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Yeh
Woh
Coup or completion of the revolution Moral vigour interview Wave
of sectarian violence Front foot block By Masud Alam A wishfully made-up
response of Najam Sethi, Interim Chair of Pakistan Cricket Board, to those
who greet his appointment and to those who loathe it, for all the wrong
reasons: “Let me start by saying I
am deeply impressed with the red hot passion with which I have been discussed
in cricket-loving circles lately. You, my friends of all ages and genders,
are the only reason I accepted this position. I would like to change the
world or at least Pakistan but I know I cannot. I tried to change Punjab in
four months and, well, it was a partial success. But changing Pakistan
cricket in three months I am certainly capable of. And nothing will cheer us
Pskistanis and bring us together to celebrate, better than a fighting fit
Pakistan cricket. I am not a cricketer and
this is not a cricketing job. Yes, an ideal candidate will be a former player
and an icon of his time, turned a management professional through education
and experience. But in a far from ideal Pakistan we are lucky to have someone
like me who at least brings one of the two qualifications to the job. If
anything, knowing little about cricket makes me truly unpartisan. I don’t
like or dislike one player more than the other and therefore I’ll let
people qualified to do the job, select and train players on merit. PCB is a rich autonomous
body that isn’t answerable to anyone how it spends its four arab rupee
annual budget. My predecessors — cricketers, bankers, doctors — spend all
this money to only earn PCB the reputation of an inept, corrupt and highly
politicised public body that is a disgrace for the sport and a criminal waste
of public money. This money is the source of all that’s wrong with PCB. I
plan to use the budget wisely, to make myself personally accountable for
every rupee in it and by booby trapping every money trail in the affairs of
the board. I am letting cricketers
handle cricketing affairs, managers handle management and accountants watch
numbers, while I keep myself concerned with macro management. And I assure
you I’ll plead for open trials of the corruption and disqualification cases
that I am working on in the early days of my new job, so that people can
judge for themselves what the rot in PCB looks like from inside. Then it’s
up to them. It’s their pressure, not I or any other chairman that can
rescue Pakistan cricket. If I can’t show you this ugly face in my capacity
as chairman, then you’ll hear it from me in Aapas ki Baat. The head is responsible for
the overall running of the organisation rather than for an individual’s
performance or conduct, on or off-field. I assure you that starting with tour
of West Indies we’ll have the best available talent, trained and managed by
the best in the profession. But I cannot assure you great performances
neither can I rule out misconduct. These boys come from a mohalla near you.
If they are mediocre, or talented but lazy, or unsportsmanlike or criminal,
you are more responsible for producing the specimen, than the board for not
recognising the kink in their personality. The thing about talent is
no one is ready to face the fact that we are not getting an awful lot of it. I am not saying we are
entirely talentless, but the range of our talent is rather limited; in
cricket it starts with Shahid Afridi and ends with Misbah ul Haq and in
character it started long ago and never seems to end. We can find cricketing
talent better than Afridi and Misbah but can we find cricketers with
character? Butt had everything going for him — he was a good looking,
English speaking, stylish opener who made it to the captaincy in his mid 20s.
He had a life of cricketing excellence to pursue, so much cricketing pleasure
to give and so much love to get. And what does he do? He becomes the ring
leader of players who take money from gamblers to not play cricket! Look at this talented boy
Mohammed Amer who is not a spring chicken either. The then chairman Ejaz Butt
pleaded with him: ‘beta tell us the truth so I can help you’ and he —
like the other two disgraced colleagues, Butt and Asif — kept insisting he
was innocent. I am not planning on
opening another academy to teach cricketers integrity, build their character,
and make them better human beings and superior sportsmen. These are the
qualities talent brings with it, or doesn’t. You send me the talent, you be
responsible for character. I process talent, I’ll be responsible for their
development as cricketers.” masudalam@yahoo.com
Two years after Tahrir, Egypt stands divided after another overthrow — this time of a democratically elected president, and not a long standing dictator issue By Ahmad Nazir Warraich Democratic
transitions are never easy and the Egyptians are finding it the hard way.
