The General perspective
Thanks to his policy somersaults and experimentation, Musharraf finds himself isolated or at best surrounded by untrustworthy opportunists
By Farrukh Khan Pitafi
As the end of the term for the incumbent assemblies approaches, a strange kind of muted chaos swarms the power corridors. The proverbial echelons of power indeed remain divorced from the dynamics on the street and an eerie lack of connection between the rulers and the ruled is getting only too visible. Whereas to the common man on the street hunger and abysmal impoverishment appear to be the most pressing problems, our rulers seem concerned only about one man's prolonged stay in power.

overview
Politics of conjecture
The aftermath of the ouster of Chief Justice may not impact the political map as hoped by some but it certainly has acted as a catalyst to clarify certain sad truths
By Farah Zia
At a heated drawing room discussion on politics exactly one month ago, the division became sharp and clear. One group, of what then seemed like cynics, predicted that by May 1 the 'so-called judicial crisis' would be off newspaper headlines and obviously nowhere on the streets. Musharraf's will, or status quo, would prevail in a month from now, it prophesied. The other group, of revolutionaries shall we say, read too much in the protesting lawyers movement and remarked wishfully that the movement wouldn't stop short of bringing Musharraf down and making judiciary truly independent for all times to come.

Under fire
Popular word has it that the present Election Commission is unable or unwilling to exercise its powers to stop official interference
By Aoun Sahi
For all practical purposes, 2007 should be the general elections year, as the constitutional term of the present assemblies will be over in November. President Pervez Musharraf has already termed these as 'the mother of all elections'. For political analysts, the scenario may well undergo a sea-change if the present regime allows free and fair elections. According to the Constitution, it is the duty of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to organise and conduct elections, and to ensure that they are carried out "honestly, justly, fairly, and in accordance with the law."

Are Pakistan's political parties prepared for the battle at the hustings to win the right to an unencumbered rule? Parliamentary elections seem to be scheduled in November 1997, leaving less than 200 days to strategise and go for the kill.

Elections are all about a fair competition for political parties to seek people's votes to form a government on their behalf and serve their interests. Not in all elections does one party get a simple majority to form a government on its own. In Pakistan, during the 1990s, a largely two-party system was evolving that may have made it possible for one party to garner a simple parliamentary majority (Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League actually managed to do just that in the 1997 elections) but the military coup of General Pervez Musharraf appears to have put paid to that. The political polarisation that is his legacy makes it likely for another spell of a hung parliament and coalition governments.

With Pakistan's immediate future looking coalition, political parties will have to quickly start strategising on what will be the best co-habitation partnerships.

Fractious as Pakistan's polity is, it appears likely that there will be two sets of coalitions: pre-election (to garner votes) and post-election (to form the federal and provincial governments). Hazardous as it is to look too far ahead into Pakistan's future, this article deals with only the pre-election coalition likelihoods.

Election campaigns need issues around which votes can be mobilised. As of now, two major issues, which are red-hot election issues, are: (i) continued military-dictated policies for an additional five years (re-election of Musharraf as president, if not president-in-khaki), and (ii) supremacy of the judiciary (rehabilitation of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in the face of the military's opposition).

The outcomes of both these issues before the general elections will determine the nature of formal election alliances of political parties (see box item on compositions of likely alliances and their pros and cons). If Musharraf is re-elected by the current parliament, as he is positioning himself to do so, the election alliances will reflect compositions that are amenable to co-habiting with the military a la Shujaat Hussain's ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Q and Altaf Hussain's Muttahida Qaumi Movement.

If the chief justice is rehabilitated by the Supreme Court, things will get messier as he is likely to play a role in deciding the vires of Musharraf's re-election from the current parliament and of his insistence to stay in army uniform. Anti-Musharraf forces (minus Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party) will get a timely shot in the arm from the mouth-watering prospect of a legal battle between the president and the chief justice and make for a vigorous voter wooing campaign. This will be a ripe time for a deal (albeit post-election power sharing) between Musharraf and Bhutto -- to save each other from the volatile post-election scenario.

