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politics By Raza Rumi The federal government seems to have escaped many a crisis in recent months. There is a pattern to this madness. The systemic fault lines of Pakistan’s political system manifest themselves time and again. Whether it is the long-standing civil-military distrust or the fissures within the political elites, this is not a new story. growth Preparing
for the floods development Tourism
troubles analysis
politics Consensus is vital for democracy Any morality-led reinterpretation of the supreme law will open doors for future misuse By Raza Rumi The federal
government seems to have escaped many a crisis in recent months. There is
a pattern to this madness. The systemic fault lines of Pakistan’s
political system manifest themselves time and again. Whether it is the
long-standing civil-military distrust or the fissures within the political
elites, this is not a new story. In recent years, the new
power centre i.e., higher judiciary has entered the equation thereby
creating a new dynamic in terms of power imbalances between various
actors. This development has its roots in the events of 2007-2009 when the
so-called lawyers movement mobilised urban middle classes and led to what
some analysts have termed as the ‘law model’. Faisal Siddiqui, an
active member of the lawyers movement has cited this historic quote in his
piece (January 1, 2012,The Dawn) by Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja: “The past
three years in the history of Pakistan have been momentous and can be
accorded the same historical significance as the events of 1947… and
those of 1971 … It is in this backdrop that these petitions have been
heard and decided.” Furthermore, Siddiqui
writes how the courts and growing ‘judico-politico’ power articulated
the ‘law model’ — negotiating democratic transition through courts
and the law — in direct opposition to the ‘force model’ conceived by
Musharraf and his associates in the junta. The tensions resulted in the
emergence of a ‘consent’ model typified by the NRO and how it allowed
for a negotiated democratic transition. Indeed, this is a new
development in Pakistan. The understanding of this law model is rather
limited and perhaps rudimentary given that this model is still evolving.
Nevertheless, a few conceptual problems can be detected. First of all, it
is a well-established principle that democratic development requires an
elite consensus of sorts. The very process of
democratisation, as has been noted in various democratic countries entails
negotiation, bargain and compromise. Therefore, the consent model is what
has driven many countries towards democracy. Several Southeast Asian
countries like Indonesia have implemented this model and proceeded with
strengthening of civilian institutions, Needless to say, the
political elites and civil society play a major role in effecting this
consensus. By signing the charter of democracy, most political parties in
Pakistan did agree on a common framework. However, in actual terms the
realisation of CoD has been problematic. Even though much of it has been
implemented in terms of constitutional reform, the interplay between the
parliament, judiciary and the military has been problematic to say the
least. First of all, the
military ascendancy remains for various reasons. There are domestic
lobbies, especially within the largest province of the country which trust
the armed forces compared to the ‘corrupt’ politicians. The military
is engaged in a protracted battle against extremists and also as an ally
of NATO in the ‘war on terror’. Under such circumstances, it is
difficult to reset the parameters of power relations. The political elites
have remained disunited in terms of tackling this issue even when they
displayed rare consensus in devolving powers from the centre to the
provinces. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the judiciary now treats itself as a representative of
people’s will due to the support it garnered during the lawyers
movement. Judges have made remarks to this effect to the extent of one
Supreme Court judge saying that the Court was only answerable to people.
This representative politics is misleading. After all, what would be the
mechanism of public accountability when the judges cannot be held
accountable other than their peers through a mechanism i.e. Supreme
Judicial Council — which has remained inactive for most of Pakistan’s
history! The growth of middle
class is another factor, which emboldens this new consciousness among the
judges and lawyers. Various estimates suggest the middle class or
‘extended middle class’ could be between 30 to 60 million people. One
study by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics even suggests
that the size of this extended middle class may be the largest in the
region even larger than India. This class is driven by different motives
than pure patronage that the traditional electoral process guarantees in
the rural and semi-rural areas. However, analysts such
as Ayesha Siddiqa are not too optimistic about the middle class as an
agent of change. In her view, Pakistan is a praetorian state and
“society which means that it is mired in or inclined towards illegal and
excessive authority and violence.” Perhaps this explains why the
unelected institutions such as the judiciary and the military branch of
the executive are likely to remain dominant. This is partly why the ‘law
model’ is inherently problematic. Without the participation of people
and electoral accountability the exercise of power by the unelected can
only reinforce the historical trends of a state that remains divorced from
the citizen and loses further legitimacy. The middle class is also
an avid consumer of Pakistan’s noisy media, especially its twenty-four
TV news channels. Entertainment has now been redefined as
politician-bashing and advancing the old argument that ‘democracy’ is
a failure and it does not deliver except enrich the politicians.