When the regime of Hosni Mubarak
fell, the people at Tahrir Mohammed Morsi became the President on June 30, 2012, as a result of what was considered to be a generally fair election. He was the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. Why did then the opposition rise against him, allowing, in fact pushing and cheering the Army to overthrow his government. One reason could be that the change in 2011 was too sudden. Mubarak’s dictatorship was overthrown, not through a sustained struggle, but through a sudden rush of public sentiment expressed through strikes and protests. Then the opposition was not equipped to run the government. It takes time for the status quo power structure to readjust and realign and accept the new power paradigms based around people’s will. Democracy is not an event, it’s a process. Election is just one step in the right direction. Democratic process requires establishment of an independent legislature, which is truly reflective of the will of the people, whom it is supposed to represent and not party interests alone, and holding of regular free and fair elections. It requires functioning and free courts, and a robust and fiercely independent media, that acts as the ever watchful watchdog of the people’s rights. All this takes time and mutual jostling for power between the various organs of the state that best serves the interests of the people. Another major problem is that such national and historic transitions require great leadership and organised political parties, with wide ranging grass roots level support. In Egypt the most organised political entity was the Muslim Brotherhood, which was banned for most of its life and worked underground. It had its own ideological base, but perhaps did not command the support of the majority of the people. On the other hand, the leaders of the Tahrir Square protests and movement were the young, middle class, comparatively liberal and secular urbanites. This motley group did not belong to any one party, had no single leader, and therefore no means to win the elections. Resultantly, the Brotherhood came out the biggest winner. Unfortunately, in the opinion of many, the Brotherhood could not provide the leadership and bipartisan policies with which it could coalesce the whole nation together and adroitly navigate it through this difficult period of transition. Morsi himself was a stand in as his party’s main candidate was disqualified from contesting the elections. So the transition started with a disadvantage of not having the whole nation behind it, under a leader acknowledged by the majority. Egypt stood divided right from the start of the democratic era. Some of the opposition felt that their prize was snatched from them. In this background Morsi made the critical mistake of not keeping the opposition fully on board. Morsi upon assuming power, moved to consolidate his position, through removal of the senior military brass, and passage of several ordinances restricting the powers of the judiciary. At that time purging the top military brass made tactical sense, but without the people and particularly the ‘revolutionary forces’ behind him, this was a dangerous move, and perhaps that is one reason why it has eventually backfired. Additionally, the record of the Morsi administration on human rights faced criticism from the beginning. There were complaints of alleged muzzling of the press, both for making fun of and speaking against the President. The human rights activists claimed that his regime restricted women’s rights, as well as those of the minorities. The recent violence against Coptic Christians and Shias gained prominence. Morsi had promised to keep all factions on board in his government, but is alleged to have staffed most of the main posts with his party loyalists, and not from the parties of the opposition. The credentials of Morsi as a democrat were deeply undermined by his acts. Earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood had announced that they would not contest for the post of the President, this had further alienated the Tahrir Square group and raised the fear in the minds of some moderate and liberal Egyptians that the Brotherhood, would use the democratic tools to attain its objective of coming into power, but once in power, would turn its rule into an autocratic one concerned only with its own electoral base. This fear seemed to have been strengthened, whether rightly or wrongly, by the later actions of the Morsi administration. Therefore, a major criticism of Morsi’s government by the opposition is that he had proved to be the President of his party only and not of the country. In addition, the economy has taken a nosedive. To make matters worse there are severe fuel shortages, as well as power shortages. It is reported that law and order has deteriorated and crime is on the rise, all of this leading to the impression that the government is not in control. Periodic protests and strikes had been building for a few months, however, they seemed to have reached a climax last Sunday with huge protests staged by the opposition parties. Clearly the situation was fast becoming volatile, and many analysts felt that the Army would intervene. In nascent democracies, division amongst the political forces always creates space for military intervention. The Wednesday ‘coup’, removed Morsi from office and appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court as the interim president, with power to amend the constitution and Mohamed ElBaradei as the interim prime minister. Morsi is calling it a coup, the opposition is calling it the completion of the revolution. Egypt stands divided. The people who spearheaded the last revolution are the ones who are part of this one as well. However, this has derailed democratic transition and may lead the country into chaos, depending on how the Brotherhood chooses to, or is able to react. This is a testament to the historical truism that democratic transitions are always a long drawn out process, there is no ‘instant’ version of it. After all, Pakistan is the best example of it, and Egypt has just taken the first tentative steps. It is difficult to say how things will settle down as a result of the current crisis, but the transition to democracy is what Egypt needs. The writer is a Lahore based lawyer and political analyst
