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Editorial
— Talk or fight militancy An
offer in a video interview A role in the
dialogue process United
in attack
The political
shenanigans of the men descending on Pakistan with new political solutions
look almost surreal if we see them against the bloody events of the last two
weeks. And the blood-letting and brutality of months and years before. In
between came an offer of talks with the government by Hakimullah Mehsud
through a video and a letter by the TTP Punjab head, Azmatullah Muawiya. Some analysts are saying
the talks are a non-starter, given the preconditions laid down by the TTP.
They seem to be suggesting that the TTP should lay down arms, submit to the
writ of the constitution and give up violence. If all of this happens, there
would be no need to talk, one would assume. The political parties, on
the other hand, are divided. Ironically, the worst hit party — the ANP —
seems keen to engage in talks and has time and again urged the government to
do so. As a matter of fact, the government has in the past engaged in both
strategies, fighting with the militants and talking to them, and entering
into peace pacts. Judging by the frequency of attacks, it appears neither
has worked. The important thing is to
figure out if we have reached a point where there is no other option but to
talk. According to a recent news item, the army is said to have told the
government to make a serious strategy for talks. So no matter how futile the
idea may seem, all stakeholders who are in the thick of this, on either
side, are in favour of talks. As senior journalist
Rahimullah Yusufzai suggests in his interview the solution lies in a
combination of talks and fighting — talks with the right people and
fighting with those who are not ready to talk. He thinks intelligence-based
selective operations against the negative elements can be more effective.
Let’s see how the government responds to this offer.
militancy The major actor of
instability in the country in 2012 was the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
According to the Pakistan Security Report 2012, prepared by the
Islamabad-based research institute the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, the
TTP proved lethal with 350 terrorist attacks across the country, which
claimed lives of 498 civilians and 633 security forces personnel. The TTP has taken more
than six year to reach a point where it can ‘offer’ the ceasefire to the
state. The strength of the terrorist group not only lies in its ruthless
acts of violence but also in its agenda, nurtured with the help of local and
international terrorist groups. The overall pro-jihad
atmosphere in Pakistan also played into the hands of the militants. There
were 104 militant and 82 sectarian groups of varying strengths operating in
Pakistan before September 9, 2001. These groups had ties with regional and
international terrorist organisations, and shared an array of agendas and
ideologies. Soon after 9/11, the
number of these organisations decreased in mainland Pakistan and Kashmir to
21 jihad and 39 sectarian groups, mainly because of the government’s
action against militant organisations. The number of militant
groups grew in Fata, where more than 50 local Taliban and many other
militant religious groups came into being between 2002 and 2007. The US
invasion of Afghanistan and concentration of al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban in
Pakistani tribal areas inspired the surge. As many as 40 groups joined the
TTP headed by Baitullah Mehsud, who succeeded Nek Muhammad, the first
Taliban commander in FATA. In the past 12 years,
Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have moved strategically to gain
increasing control of the regions along the Pak-Afghan border. There is,
however, sufficient evidence to suggest the Taliban were not keen on the
imposition of shariah in the tribal areas and their primary purpose was to
use the slogan of jihad to recruit fighters and collect donations. The
literature, whether in the form of publications, shabnamas (night letters),
pamphlets or CDs and DVDs, produced by the Pakistani Taliban or their
affiliates in Pakistan between 2002 and 2004 indicates that the primary
focus of their struggle was to wage jihad against the US and ISAF forces in
Afghanistan. Inside Pakistan, their
strategy against Pakistani troops was defensive. This was the formative
phase of the Taliban movement in Pakistani tribal areas. With the passage of
time, their agendas expanded and in 2007 different Taliban groups united
under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), these group had
adopted tendencies of Takfir (declaring other Muslim sects and groups as
non-Muslim), and Islamisation of the state. Baitullah Mehsud, who
united the tribal Taliban groups under the banner of the TTP in 2007 and was
killed in a US drone strike in South Waziristan in August 2009, had first
shaped the contours of his own system in the tribal areas when he reached an
agreement with the government on February 22, 2005 in South Waziristan. He
had been successful in eliciting an assurance from the government that he