Ironically, a large number of the young supporters of Imran Khan led
Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf believe in this dicta. On the one hand, they are
keen to vote and bring PTI to power through the ballot box, and on the
other they also want to discredit and bring the whole ‘system’ down
which in populist discourse is deemed as ‘corrupt’. Since Pakistan’s
dismemberment in 1971, national security has been an obsession with the
state. The education system, the popular discourse, notions of
nationalism, patriotism have been defined in terms of militarism, nuclear
prowess and xenophobia against India which has now grown to the extent
that almost the entire world is somehow plotting against Pakistan and it
needs to ‘defend’ itself. The rise of a new right wing nationalism,
therefore, is aided by these historical factors. But the last ten years of
Pakistan’s involvement in the war on terror and its political elites’
inability to arrive at an alternative narrative has given extraordinary
consensus. The ‘force model’ as termed by Siddiqui has perhaps entered
into a new process of reinvention. This new force
‘model’ prefers individual judges over the Constitution, it permeates
on a daily basis through a variety of talk shows which barring few
exceptions regurgitate what the Zia ul Haq tailor-made textbooks and legal
system have set as the destiny of Pakistan. This ‘destiny’
encapsulates expansionary nationalism (strategic depth in Afghanistan); a
righteous society (purged of non-Muslims and dissenters) and a primitive,
emotional sense of honour (through nuclear might as a ‘deterrent’). Sadly, despite the
growing middle class, ‘modernity’ and socio-economic mobility, many
Pakistanis are wedded to these constructs. It is indeed true that no
society or group can be a static entity and there are several signs of
change evident in Pakistan, especially in terms of women’s empowerment
and integration into the contested globalization. Yet, the commitment to
democratic system by the urban classes is an unknown. In the recent weeks,
power play in Islamabad has shown that an overt military coup is perhaps
not possible in the due to the emerging systemic dynamics. A coup cannot
be sustained in the presence of a powerful judiciary and a media, which
has its own stakes in the power-arrangements. Democratic transition,
truncated and compromised as it might be, continues to be underway. With
the new general election it might enter into another phase where the
contests and fault lines become sharper and move towards a resolution of
sorts. In the short term,
adhering to constitutional provisions will be vital. Any morality-led
reinterpretation of the supreme law will open doors for future misuse.
Whether it is the jurisdictions of the Parliament and judiciary, the
immunity granted to the President or the sanctity of basic rights. Under
no circumstances, the elites should trample the arduous consensus reached
after nearly 35 years in the form of 18th and 19th
amendments to the Constitution. Regardless of what the
stakeholders may have planned, Pakistan needs political stability and
serious focus on policy. The year 2011 was disastrous for economic policy
as the government moved from one crisis to another; and paid scant
attention to issues, which affect millions. The results are evident:
doomsday pundits are predicting an economic meltdown once again and the
energy shortages have paralysed sections of industry and enraged the
citizens. Perhaps it is time for the reinterpretation and enforcement of a
‘consensus model’ whereby the elected and the unelected, the
guardians, populists and the adjudicators agree on the constitutional
rules of the game. Neither the Parliament nor the judiciary should abuse
the constitutional provisions for their narrow interests. If the trend
continues, such bitterly played power struggles will lead to ‘grievous
consequences’ of another kind.
growth The World Bank
has recently released Global Economic Prospects Report 2012 that makes
some important observations and projections about economic growth in the
world, especially in developing countries. The report makes useful
projections about economic growth in Pakistan while expressing some deep
concerns over the ongoing downfall. It says that economic activity in
Pakistan had firmed up in the second half of 2011 and will continue to pay
back in 2012. It notes that Pakistan is South Asia's second largest
economy, representing about 15 percent of regional GDP carries potential
for growth. The report also warns
developing countries across the globe to prepare for further downside
risks, as Euro Area debt problems and weakening growth in several big
emerging economies is reducing global growth prospects. The developing
world's GDP improvement could be set back by years in the event that such
circumstances come to pass. The report makes an
important observation that "The global economy is now expected to
expand 2.5 and 3.1 percent in 2012 and 2013 (3.4 and 4 percent when
calculated using purchasing power parity weights), versus the 3.6 percent
projected in June for both years". Showing great concerns about
developing regions, it warns "perhaps more importantly, capital flows
to developing countries have weakened sharply as investors withdrew
substantial sums from developing-country markets in the second half of the
year. Overall, gross capital
flows to developing countries plunged to $170 billion in the second half
of 2011, only 55 percent of the $309 billion received during the like
period of 2010". That trend, along with trouble in Europe, has caused
developing-country growth to be revised down to 5.4 percent and 6 percent
versus 6.2 percent and 6.3 percent in June 2011. This trend will have
repercussions on economy of Pakistan. Its heavy reliance on foreign
assistance could be hit hard if fiscal consolidation in high-income
countries were to result in cuts to overseas development assistance. Though the slowdown in
high-income economies will be sharper, developing countries will also be
affected. Downside risks related to the loss of markets confidence in the
ability of one or more high-income countries to repay their debt remains a
serious concern. Though European debt
crisis is still far from over there are some early signs that it may
slight recover during year 2012. The revival of market will mainly depend
on fiscal sustainability in Europe. The portion of the
report on Pakistan points out that the country's economy firmed in the
second half of 2011. Industrial production surged to grow at a robust
32.1pc annual pace during the three months ending in October, after
falling at 9.1 and 10.1pc rates during the first and second quarters,
respectively. The report reaffirms
that economic activity in Pakistan continues to markedly lag outcomes
elsewhere in the region, reflecting worsening security conditions, greater
political uncertainty and a breakdown in policy implementation. Infrastructure
bottlenecks, including disruptions in power delivery, remain widespread.
