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|                                                                              | issue Fielding
   candidates Yeh
   Woh essay Sceptic’s
   Diary 
 
 
 
 
 issue Extremist terrorism
   has taken a heavy toll on Pakistani life, both civilians and soldiers. The
   conflict, which was largely confined to the Federally Administered Tribal
   Areas until 2006-07, has spread to the urban centres. Despite several large
   and small military operations in FATA under the overhang of Operation Al-Meezan,
   the conflict continues to simmer there. Worse, with the military putting the
   squeeze on extremist groups in FATA, they have resorted to terrorist attacks
   in the urban centres. Result: chaos, and a sense
   among the common citizen that the state is not in control of the situation. Recent attacks on the Shia
   community and the lacklustre response of the state, bordering on insensitive
   apathy, have strengthened the view that the state is merely reacting and has
   no well-thought strategy to address the problem. People want solutions —
   and fast. Are they right? There are three problems
   here. One, checking terrorism is not an easy task. More so when it is the
   result of extremist ideologies operating within a context where external
   threats link up with internal fault-lines to create a diabolical interactive
   dynamic. Even if the state and its functionaries were competent, the country
   would still have had to live with this menace for a long time. Two, the bigger problem is
   that the ideologies the state has to deal with have seeped into large
   sections of the population. This makes it very difficult for the state to
   isolate the terrorist from the population. Finally, the state itself,
   for a host of reasons, is simply unprepared to deal with the problem. There
   is no comprehensive strategy based on studying the phenomenon and breaking
   down the response to the three phases — short-to medium-to long-term. Corollary: we should expect
   more of the same. So, nothing can be done? I have faced this question
   repeatedly over many years but more so in recent times. The problem with
   offering solutions — and yes, there’s no overarching single solution; any
   strategy will have to have multiple solutions — is that they must be
   viable. In this case, the viability of a solution is not just related to what
   must be done but also what can be done. The problem becomes worse when the
   ‘must’ and ‘can’ parts of viable solutions collide headlong into a
   wall made up of several disabling factors. Let’s take an example:
   terrorism is a national threat. A national threat is to be dealt with by the
   federal government, regardless of how much power has been or can be devolved
   to the provinces. Easy? Conceptually, yes. In reality, policing is a
   provincial subject and since no effort has been made in the past decade to
   create a federal force to deal with the issue with a mandate to override the
   province or parochial provincial interests, there is inertia. Ask the interior minister
   and he says Punjab refuses to deal with the problem. And what can the federal
   government do? Nothing. This is a real
   problem and a procedural-structural one. The state faces a similar problem in
   terms of creating an effective legal framework to deal with acts of terrorism
   whether it is the issue of the law of evidence, witness protection or
   detention and trial. The deep irony is that taking care of these structural
   problems is a necessary but not sufficient condition of fighting terrorism.
   The sufficient would require much more at the operational level. The point, however, is that
   if the state has been unable or unwilling or both to even deal with the
   necessary, how much more difficult it would be for it to address the
   sufficient. There are always four
   levels of any conflict. In ascending order they move from the tactical to the
   theatre to the strategic to, finally, the highest level, i.e., the political.
   Any comprehensive strategy has to wed the necessary and the sufficient at all
   levels. At the political level, the state has to see how, if at all, the
   internal and external threats complement each other.  What can be done, if such
   linkage is found, to reduce the catalysing effect of the external on the
   internal?  At the strategic level, a
   decision has to be taken about who the enemy is, how to define it and what
   guidelines to issue for the lower two levels to deal with it operationally.