would be allowed to enforce shariah in the area in exchange for not sending
his militants to Afghanistan. Not only did he not keep his end of the deal,
the pact also helped the Taliban consolidate their grip on the area. Other Taliban groups
followed in Baitullah’s footsteps. Baitullah formulated a
four-point strategy to gain control over the area. His militants took steps
against criminals; started collecting ‘taxes’ to speed up their
operations; killed or forced out influential tribal elders who they knew
could challenge their authority; and created a parallel justice system to
resolve disputes promptly. The Taliban also contributed to the welfare of
the local population in order to gain their sympathies. The Taliban also shrewdly
exploited the tribal ethnic and religious sentiments in their favour. Their
strategy eroded the traditional concept of the tribes’ collective
responsibility for security, which undermined the administrative machinery
in the tribal areas. Other actors who could pose any ideological or tactical
challenge to the Taliban rule were treated harshly, especially
non-governmental organisations, political leadership and formal and modern
educational institutions. Taliban groups banned NGOs, targeted CD shops and
attacked educational institutions, especially girls’ schools. The process of
Talibanisation in the tribal areas was gradual and the militants eventually
managed to establish parallel justice and administrative systems in the
areas they controlled. An attractive cause is
indispensable for an insurgency. A closer look at the Taliban movement shows
different shades of ideologies, mainly sectarian and political. But the main
‘cause’ of Taliban groups is their Deobandi sectarian teachings.
Sectarian differences among Taliban ranks as well as the Deobandi tag are
significant factors isolating the insurgency from the mainstream religious
community. The short-term cause of
the Taliban was to liberate Afghanistan from American-led occupational
forces through jihad and to enforce a new social, political and economic
order based on their ideology or interpretation of Islam. The long-term
cause is to drive out the infidel forces from all Muslim lands. They
associate their identity with the various Islamic movements across the world
and disapprove the geographical barriers. A common Muslim cannot
disagree with this diversified cause and especially when they include
anti-imperialism in it, the people conceive it as a revolutionary movement.
The Taliban tactically manipulated their agenda. The religious political
parties who are part of mainstream electoral process and also the moderate
Islamic scholars find themselves in doldrums to counter Taliban on
ideological front. In this perspective, the
state and the political leadership had to realise that the real strength of
the militants of most groups had been their ability to sell their cause; and
through their propaganda strategies they had tried to counterbalance the
disparity between the capabilities of the security forces and of the
militants.
An
offer in a video Through a
40-minute video message sent to media on December 28, 2012, the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) Chief Hakeemullah Mehsud has made a conditional offer to the
government for peace talks. Mehsud has expressed his
willingness in the video to negotiate peace but has categorically denied
disarmament. “We believe in dialogue but it should not be frivolous.
Asking us to lay down arms is a joke,” he says. The Taliban leader has
also attached certain conditions to the peace talks: amending the
constitution of Pakistan according to shariah, an end to Pakistan’s
alliance with the United States and starting a war with India. The offer has clearly
created waves in the country. Some political parties say the government must
avail this chance for negotiations with the Taliban. Others, however, are
sceptical; they view the TTP’s offer as a ploy to avoid a possible
military offensive in the tribal areas and to gain sympathy from people. The government has shown
reluctance though. The military and the government have attempted to strike
peace deals with the Taliban at least six times — from 2004 in Shakai to
2008 in Swat. All efforts ended in failure. The political leadership was
involved in the Swat peace deal while the army negotiated the rest of them. A day before the release
of the TTP video, interior minister Rehman Malik said the government would
consider peace talks with the Taliban if Hakeemullah Mehsud made an offer
himself. Although Malik has yet to react to the offer, senior leader of the
PPP and federal minister Khursheed Shah has brushed aside chances of peace
negotiations with the TTP leadership, saying the Taliban must disarm first. The ANP that lost Bashir
Bilour in a suicide attack on Dec 22, 2012, and has borne the brunt of the
TTP strikes against secular parties, has cautiously welcomed the talks
offer. Pakistan’s security
establishment has also reacted cautiously to the offer. “We should not be
swayed by their offer,” a senior security official tells TNS, adding:
“The TTP has suffered huge losses in recent military operations launched