GDP growth slowed to 2.4 percent in fiscal year 2010/11, ending in June
2011, from 4.1 percent in 2009/10, in part due to the economic disruptions
of the devastating floods that hit in July and August of 2010. However
with the recent economic recovery signs in agriculture, trade and
industrial production, Pakistan is projected to post a rebound to 3.9
percent in 2011/12, and to firm further to 4.2 percent in 2012/2013. Some
pre-requisites, however, will be to take advantage of regional trader and
expansion potential if it successfully addresses issues with neighbors. A notable bright spot
has been a strengthening of exports, evident particularly in the first
half of 2011, led by textiles that surged 39pc in the first half of the
year. However, like India, Pakistan's export volume growth saw a sharp
fall-off in October and its export volumes fell to a minus 46pc rate in
the three-months ending October 2011. This area will need further
attention in case the country wants to further capitalize on this growth
potential. Along with an upswing in
worker remittances inflows, robust exports have supported Pakistan's
external positions and contributed to an improvement in the current
account from a deficit of 0.9pc of GDP in 2010 to a surplus of close to
0.5pc of GDP in the 2011 calendar year. Remittance inflow to Pakistan rose
by an estimated 25pc in 2011, partly in response to the widespread
flooding in the second half of 2010. This trend will also continue to grow
and can be effectively utilized in shape of domestic investments. The World Bank notes
that monetary tightening in Pakistan brought about positive real lending
rates in early 2011 as well, the first time since late 2009. This aspect
can provide fuel for future growth. Pakistan' domestic crop
conditions and price controls are more important determinants of domestic
food price inflation. These factors have contributed to inflationary
pressures in 2011. A good crop year (2011-12) in Pakistan and sustained
high stocks are providing a buffer for grain prices and import demand in
2012. Administered fuel price
increase in Pakistan has also contributed to price pressures, although
pass through of international price increases has been incremental and
partial, such that some targeted local food and fuel prices remain
subsidized to varying degrees and below international levels. These
subsidies must continue to avoid any political backlash. However with fuel
prices going down in Asia and global markets the government can transfer
the advantage to consumers and not filling budget gaps. More recently, currency
devaluation has contributed to inflation as well. In Pakistan, monetary
authorities have also been monetizing the deficit, complicating the
efficacy of other monetary policy efforts to reduce inflation. This trend
must stop in 2012 to avoid further price hikes and devaluation. The report makes useful
observation that lower revenue growth has contributed to larger fiscal
deficits in Pakistan. Terms of trade losses are estimated at about 1.9pc
of GDP for the region in aggregate. India and Pakistan saw negative
impacts of close to 1.8pc of GDP - estimated January through September
2011 terms of trade impacts relative to 2010. This effect can be reversed
through aggressive regional and bilateral trade under MFN trade policy. There are a few
suggestions from the global experts that drastic measures are needed
include more open macroeconomic policy stances, aimed at reducing
stubbornly high inflation and controlling large fiscal deficits, can
contribute to stronger domestic demand. Controlled borrowing costs,
reduced inflation, moderating economic activity and some local factors
(e.g. clear policies, continued reform agenda, and improving political and
security conditions) can contribute to significant improvements in
investment growth. At the same time, the
internal and external environments have become increasingly challenging
and uncertain and without dealing with those properly and timely fashion
required stability and progress can't be achieved. This area needs
political solutions and wise choices that shall not go against the larger
economic interests of this country. Expanding the drivers of
growth also holds potential. With markets in Europe expected to experience
prolonged weakness, Pakistan has the opportunity to re-think and pursue
new sources of growth in both domestic and external markets. This may
include focusing on export growth toward faster growing emerging markets,
as well as internal market enhancements through structural and governance
reforms. Such actions would help boost export demand, help raise
investment, provide better jobs and generate an environment for more
inclusive growth. The World Bank report is
one important source that raises several questions and sets new grounds
for economic discussions. What can be deciphered from this report is that
Pakistan has new set of new opportunities and resources that can be used
for achieving the much needed economic growth. It is also important to
note that during worst economic recession in the world and recent Euro
zone debt crisis Pakistan economy has shown signs of growth. That shows
resilience and systemic strengths of our economy that can be capitalized
for larger gains. Some factors that can be taken into account are
agriculture growth, export oriented industrial production, regional trade,
large scale trained and semi-trained labor force and significantly growing
young population that can be converted into a productive human capital. The People of Pakistan
are waiting for the right moment and leadership to convert their resources
into growth and development. The writer is Deputy
Chief of South Asia Partnership Pakistan and Global Campaigner irfanmufti@gmail.com
Preparing
for the floods Illegal
encroachments inside the Indus riverbed in Katcha area or floodplains
virtually diminished the reverine forests from the area and caused
embankments to weaken and natural floodplains to shrink. These factors
caused unprecedented flooding in Sindh, exposing the vulnerabilities
associated with Katcha land and riverbed encroachment. According National
Disaster Management Authority NDMA and Provincial Disaster Management
Authority (PDMA), Sindh, over 7.2 million people were displaced, 2.4
million acres of crop area inundated, 10 thousand villages were damaged,
19 thousand livestock perished in 2010 floods. The total losses according
the official statistics has exceeded to 454.11 billion in Sindh,
agriculture, housing and irrigation sectors being the worst affected. It is essential here to
understand the very concept of Katcha land (floodplains) and its
significance in connection to floods and super flows of river Indus which
remained hallmark of the mighty river throughout known times. The land outside the
dykes is called “Pakka” and land inside the river belt is called “Katcha”,
according the local revenue department officials the word Katcha is used
in local language which means the area or land not registered by revenue
department. The concept of Katcha
got prominence after the river Indus was demarcated with two large
embankments as protective shields for the populations living outside the
river belt. To protect the hinterlands from flooding, earthen embankments
were erected on both sides of the River Indus 5 to 20 km apart during the
period from 1860 to 1960. The riverine or katcha
area of Sindh between Kashmore and to Indus delta up to the sea coast
within the flood protective embankments is 2.112 million acres, which is
roughly divided into present and the abandoned river channels (600,000)
acres, forest lands (450,000) acres, roads, settlements and government
structures (50,000) acres agriculture land (1.0 million) acres, of which
more than 60 pc is Kabuli or private land the rest is Na-Kabuli or government’s land. The population and
cultivation in floodplains were a fraction of what these are today. The
forest growth covered all the land wherever water reached. Later on people
cut forests, made temporary settlements and cultivated crops wherever they
chose and were thus responsible for conversion of the wooded area into
patches and blocks which to a large extent characterizes the riverine
tract today. The total population of
riverine Katcha area according to the 1972 Census was 750,000 people.
