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project Chavez is not going Yeh Woh polls Capitulation to
militants
Nacta now
project Iran and Pakistan
had sent out invitations to many neighbouring countries for the
groundbreaking ceremony of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline. No one showed up
for even token representation. Many neighbours obviously do not share the two
countries’ excitement. The growing unease of the US and disquiet in Gulf
neighbours have further iced the lingering doubts over the completion of the
project. The idea of the pipeline
took shape in the 1990s, and after almost two decades, a pipeline expected to
promote better relations between Iran, Pakistan, and India, has already seen
India dropping off from the deal. The expectation that Pakistan too would
forego the project began to fade as the power shortages in Pakistan forced
the Pakistani leadership to review its options and gas imports from Iran
appeared as one solution that might ease the shortages in a minimum possible
time. The pipeline project, the
expected development of an oil refinery, coupled with a deep Sea port next to
the major markets around the Persian Gulf, bringing the sea closer to China
and other landlocked Central Asian countries, ordinarily is a win-win
proposition for all countries in the neighbourhood. The economic impact of
the Gas pipeline project for Pakistan and Iran under ordinary circumstances
would have been a great economic and political engagement for the regional
cooperation. However, the uncertainty of
peace, hostile US-Iran relations, the presence of international forces
particularly the US in the area, has thrown the project in the middle of an
escalating regional conflict. It is now feared that the pipeline project
would accelerate the already brewing diplomatic and strategic disagreements
between the US and Pakistan. Some analysts believe that
the fragility of the regional state of affairs and belligerent relationship
between the US and Iran are major roadblocks that Pakistan might not have the
capability to overcome. The pessimism prevailing
over the completion of this project emanates from the UN, US, and European
Union sanctions on Iran for refusing to halt nuclear enrichment. In all
fairness to Iran, the sanctions appear premature and high-handed. The sponsor
of the several UN resolutions since 1979, United States, still is unsure of
the state of nuclear enrichment progress in Iran. The UN sanctions are
limited only to nuclear enrichment. The US and EU sanctions embody any
financial or business relations with Iran — by any country — within the
framework, and the scope of the sanctions. That means any country, dealing
with Iran, without explicit understanding of the US and the European Union,
could possibly face the same sanctions, applied on Iran now. Some analysts have also
advanced several other hurdles that could freeze the project. The issue of
Pakistan’s ability to raise its portion of financing has been a big
question mark. Out of the total cost of a little less than $1.4 billion, Iran
has committed $500 millions. How Pakistan, given it current financial woes,
would raise the remaining funds, has not been fully explained to the media
and the National Assembly. Banks including Pakistan’s own Bank have backed
out of the project fearing an impact on their international financial
relations with Western Banks. One Chinese Bank, that initially was willing to
fund the project, declined participation on identical grounds. Pakistan’s portion of the
cost, initially estimated to be around $1.5 billion, now stands at around
$800 million as Iran has already confirmed that it would chip in with $500
million. The reduced gap in financing over a period of almost two years is
not a deal breaker anymore. Some domestic cost cutting and frugality in State
expenses could fill the gap. Apprehensions regarding the
technical expertise needed for construction certainly have some merit. The
Russian giant Gazprom that had shown interest has backed out from the
project. However, looking at the present requirement of around 450 miles
construction on the Pakistan side, technical issues might not be of huge
concern. Iran has the technical knowhow and it would not be difficult to
transfer expertise to Pakistani crews working on the project. The Gas
pipeline construction is not rocket science anymore, and the engineering
talent within Pakistan can manage the laying of the pipeline. The prevailing complex
socio-political environments in Balochistan, where the largest section of the
pipeline has to be constructed, add some more twists in the feasibility of
the project. The ongoing insurgency, unstable political surroundings, and
armed groups that regularly confront the law enforcement agencies in
Balochistan, might attempt to slow down or stop the construction entirely.
Besides the pipeline construction, the Chinese company managing the Gwadar
port also intends to start highway construction through the South and Central
Balochistan. Providing protection to both projects concurrently might
overwhelm the law enforcement agencies, already stressed by heavy criticism
of their strong-arms approach in dealing with the people of Balochistan.