On the sixth anniversary of the Lal Masjid operation, the principal of Jamia Hafsa, Umme Hassan, clings to her traumatic past in a world marred by ‘moral depravity’ and ‘ever-conspiring international and domestic enemies’ By Sameera Rashid As I enter the
sitting room of Jamia Hafsa to interview Umme Hassan, principal of the
seminary, I fail to distinguish her from other women in the I thought she would soon
shed the gentle mask and start a rant against the military operation,
codenamed ‘Operation Silence’, launched by the military-led government in
2007. After all, she had lost her only son in the Operation whose
phosphate-charred dead body she claims was handed over to the family by the
administration. But she did not. After her
matriculation from a government school in Rawalpindi, Umme Hassan was married
off to Maulana Abdul Aziz. She credits her transformation as an Islamic
educationist to her husband. A large madrassa for girls, Jamia Hafsa, was
opened in 1992; it was a boarding seminary. When Jamia Hafsa was razed to the
ground after the Operation, its premises was shifted to Madrassa Sumiyyah,
which has been renamed now as Jamia Hafsa. Here effusive praise of her
husband for motivating her to study is in sharp contrast with her own views
about the role of women in society, which are stifling to say the least. Her
emphasis on women helping in household chores that she calls khidmat
perplexes me, so I ask: Is the role of a woman confined to serving her
family? Shouldn’t women work? She replies that “women should not move out
of the confines of their home unnecessarily. If a male member is earning and
fulfilling their needs, they should be contented in life.” The veneer of gentleness
melts away as she passionately speaks against the onslaught of Western
culture on the Pakistani society. In fact, a common refrain of Umme Hassan is
the spread of immorality in the society: “our TV channels are showing
Turkish soap operas, where men and women are shown engaged in immoral
activities; our marriage ceremonies have been Hinduised; we celebrate Basant
and Valentine’s Day; and alcohol is easily available. A month back, a
friend sent me a text message about a television programme on sex
trafficking. One hundred thousand women are working as prostitutes in the
brothels of Karachi,” says the principal of Jamia Hafsa. The mono-dimensional views
of Umme Hassan are perhaps a result of her limited education which encourages
religious particularism and rejection of secular viewpoint. Further, this
homogenised worldview and religious exclusivity can only be sustained by
emphasising moral purity and zealotry. The reason is simple: moral principles
are relative and are shaped by cultural and social experiences. However,
moral puritans discard all such experiences and couch moral principles in
abstract notions to assert their universality and applicability in all ages
and climes. I ask her: If the
government provides free education to all, gives them health coverage and
finds jobs for our youth, but also allows people to pursue arts and music and
live their life as they want to live, would that be acceptable to the
clerics? “No, it cannot be
permitted in an Islamic republic. Our Prophet (PBUH) destroyed 365 idols and
broke musical instruments at the conquest of Makkah; and he fought against
Abu Jahal, who believed in Jahaliyat and profanity. But we are promoting a
culture of dance and music,” says Umme Hassan. I realise that her exterior
serenity is not fake but, at the same time, her sense of loss and the desire
for revenge against the perpetrators of operation lurks beneath the surface.
While talking of the Lal Masjid Operation, she slightly raises the pitch of
her soft voice: “How can we forget Cobra helicopters and Special Services
Group commandoes, storming Lal Masjid? They can’t win war against India but
raid our compounds.” She employs different
linguist constructs to describe the operation: catastrophe, calamity, sheer
barbarity. She says that more than 300 seminary students and their relatives
perished in the operation. However, Umme Hassan
brushes aside allegations of construction of bunkers, of stashing of arms and
presence of foreign militants in Lal Masjid. “All of these are malicious
lies, which were fabricated to launch the military operation against us,”
says the principal. Apart from moral zealotry,
the belief that Hindus, Jews, Americans and intelligence agencies are
conspiring against ‘Muslims’ — that means Muslims belonging to
Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jammat — is also a part and parcel of her mental
framework. She believes that “shooting of Malala had been engineered by the
security establishment to malign the Taliban; in fact, it was not a genuine
shootout but a fake encounter.” Umme Hassan clings to her
traumatic past for navigating her present world, a world marred by moral
depravity and ever-conspiring international and domestic enemies. Of course,
hers is not an easy world to live in, and so, she thinks, it needs to be
purified through moral vigour and jihad.