The ideal case scenario for Musharraf would be the status quo: stay both president and army chief for another five years, have the PMLQ-MQM combine at the centre, Sindh and Punjab, and allow a slightly tempered MMA-led dispensation both in North West Frontier Province and Balochistan. The MMA, being high on rhetoric and low on physical, will always create fewer troubles for Musharraf vis-a-vis the size of the military's pie in politics than the PPP.

However, status quo is something that cannot possibly prevail -- not after the judicial crisis. The next best thing for Musharraf -- a change of faces -- will be the path of least resistance for the short term. The answer is PPP which, if on his side, will lend Musharraf's policies and systems a legitimacy that even PML-Q has never provided.

Paradoxically, both the weakest link in and the strongest determinant of the pre-election alliance politics will be the much debated Musharraf-Bhutto deal. If it does not come through, even as an unwritten pre-election agreement (to be verified by a series of small but critical confidence building measures), by either side, it will upset all political calculations and result in post-election chaos, which will neither benefit Musharraf nor Bhutto but help the other anti-Musharraf forces.

It is also ironic that the strategy of all anti-Musharraf forces (minus PPP) will depend on the slow-motion and awkward political tango between Musharraf and Bhutto. These two will decide how strong or weak the other political contenders will become by agreeing on the degree of mutually beneficial trust they can generate. Whatever the nature of the Faustian bargain they strike, there is much to lose by even a small political miscalculation. Not just by both of them but by the whole of the country.

Alliances & coalitions

Current affairs

Alliance 1: ARD (opposition)

Main parties: PPP, PML-N

Pros: Includes past winners, present voter favourites and future govt

Cons: Their only commonality is their hatred of military/Musharraf

Alliance 2: MMA (Opposition)

Main parties: JI, JUI-F, JUI-S

Pros: Appeals to anti-secular, anti-Musharraf and anti-US communities

Cons: Virtually uni-dimensional, over-simplified appeal, failure to inspire publics in NWFP and Balochistan

Alliance 3: Government

Main parties: PML-Q, MQM, PPP-Sherpao (defunct National Alliance, PPP-Patriots)

Pros: In the ruling seat and in the good books of the military

Cons: In the ruling seat and in the good books of the military

Likely pre-election mergers

Alliance 1: Religious-right

Main parties: Most current MMA members

Pros: Can woo anti-US sentiment votes, anti-'war against terrorism' votes, pro-Sharia votes

Cons: Likely to lose anti-Musharraf (who will have been elected president before polls) votes

Alliance 2: Centrist-religious

Main parties: MMA, PML-N, Tehrik-e-Insaf

Pros: Perfect platform for the consolidation of anti-PPP votes

Cons: Out of favour of military and the West

Alliance 3: Centrist-secular

Main parties: PPP, PML-N, ANP

Pros: Perfect platform for anti-religious sentiment votes, likely good showing in Sindh, Punjab and NWFP

Cons: Voters of both PPP and PML-N will stay at home in constituencies where only one party fields candidates rather than vote for the 'other/second best' party candidate

Alliance 4: Secular-left

Parties: PPP, ANP, MQM, Ponam (nationalists from all four provinces)

Pros: Will attract votes of those who define themselves as progressive-liberals

Cons: Will lose 'centrist' floating voters who like PPP but are alienated by aggressive 'nationalist' posturing of NAP and Ponam

Alliance 5: Left-right/right-left

Parties: PML-Q, MQM

Pros: Will have support from military/Musharraf, MQM keeps its voters intact

Cons: PML-Q is a motley crew of rag-tag groups, programmed to self-destruct

- Adnan Rehmat

When Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was made defunct by the president, few believed the reasons for this step were exclusively those enumerated in the reference against him.

