenon of people willing to take their own life for achieving their goals. "Earlier terrorists, like the Ismaili Assassins, understood that they would probably be captured and killed. In that sense, we can consider such operations as suicide missions while the Kamikaze pilot missions were certainly suicidal ones." Although, he adds, it seems more a tactic than an act of desperation, the psychology of the person who volunteers or is selected or motivated to carry out a suicide mission isn't fully understood at all.

Suicide bombing, Prof. Bergesen says, can only be understood if we look at the phenomenon from the point of rational choice theory. "Plane hijacking was once a favourite tool of terrorist organisations but the act became highly challenging and, at one point, impossible following the introduction of metal detectors and other security measures. This led to the increase of kidnapping and hostage-taking incidents. In the present scenario, it requires only a limited amount of resources to arm a militant with explosives and send him on a mission with a high probability of achieving the target."

The use of suicide bombers, he adds, appears to be a rational choice of many organisations as it reduces the cost of carrying out the operation, limits the chances of the perpetrator being captured alive to divulge information about his accomplices, leaves the targeted individual or group in a permanent state of fear.

A number of researches over the years point that the jihadi literature, throughout its history, has portrayed Muslims as the ones empowered by God to conquer the world. As a proof, they cite the astounding military successes Islam had in its first several hundred years. Most literature attributes the present state of affairs to diversion from the fundamentals of the religion, most importantly jihad, which is seen by many as the foremost and most prestigious expression of faith.

Another significant fact about jihad is that most of the jihadi literature produced in the early times was by the rulers and most prominent religious figures and rulers in Islam participated in jihad as volunteers. Thus, it can be said with confidence that the writings of such figures are not merely theoretical but practical guides to one of the most important components of their religious experience.

The jihadi literature dwells heavily on the injunctions of the Holy Quran. One such verse referred to in innumerable documents is from Al-Taubah that says, "Allah has verily bought the souls and possessions of the faithful in exchange for a promise of Paradise. They fight the cause of God, and kill and are killed. This is a promise incumbent on Him, as in the Torah, so the Gospel and the Quran. And who is more true to his promise than God? So, rejoice at the bargain you have made with Him; for this will be triumph supreme. (Quran 9:110)"

Another injunction referred to frequently is Al-Anfal which is used by the authors of jihadi literature to ensure that the 'mujahideen' hold their ground till death. The Surah reads: "For any one who turns his back on that day, except to manoeuver or rally to his side, will bring the wrath of God on himself, and have Hell as abode; and what an evil destination. (Quran 8:16)"

The classical definition of jihad, according to many experts on Islam, is closely regulated warfare enjoined by God upon the Muslim community with the express purpose of either expanding or defending the community, and the right attitude of the fighter is to seek death as the goal, not because of a hatred of life but because of the reward to be gained by passing through it. The only regret to be felt is that one cannot die a martyr over and over.

Hence, since seeking death as a martyr is considered virtuous while seeking death for its own sake is not, the issue of who is a martyr is significant in the discussion about jihad.

Many scholars have affected the recent history of jihadi ideology especially the writing of Abdullah Azam, who is also considered the mentor of Osama bin Ladin. In one of his works, titled Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations, he writes, "History does not write its lines except in blood. Glory does not build its lofty edifice except with skulls. Honour and respect cannot be established except on a foundation of cripples and corpses. Empires, distinguished peoples, states and societies cannot be established except with examples. Indeed those who think they can change reality or change societies, without blood, sacrifices and invalids, without pure, innocent souls, they do not understand the essence of this deen…"

The message, according to many scholars, seems too stark when compared with the overall magnificence of Islamic civilisation and history, and it completely ignores the spiritual heritage of Islam. Nonetheless, it is a popular view among many radicals for whom "martyrdom operations" are one way of overcoming the despair.

The question of intention is of core importance for the justification or not of a "martyrdom operation". It is only at the point of intention that a "martyrdom operation" differs from other types of suicides. Intention is also mentioned as the first point in the document supposedly written by Muhammad Atta, one of the hijackers of the planes that hit the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. If the intention is to uplift the word of God, one scholar says, the action falls under the category of jihad and the actor is a martyr. But he failed to explain how blowing up the UN headquarter in Iraq, shopping malls, schools, imambargahs and mosques in Pakistan, civilian commuters in Israel or the World Trade Center in the US would uphold the word of God.

At present, Prof Bergesen says, it remains to be seen whether the larger Muslim community would expunge or legitimise the "martyrdom operations" as a weapon. "And this is not a small choice because of the nature of the weapon and its approach which is reactionary in attitude towards the widely accepted Islamic teachings."

The increasing trend of suicide operations, he says, would not stop with the issuance of religious edicts from the Imam of Kabah or the Mufti of Jamia-al-Azhar; its opposition must come from scholars in Chechnya, Kashmir, Pakistan etc. A scholar in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, or any other location in the core Muslim lands, simply does not have the moral authority that one in Chechnya or Palestine or Pakistan does. He feels that when there is a disagreement among these different scholars, the feeling one gets from contemporary radical literature is that the former are viewed as representing.

In case of Pakistan, the situation is more complicated. There appears to be a visible divide among the scholars when it comes to issuing edicts against suicide bombings. Several prominent scholars of the Barelvi school of thought have declared suicide missions as contrary to Islam and, resultantly, faced the wrath of militant organisations. On the other hand, frantic efforts by Interior Minister Rehman Malik have not succeeded in extracting even a single edict against suicide bombing from any noteworthy Deobandi scholar whose words carry more legitimacy in the eyes of the militants.