on their hideouts in many areas. They have made this offer to avoid further
loss”. He says they are also
under pressure, after a strong negative public reaction to attacks on Malala
Yousafzai, anti-polio workers and Bashir Bilour. Brigadier (retired)
Mahmood Shah, former home secretary KPK and secretary Fata, says violence
and peace negotiations cannot go along simultaneously. “The TTP makes such
offers when it feels the public opinion is going against them and a fresh
military operation may be launched soon,” he says. But what can be the
apparent goal of the TTP this time? “They do not want to initiate dialogue
that may result in their elimination. They are trying to negotiate to
promote their cause. The government has had negotiations with militants
between 2008 and 2009, after which it was clear the Taliban are not
interested in peace and are using negotiations and agreements to further
their agenda. In the past, they have used negotiations and agreements to
re-group and re-organise themselves,” he reiterates. In 2006, the Taliban
signed a peace deal with the government which categorically said that they
would not run a parallel government in the tribal areas —“But, they
violated the pact,” Shah says. Mansur Khan Mehsud,
director research of Fata Research Center, a think-tank based in Islamabad,
say the TTP is not serious about peace talks — “The very next day of
making the talks offer, they go ahead and slay 20 soldiers of the levies
force. It is reflective of their intensions”. Mehsud does not think the
TTP would take part in negotiations if pushed to against the wall. “It is
not in a position to force the government to start peace talks presently.
Serious military operations are being carried on in agencies of Khyber,
Kuram, Orakzai and South Waziristan. In fact, the TTP is under immense
pressure and it wants to avoid a military operation in North Waziristan,
their last sanctuary”. According to him, the only
purpose of releasing the video message last week was to show the world that
there is no difference between Hakeemullah and Wali ur Rehman. “But, there
is a stalk difference between the two. Hakeemullah is being sidelined, only
to be replaced by Wali ur Rehman”. Telling the difference
between the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, he says, “In
Afghanistan, the Taliban movement is a national resistance movement and its
agenda is to liberate its country from a foreign force. But in Pakistan, the
TTP consists of around 60 groups with different leanings. They do not have a
unified agenda”. He is adamant that if the
state of Pakistan accepts the TTP’s offer, it would mean to acknowledge
its status as a powerful actor in the country. It would definitely help the
TTP improve its standing and strengthen its network,” he says. Peshawar-based senior
journalist, Ismail Khan, thinks the surge in the attacks after the peace
talks offer is an attempt of the TTP to assert itself. “The government
will have to decide what it wants to do. It has not decided yet,” Khan
says. Security officials say it
is for the government to decide whether or not to hold dialogue with the
militants. “We are continuing with our operations geared towards
eliminating terrorism,” a senior military officer reportedly said to Dawn.
Political and security
analyst, Dr Khadim Hussain says that the TTP is under immense pressure after
the assassination of Bashir Bilour. “Terrorists use the tactic of
negotiations when they feel public support for them is thinning. It helps
them show to the public that they want to talk but the state is not ready to
do so. It results in division of opinion among political parties and civil
society. Also, it helps them to buy time to restore their supply lines,”
he says. Hussain is apprehensive
about the talks: “Dialogue is a political process and political parties
and civil society forms the mechanism of the dialogue after contacting the
terrorist groups. The guarantors of the talks, such as the UN and some other
countries acceptable to both parties or regional or military organisation
like Nato are approached, and then, finally, the agenda of the talks is
finalised”. First, he thinks, an
agenda for talks must be finalised. “They need to identify tribal elders
who would talk on their behalf. They also need to suspend their activities
and close their training camps, and they will have to take responsibility
for all affiliated groups. They need to stop terrorist activities.” He is sure dialogue cannot
be initiated through an offer in a video message. “The militant network,
both ideological and strategic, is intact and the ideological, strategic and
tactical alliance of various militant groups has matured.” Hussain believes the
security establishment will play the main role in this case. “The
parliament has already passed unanimous resolutions condemning terrorism and
backing security forces to eliminate terrorism,” he says. aounsahi@gmail.com
interview The News on
Sunday: Some analysts are saying that the talk about talks is a non-starter
while, according to a newspaper, the army is believed to have asked the
government to make a strategy for talks. Do you think a point has come where
there is no other option but to talk with the TTP? Rahimullah