“If I can equip the students with tolerance to deal with the divisions in society, my job is done” Sitting in his LUMS office, overwhelmed by his farewells, Dr Najam talked with The News on Sunday about his days at LUMS and issues that affect Pakistan today. The News on Sunday (TNS):
What brought you back to Pakistan after 20 years in the US? Was it for a Adil Najam (AN): LUMS and
my country brought me back. I had not planned how long my stay here would be,
although I thought it would be longer. When I joined the university, everyone
was curious to know the length of my stay. But I refused to answer them. When
I went to the US I thought it would be for two years but it took 20 years to
return. So, I have learnt that life can never be planned (laughs). Life
should not be planned and one should walk off while things are going good. I have honestly lived every
moment of my time at the university and honestly enjoyed every moment. I’m
taking back good memories. But I did realise that I am missing my research
work. TNS: How would you sum up
your days at LUMS? AN: I have learned a lot.
Running a university is like running a small community. Many of our
challenges are the same as those of any university anywhere in the world.
But, some challenges are unique to Pakistan or to private universities in
developing countries. We have done particularly well in raising funds for a
private university and to support deserving students who need financial help
- National Outreach Programme of LUMS has grown tremendously and Rs. 358
million was given in financial aid this year. It is unbelievable. Forty per
cent of the LUMS students are on financial aid. It may be viewed as an
elite educational institute but it is probably amongst the most economically
diverse universities in Pakistan. TNS: Would you agree the
higher education is the ‘happening’ sector in Pakistan? AN: What is happening in
higher education is indeed very exciting. It has the potential to shape the
future of this country. We have more young students in universities now than
ever before. Perhaps, the most important thing today is to focus on quality
than quantity of education. We have been too concerned about how many people
are in colleges and universities and not so much on how well they are being
taught. We have been chasing ‘interesting majors’, and in the process
have lost sight of the value of a good broad-based education in humanities
and social sciences. There in lies the challenge. Private universities have
greater responsibility in maintaining excellence and quality of education. TNS: There is an impression
among people that strong religious groups are propagating their point of view
actively at LUMS. In fact, that they are polarising the campus. Would you
agree? AN: There are all types of
students at LUMS. All types that exist in Pakistan. It is a reflection of
Pakistan. And LUMS is no different. The only difference, say compared to the
Punjab University, is that we deal with it differently. The goal to me is to
give these young people an education that inculcates tolerance and respect
for diversity. We have to inculcate in our students the merit of
co-existence. If I have difference of opinion with you it does not mean I
should shoot you. If I can equip the students
with a set of tools to deal with the divisions in society with tolerance then
my job is done. TNS: But do you think this
polarisation is increasing at LUMS? AN: No I don’t think it
is increasing. We have to turn divisions into diversity. I think this
division is widening in the society, and whatever is happening in the society
will be reflected at LUMS too. A good university should give its students the
tools to deal with the divisions. A bad university widens these divisions. It
creates groups and parties. One tool to handle such a situation is debate,
the other is the understanding not everyone is the same, and yet another, the
understanding that someone can be different from me but it does not mean that
he is a bad person. The essential tool then would be whether you see a
‘different’ person as a symbol of fear or interest. I think Pakistan’s
biggest problem is divisions and fears prevalent in the society. We have too
many problems and we are unable to come out of them. TNS: So, what is
Pakistan’s real problem? AN: Pakistan’s biggest
problem is the divided society. When I was in college, the dominant division
was between rich and poor. There was no Shia versus Sunni and Sindhi versus
Pathan division then. Now, we have created new layers of divisions —
conservatives versus liberal versus religious versus ethnic versus
ideological. We blame Zia for these
divisions but do not look beyond his era. We, an ideological country, are
also a creation of a division. We are not inclusive but exclusionary nation.
You see the issue of Ahmadis, which I think is one of the biggest blots on
our faces, started much earlier than the Zia’s regime. We ousted a
scientist like Dr Abdus Salam from Pakistan. He came to the Government
College, Lahore, as a Pakistani but we sent him back. It actually started in
the Liaqat Ali Khan’s regime. It started happening from day one. Every country and society
has divisions but we, because of our political instabilities, started using
them as a tool. This might be a hard
comment but I am speaking the truth — that all of us, not only politicians,
but every one of us, started using it as a tool of power. By creating
divisions, we started getting votes and making ourselves more powerful.