   This is where the national narrative comes in. A good example would be the
   narrative India has created on Kashmir. It is that narrative that not only
   sells Delhi’s oppressive policies in Kashmir but also finds its defence for
   them in the majoritarian consensus. I give a negative example deliberately to
   show how states can, when they want, sell even that which, going by the
   idealist framework, they shouldn’t. The state in Pakistan has
   failed to do that. The strategic level also has to deal with how to configure
   forces; where and when to employ them; how to use force; when to rely merely
   on the threat of the use of force; how to translate the use of force into
   utility of force; when to fight; when to talk — essentially, a host of
   issues. This level must also
   develop a consensus among political actors in a democracy. A state can never
   win against the terrorist if half the political actors don’t agree with the
   rest. Or when the state wants to fight but the political opposition
   doesn’t. At the theatre and tactical
   levels we have the actual operations being conducted. Effective intelligence,
   good policing, optimising the effort. Forces have to be configured according
   to the nature and level of threat.  The terrorist operates
   within a context but he also aims to change that context. Understanding this
   is very important. Tied in with this is the strategy of dislocating the
   terrorist from the context that sustains him. In Pakistan, that offers its
   own problems. A state that has relied on religion to bind it together now
   faces the threat of being torn apart by the very fault-lines, denominational,
   that have historically informed the practice of religion. So, the state is in the
   unenviable position of going against the “aspirations” of large sections
   of its own population. Note another irony: since we also want democracy, this
   population must exercise the right of vote too. Traditionally, religio-political
   parties haven’t picked up too much vote except in certain areas. But there
   are other parties, centre-right and right of centre who get this vote and for
   doing that they also link up with those forces whose hard-line cadres are the
   very people that pose this threat.  Exhibit A: PMLN’s
   overtures to Ahle Sunnat Wal Jama’at, the political face of the terrorist
   Lashkar-e Jhangvi. Exhibit B: the enlightened
   PPP’s government in the Punjab in 1993-96 which had an SSP MPA who was also
   a minister. So, what kind of solution
   can one offer when the state is unable or unwilling to do both the necessary
   and the sufficient? Your answer is as good as mine. The writer is Editor,
   National Security Affairs at Capital TV and a visiting fellow at SDPI  Correction Last week in this
   space we used a photograph of William Dalrymple but inadvertently missed the
   credit. The photograph is by Saad Sarfraz Sheikh. 
 
 
 
 
 
   The ongoing
   intra-party elections of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have pitched
   different groups of the party against each other. The old guard is under
   pressure and desperate to save their slots from losing to political heavy
   weights coming from other parties.  Hooliganism at polling
   station in Lahore and tensions in Multan and Rawalpindi are manifestation of
   existing friction — of contests between Kasuri group and Assef Ahmed Ali
   group in Kasur and Shah Mehmood group and Javed Hashmi group in Multan. The
   results are important as they will make choices clear and easy for the top
   leadership in these constituencies. Besides, there are
   questions as to what the party stands to gain or lose from these elections.
   Will they set a positive tone for the party? Will this exercise lead to
   further fragmentation in the party or acquaint its members (most of whom are
   new to politics) with the secrets of electoral politics?  Omer Zaheer Mir, Central
   Convener, PTI’s Tsunami Change Group and ex-member PTI Punjab election cell
   tells TNS their intra-party elections have created a hype which will
   translate into active participation of party members in the general
   elections. He says millions of party members have elected union council level
   leadership through cell phone messages in the first stage of the polls.