Mitigating problems in Balochistan and the priority of the two projects
require problem-solving skills, not obduracy. The proverbial elephant in
the room is world’s largest power and a stakeholder in the Middle East and
Central Asia. The US under NATO umbrella has its armed forces stationed in
Afghanistan. United States is fully aware of Pakistan’s acute need of power
generation. So far, the help the US has offered in this area falls woefully
short of the needs. Still, the US is not willing to let up pressure on Iran
and a deal with so much fanfare would be hard for the US to gloss over. The US relations with Iran
deteriorated immediately after the departure of the Shah of Iran, and have
not improved since. The current standoff primarily is over the state of
nuclear device development in Iran. There are several inconsistencies in the
US arguments against Iran. The acrimonious nature of the US-Iran relations
makes the US arguments against Iran suspiciously self-serving. The US had
never acted decisively against any nuclear proliferating country. Both India
and Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities within the full view and knowledge
of the US. The US was fully aware of India and Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions
for more than two decades before 1999 but never really took any forceful
steps to deter either country. Israel’s nuclear programme is doubtlessly
far more advanced than the current Iranian programme. The US deal with India
and a quiet acceptance of the Pakistani programme also set up a precedent
that could jeopardise the nuclear weapons control and monitoring system. Pakistan and the US
relations have been through many critical moments and trust deficit is
unmistakably evident to all analysts. The lack of trust, entwined with gaps
in communication between the two, opens up the possibility that the US might
just enforce sanctions against Pakistan. Pakistani analysts believe that US
would not take adverse actions against Pakistan, as it needs the corridor
through Pakistan to move its equipment out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
The thinking is that if Pakistan holds ground, the US would eventually look
the other way as has happened in the past. Hypothetically, the US may not
enforce direct sanctions until the end of 2014. The European Union sanctions
can be set in motion immediately, and the impact would be substantial. The president has signed
the accord with Iran on behalf of a government that would be leaving office
within days. Presumably, all stakeholders are on board, understand the
implications of the deal, and have worked on irksome details that would
eventually decide the fate of this project. Helal Pasha is a Management
consultant based in USA. He writes for ‘Daily Kawish’ and Internet based
publications
I came upon Bolivar, one
long morning, in Madrid, at the entrance to the
Fifth Regiment. Father, I said to him, are
you, or are you not, or who are
you? And, looking at the
Mountain Barracks, he said: “I awake every hundred
years when the people awake.” (Pablo Neruda) Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías
certainly saw himself as a loyal disciple of Simon Bolivar. In the late 90s
and early 2000s, while the global economic and intellectual elites celebrated
the “end of history”, it seemed that mainstream political discourse had
little interest in referencing anti-colonial struggles or anti-colonial
heroes such as Bolivar. But in his determined opposition to neo-liberal
economic policies and the Washington Consensus, Chávez felt the need to
revive the name and political potency of Bolivar’s legacy. More than 160
years after his death, Bolivar officially had an –ism attached to his name:
Bolivarianism. In his collision course
with neo-liberal economic policies, Chávez led Venezuela as a
democratically-elected President, and transformed it into the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela. This official name, adopted in the 1999 Constitution
introduced by the Chávez government, has more significance than a mere
appeal to patriotism. Venezuela under the Chávez government was adopting the
mantle of Bolivar himself: it was a declaration that the republic intended to
work for meaningful political and economic unity in Latin America. Chavez could describe
himself as a Venezuelan patriot one day, a socialist the next. In China he
paid homage to Mao. He told the Arab world he was a “Nasserist”. There
are those who see inconsistency here, even bombastic bumbling. Perhaps Chavez
knew exactly what he was doing: recognising the fact that a global discourse
of social justice need not be expressed in one way. It may be argued that there
was also a dark side to Chávez’s attitude of inclusiveness when he reached
out to avowed opponents of Washington’s dominance in the world. Chávez
nurtured ties with the Ahmadinejad government in Iran, the Assad regime in
Syria and the Gadaffi regime in Libya. Democratic and popular movements in
these countries, which have struggled against an oppressive state apparatus
for decades, were angered by such a policy. In the global Left too, there
were many critics of such a rapprochement between a Latin American republic
striving for socialism and the Iran of the Ayatollahs. Some aspects of Chávez’s
foreign policy are questionable on ethical grounds, even if they may have
appeared to be good realpolitik as Venezuela strove to establish a bloc to
counter US influence. But let us ask ourselves a
question. Let us suppose that the Bolivarian experiment with socialism
survives and flourishes far after Chávez’s death. Let us also suppose that
the oppositional movements in Syria, Libya and Iran adopt the same
anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideas which have galvanised the global
Left again since the mid 2000s. Is it, then, unrealistic to imagine that
tomorrow the movements for social justice in these countries would find
staunch allies in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela? Can we not dare to imagine
such solidarity? Certainly if Chávez’s
life and work demonstrated anything: it is the power of a dream. His
political career started out as a mid-ranking military officer who
desperately attempts a coup d’etat in 1992 in pursuit of his social vision.