Since early 1960s, pasture lands in Guddu and Kotri Barrages totaling 2.7
million acres of the government land were converted into agriculture lands
with the consent of the government. Many people moved in these pastures
which started to lose their originality for which these areas were
maintained throughout the recent history of river Indus. According to one study,
more than 40, 000 ha of riverine forests of Sindh have been encroached
upon by influential landlords who have political backing. The impact of this
action has emerged in the form of overall degradation of the riverine
ecosystem by destruction of wildlife habitat, disappearance of associated
fauna and flora, reduction in gene pool, degradation of soil, change of
micro climate and over all environment of the region. After the independence
in1947, Sindh provincial government introduced forest land lease policies
during the period between 1960s to 2004, (Forest Lease Policy prior 1975,
Forest Lease Policy 1979, Forest lease Policy 1983, Forest Lease Policy
1991 and Agro forestry Lease Policy 2004) which perpetuated the crisis. By virtue of these
policies the government allotted land of Katcha areas to the people for
plantation of trees and agricultures purposes. Large chunks of land were
given to the influential people and remaining lands were forcibly occupied
by them illegally. No system of checks and balances was introduced by the
government which made way for the landed aristocracy to prevail in these
areas and covert the protective shield into future disaster. In addition to that, the
timber mafia under the patronage of powerful people in the areas who have
their stake in the governments have been chopping the forests over the
years without any fear, and, of course, the involvement of Sindh Forest
Department in this quest cannot be ruled out. The consequence of
encroachment has been that embankments have become prone to flooding and
can not sustain extraordinary flows of water. And even after floods have
receded, people settle in these floodplains and government takes no step
to stop occupation of riverbed. NDMA has announced that
Sindh could possibly witness such disasters for the next two decades, a
nightmare for the people and policy makers alike. Sindh seems to be devoid
of preparedness for disasters of such magnitude, owing to the fact that
only 30 percent repair work of dykes has been completed in two years. A
substantial number of people is still in camps and rehabilitation of those
returned remains a major challenge as well. In this bleak scenario,
the most striking challenge for the government is to prevent
encroachments. Since Forest Lease Policies have been the main cause of
moving from Pakka to Katcha areas, they need to be revisited and modified.
Floodplains must be revived with forests and a well thought-out forest
policy be devised. It is significant that
government pays heed to the views of experts and civil society. By doing
that it could bring some sort of tangible change in Katcha area and its
revival without which any future floods of such magnitude would be
extremely harmful for the people of Sindh and the province would be pushed
to the worst human disasters of drought and hunger. The writer is a
Researcher at Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER)
development The Federally
Administered Tribal Area (Fata) is made up of seven agencies and six
Frontier Regions (FRs) covering an area of 27220 km. its population is
estimated 3.341 at million. This is roughly 2 percent of Pakistan’s
population. Fata has remained
insular and detached from the mainstream of development for many years,
and very few development interventions have been made in this regard. The
activities of local resource mobilisation and the generation of employment
have not taken place, resulting in massive unemployment and scarcity of
opportunities for livelihood. Consequently, poverty and backwardness
predominate in the region. Basic socio-economic indicators such as the
literacy rate, per capita income and health depict a grim picture of
development. Although a number of
development projects have been initiated by various organisations in
recent years, the focus of these developments has mainly concentrated on
providing basic services to the target population, including primary
education, basic health, rural water supply, irrigation and sanitation.
The result of these interventions, however, has not been very satisfactory
and it has contributed only marginally in terms of providing basic
necessities and amenities to the common people. As these steps have not
matched the development requirements of the impoverished community they
have failed to make a substantial dent in the poverty rate. Fata has benefited only
marginally from development activities and donor support. There are number
of factors which can be held responsible for this rural stagnation and
backwardness. These include climatic conditions, remoteness of the
agencies, lack of infrastructure, and recent insurgencies which have
created a tumultuous situation in the region. Fata falls behind the
rest of the country in almost all socio-economic comparisons. The region
is greatly impoverished and insecure in terms of food. Though agriculture
is the major source of livelihood its productivity remains low due to the
scarcity of water. This is particularly true in the Mohamand and Khyber
agencies. Since the region is not
self-sufficient in food this deficit is met by importing from other parts
of the province. About 86 percent of all wheat and 83 percent of all
cereals are imported to Fata annually. According to the health department,
45 percent of all children below 5 years of age are malnourished in the
Mohmand agency. The figures published by
the government are the only sources that give an overview of Fata but they
cannot be relied upon as discrepancy exists between the official figures
and that of other sources. The overall literacy
rate for Fata is 17.42 percent, which is considerably lower than that in
other parts of the country. This is especially true for the female
literacy rate which was estimated to be 6.43 percent in 2006. There are
schools but they mostly remain vacant, with neither teachers nor student.