Yusufzai: I think there are two options: either you fight or you talk. So,
they have been fighting and also talking. There have been peace agreements
in the past but they haven’t really worked. There have been violations by
both sides. While almost all the past peace agreements went in favour of
militants. The government at that time talked to the militants from a
position of weakness. I can’t say there is no other option but to talk. But I think that there is
a growing feeling among political parties, not all of them but some of them,
that may be they can try to talk to the militants. I must say that these
efforts to again enter into talks are not really planned. There was no
planning, no real homework was done by the either side. It just came because
the TTP Punjab head, Azmatullah Muawiya, wrote a letter to The News, saying
that they are willing to talk but they have set certain conditions. And then Hakeemullah
Mehsud came up with his video statement. He again said that yes, we can have
talks but they should be meaningful talks and that they have certain
conditions. And also, he said that they will not lay down arms. Because,
before that some of these ministers were saying that first the militants
should surrender or lay down arms, then we can talk. So, I think this was
not really planned or there was no real effort to engage in talks. Even now
I don’t think that the government has given it a serious thought. May be
they are talking to each other through media. There are offers and counter
offers, there are conditions and counter conditions. I don’t think there
is any serious effort to talk to each other at this stage. TNS: What is the
government’s position at this point? Judging by the number of attacks, is
the government now compelled to talk and will it talk from a position of
weakness? RY: Yes, if you look at
the demands made by the TTP and Hakeemullah Mehsud it seems they think they
can dictate terms and they think the government is in a weak position. The
government may not accept that but somehow it looks as if the government is
not ready and not in a strong position. So, that’s why I thought that may
be the government, this government specially, will just wait. They will say,
okay let the elections be held and let a new government come into place and
they can think about the situation. So, and then the military and the
government have to discuss the issue because the military has a say in these
matters. And I don’t think the government is in a very strong position at
this stage. That’s why this demand that the militants should lay down arms
may change and then they could just say you renounce violence and then we
can talk. So, let’s see how things go but right now I am not very
optimistic about any talks or any peace agreement.
TNS: What is the
government’s strength if any? What can it offer to the Taliban? RY: The government has a
presence in all the tribal areas and the military is deployed there. There
have been military operations, the TTP has suffered losses, it has lost
territory. The TTP’s strength is the suicide bombings and attacks anywhere
in Pakistan against any target. They seem to have an endless supply of
suicide bombers. They have been attacking very important and big targets.
That is TTP’s strength. The government’s strength is that they can keep
the troops deployed in all these areas and keep the TTP at bay. That’s
what the government can do. I think that the
government cannot meet all the demands made by the TTP. These demands will
be unacceptable to the politicians, political parties, civil society. And
also, you do not allow an armed group to dictate terms like that.
So I think what the government can offer is that it can announce
amnesty, it can release some prisoners, it can provide funds for
reconstruction of the tribal areas to which these militants belong. It can
promise to rehabilitate families of militants and also the tribal people who
have been displaced or who have suffered losses. So, the government can make
resources available for this purpose. There can be exchange of prisoners. Other demands made by the
TTP would need amendments in the constitution and the parliament will have
to pass these laws that cannot happen quickly and there would be a
timeframe. As I earlier said, this cannot happen before the elections. And
even after the elections we do not know which party will be in power and
what will it say. And also the army I
don’t think will be willing to accept all these demands. The army has
offered huge sacrifices and these cannot be forgotten easily. This cannot be
forgotten easily. It seems an uphill task to accept these demands or to make
an agreement on those terms which have been announced by the TTP. TNS: Do you think there is
a political consensus among the political parties about engaging with the
Taliban? RY: I don’t think there
is a consensus yet. Even the ruling party has not discussed it properly and
there will definitely be issues. I think the government must discuss the
proposal in the parliament as it would be extremely difficult to develop a
consensus among different parties. Then the army should also be consulted.