   “They have seen their opinion matters and this will motivate them to go to
   polling stations in general elections,” he thinks. He claims such an exercise
   has never taken place in the history of the subcontinent, resulting in
   election of tailors, street vendors etc as presidents of union councils. A
   large number of elected town presidents are from middle and lower-middle
   classes with no family history of politics. Mir agrees feudals and
   filthy rich candidates have won in some areas but clarifies this has not been
   the trend in most cases. “You go through the list of successful candidates
   and you will find very few Niazis and Khans. Ancestral/familial politics is
   something we have discouraged.” Mir claims the PTI
   popularity is on the rise, “due to the genuine and transparent intra-party
   polls it has held” because “people tend to trust the party which holds
   affairs in transparent manner and makes its leaders declare their assets
   publicly”.  He urges the Election
   Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to call record of polling from all political
   parties who claim they have conducted intra-party polls. “We have complete
   record of text messages and calls and have maintained the voting lists. Can
   anyone tell how the presidents of PML-N etc are elected behind closed doors
   and who vote them to these positions? Sarwar Bari, National
   Coordinator, Pattan Development Organisation terms the PTI elections a
   welcome development though he condemns use of force and violence at polling
   stations.  “At least these elections
   and the related activities are visible to the public,” he says adding that
   in the pre-partition days annual meetings of All India Congress and All India
   Muslim League coincided with intra-party elections. These were occasions
   where great leaders like Jinnah, Gandhi, Bose etc would enter into debates
   and answer questions raised by party workers. Unfortunately, “these
   traditions were discontinued after the Partition when feudals entered and
   dominated politics,” he adds. Sarwar does not expect the
   fundamentals of party politics to change immediately but says the change will
   come gradually. Generally in elections, the main foundations of political
   mobilisation have been caste, personal friendships, reciprocity etc but,
   here, “the PTI ideologues have also played a role,” he adds. Senior political analyst
   Suhail Warraich calls for development of a proper electoral college before
   any political party goes for intra party elections. He tells TNS even the PPP
   and the PML-N — the two biggest parties of the country — do not have
   membership lists.  In case of the PTI which
   claims to have one, he adds, “any person who bothers to send an SMS at a
   prescribed number becomes a member and eligible to vote for election of 13
   union council members. Instead of gauging a person’s association with the
   party by his willingness to send an SMS, he should be properly registered and
   involved in active politics and decision-making.”  No doubt the union council
   members are loyal to the party and become electoral college for selection of
   top leadership but the fact they have been selected through text messages and
   phone calls is questionable. Warraich says the political
   parties in Pakistan do not have funds to spend on enlistment of members and
   for engaging them actively in party activities. In Scandinavian countries, he
   adds, even the government supports political parties to conduct intra-party
   polls. The importance of
   intra-party polls cannot be undermined. They organise party workers and help
   in selecting different tiers of leadership but expecting a change in top
   leadership is unrealistic in the Pakistani scenario. “Parties are known
   because of the leaders and not otherwise. If Mian Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan
   change the name of their parties today, the popularity would switch with
   them.” He sees the clashes and
   brawls among followers of different PTI groups at polling stations as normal.
   “This happens whenever there are open contests. It seems those who lose
   will accept the results, especially when there is very little time left in
   elections,” he adds. 
 
 
   Yeh Woh Good girls spend
   their better years imagining what would ‘he’ be like, with or without the
   help of his photograph, and often without having a preferred candidate in
   mind. He could be an air force
   cadet for a Nowshera girl, a high school droupout but flashy
   son-of-a-rich-man for a Lahori girl, a poor artist for a Karachi girl, or a
   white man for a Mirpur girl … or you can mix and match fantasies, spend
   some time with each until it stops being exciting and then move on to the
   next. One obvious benefit of fantasies is in the freedom it gives you.
   Absolute freedom to be whoever you wish and pick as your suitor whoever you
   wish. No complications, no resistance, no consequences. You can be as
   creative and daring as you please. Be kinky, be bad. Plan to elope with the
   motorbike cutie in your street who drops you hot languid looks and pumps up
   his biceps every time you pass each other.  You can look forward to
   receiving rishta of a Shan lookalike who rides a white horse for his first
   introduction with his future in-laws. You can imagine running in slow motion
   holding Faisal Qureshi’s hands on French beach and singing, ‘wada karo
   saajna’. I must clarify the song and the actor are in no way related and
   that I’ve used the name in generic terms, in the expectation that among so