From there, Chávez matured into the leader of a mass political current which
took power by 1998, propelled by an eruption of popular opposition to the
diktat of the IMF, World Bank and the Global North. His style of leadership was
loud, but he clearly meant business. Nationalising Venezuela’s energy
resources was merely the beginning. The Chávez government undeniably
strengthened the current for the integration of the many states of Latin
America. It was a polarising discourse: one that inspired similarly
polarising movements in nearby countries. A tide of populist leftism swept
Latin America, bringing to power governments in Bolivia, Nicaragua and
Ecuador which looked to Chávez for support and inspiration. At home, the Chávez
government’s biggest success was probably the fact that it created the
social conditions where the urban poor could for the first time have a
credible stake in the political process. Venezuela’s oil wealth was
channeled for the first time towards redistribution among the marginalised
rather than accumulation among the country’s oligarchy. This process of enhancing
social welfare was not without its drawbacks. And these drawbacks, real and
imagined, were pointed out with unfailing consistency: both within and
outside Venezuela. Critics tended to fall back on neo-liberal disapproval of
any mass redistribution of wealth. Much skepticism was expressed about the
economic soundness of Chávismo. More right-wing voices in the global media
often referred to this massive social spending as “bribing” the poor of
Venezuela. At the end of the day, it must be remembered that much of this
criticism came from quarters which were moved more by an aversion to mass
socialist politics and less by a concern for the actual macro-economic
challenges created by Chávez’s policies. A discussion on Chávez and
Chávismo deserves far more space than one column. It must be pointed out, at
the risk of sounding banal, that your view of Chávez depends on where you
come from. This scribe agrees with those who, in folly or otherwise believe
that democracy can never take root in Pakistani society without massive
wealth redistribution and curtailing the role of un-elected institutions of
the state. In 2002, General Pervez
Musharraf was covering the naked authoritarianism of military rule with the
fig-leaf of managed elections and favoured political parties. Hardly a soul
among a population of 180 million considered the sanctity of the Constitution
worth protecting with their life. And why would they? What had the elected
governments of the 90s given to them except tragic theatre? In the same year, military
leaders in Venezuela, with the open support of the Venezuelan economic
oligarchs and the United States of America, tried to overthrow the elected Chávez
administration. The President himself was taken into custody and spirited
away. The outpouring of support for Chávez was enormous among the Venezuelan
population. There exists video footage of Venezuelan youth from the barrios
(slums) with covered faces, setting up barricades on the outskirts of
Caracas. As journalists approached them, they quoted from the Venezuelan
constitution, saying that they supported the elected Chávez government. They
understood the need to uphold a constitutional order, because they felt it
was their constitutional order. The coup attempt was soon defeated. Is there nothing that we in
Pakistan can learn from that chant which rang through the streets of Caracas?
Back then in 2002, all
through his electoral victories, in the painful days of his final illness and
again today at Chávez’s funeral, they chanted: “Chavez no se va!”
Chavez is not going.
Yeh Woh Political parties have a
reputation and their leaders’ huge egos to protect, pundits have
predictions to make and to do breathless running commentaries on heavy weight
contests, and we the people are either thinking of personal gains or not
thinking of election at all. In essence, the traditional politician wishes
for status quo – continuation of a system in which votes can be bought,
polling result can be manipulated, and membership of parliament can be used
to favour family, friends, and supporters – while the average voter wants a
wholesome change but doesn’t believe it can come through elections and
therefore sees no benefit of taking part in the exercise. So while ‘they’ are
busy switching loyalties, holding jalsas, making outlandish promises, buying
voter loyalties, and befriending polling staff in preparation of the election
that is yet to be announced, we the people, are being our cynic selves
sitting on our haunches waiting for divine intervention. Histories of both
God and the world show that God does not help those who don’t help
themselves. So let’s help ourselves. My constituency will elect
a couple of members of parliament whether or not I participate in the
exercise. The elected parliamentarians will represent ‘me’ whether or not
I voted for them. They’ll make laws that’ll affect my life and the life
of those around me whether or not I like it. That is my dilemma. It’s my
life and my loved ones’ life that I care for. I do not care for politics. I
have no time or inclination for politics. But my day to day life is tied with
politics. The politicians I despise in fact define and design my world. So is
it better to avoid politics or be involved? At least once in five years? If all the prospective
candidates in my constituency are traditional politicians – people hungry
for a share of power, corrupt in their practice and belief, and ineffective
as legislators – I can always put up my own candidate. I can do that
because there are many like me in my constituency. I start with my neighbours
and work my way through my street and the next street and next neighbourhood.