There are so many stakeholders; too many people have lost lives, including
police, frontier constabulary, frontier corps and so on. The provincial
government should also be taken on board as it has suffered heavily due to
terrorist attacks. TNS: Who exactly is the
government going to talk with, is there a central leadership, Quetta Shura? RY: Let’s be very clear.
Quetta Shura is the name given to the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Muhammad
Omar. We are talking about Pakistani Taliban — the TTP led by Hakeemullah
Mehsud. It has like-minded groups and branches and has a presence in all the
provinces. I think it should be left with the TTP to assign leaders who can
talk to the government. But the government must talk with the central
leadership which has full control over all its groups operating in the
country. Last time, the government talked to Fazlullah, etc, who controlled
a specific area. TNS: What in your opinion
is the solution? Can it be a combination of talks and counter-terrorism
military operations or what? Is the operation in North Waziristan on the
cards or not in the near future? RY: If you talk to the
military people, they are ready and want to go to North Waziristan. But they
want the government to own such a decision. They are also saying that Nato
forces in Afghanistan should seal Pak-Afghan borders as militants may cross
over and then launch attacks on Pakistani territory from there. So, I think
this operation may not take place in the near future and so any peace talks.
In terms of solution,
things are not so easy. Fighting is going on for so long. In the end, you
have to talk but after making full preparations. In case of failure, it
becomes very difficult to turn again to talks. So, I think talks should be
with the right people. Then, there are those who
are not ready to talk and keep on fighting. No government can afford
ungoverned spaces. In such cases, I think there should be intelligence-based
selective operations against these elements and large scale operations
should be avoided as the later affect the masses badly. — Dilawar Jan
‘To talk or not
to talk’ is the new focus of a fresh debate after the Taliban offered the
government talks with some heavy conditions. Surprisingly, all the major
political parties are favouring the talks with this avowed enemy of the
state, however, with some ‘ifs and buts’ — to end the Memories of the past and
ongoing military operations against the militants with horrendous casualties
on both sides go sour the moment talks are talked about. What have we
achieved through relentless fighting while shying away from talks? How will
the armed forces come to term with an enemy it has chased feverishly for a
long time? Though the army generals
are yet to discuss the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s ‘peace offers’ in
details, they want the political leadership to formulate a response to the
suggestion for a ceasefire. “It is for the government to decide whether or
not to hold dialogue with the militants. We are continuing with our
operations geared towards eliminating terrorism,” a senior military
officer told a local newspaper. He said that although the offer was yet to
be fully dissected, it could be a tactical move by the militant outfit,
given its timing and the conditions. “Political leaders should capitalise
on the situation,” he said. Analysts are reluctant to buy the army’s
claim that it has piled enough pressure on the militants for talks. It seems
otherwise. After some daring hits, the Taliban leaders offered a ceasefire,
if the government ‘adopted Shariat after changing the Constitution,
revised foreign policy and ended its engagement with the war on terror in
Afghanistan’. The Awami National Party (ANP),
that suffered the major brunt of the decade-long militancy, seems exhausted
after losing many leaders, including senior minister Bashir Bilour. The
party is now comfortable with the idea of holding talks even with an armed
party as the Taliban are adamant to not disarm. Addressing a gathering held
in the memory of Bashir Bilour last week, ANP chief Asfandyar Wali Khan said
that the government should hold talks with the Taliban and if the terrorism
problem is not resolved through talks, then other avenues should be
explored. Roping in the federal government, Khan said the centre of
terrorism is Fata which is under the jurisdiction of the federal government.
“The ANP could only play a role in the dialogue process with the Taliban
when they are given the authority.” Why did the ANP take so
long to realise that talks are also an option to end the crisis? Shafiq
Ahmad, security analyst and senior journalist, takes the ANP to task for its
utter failure to restore peace in KPK. “The party came to power with the
slogan and promise of restoring peace after tackling the menace of
militancy. But they have failed. The ANP even designated Senator Afrasiab
Khattak with the sole responsibility to find ways for restoring peace even
if it needed to talk to the militants.” According to Shafiq Ahmad,
the ANP has run short of options and holding talks with the ever-growing
Taliban is the only way left for them to restore some kind of peace before
the coming general elections. “No party in the KPK
would be able to carry out election campaign in the present scenario. The
Taliban find it easy to roam around and hit their targets in the province.