On average each school has 65 students; the student to teacher ratio is
also about 60 since on average there is 1 teacher per school. The figures
for teachers, schools and students in 2002-05 show that the numbers of
students are increasing as the student to school ratio has constantly gone
up from 50 to 65 and the same is the case with the student -teacher ratio
which also increased from 53 to 59.This shows a willingness on the part of
the masses to participate in school. On the contrary, teacher to institute
ratio has remained constant (almost equal to 1). From this may be inferred
that sufficient staff has not been hired. In addition, some of the
reported teaching staff may exist only on paper. According to the health
index, five agencies of the seven in Fata are among the 17 lowest
districts of Pakistan. The infant mortality rate is 86.8/1000 in FATA as
compared to 83.3/1000 in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 76.8/1000 live-births
in the rest of the country. Whereas comparatively, the UK’s IMR is 5 and
the US’s IMR is 6. The maternal
mortality rate is estimated to be as high as 600/100,000 as compared to
450/100,000 live births in the Khabar Pakhtunkhwa region,
and in the rest of the country. Sanitation is yet
another concern. Clean drinking water is not commonly available. According
to official figures, only 56 percent of the population has access to clean
water but only 1/3 of it has access to individual water connection. This
means that only 18pc of the population has easy access to water, and hence
the rest of the population has to move long distances to fetch water for
their daily needs. More than 56pc of the people do not have lavatories at
all, 64pc of all people do not wash their hands with soap after attending
the washroom, and more than 4% does not wash their hands at all. Similarly, the majority
of the population is lacking in the basic necessities of life. About 90pc
of the population has no access to sanitation, sewage and drainage. This
causes communicable diseases and ailments such as diarrhea, pneumonia,
fever and gastrointestinal illness in the region. The water table
continues to subside, either as a result of drought or over exploitation
of the existing tube wells. The normal water table
depth in most parts of Fata is between 300 and 500 feet. Around 19 percent
of the housing units use piped water while 3.2 percent use hand pumps and
35.1 percent use wells. Moreover there is a major problem with the
purification of water. A great number of wells, springs and others means
of water are unprotected, leading to diseases like diarrhea.T.B, etc.
Women are normally responsible for fetching water for drinking, cooking,
and they washing and spend a considerable amount of their time i.e. (25pc
of them spent 1 to 2hr and more 10pc spent 1 to 3 hr in fetching water). Although livestock and
agriculture are the main sources of livelihood in Fata, agriculture there
is marked by low levels of productivity, resulting in greater food
insecurity in the region. Hence, the people in the tribal areas are not
self-sufficient enough to fulfill their basic needs. As the people in the
region do not have a viable and sustainable means of income, the poppy is
still cultivated in some parts of the Tirah and others places in Fata and
is deemed to be the major source of income. Food can be easily
transported from the outskirts of the region. Access to food is, however,
the real concern as special transportation has to be used, adding further
costs. 40-50pc of all visits to health centers are due to malnutrition.
Moreover, prices of food commodities are relatively higher than those
prevailing in other parts of NWFP (e.g. wheat flour price is 7pc higher
than the price in Peshawar). The total road network is only 4908 km, which
is 0.18 km per sq km of area (half of the country’s average). Moreover,
the housing in this area is constructed from earthen materials. The roofs
of 94pc of the houses are made of wood, leading to widespread poverty
within community. The majority of all
housing units use electricity as a source of light representing 62pc of
the total. In both rural and urban areas, kerosene oil is used by
approximately 36.1pc of the housing units. About 92pc of all housing units
use wood as a cooking fuel while approximately 1.7pc uses kerosene oil for
this purpose. Only 1.3pc of all households use gas and 5.3pc use other
sources of cooking fuel in their houses. So far, health planning
is focused on infrastructure only while the aspects of human resource
development have been ignored. The focus then should be on developing
human resources by establishing paramedical schools and a medical college.
Fata needs to be viewed as a special case on account of its geography and
complex social and political system when it comes to feasibility of
development projects. Sources and references
for this article include: Directorate of Education Fata, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar, Planning and Development Department “FATA SDP
2006-2015”, Government of Pakistan, Bureau of
Statistics, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Rapid Need Assessment of Fata by WFP, Pakistan Multiple Indicators
Cluster Survey Fata, Bureau of Statistics Planning & Development
Department Government of Pakistan, Naveed Ahmad Shinwari. (2008),
“Understanding Fata”, Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme,
Constitution of Pakistan [Available online at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/,
Demographic indicators - 1998 CENSUS, Population Census Organization,
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Directorate of Education Fata, NWFP,
Peshawar, Enrolment (Public Sector) by Province, Stage, Gender and
Location for 2004-05, academy of educational planning and management (NEMIS
project), Islamabad, Population Census Organization Federal Bureau of
Statistics, USAID/Save the Children, Fata in figure 2006, Planning and
Development Department “Fata SDP 2006-2015”, Government of Pakistan,
Bureau of Statistics, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Rapid Need
Assessment of Fata by WFP, Pakistan, Fata Development statistics, 2005,
Fata development statistics 2005, www.Fata.edu.com, Multiple Indicators
Cluster Survey Fata 2007-2008, Agencies/F.Rs Development Briefs of Fata
(2006-07), Statistical Abstract for Fata
NWFP Bureau of Statistics The writer is a
Fulbright Scholar studying at Ohio University, USA and Tourism
troubles The founder
chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party, Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
was also the father of tourism in Pakistan. In 1972, he gave our country a
head-start. He was so advanced in his vision regarding the prospects of
tourism that even the United Nations took cue from his initiative and
established the World Tourism Organisation (WTO) in 1975. I was fortunate to be
member of a Pakistani delegation, along with the then Secretary Tourism Mr
Roedad Khan, to the first and the second conventions of WTO held in Spain.