I look for people who, like me, do not trust traditional politicians and
generally do not participate in elections. I discuss with them the
possibility of fielding a candidate we trust. Perhaps we know a teacher, a
lawyer, a social worker, or a local businessman who can represent us ably and
honestly. Perhaps there’s a wise and compassionate person who can be a
candidate but is too poor to run his own campaign or even to pay the
government fees. We, the voters, choose our own candidate, file his or her
nomination papers, pay the fees and run their campaign. We do that because we
want our parliamentary representative to be an agent of positive change and
we won’t compromise on their character and integrity. Better still, I can be a
candidate. After all I care for mine and my community’s future and I
consider politics important enough to fail all the candidates in their
aspiration to be my elected representative. If I consider them corrupt then I
must be ethical and upright in my own affairs. If I consider them ineffective
then I must know what it takes to be effective. And in that case I should be
putting myself up for the job rather than boycotting the election. That way
I’ll not only be doing my civic duty, I’ll be demonstrating my trust in
politics and giving hope and encouragement to others around me who do not
trust the traditional way politics works in our society. All the arguments against a
‘shareef’ person standing for election – you need loads of money, you
need muscle, you need clan and sectarian loyalties etc – are tired clichés.
The only factor supporting these misconceptions is practice, and the only way
they can be challenged and proved wrong is by trying it your own way. Oh, and you have to be a
registered voter to be a candidate. So register and confirm your voter
details before the election schedule is announced because that is the cut off
point for you to be a part of the political process – as a candidate or
just a responsible citizen. masudalam@yahoo.com
polls Mian Nawaz Sharif
launched the manifesto of PML-N for the coming election on February 7 in a
crowded press conference at Lahore. The green and white title page of the
104-page document, which PML-N terms as national agenda of real change,
comprises pictures of a running bullet train, a flying PIA plane, a
satellite, a motorway, windmills for energy, high rises, running factories, a
young person working on some latest IT gadget, two slogans ‘stronger
economy stronger Pakistan’ and “we will change Pakistan”, and Nawaz
Sharif sitting in the JF Thunder jet of Pakistan air force. Economic revival, as is
obvious from the title page, is top on the agenda, followed by energy
security, agriculture and food security, social change, democratic
governance, science and technology, the employment challenge, media art and
culture, a charter of inter-provincial harmony, speedy justice, corruption
and accountability, foreign policy and national security, militancy and
terrorism and implementation on the constitution. The document talks a lot
about economic revival but almost ignores militancy and terrorism which are
at second last section of the manifesto. Instead, all it does is discuss the
historical perspective of militancy and terrorism in war. It assumes that the
issue of militancy and terrorism is linked with poverty and promises
construction of schools, hospitals and economic uplift to fight out this
menace. Security analysts do not
agree that economic uplift is possible without fighting out terrorism and
extremism in the society. The TTP has already asked the PML-N chief to act as
a guarantor for peace talks but the manifesto is strangely silent on the
issue of peace talks, leave alone chalking out a pathway to make the peace
talks materialise. Critics think this is a
provincial way of thinking the national agenda. It promises to increase the
exports to USD 100 billion and a tax to GDP ratio from nine to 15 per cent.