"The elections are just around the corner and there are a number of legal issues that shall have a direct impact on the elections that are either already before the Supreme Court or are expected to come before the Supreme Court, and the President of Pakistan somehow had reason to believe that the Chief Justice was going to make decisions in accordance with law and not as per the wishes of the government or those of a president in uniform," says Ameer Sultan, a lawyer based in Lahore.

According to the news reports surrounding the current judicial crises, when the chief justice was asked for his opinion on the president's plan to get himself elected for another presidential term from the existing assemblies, his response was not satisfactory enough for the president. When the chief justice responded that a decision could only be taken once such a matter was brought before the apex court apparently left some room for doubt regarding the possible outcome of any such threatened litigation. This was apparently unacceptable for the president.

"It is impossible for the present assemblies to elect the president for a term beyond their own tenure -- something the president apparently wants to get done. Even the constitutional cover afforded to the president under the 17th Amendment is running out and so it is only natural for anyone who understands law to agree that this is not possible and shall be stricken down in any legal proceeding," says Ahsan Bhoon President Lahore High Court Bar Association.

Furthermore, according to Ameer Sultan, General Musharraf cannot be elected as president for a period of two years after he ceases to be a general in the Pakistan Army.

"As per the Constitution any candidate for the Presidency needs to fulfill the eligibility criteria set in the Constitution according to which any person in government service is ineligible to become a president of the country until two years of ceasing to be in that service. The specific permission given to General Pervez Musharraf through the 17th Amendment was also limited to his existing presidential term, after which he shall have to be eligible once again to contest the presidency," adds Ameer.

Similarly, there were other matters that, if decided on merit, would have a direct impact on the present political setup -- which for the time being is ideal for complementing President Musharraf's rule.

Notwithstanding the imminent 'deal' with PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto, the return of the two former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto is another such possibility that President Musharraf appears to be unwilling to leave up to the courts to decide on merit.

"Returning to one's country is a fundamental right no one can be denied. How can the president decide who shall be allowed to return to his country and who not?" asks Mr Bhoon.

According to the government, Nawaz Sharif has contracted with the government not to return to Pakistan and the government is, quite simply, implementing the contract in letter and spirit by disallowing him to return.

Nawaz Sharif's lawyers, however, believe that even if such an agreement exists it is unenforceable. According to one of the most fundamental principles of contract law, no one can contract out of law and similarly no one can be denied his fundamental rights under the pretext of implementation of a contract. For example, any contract the specific performance of which requires one of the parties to stop drinking water in consideration of a certain amount, shall be a void contract because drinking water is a fundamental right and cannot be denied to any one. On the same principle, Nawaz Sharif or his brother, for that matter, cannot be denied his right to return to his country even if he did sign an agreement not to do so. Benazir Bhutto, meanwhile, the government claims, has never been stopped from returning to Pakistan.

Conveniently enough, if the said deal between Benazir and Musharraf does go through, she will have no problem returning to the country. Getting elected to the premiership, however, is another thing. According to an amendment in the Constitution, no one shall be qualified to become a prime minister of the country more than twice. For Benazir to become prime minister, whether as a result of the 'deal' or otherwise, the PPP will have to achieve a two-third majority itself or with the help of its allies. Only then will the party be able to amend the Constitution to remove the ineligibility of two-time prime ministers of trying a third time.

The success of the 'deal' between PPP and the government, therefore, shall depend a lot on the outcome of the coming general elections. Furthermore, if the government's concerns are correct the decision regarding the chief justice shall also determine the future of Pakistan's politics.

As the sitting assemblies are about to complete their term in a couple of months, debates about the timing of the next general elections, the likely composition of the interim set-up, the election of General Musharraf as president for another term and other related matters are getting louder and louder. There are even those in Musharraf camp who have proposed postponement of elections for another year but there have been little or no buyers of this idea. However, the word that is going around and getting stronger is that there should be an unbiased caretaker government that should oversee the whole elections process to ensure transparency.