The “tourism tigers”
of Asia today were nowhere in the picture then. A young Ardeshir Cowasjee
was made the Managing Director of Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation
(PTDC) and the charismatic Raja Tri Dev Roy, the chief of Chakma tribe of
Chittagong Hills, who opted to remain in Pakistan, was made the minister
of tourism. At that time, Karachi was the hub of the aviation industry in
the region and all the major European, American and Far Eastern airlines
operated out of Karachi. Dubai, at that point, was just a sleepy little
fishing village. Air Marshal Nur Khan, a dynamic personality of our
country, was given charge of PIA, and he in turn hired Zia Mohy-ud-Din to
run PIA’s Arts Academy to introduce Pakistani culture on the global
forum. In 1984, I resigned from
PIA and established my own tourism company, Indus Guides, to put to
practice the training and the experience I had gained in Spain and Egypt,
the two countries considered as Mecca of tourism. The tourism
infrastructure in Pakistan, like hotels, motels, restaurants and quality
transport, was in place and so was the human resource like bi-lingual
guides, porters and camp cooks. However, there were a few things missing
in making our tourism to turn it to an economically viable industry: 1 – Our tourism
activity was confined to the Northern Areas (Gilgit Baltistan), which was
limited to four months of summer. We, at Indus Guides, explored new
tourism destinations in the Indus Valley, Tharparkar, Mehran, Balochistan,
Salt Range and Cholistan and developed vibrant winter tours. 2- Our international
promotion, particularly during trade fairs, was bureaucratic,
unimaginative and boring. We were unable to make any impact on the trade
visitors. In 1987, at the trade fair in Berlin, Indus Guides took 1000
dozen of glass bangles and a colorful brochure, in the German language,
explaining the concept of “Churian” in our culture. Suddenly, the
otherwise dull and boring Pakistani pavilion came to life and there were
lines of trade visitors asking for free bangles. 3 – Similarly, in
Madrid, Indus Guides went with a different concept. While India put Bindia
on the visitors, we gave bangles and applied Henna to the palm and wrote
their name in Urdu. Suddenly, there were hundreds of visitors with their
Henna dyed hands-up moving in the fair. 4- Pakistan had an
excellent new tourism product in the Silk Road (Karakoram Highway) over
Khunjerab Pass leading into China, but it needed a very strong
international projection for which our Ministry of Tourism had neither the
will nor the vigour. We invited international television channels to visit
different areas of Pakistan and were able to make 39 promotional
documentaries in a span of 10 years. That really helped the Silk Road
become one of the top tourist products in the world. In 1988, the Travel
Agents Association of Pakistan (TAAP) and the Indian Association of Tour
Operators (IATO) held the first ever India-Pakistan Convention “partners
in prosperity through tourism”, in Lahore. The Indian delegates and
their families, numbering over four hundred, brought immediate prosperity
to the shopkeepers of Liberty Market, particularly the jewelers, who ran
out of their stock. On the tourism front, we made a lot of positive
progress as a result of that convention. Tour operators of both
the countries were authorised to apply for group visas. Tourists traveling on
group visas were exempted from police reporting. The number of cities
that you could visit was increased to ten. Visas were issued within
a few days. The result of this
convention was amazingly positive because as a Lahore-based tour operator,
I doubled my business in six months. I want to share a very pleasant
telephone call from Julundhar, India: (Note! That in those days
communication was not very easy and cell phones were not in use) “Hello! Uchaa bollo ji…Maeen
Agni Malhotri bool rahiee aan…Punjab Women Association di sadr. Aurtaan
nain shopping wastey kal Wagah Border tey aunan….Tusaan! Transport tey
hotel da intizaam kar laina.. We will pay you when we come.” Tourism is
all about trust. In 1989, India invited
us to Delhi. Yousuf Raza Gilani, the then Minister of Tourism, was the
leader of a three hundred strong tourism delegation to Delhi. He, along
with his wife, enjoyed the Indian Tourism boards’ hospitality.
Ironically, now as Prime Minister of Pakistan, under the 18th Amendment,
he has abolished the Federal Ministry of Tourism, which he headed in 1989
and buried alive the industry that was created by Bhutto, the founder of
the PPP. We understand that
tourism is the first victim of terrorism, but efforts to promote tourism
should never be given up. That is precisely what the terrorists want.