It also promises to double the annual average rate of growth from three
percent to six percent and to accelerate industrial growth rate from present
3 per cent to eight percent and to bring down budget deficit to four percent
by 2018. It talks about tax reforms and bringing the informal economy into
the tax net. It is ironic considering that only two years back the PML-N was
the most vocal opponent of Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST) bill in the
parliament. It clearly tries to address
the solution of all problems through economic uplift. Most parts of the
manifesto are not self-explanatory. It promises to safeguard the rights of
minorities and women according to Islamic teachings and values. It is a male
dominated manifesto with only one sub-section on women. The issue of
environmental protection also got a two-paragraph sub-section which talks
about issues of global warming, climate change, water-logging and salinity
and natural disasters. Interestingly, the
sub-section ends making a promise to build ‘Model villages’ in all
natural disaster zones to reduce discrimination. There are some unexplained
promises in the document. For example, the document promises direct
inductions from lawyer community to judiciary on contract basis for speedy
justice and to help reduce backlog. It means whole lawyers community would
become a stakeholder in judiciary. It also promises revival of panchayat/jirga
system for delivery of justice at doorsteps but does not discuss how to
depoliticise this system. The document also promises
to solve Kashmir issue according to UN resolutions, bring foreign policy and
national security under the ambit of parliament and promises to establish a
cabinet committee on defense and national security to maintain democratic
oversight of all aspects of foreign, defense and national security policies. Security analysts say that
security sector reforms in PML-N manifesto are much needed steps but most of
them are over-ambitious. The military establishment has already shown its
reservations on the PML-N proposed changes in security policy. Political analysts say that
the manifesto is designed keeping in view the problems of Punjab which are
energy crisis and unemployment etc. It does not talk enough about the rest of
Pakistan. It seems the PML-N wants to capitalise on the PPP failures. “The
PML-N has been trying to send a clear message to both urban and rural parts
of Punjab. The manifesto talks a lot about economic revival, energy security
and has also given agriculture a priority. They want to take away rural part
of Punjab from the PPP as well,” says Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, noted political
and security analyst. “Militancy and extremism
is among the top most issues of Pakistan. The manifesto does not give a way
out of it. There is no mention of de-radicalisation programme in the document
while police reforms have also been discussed in a very local way,” she
says. It seems the PML-N has
deliberately not touched the issue of militancy and terrorism in its
manifesto. The three-page personal message of Mian Nawaz Sharif ahead of 14
sections of the manifesto does not even mention a word on extremism,
militancy or terrorism: “We are all aware of the enormous damage done to
the country in the past decade at the hands of authoritarian rulers and their
inept and corrupt successors after 1999. Poor governance, deteriorating law
and order situation, repeated breaches of sovereignty, widespread corruption,
galloping inflation, unprecedented loadshedding, massive unemployment and
increasing poverty have left the citizens in a vicious cycle of pain and
suffering.” Ch Ahsan Iqbal, deputy
Secretary General PML-N and Member Manifesto Committee tells TNS Pakistan’s
first, second and third issue is deteriorating economic situation. “All
other issues including extremism and militancy are linked to it. The PML-N
wants a holistic approach to fight out militancy and terrorism. We would
focus on changing the narrative that push people to join hands with militancy
and terrorism,” he says that our civil-military relationship agenda is
derived from the Charter of Democracy. “We want that all institutions work
within its framework.
Capitulation to
militants Two All Parties
Conferences, first by Awami National Party (ANP) and second by Jamiat Ulemae
Islam (F) have urged talks with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but is
there any rationale for these talks? Prolonged conversations
with political workers and persons from different strata have revealed most
are against the talks. But they wish to be anonymous while opposing them in
public to avoid the militants’ wrath. “It will help bring
Peace, it is said. But have the earlier agreements with militants — Shakai
(2004), Sararogha (2005), Miramshah (2006), Khyber (2008) and Swat (2008)
brought about peace?” Asks a political activist. “These agreements were
explicitly pro-militants — the state halted operation withdrew troops from
demanded areas, announced amnesty for, and released militants, paid them
compensation etc. But all this didn’t pacify them; they didn’t stop their
war against the state; instead, they got emboldened and more lethal and
extended their campaign and sway to other areas,” he adds. Some apologists, he says,
accuse the state and its security forces of not honouring the earlier deals.