Political analysts believe that if things start moving in the right direction, without any further delay, the most suitable time for the upcoming general elections would be somewhere around November 2007. It will not be possible to hold elections before November as it would be Ramazan from mid-September to mid-October this year. Besides, this is also acceptable to the opposition parties. They are demanding an early dissolution of assemblies, mainly to stop its members from re-electing General Musharraf as president for another term.

If one assumes that the elections are going to be held in November, then it's the right time now to break the inertia and take bold decisions. This means that there should be a neutral caretaker government in place by August through October (90 days) to oversee preparations for the polls and ensure electoral transparency. But, the on-ground truth is that there are countless issues waiting to be resolved. A three-month period (May through July) to resolve all such issues seems too short, especially when it appears that the ruling elite is the least interested in tackling them.

After the timing comes the issue of the likely composition of the caretaker government, ideally acceptable to all the major political parties. But, the forming of this consensus is not as simple as it may appear on paper. While the PPP-P may agree on accepting Musharraf as president during the elections, PML-N and MMA are least likely to accept this. At the same time, PPP-P cannot take solo flight and estrange ARD as well as PML-N.

On the other hand, Musharraf cannot afford to lose all-time loyalists like Chaudhry Pervez Elahi and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain who have stood by him in every crisis. It were these people who publicly announced that they would get Musharraf elected as president in uniform a hundred times if need be. To bring all these people together to table and make them agree on a mutually acceptable interim set-up is no child's play.

Speculations are rife that Senate Chairman Muhammad Mian Soomro can be a probable caretaker prime minister. He has the backing of the establishment as well as acceptance of several opposition parties. Senior PPP-P politician Aftab Shabaan Mirani is another option acceptable both to the establishment and the opposition, especially the PPP-P. Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Aitzaz Ahsan and Raza Rabbani can also be part of the caretaker cabinet provided they choose not to contest the general elections.

Many other above-board politicians are out of the race as the Constitution bars heads of caretaker cabinets from contesting the elections. Article 222 Section (7) of the Constitution says: "When a care-taker Cabinet is appointed, on dissolution of the National Assembly under Article 58 or a Provincial Assembly under Article 112, or on dissolution of any such Assembly on completion of its term, the Prime Minister or, as the case may be, the Chief Minister of the care-taker Cabinet shall not be eligible to contest the immediately following election of such Assembly."

An interesting development in this respect has been the filing of a petition in Lahore High Court by Advocate MD Tahir regarding the formation of an interim government under the supervision of the suspended Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP). The advocate has made the chief election commissioner and federal government respondents in the petition and contested that the CJP could play a vital role in bringing the country out of the present chaos.

This time around the mandate of the interim government will be totally different from that given during the last four elections. All of the last four governments were dissolved on different charges and succeeded by hostile interim governments, given the task of witch-hunting the outgoing rulers. The choice of its members would be simple; most of them coming from the opposition ranks. One can easily recall that during the interim government of Moeen Qureshi, the state machinery's attention was more on holding media trial of Nawaz Sharif and rounding up of his aides at the hands of Ehtesab Bureau under Zahid Sarfraz than ensuring transparency in general elections that were to follow.

Now the situation is totally different as the assemblies are likely to complete their term for the first time in the history of Pakistan. Instead of hounding the outgoing disposition, the interim government will have to win, or try to win, the confidence of all the major players in the current political set-up of the country.

As the end of the term for the incumbent assemblies approaches, a strange kind of muted chaos swarms the power corridors. The proverbial echelons of power indeed remain divorced from the dynamics on the street and an eerie lack of connection between the rulers and the ruled is getting only too visible. Whereas to the common man on the street hunger and abysmal impoverishment appear to be the most pressing problems, our rulers seem concerned only about one man's prolonged stay in power.