Remember 1972 Olympics at Munich where the Israeli athletes became victim
of a terrorist attack. Did Israel stop participating in Olympics? There
was a bloodbath of tourists in Luxor and later in Sharm-ul-Shaikh in
Egypt. Did Egypt stop promoting tourism? Have tourist stopped going to
Egypt? A Bali Disco was blown-up by terrorists in which hundreds of
tourists perished. Has Indonesia closed down tourism? Attack on tourists
is a common occurrence in Philippines. Have they closed down their tourism
setups? Sri Lanka has been going through a civil war for 25 years. Did
they stop promoting tourism? No! In Pakistan, luckily
there has been no terrorist attack on tourists. Attack on the Sri Lankan
team in Lahore was purely due to bad planning of the Pakistan Cricket
Board and the security agencies. But, again, it was the trained driver of
a tour operator in the private sector who saved the Sri Lankan team. Why
should the elected government take the line of least resistance and
give-up tourism, the most lucrative industry? It must not be forgotten
that investment only follows tourism trails. If there is no tourism, there
certainly will not be any investment. So why have a ministry of
investment? We now have a ministry
of textile because it is a foreign exchange earner. So is tourism! So why
abolish its ministry? Tourism is not a
provincial subject because it is too big an industry and must be handled
at the federal level by someone who is not a gap-filler but a genuine
tourism technocrat committed to this industry. analysis For all of
Pakistan’s problems, meaningful information required to address these
problems — about the nature of changes in society and the fragmentation
of the state — remains conspicuous by its absence. I have flagged this
lack on numerous occasions in the past, alongwith the related tendency of
progressives to reinforce old stereotypes that actually hinder the
emergence of new political alternatives. I was, therefore,
pleasantly surprised to come across an announcement this past week
advertising the launch of a report on the ‘illegal economy’ at a
prominent Islamabad hotel. A well-established policy thinktank was
commissioned to undertake research on this most important of subjects by
the United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC), with a 100-odd page
report the outcome after fieldwork and writing over a 9-month period. In an environment
featuring so little socially relevant research, the fact that a critical
mass of information will now be in circulation constitutes a major
value-added in and of itself. Yet, I cannot help but wonder about the
utility of ‘policy’ reports that tend to remain completely silent on
matters and actors of enormous significance. And then, there is the
related question mark over just how limited the sphere of circulation is
given that the policy ‘community’ seems scarcely inclined to rock the
boat. The ‘illegal
economy’, at least in its current manifestation, is a direct correlate
of the Afghan war, which started back in the late 1970s. Drugs and guns
became commonplace and over the decades the entire region — including
parts of Iran and Afghanistan — have been transformed by the political
economy of war. It is fashionable these days to express moral indignation
about ‘terrorists’ and the ‘illegal economy’ but the fact is that
governments — both within the region and their western patrons — were
and remain heavily implicated in the political economy of war. The afore-mentioned
report was predictably silent on this wider historical and political
context. Challenges were framed in terms of a lack of capacity of the
Pakistani state to deal with smuggling and the like. There was no mention
of the debacle in Afghanistan, NATO patronage of certain warlord factions,
the livelihood requirements of subsistence farming households in Afghan
society, the Pakistani military’s corporate activities, and a host of
other issues that constitute nothing less than central aspects of the
‘illegal economy’. Indeed, without acknowledgment of these issues, a
‘policy’ report becomes nothing more than an expensive exercise in
self-indulgence. In fact, many of the
broader concerns articulated in this report were flagged almost three
decades ago by academics such as Eqbal Ahmad and Ikramul Haq. These
academics were not constrained by the imperatives of power politics in
anything like the same way as the policy buffs that regularly sit together
in comfortable hotels trying to sound more important than one another
(although many academics do, to be sure, do a lot of useless pontificating
themselves). Haq wrote in 1984 about the role of the National Logistics
Cell (NLC) in transporting contraband and arms to and from Pak-Afghan
border checkposts. The writers of the afore-mentioned report may have
noted that the drugs and guns trade continues, but are silent on whether
or not military-run companies still do what they were doing when the
political economy of war took shape. As I have already
suggested, big question marks hang over the policy community in the sense
that the (mostly Western) donors funding policy research are hardly
innocent bystanders with no vested interest in the processes that they
purport to understand. Some donors are far less willing to take on the
more difficult questions which speaks to the objectives of the political
forces — either government or private — that are pursuing an
‘international development’ agenda. Part of the problem has
to do with the fact that so many previously independent researchers are
now relying more and more on donor monies to do research. In the era of
the Welfare State — even in countries such as ours in which the
state’s welfare function is nominal — public funding for research was
far less constrained in terms of what was considered worthy of research
and the particular theoretical framework framing the research. These days
donors tend to dictate what is researched and how. Of course, the
contradictions that have intensified over time between states, non-state
actors and even within state institutions make it difficult to gloss
around issues that have long remained underspecified, and in particular
the question of the ‘illegal economy’ (which is generally considered a
subset of the ‘informal economy’). This is because the binary of legal
and illegal, for instance, is to a large extent misleading, and there is
increasing recognition of the dubious links between those who occupy
official positions and those demonized as the antithesis of freedom and
democracy. If nothing else, it has become difficult to abstract from
historical facts that make conceptualizations of ‘good’ and ‘evil’
increasingly untenable. This is not to take away
from the fact, as I have already pointed out, that even the writing and
distribution of relatively ahistorical and apolitical policy reports on
subjects that are of great significance to society represents forward
progress. Of course, it is up to those with a clarity of purpose to take
advantage of the space that is created by shifts in mainstream policy
discourse and bring history and politics back into the mix. It takes
courage to call a spade a spade, but if more people in this society start
to do so there is hope yet that the complex nexus of power that keeps
ordinary people physically and mentally enslaved can be exposed and,
eventually, undone. Under
cover According to
estimates, the size of informal economy (mostly non documented economy) is
around 20 to 30 percent of our legal economy. The share of illegal economy
in this informal economy was anybody’s guess. The illegal economy
includes all injections into the overall economy (both formal and
informal) from illegal activities. SDPI and United Nations
Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) made an attempt to assess the size,
nature and dynamics of the illegal economy in Pakistan through a joint
study and revealed that the share of illegal economy in Pakistan’s
informal economy is around 5-10 percent. The focus of this study is on the
dominant forms of transnational organised crime present within the region,
specifically (in order of magnitude), drugs and precursors trafficking,
migrant smuggling and human trafficking, arms trafficking, illegal timber
trade and kidnapping for ransom. First look at some
numbers. Afghanistan is the source of more than 90 percent of the
world’s opium and a significant cannabis producer. In 2011, 160 MT of
365 MT (44pc) Afghan heroin was trafficked through Pakistan. The
destination value of the heroin transiting Pakistan is around US$ 27
billion and the local value of the illegal drug and precursors trade in
Pakistan has an estimated worth between US$ 910 million and US$ 1.2
billion respectively. Estimating the size of
migrant smuggling and human trafficking economy is challenging given the
lack of data. Conservative calculations put the size of the proceeds of
migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Pakistan at around US$ 107
million. Regarding arm
trafficking, the economic value of production and trade of one single item
i.e., AK47 is estimated to be US$ 52 million. It is likely that the actual
figure is in excess of this estimate. Warlords in Afghanistan
have been using illegal timber trade as a source of income since the
1980s. Militants in Swat have reportedly benefited from timber trade by
levying a 10-20 percent tax on every timber shipment out of the region.