   many Faisal Qureshi’s on television, one must be a ladies’ man.  The point is you are free
   to fantasise because you can’t think of anything to do to change the
   reality. You have accepted your role in life to be gracefully passive, be
   thankful for being allowed to attend college or university, enjoy whatever
   freedom you can extract from your parents and teachers, and then marry an
   uninteresting and romantically challenged man to become a full time mother
   and home maker for the rest of your life. You need fantasies to spice up a
   bland reality without having to do anything for it.  Men fantasise too. Only,
   they are at their fantastical best when dealing with responsibility rather
   than the opposite sex. For instance they play out in their minds for months
   various scenarios and logistical details before finally taking the car to a
   garage for an oil change. The bigger the responsibility, the faster they run
   away from it. Voting in general elections for instance is the most important
   civic responsibility and around 25 million men who had their vote registered
   did not use it in the last election.  And not because they
   don’t care. They speak passionately
   against the oppression of the powerful, they lament the shabby and filthy
   state of this country, they decry rampant corruption, they yearn for a
   democratic change, but there is nothing they’ll do to bring about this
   change. They won’t even go out to vote. When the ugliness of reality makes
   them sick they take refuge in their favourite fantasy in which the Leader
   emerges from somewhere, gets elected to the highest job, and puts everything
   in order by simply signing a summary. The Leader can be someone
   known or it can be a total stranger, which is a more exciting prospect. That
   Leader is as improbable to show up as angels descending on Earth to help us
   fight the war against terrorism. Fantasies create a beautiful but passive
   world in which there are no choices, nothing to do, no responsibility and no
   expectations. There is however a guarantee that reality will turn uglier the
   next time you come out of your reverie.  Because the good girls who
   spend their blossoming years imagining what would be their man like, grow
   into women who have found out what their men are like and they are not
   impressed. Half of the voters – men and women – vote for a known criminal
   or a person of bad reputation and the other half doesn’t vote at all, and
   then they wonder why every government we elect is more corrupt and inept than
   the last. There are good candidates
   in every constituency, just as there are potentially good husbands in every
   neighbourhood. You don’t have to go for the lesser evil. You don’t have
   to accept rogues, thugs or idiots as your husband or representative. If you
   don’t like any of the candidates, field one of your own and canvass for him
   or her. Better still, put yourself up as a candidate and find out what does
   it take to get the trust of people. 
 
 
 
 
 
   essay “Pakistan desires
   to show a beacon of light to the world, which has been caught in the vortex
   of materialism and has lost its way in the darkness of atheism and
   agnosticism,” thundered Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Osmani as the first
   Constituent Assembly listened attentively. He was speaking in support of the
   Objectives Resolution presented in the House two days ago, on 7 March 1949,
   by Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan. It is believed that the
   resolution was drafted by the Maulana. His words were music to the ears of
   many sitting in the Assembly Chamber in Karachi. There was more than one
   reason for them to celebrate this turn in the region’s political discourse. Pakistan Resolution was
   presented nine years ago. During the period between the Pakistan Resolution
   and the Objectives Resolution, the world went through the frenzy of World War
   II; the bloodiest event of mankind’s history which took tens of millions of
   life all across the globe, most of them in horrid ways. Standing at the fag end of
   this event, you did not need arguments to convince a new state that an option
   other than the greedy capitalism is worth a try. But probably the honorable
   members were not as much concerned about the horrors of capitalism as they
   were about the “excesses” of communism that were purportedly advancing
   from the western side. “Islam has no truck with
   capitalism. The Islamic State brings about an equitable distribution of
   wealth by employing methods peculiar to it and distinct from communistic
   practices.” So the Islam was the panacea, the antidote to the ills of the
   two systems of governance that the world had known thus far. Members of the Constituent
   Assembly cheered over the passage of the resolution. It elated them. Most of
   the members boasted of a glorious past and the resolution reassured that the
   return of greatness was at hand and a matter of few years. On a more
   pragmatic note, however, they rejoiced over the other more handy feature —
   the “Islamic State”. It seemed to be a perfect tool to fix “the problem
   of cultural diversity” that they saw as an obstacle in the way of building
   a nation for this country. The problem originated from
   the fact that the new country had at least five distinct languages and
   cultures. Sindhi was Greek to a Pakhtun and Bengali Latin for a Punjabi and,
   more importantly, one of these was separated from the others by a thousand
   miles stretch of enemy territory. The problem had two
   dimensions. One, what will serve as the uniting element, the binding force.