Bhutto thought if he passed the anti-Ahmadi law he would get the vote of the
religious lobby. We are product of a
division. We are victims of division. Take the example of Bangladesh. One of the interesting
things I learnt in these past two years at LUMS (and my friends laugh at me)
is to pity politicians. They might have committed many sins but we too put
all the blame on them, even the blame for what are our own sins. It is so easy in this
society to blame anyone for anything, to hide our own sins and weaknesses. Our problem is not the
state but the structure of the society. In my view, divisions, which is
indeed the biggest tragedy this country has experienced, is not state-centric
but society-centric. TNS: Do you think society,
including politicians, have realised that these are the issues of the
society? AN: The problems cannot be
resolved in the parliament. Frankly, you and I can solve this problem. These
can be resolved either in universities or in media debates. We have got into this
situation because lots of people took lots of wrong steps. To get out of this
situation, lots of people will need to take lots of right steps. Don’t wait
for prophets. Let us start with one person, one class, one section at a time.
TNS: What other challenges
are facing Pakistan? AN: Since I have a
background in environmental studies, I see all other challenges facing
Pakistan related to its environment. Take, energy, health, water… all these
are environmental challenges. Nations change destiny
based on economics. By increasing wages or taxation systems one can earn
small benefits. But these measures will vanish when inflation will rise. We
need long-term systematic solutions. There was a time in history
when we used to have five-year plans now we can not even plan for tomorrow.
This is the problem of the poor nations, that they get caught in the moment
and problems of today. We will continue to suffer until we have a great
leadership. I believe in leadership.
But our problem is we are seeking prophets not leaders. The good thing is we
have started thinking of change. A debate has been internalised. Now we need
leaders that can take tough decisions. In the recently held
general elections, irrespective of who people voted for, the space for tough
decisions has been created. I believe when this happens this happens all of
sudden. We need patience in the run up before it takes place. You see the
rise of China, India, Vietnam, when change happens it happens really fast.
Its momentum is built up by societal change. That societal change, I
think, will come from Pakistani youth. We have made youth a slogan but I am
not talking of slogan “youth”. Youth is important for two reasons in
every society. One is that the young are idealistic. Older people generally
become cynical. Young can imagine a better world and they do not cling to
customs and traditions. The hurdle in change is not
what we should do new but how to unlearn old habits. TNS: Many people think the
youth of the country is directionless and confused. AN: No. The young
population in this country is not directionless and confused. Today’s youth
is much more politically savvy than the youth of my times. In our times we
used to listen to songs of love and romance but today’s songs are more
about hunger and politics. I have great faith in this generation; they are
aware and have hope. TNS: Do you see governance
as another challenge facing Pakistan? AN: Easy answers to this
question would be to blame corruption and lack of political will. To talk
about political will is easy but it is difficult to shape. The root cause
really is lack of institutional trust. TNS: What are the reasons
for Pakistan to be isolated from the world? AN: Afghanistan, India,
China, and America are the obvious challenges and I am not undermining that.
I think Pakistan’s biggest challenge is that we have cut ourselves off from
the world. See the newspapers and television channels of today, we carry
nothing about what is happening in the world. We are living through the most
interesting times in human history and Pakistan is totally oblivious about
it. We don’t even have a foreign minister. I think, media and academics
have to become part of global debate. TNS: Pakistan has paid a
heavy price of becoming an ally in the war on terror. Do you agree? AN: It has drowned us
completely. But blaming these years is not right. Just take a look at our
newspapers. Every problem we are facing today has been created by us. We have
to see who in the world has come out of such a situation. Two cases are
obvious: Ireland and Sri Lanka. Our security establishment will say they did
it through force. But both changed when the public opinion turned against the
extremists. There was lot of public sympathy for the extremists in both
countries. When the leadership was able to take away that sympathy they
collapsed quickly. So the real battle is not in tribal areas but on TV
screens, in my class, in newspapers, in Friday sermons. I think there is
blatant distrust of establishment that has turned into de facto support for
them. I don’t think everyone supports them. We are in a state of denial. We
have to come out of that state of mind.