From 2007 to 2009, Swat reportedly suffered more deforestation than in the
entire decade prior to that. The
proceeds from illegal timber trade are estimated to be US$23 million. Anecdotal evidence and
police data from all major cities of Pakistan indicate that cases of
kidnapping for ransom have been on the rise since 2007.
The proceeds from kidnapping are estimated at just over US$ 10
million. This is a conservative estimate because of the absence of
reliable data on ransoms paid, as well as the under-reporting of the crime The figures reported
above are extremely conservative guesstimates. What matters the most is
secondary illegal economy which is extremely difficult to be measured. Out
of the US$ 27 billion (destination price) worth of heroin a significant
amount does come to Pakistan and Afghanistan, either in the form of
private investment, black money, arms and ammunition, or in the form of
foreign remittances. Interior Minister of Pakistan is on record saying
that he has evidences that terrorism in our region is partly being
financed through drug money. Trade of Acetic
Anhydride (AH, a precursor used in Heroin production) is another grey area
in Pakistan. This is used in paint industry. Against a domestic
requirement of 100,000 liters Pakistan imports around 1.3 million liters
of AH, some legally through a license from Ministry of Narcotics whereas
large quantities are imported using the mislabel of H2O2 . Most of the AH
is supplied to Afghanistan. Migrant smuggling is
another major concern not only in destination countries but for us as
well. It simply shows the cracks and leakages through which any one can
come or leave our borders (here I am not talking about porous borders with
Afghanistan). This does not only have implication on international
security but on our security too. The third important
aspect that I want to touch upon is proceeds of US$ 52 million that come
through sales of AK47. Most of these guns are coming from Afghanistan. The
value of US$ 52 million raised does not reflect the hundreds of millions
of dollar losses that our economy has to suffer from the users of these
guns. Interestingly, the data
reveals that areas in Pakistan most conducive for drug and arms
trafficking; emigrant smuggling; and illegal timer trade re also ranked as
worst in terms of their food security. These districts, mainly lying
around the borders of Afghanistan and Iran, are also hit by militancy and
many of these districts were worst hit by floods in 2010. This is a
classical case of one form of insecurity breeding other forms of
insecurities. Pakistan’s formal
economy has got crippled due to this illegal economy. But the impacts go
beyond our borders. These forms of crime have become a threat to
governments, civil societies and economies, undercutting the rule of law
and hampering the achievement of Millennium Development Goals.
Traditionally, these issues have been left at the edge of development
discourse but there is now an acknowledgement at the highest levels in the
United Nations and by leading institutions like the World Bank and the
World Economic Forum that security issues need to be mainstreamed into
traditional development paradigms. In an inter-connected
world, countering the illegal economy is a shared responsibility. It is
striking that most illicit flows go to major economic powers. In other
words, the world’s biggest trading partners are also the world’s
biggest markets for illicit goods and services. This reflects the extent
to which organized crime has become linked to the global economy, and vice
versa, through the illicit trade of banned or legal products (like natural
resources), or the use of established banking, trade and communications
networks (financial centres, shipping containers and the Internet). The response requires
increased international cooperation within the context of an integrated,
comprehensive and cost-effective strategy with a balanced approach between
development and security, and respect for national sovereignty and human
rights. It is important that awareness is increased and collective action
is taken against the threat of organised crime and its resultant illegal
economy This is shared
responsibility between developed and developing world; between Afghanistan
and Pakistan; and among various stakeholders of Pakistan. Despite the
constraints which hinder research on organised crime and illegal trade it
is quite possible to start an effort to understand the dynamics and nature
of the illegal economy on a country and its wider impact on that country
and beyond. It is high time
that we should devote our attention to this highly crucial topic in
Pakistan. The writer heads SDPI
and supervised preparation of SDPI-UNODC joint report, “Examining the
dimensions, scale and dynamics of the illegal economy in Pakistan”. He
is contactable at suleri@sdpi.org
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