The recent daring attacks by the Taliban, including the assassination of
Bashir Bilour, the PAF base and the brutal killing of 21 paramilitary men,
make it abundantly clear that electioneering in the presence of a potential
enemy is a risky business,” Ahmad says. Senior government
officials have reacted cautiously, with some suggesting that the offer
should be carefully considered, while others have warned that the Taliban
will not agree to end their attacks until a final settlement on their terms.
Pakistan People’s Party
will obviously take the lead in either holding the proposed talks or taking
the enemy head on. Minister for Information and Broadcasting Qamar Zaman
Kaira and Minister for Religious Affairs Khurshid Shah, talking to media
persons recently, said the government is willing to talk with the Taliban,
but only under the sphere of law and the Constitution. PML-N Quaid Nawaz Sharif
also underscored the need for talks with the Taliban minus al Qaeda and
other foreign elements for the cause of durable peace. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
that has been clamouring about the growing strength of the Taliban in
Karachi also got on board favouring talks. Recently, the party Chairman
Altaf Hussain said that he held the interests of Pakistan above everything
else and was ready to talk to the Taliban for the survival, security, peace
and stability of the country. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
has been supporting talks all along with its Chief Imran Khan saying that
talks are the only way out. Jamaat-e-Islami also finds
its stance vindicated as it always called for an end to the military
operation and talks with the Taliban. Given the fact that all
the mainstream parties are ready for engaging the Taliban in talks, what
will be the government strategy and what kind of incentives the government
may offer to the militants? Even the armed forces, according to media
reports, have asked the government to thrash out a strategy about holding
talks with the Taliban. According to Salim Safi,
host of Jirga, a TV show on Geo, who received the Taliban letter offering
talks, suggests in one of his columns that talks must be held with the
entire spectrum of the Taliban and not with one faction or the other. He
writes that besides Mulla Omar and Hakimullah Mehsud, Afghan Taliban should
also be included in the process of talks. “The political
leadership should evolve a clear strategy and then take the military
leadership on board. After outlining the details of a ‘give-and-take’
formula, the government should constitute a committee including government
representatives and members from the PML-N, the Tehreek-e-Insaaf, the JUI-F,
the JUI-S and the Jamaat-e-Islami,” writes Safi. “This committee having
full backing by the political and military leadership should be mandated to
reach some understanding with the Taliban.” Safi also suggests
engaging popular religious leaders like Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman Khalil,
Hafiz Saeed, Maulana Masood Azhar, Maulana Ahmed Ludhyanvi, Maulana Tayyab
Tahiri, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Tariq Jameel in the process, saying
Taliban share their ideology and respect these leaders. Brushing aside the myth
that the Taliban only talk through guns, Shafiq Ahmad says the Taliban
believe in talks and they resolve their differences through jirgas. “Why
can’t the Pakistan government hold talks with them when the United States
is holding talks with their arch enemy in Afghanistan? Even the American
military commanders have concluded that the Afghan war could only end in a
negotiated settlement with the Taliban, not a military victory.” Ahmad
says a grand jirga comprising political, religious and military leadership
should be formed to initiate dialogue with the Taliban. Bringing Taliban to
the negotiating table will ultimately lead to constructive talks ending the
continuing violence.”
United
in attack Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan or TTP is an umbrella organisation of some of the most deadly
Islamist groups based in the Pakistani tribal areas. The component groups of
the TTP are Deobandi and quasi-Salafist. Although there are
differences between the different commanders, their hate for the United
States and its Pakistani allies (in the Pakistani military) keep them
united. All these groups support the Afghan Taliban against the American and
NATO forces in Afghanistan, and want to implement shariah in Pakistan. They
have repeatedly said that their war on the state of Pakistan will not come
to an end with the departure of the American and NATO troops from the
region. As the Pakistani state has
failed to take on the Islamic extremism with full force, the TTP has become
increasingly deadly. The TTP is not the first
organisation in Pakistan that has used the word ‘Taliban’ to describe
itself. At least two Islamist and jihadist organisations have worked under
this name in Orakzai Agency in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A third group
under the name of the Tehreek-e-Taliban emerged in October 2007, with the
aim of fighting criminals and to implement shariah. The group, headed by Abu
Nauman Askari, also announced to form a 16-member shura. However, none of the three
groups succeeded in making its mark. In December 2007, more
than a dozen Taliban groups in the FATA coalesced to form the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan. Its first president was Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan.