Factors that sustain LeJ’s reorganisation By Muhammad Amir Rana The recent surge in
terrorist attacks has once again proved that not only terrorists’
operational capabilities are intact but their outreach is also expanding. A review of the nature,
type and geographical spread of terrorist attacks in Pakistan suggests that
the terrorists have developed well-established support networks and
logistical infrastructure across the country that help them carry out attacks
anywhere and at
Usually, LeJ is considered a sectarian terrorist group with a monolithic identity. The terrorist group has passed through certain transformational phases and now in its nature it is not a structured group. The LeJ is divided into many factions; though efforts are going on to bring these factions into one fold. Ideologically, it is more diverse than in late 90s when it was proscribed. The LeJ nexus with Al Qaeda and TTP has not only broadened its ideological horizon but also equipped it with lethal operational tactics. It may not be the LeJ of the 1990s, which was mostly involved in targeted killings, but its new face is extensively lethal in terms of operational capabilities and connections with terrorist groups. The LeJ is now an ultra-sectarian organisation, which is working for Sunni supremacy in state institutionalisation. To achieve this purpose killing of the Shias is one of the operational tactics, but could use it to hit other targets as well such as security forces, foreign interests and political leadership. Although LeJ claims to be a
separate entity, it solely depends on the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
for human resources and justifies the killing of Shias in Pakistan. A recent
statement circulated by a faction of LeJ led by Asif Chotu declared Shia
Muslims a major obstacle in the way of enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan. The
SSP denies any direct link with the terrorist group, but the LeJ is a major
source of its vigour that it exploits for political gains. Though a faction
within the SSP is against sectarian violence its voice is diminutive in the
larger discourse of the organisation. After 9/11, the LeJ started
losing its sectarian identity and the group became a tag name for small
terrorist cells. Qari Hussain, the trainer of suicide bombers who was killed
in a drone strike in 2010, had infused new life into the group while
recruiting Punjab and Karachi-based youth and re-initiating sectarian
terrorist attacks. The phenomenon of Punjabi Taliban also helped LeJ to
overcome its internal weaknesse Another major factor, which
gave life to LeJ, was the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) provincial
government’s approach of appeasing the extremists in its last tenure made
the province safe but eventually this approach led to greater security
threats for the country. It was predicted during his previous government that
the terrorists could turn against Punjab as well. Now PML-N has government in
center and coalition government in Balochistan as well. Now it cannot apply
the compartmentalised approach just to secure Punjab. Punjab government
policy had provided the militants enough space and time to enhance their
strength and capability and expand their network. Malik Ishaq, founding
member of the LeJ who was considered a ‘good Taliban’ by the Punjab
government, was a significant contributing factor in Punjab’s appeasement
approach. These facts injected new
life into the agenda and operations of the group, on the organisational level
it remained splintered and disconnected until recently. Its Balochistan
chapter, led by Usman Kurd, which targets the Hazara Shia community in Quetta,
had little interaction with groups in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Seven
other LeJ groups are active in Karachi and Punjab, including the Attaur
Rehman alias Naeem Bukhari, Qasim Rasheed, Muhammad Babar, Ghaffar, Muaviya,
Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq groups. These groups have devised their local
agendas as well and indulge in local turf wars. The LeJ is once again
coming under a unified command, which could be a major reason for the
escalated sectarian violence during the last few weeks. Asif Chotu, once a
close aide of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi founder Riaz Basra, is reorganising the
group. He had joined the TTP in 2010 and reunited the scattered members of
LeJ and on behalf of the TTP launched several operations across the country.
He has approached other factions as well and now most of the splinter groups
have come under one umbrella because of his efforts. The unity among LeJ
factions is not the only source of their strength. They are also gaining
strength from fragmentation and confusion over the war against terrorism
among the security, political and civil society leaderships in Pakistan. It is a dangerous
development, which is causing an escalation of sectarian violence across the
country.
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room. Dressed in
printed lawn suit, with white dupatta covering her head, her nails reddened
with hennah, Umme Hassan does not come across as a fire-brand preacher, but a
simple housewife.
short stint at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) as the
vice chancellor? 
anytime
in the country. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is suspected as a main element of
this support structure. 
s.
The Punjabi Taliban had emerged from the militant and sectarian landscape of
Pakistan and share a similar worldview, ideology and political and sectarian
ideas.