   No one in power echelons had the capacity, courage and foresight to pursue
   the nation building as a humane and democratic process. They were desperate
   for quick fixes even if these required blatant use of force. The other aspect of the
   problem was more worrisome — how would the ruling elite maintain its
   hegemony over this country where they had no cultural or political
   constituency. The Pakistani elite at that time was composed mainly of
   Urdu-speaking migrants from northern India. Their language and culture were
   not indigenous to the areas that formed Pakistan. Urdu had a hold in Punjab
   even before Partition but not in other parts of the country and certainly not
   in Bengal. A nation built on indigenous identities and democratic principles
   offered no place to this elite, not at least the top and the most powerful
   one. The most important of the
   interpretations of the Objectives Resolution thus was that it required all to
   abandon their languages and cultures and adopt the one ordained as Islamic by
   the ruling class. Baba-i-Urdu Molvi Abdul Haq is on record to have said that
   all languages of the subcontinent, except Urdu, are languages of kafirs and
   thus have no place in this Islamic country. The lofty Islamic ideals
   belittled and demeaned all things local. “Provincialism” was propagated
   as a scourge and “lisani” (linguistic) labelled an evil. Unlike the western
   provinces, Bengal in 1947 had a fully grown and thriving middle class. It was
   educated and trained in its mother tongue that was used in all walks of life
   in that vast area. Again unlike the languages of the western provinces,
   Bangla had a distinct script of its own, developed and in vogue since
   centuries. On the western side, only Sindhi had a script and a print media.
   The decision to abolish Bengali language from official use through a
   notification was arbitrary, naive and callous. It implied overnight
   disempowerment of the biggest section of the middle class of the country.
   Such a brazen act of omission was bound to meet stiff resistance. The decision sparked a
   movement in East Bengal that pitched mother tongue against the state
   narrative of nationhood. It started as early as December 1947 and spread far
   and wide. There were frequent street protests in 1948 led fervently by Dhaka
   University students. In one of those, the former prime minister of united
   Bengal AK Fazalul Haq, was hurt in a scuffle with police. He was the Bengali
   leader whom Quaid-e-Azam had chosen to present the Pakistan Resolution to the
   Muslim League meeting of 1940 in Lahore. The movement got its first martyrs
   in 1952 when on February 21 four of the protesting students died as the
   police opened fire to break the crowd. The language movement of
   Bengal was the first tussle between the two paradigms of identity, one based
   itself on all things indigenous and the other derived a whole array of
   cultural symbols from a particular interpretation of Islam or borrowed these
   from various chapters of the history of different Muslim societies. While the
   Islamic one attempted to unite distinct ethnic groups on the basis of faith,
   the cultural recipe supported unity among believers of diverse religions.
   Islam suited the ruling elite of Pakistan as it not only offered return of
   the glory, it also supported the status quo — the continued dominance of
   Urdu speaking elite. Bengalis, however, won the
   first round. They successfully checked the onslaught of this elite. The
   national language status for Bangla was one of the 21 points on the basis of
   which the United Front made the Muslim League bite the dust in the landmark
   elections of 1954. The Bengalis had by now grown weary and were apprehensive
   about the intentions of the ruling coterie at Karachi. They pressed
   forcefully for their democratic rights and again Islam was used to silence,
   subdue and coerce them. The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)
   led the cause of Islam-based identity in both the wings of the country. In
   East Bengal, it secured 6.1 per cent of the votes in the 1970 elections while
   Awami League swept with 75.1 per cent of votes, bagging a whooping 160 of
   total 162 seats of that province. The language based
   narrative of nationalism defeated the supra-cultural Islamic state ideal on
   all possible avenues — on the streets, in the campuses and at the polling
   stations. It however did not soften the other party that instead further
   stiffened. It ended up as a bloody clash that reached its zenith in the
   spring of 1971. The nationalists came well-prepared and won on this front
   too, though only after a lot of bloodletting.  The Islamists stood
   defeated completely and thoroughly. This had cleared the way for the
   triumphant Bengali nationalists to pursue the state formation on the basis of
   their secular and culture-based ideals. Did they? No, they did not. The violent campaign
   against the nationalists was spearheaded by the Pakistan Army as the Jamaat (JI)
   people served as their point-men. With the benefit of hindsight, it now seems
   that probably the Pakistan Army was serving as the front-men of Jamaat. The