Hafiz Gul Bahadar was appointed his deputy and Maulana Faqir Mohammad was
third in command. It also announced to form a 40-member shura. Hailing from South
Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud belonged to the Mehsud tribe. He neither
attended school nor madrassah. He was religious and preferred not to be
photographed. He gained prominence when he signed a controversial deal with
the Pakistan army in February 2005 — which did not last long. The TTP came into being in
the year when the Pakistani Taliban turned against the Pakistani state, the
Pakistani army in particular. The suicide attacks in Pakistan reached a
record high in 2007, with 56 suicide bombings of which 36 attacks were
directly or indirectly against the Pakistani military. Baitullah Mehsud
gained notoriety when his men kidnapped some 250 Pakistani soldiers and
released them only after the Pakistani government set 25 Taliban militants
free. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who
belongs to North Waziristan, became known when he signed a deal with the
Pakistani military in September 2006. Faqir Mohammad belongs to
Mohmand tribe settled in Bajaur Agency. He studied at various madrassahs
including one in Swabi District. He is known to be close to the al-Qaeda and
Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM) leaders Maulana Sufi Mohammad
and Maulvi Fazlullah. Another deputy of
Baitullah Mehsud, Hakeemullah Mehsud led a militant group, Fidayeen-e-Islam,
before he merged his group with the TTP. He studied in a madrassah in Hangu.
Hakeemullah Mehsud became the amir of the TTP when Baitullah Mehsud died in
a drone attack in August 2009. The TTP routinely
collaborates with the militant Deobandi groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Harakatul Jihad al-Islami (HUJI)
and Jaish-e-Mohammad. The TTP is close to TNSM and other extremist groups. The TTP has close links
with the Afghan Taliban and consider Mullah Omar to be their amir. However,
the TTP Taliban hold far more extremist view than their Afghan counterparts.
The Afghan Taliban are known to be against the United States and some other
states they consider to be ‘infidels’. They also hold Shias as
non-Muslims. The TTP, however, goes a few steps further — in declaring war
on the Barelvis, arguably on the Jamat-e-Islami of Pakistan and on Deobandi
leaders they disagree with. It is commonly believed the TTP assassinated the
less extremist Deobandi clerics such as Maulana Hassan Jaan, and was behind
attacks on JUI leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Jamat-e-Islami rallies and
leaders, including Qazi Hussain Ahmed. Apart from attacking
Pakistani military targets, some of the TTP component groups have been
targeting Barelvi mosques and shrines. They have assassinated a large number
of Barelvi ulemas. In July 2007, unknown militants mysteriously appeared and
occupied the mosque-mausoleum of Haji Sahib Turangzai in Mohmand Agency in
north-western Pakistan. They later destroyed it. After the formation of the
TTP, the militants from the TTP components accelerated their attacks on the
Barelvi shrines and ulemas. They have bombed scores of Barelvi shrines
throughout Pakistan which include some prominent ones such as mausoleums of
Rehman Baba near Peshawar, Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi and Data Darbar in
Lahore. They have also assassinated scores of Barelvi ulema, including Dr
Sarfraz Naeemi. The TTP is also against
secular education in schools. They have been bombing schools all over
north-western Pakistan. In the last five years, since the TTP was formed,
hundreds of schools have been destroyed. Resistance to the Taliban policy of
attacking schools gathered international attention after 14-year old Malala
Yususzai was shot in the head. Unless full power is used
to crush the TTP and other extremist groups, the state of Pakistan is likely
to collapse under the burden of the Taliban. The writer is a US-based
journalist and author of ‘Shadow War — The Untold Story of Jihad in
Kashmir’
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decade-long spell of ruthless bloodshed. 