They always support the narration of militants (anti-state elements) and
blame the security forces (state institutions) for spread of terrorism and
violation of these accords. “But didn’t militants agree to certain
conditions but then violated them; they didn’t take advantage of
opportunities given by the state; they used peace-talks as an interval for
gaining more areas and strength; they continued to support foreign fighters
on Pakistani territory; they killed over 35,000 innocent civilians and 5,000
soldiers and desecrated even their bodies; they least cared for Pakistan’
international compulsions. Talks with them won’t be
accepted to the families of martyrs. It will mean surrender, appeasement and
our capitulation to them. These can be held only if they surrender and accept
the state sovereignty; there is no other option than to do to them what they
are doing to us,” the activist says. Some analysts argue that
when US could hold talks with Afghan Taliban despite their attacks and
rejection of Afghan constitution, then talks with the militants should not be
marred here by asking for their surrender and ceasefire. They forget the
difference between the sitting here and there. Taliban there are fighting the
US and its allies who have occupied Afghanistan and the TTP here is waging
war against its own people, land and security forces. How could they be
equated? According to a social
activist, it is obvious no state or its people can allow or afford a parallel
system or a militant force in its jurisdiction. They can’t be expected to
embrace those who are hell bent on their annihilation. “How can talks be held
with them? Have they submitted to state’s writ, its constitution and
accepted and repented their mistakes and injustices? Will they
unconditionally surrender? Will they cease to indulge in terrorism?” “The militants this week
released another video wherein six Pakistani soldiers were beheaded. Then the
TTP’s spokesman offered talks while Adnan Rashid, the master-mind of
several high profile attacks who was freed from the Bannu Jail by TTP last
year, sat beside him. He is a figurehead. His presence in the video makes a
mockery of the talks offer and is meant to molest the establishment,” says
another social activist. “The security forces are
fighting for the country and Pakistani politicians should visit the
frontlines to express solidarity with them. Instead, they are adding insult
to injury by urging unconditional talks with TTP,” he opines. Militants and some of their
apologists say alliance with the US and drone attacks brought about terrorism
in Pakistan. “But if so, (one can say only for the sake of argument and if
it is not taken as enticing them for attacks on the US) then why militants
who attack Pakistani defence installations located hundreds of kilometres
away from their hideouts and kill our soldiers and innocent civilians,
don’t go and attack the US bases in Afghanistan located a few miles away
from there?” he asks. “So assertive are the
militants that when the JUI APC avoids using the term terrorism and
militancy, it is welcomed by the TTP as a ‘positive’ development. And
when the ANP APC declares talks are the first priority (but not the only
solution as declared often by others) and talks about other options, its APC
is rejected and it is targeted,” opines another political worker. Taliban have threatened to
target ANP, MQM and PPP during election campaign and asked people to avoid
their meetings and warned other parties to consider their policies. By
welcoming some parties as guarantors and declaring others as targets may end
up giving open field to the former and restricting it for the latter. “In private discussions,
most politicians reject talks but they are pro-talks in public so as to avoid
being killed. During the APCs and elsewhere, they avoid condemning the
Taliban. They urge talks but intentionally avoid discussing the other options
(of state operation and retaliation) in case talks fail. They want peace and
power but, it seems, political expediency is being preferred over demands of
national security and sovereignty? Most are following a policy of
appeasement. But never forget the first step in retreat is never the last
one,” says a teacher. Militants assert that they
fight for Islam. What is terrorism to others is Jihad for them. They say the
government should frame independent foreign policy, separate itself from
Afghan war, cede operations in Pakistan, prepare Islamic constitution and
repeal laws repugnant to Islam. So is urged by their mentors. “Who should
decide on these things? Who should have authority to decide what is right and
bad for the country, TTP or popularly elected parliament and rulers? Should
anyone wage war on his state if one doesn’t agree with any of state
policies? Should people have exclusive authority to elect their rulers or
states can be taken over by force? Bullet or ballot, which should determine
things? Should one believe in supremacy of constitution to be enforced and
explained by the state judiciary or in abdication of state to the Taliban,
that they decide and impose whatever they want to?” asks a technocrat. “Nothing can be achieved
with piecemeal half hearted endeavours devoid of any comprehensive
anti-terrorism strategy clearly spelling out other post-talks-failure
options,” he says. “Militants don’t have
the capacity to fight a sustained war against the state. The security forces
have flushed militants out from most of their strongholds. They can no more
hold on to an area for long. They only can indulge in hit and run campaign.
But their guerrilla warfare can never bring about the change they cherish. It
can only inflict material and human losses on the nation to satisfy only
their sense of vengeance?” he adds.