   real owner of the Islamic state narrative is the Jamaat and the state of
   Pakistan was just one of its franchises. Pakistan and its army
   became irrelevant to the politics of Bangladesh after 1971. But
   Jamaat-i-Islami survived. In the 1970 elections, there was one Jamaat voter
   for every 12 of Awami League and this is not negligible especially when you
   factor in the level of organisation in the Jamaat. The Jamaat kept its
   ideals, of basing national identity on Islam, alive in Bangladesh and found
   new allies within the new country’s middle class and its military
   establishment. Bangladesh’s original
   constitution of 1972 had declared it a secular state but the later military
   rulers amended it to ward off democracy and they never forgot to play up
   Islam to compensate for the shortfall in democracy. The 8th Amendment,
   effected by General Ershad in 1988, declared Islam as the state religion of
   Bangladesh. The Awami League, though
   champions of secularism but like any other political party involved in the
   power games, does not hesitate using the religion card. The government of the
   four-party alliance (2001-2006) led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party and
   including Jamaat-i-Islami had banned Ahemdi literature through an executive
   order. The Awami League could ill-afford losing the Islamic constituency to
   its arch rivals, it thus joined hands in 2006 with another Islamic party,
   Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish, on the promise that it would extend the
   definition of state religion to include the belief in the finality of Prophet
   Muhammad which by implication would have declared Ahemdis as non-Muslims. Similarly, a Bangladesh
   High Court had declared in 2010 the constitutional amendment that had changed
   the country’s secular status to that of an Islamic state as having been
   done without lawful authority. It laid the legal ground for the government to
   revert to the secular state status but despite enjoying the required majority
   in the parliament it did not dare. It is against this
   background that the current Shahbag movement should be seen. The Bangladeshi
   youth has gathered in a Dhaka city compound in droves and continues to do so
   since the past few weeks. Their apparent demand is from the International
   Crimes Tribunal that is set up by the present Awami League government to try
   those accused of committing war crimes in 1971. Most of them are members of
   Jamaat-i-Islami. The protest gathering started on February 5, 2013, in
   reaction to a “lenient” sentence of life-imprisonment awarded to a Jamaat
   member. The youth instead demands “exemplary punishment”. This youth does not want
   Islam to be a determinant in matters of government, the biggest proponent of
   which is Jamaat and 1971 is its soft belly. A surprising aspect of the
   protest is that it has ‘pardoned’ Pakistan even before the country could
   tender a formal apology. Pakistan is conspicuously missing from the list of
   those accused of crimes of 1971. It is solely focused on Jamaat men. In
   Shahbag, there has not been even a meek demand to ‘try’ Pakistan as well.
   Pakistan and its army are a distant historical entity for the youth born much
   after those events. Jamaat, however, is an alive phenomenon — omnipresent
   and overbearing. They experience their suffocating presence on a daily basis.
   A blogger who was part of the Shahbag movement and is accused of being an
   atheist was stabbed to death, allegedly by members of Jamaat. On the other hand, the
   Jamaat is avenging the sentencing of its leaders by attacking the Hindu
   neighbourhoods and by vandalising their places of worship. They believe that
   it is the presence of the Hindus that has made the “Muslim brothers”
   fight each other. The Islamisation campaigns in Bangladesh have been
   invariably targeted against local Hindus. They were 15.6 per cent of the
   country’s population in 1975 and by 2010 were reduced to 9.6 per cent. Political parties in the
   Muslim countries over the past half century have either actively pursued the
   idea of an Islamic State or have silently witnessed the politics go that way.
   Even those who profess secular ideals have not dared take a diversion. It is
   the default position of all and a nugget of common political wisdom that any
   act being done in the name of Islam enjoys unflinching public support and
   thus must be supported at all costs. Shahbag is the first time
   in the recent history that the youth of a Muslim society has come out in such
   numbers and with such fervour and zeal to oppose something that is cloaked in
   a sacred robe. Maulana Osmani was a great orator and he had the skills to
   spell bind the Muslim elite sitting in the Assembly Chamber in Karachi. Can
   the screaming youth of Shahbag break that spell? The writer works with
   Punjab Lok Sujag, a research and advocacy group that has a primary interest
   in understanding governance and democracy. He tweets at @TahirMehdiZ. caption Bangladeshi activists and
   former freedom fighters shout slogans during a rally outside the
   International Crimes Tribunal court in central Dhaka. 
 
 
 
 
   Sceptic’s Diary They might be
   forced to do so but individuals and countries eventually need to grow up.
   Being immature has its benefits — for people and states. When experiences
   force us to re-evaluate life as we know it that is when long-term future
   directions are shaped.  Pakistan’s experience
   with home-grown and often home-sponsored terror is making this country grow
   up. Make no mistake about it. This is once-in-a-lifetime process and the
   choices we make now and the forces that prevail now will shape this
   country’s future — for our lifetime as well as that of our children. There is something ironic
   and yet beautiful at play here. Countries that have been vilified for decades
   by the intelligentsia of this country (even by the government) now seem
   similar to us in their approach of handling terrorism. Whoever drafted the
   Fair Trial bill has learned a lesson from other countries: the name matters
   when you are trying to push through a draconian law inimical to civil and
   political liberties. Remember the Patriot Act in the US? Well, someone in
   Pakistan has been listening and learning closely from the US reaction to
   9/11. Last week in this space, I
   argued that it is of fundamental importance that we remain faithful to the
   letter and spirit of the constitution when dealing with violent militancy.
   Since we have not faced such a problem threatening our very existence before
   — or at this scale at least — this is the time we should use to grow up
   as a country.  Consider the issue
   of free speech. For a large part of our history, speech and disputes related
   to it in Pakistan have focused either around the dominant religion Islam or
   freedom of the press regarding criticism of government actions. Hate speech
   is not an issue that this country has directly confronted. This is not meant
   to suggest that hate speech has not been around — of course it has always
   been there — but we have deliberately looked away from its consequences.  Now consider that a number
   of ethnic and religious sects are being targeted. Should this mean that we
   act to limit speech threatening them? If so, what should be the extent or
   immediacy of the threat? Or should we generally curtail the speech of parties
   that otherwise encourage militancy? These are difficult questions. There are
   no easy answers. And there definitely are no immediate answers. We need a
   collective dialogue to discuss these issues and more.  When the US and India acted
   to curtail civil liberties in the face of terrorism, they were acting to
   protect their majorities. Will our restrictions on civil liberties be less
   popular if they are enacted to protect minorities? Of course the majority in
   Pakistan is under threat too but groups forming part of the majority threaten
   the minorities as well. There is a word for it. Ah, yes: a royal mess.  The question whether speech
   promoting religious or ethnic hatred should be banned is a pressing one.
   Personally I am against banning speech, no matter how hateful, as long as the
   threat of violence is not imminent. This personal conviction is of course
   inspired by the First Amendment (and case-law under it) in the United States.
   I also favour the argument that solution to hate speech is more speech. You
   can disagree with it of course and make an equally compelling case for human
   dignity — while citing the debate between Waldron and Dworkin. But
   regardless of which way you swing, Pakistan (and by that I mean its people)
   needs to start talking about these issues before laws or court judgments
   mould our fate a particular way.  No one should be naïve
   enough to think that we are in this mess because it is an Islamic State. Even
   a secular Pakistan would probably have the same, if not worse, issues. The
   problem is societal so let us not focus on non-issues. I feel particularly
   bad for the idea of the Islamic State itself. It takes criticism from both
   sides. The Left blames all of Pakistan’s ills on the idea of religion and
   state working together. The Right says, what are you on about? We have never
   been, are not and at this rate will never be Islamic enough! So if you are
   the Islamic State itself, you deserve sympathy. Everyone criticises you but
   you really are not to blame for much — you have always been weak and
   subject to control by greater, often un-enunciated, ideas.  So while Pakistan grows up
   it may realise that its criticism of India, Israel and the US is now coming
   back to haunt it. Popular passions here too want quick solutions. There is a
   growing desire to not ask questions if acts of state sponsored torture are
   committed to protect Shias/Hazaras or even Sunni majority. And at the same
   time Pakistan needs to realise that it needs to grow up and confront problems
   banging on the door. Free speech and its balance with hate speech is only
   part of the issue. There are other issues too but more on them later. The writer is a practicing
   lawyer. He can be reached at wmir.rma@gmail.com or on Twitter @wordoflaw     
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