Nacta now The National
Counter Terrorism Authority bill has recently been passed by both the houses
of the parliament, setting up the long-awaited counter-terrorism and
counter-extremism body for coordinating and interacting with law enforcement
agencies to curb rising terrorism. It envisages National Counter Terrorism
Authority (Nacta) as an independent body, directly answerable to the prime
minister. Nacta has come after much
delay — the Ministry of Interior presumably wanted to keep Nacta under its
tutelage but eventually submitted in favour of the prime minister. The rationale for Nacta
seems to be the need for focal institutions and national CT strategies
dominating the world centre stage as regards to organisations that can
coordinate national counter-terrorism efforts after 9/11. Focal CT structures
and institutions have mushroomed globally which coordinate counter-terrorism
and counter-extremism efforts, like the NCTC and DHS in USA, JTAC and OSCT in
the United Kingdom, and Australian COAG and NCTC, amongst many others. This
has resulted in national strategies like the American 4Ds and British 4Ps. So, Pakistan is no
exception. The effort to formulate such an authority was set rolling by
former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s counter-terrorism policy of 3Ds
— Dialogue, Development, Deterrence. A unanimous resolution passed on
October 22, 2008 by the parliament gave 14 guidelines for the National
Counter Terrorism Policy recommended by the parliament’s committee on
national security. The committee stressed the need for a comprehensive
counter-terrorism strategy, a focal institution to integrate
counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-extremism (CE) efforts, and the formation
of Nacta to “coordinate and unify” national CT efforts. Established in January
2009, Nacta was tasked with drawing up national CT and CE strategy in
consultative process with stakeholders. Ostensibly, the purpose of Nacta was
to coordinate loosely coordinated efforts to combat terrorism, thereby
improving coordination and reducing clutter in the system. But so far it has not been
able to do much on that front — due to lack of resources. When it was set up, the
Ministry of Interior maintained that Nacta would work as a think tank and
would conduct research, propose measures to chalk-out a national
counter-terrorism action plan after consulting all stakeholders. Even though many such plans
were drawn up, none really saw the light of the day. It struggled to find a
national coordinator (one year it saw as many as four national coordinators
come and leave), till the appointment of Khawaja Khalid Farooq who finally
took this bill to fruition. As Nacta wrestled with the
legal issues involving its identity and structure, the interest of
international donors began to fade — for example, the EU that had pledged
15 million Euros and the Interpol that had expressed interest in supporting
the organisation. The new bill envisages
Nacta to be headed by the prime minister and assisted by a high-level board
of governors — with chief ministers of all provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan,
the prime minister of AJK, minister for law and justice, one senator to be
recommended by the Senate chairman, one MNA to be recommended by the NA
speaker, secretary of the Ministry of Interior, DG Inter-Services
Intelligence, DG Intelligence Bureau, DG Military Intelligence, DG Federal
Investigation Agency, the IG Police of all provinces, AJK and
Gilgit-Baltistan and the national coordinator. The board shall be
empowered to exercise all powers and functions of the authority, and will
also be responsible to approve policies and annual budget prepared by the
authority. The bill requires all federal ministries and provincial
departments including corporations, bodies, setups, controlled or
administered by/or under the authority of federal or provincial governments
to provide information and data required for carrying out the purposes of the
law. This is essential if Nacta
is to carry out its weighty mandate of drawing up a CT strategy. It might now
be finally in a position to demand compliance in order to meet its official
obligations. The adage ‘better late
than never’ stands true in NACTA’s case. In future, counter-terrorism
will require complex investigations, involving multiple countries and
numerous sources of intelligence, collectively needing more sophisticated
forms of counter-terrorism resources. The enabling of Nacta is a
step in the right direction, particularly since such a civilian body has been
sadly absent from the scene. What remains to be seen is how it will get on
with the task of crafting a new counter-terrorism and counter-extremism
strategy. A national CT strategy has to be drafted and shared with public,
with the civil society taking an active part in the deliberations. A comprehensive CT strategy
should involve educationists, who could be required to evaluate outmoded
Islamist curricula and replace them with more tolerant non-sectarian
versions. Further, scientists can be involved to jam illegal FM
transmissions; media can generate public service messages and programmes
promoting tolerance; and politicians can create a counter-terrorism
environment through legislation, budgets and policy decisions. In fact,
legislation will be a part of the directing tangential forces of counter
terrorism. In Pakistan, this legislation is resonated in the anti-terrorist
acts passed by the government, which sometime gives sweeping powers to the
law enforcing agencies. The inherent global
challenge in these developments will be balancing the rights of citizens and
fundamental constitutional guarantees against the increasing threat from
terrorism. Also, huge challenges for CT will be the level of coordination.
Only a civilian body can have the required cross-connect across the entire
spectra of the society. It is also imperative a
civilian head with law enforcement experience be appointed to give the body
some credibility and cross-connect it needs. An experienced police officer
should fit this job definition. It remains to be seen how
effective this body will become in the future.
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