Evidently, then, the government is bracing itself for a decrepit strategy to return President Pervez Musharraf to his twin offices. The government has already made it abundantly clear that he will seek mandate from the existing assemblies.

There indeed are several reasons behind this decision. First and foremost, Musharraf is not ready to put his faith in the outcome of the general elections. Secondly, thanks to his policy somersaults and experiments he finds himself isolated or at best surrounded by an untrustworthy, opportunist lot. And, please do not forget that it is convenient for him to consider himself the most vulnerable person around who is bound to take a bullet sooner or later once he steps down. Just like Tolkein's ring power makes you forget if there at all can be life without it. And, then, of course, 2008 is an election year in the United States and a lame duck of a president may not find it easy to support a man of Musharraf's track record essentially if there is no guarantee of his stable future.

As a result, the government has taken many a step in desperation, such as the ill-advised action against the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the attack on the free press. And, to think that more of such steps are bound to follow. Will Musharraf be able to obtain the mandate he wants? Will he be able to do what it takes? Thus far it has been a unique feature of Musharraf's skills that he is found talking very confidently about an apparently impossible situation and, god knows, he is generally successful at tackling the issue to his satisfaction. However, will the luck side with him this time over as well? That is the question on everyone's mind today.

Musharraf is indeed faced with an onerous task. In order to obtain a vote from the current assemblies, he will have to extract majority support not only from the parliament but also from the provincial assemblies. Now, according to the second schedule of the constitution which details the process of the presidential election, "the number of votes cast in a Provincial Assembly in favour of each candidate shall be multiplied by the total number of seats in the Provincial Assembly for the time being having the smallest number of seats and divided by the total number of seats in the Provincial Assembly in which the votes have been cast," and the concluding number shall be added to the total votes obtained in the parliament on behalf of the respective assembly. It essentially implies that the Punjab assembly that has an overwhelming presence of Musharraf supporters will not carry more weight than the Balochistan or the NWFP assemblies.

In this way, he is faced with a paradox. Since the other three provincial assemblies have a huge representation of the opposition parties, he will have to look towards the parliament in which his supporters lack an overwhelming majority. One way would be to encourage floor crossing once again -- a strategy that may or may not succeed. Another way could be an attempt to win back MMA on its side, a failing strategy which Chaudhry Shujaat seems to be advocating vociferously.

The third option remains a secret deal with the People's Party (PPP). Benazir has already expressed her great interest in forging an alliance with Musharraf. A very strong link between the PPP and Musharraf is Washington which finds an alliance between the two the only way to preserve its interests in the region while also ensuring that a more tolerant and democratic dispensation prevails in the country. However, such a deal will come at a huge price for Musharraf. Benazir's demands, if met, will essentially undermine all his weak-kneed attempts to root out corruption as he will have to withdraw all the politically motivated cases against her both here and abroad. He may have to face considerable problem when he tries to sell this idea to his actual 'constituency' -- the army. For years he has been indoctrinating the forces with hatred against Benazir and Nawaz. This U-turn may also prove to be an extremely troubling task.

The troubles do not end here. Let us suppose that Musharraf succeeds in pulling off such a deal. Will it prove to be the end of his woes? Not quite. His paranoia will grow with every passing day and there is a good chance that he may finally refuse to doff the uniform after his election. Benazir, hence, will keep an undisclosed card close to her chest in order to ensure that he does not backtrack from his commitments. Likewise, Musharraf will also ensure that a similar card, most likely a case against Benazir, remains in his hand, too.

Then there are troubles in the distant future, too. Precisely what will happen when Musharraf decides to bid farewell to his military position which he has to do given that the Article 43 (1) of the constitution, which will be fully operational by that time, clearly states: "The President shall not hold any office of profit in the service of Pakistan or occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the rendering of services." He essentially will have to appoint a full-time Army Chief who will be easily accessible to the next Prime Minister and hence further lack of trust. Thus far, Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Salahuddin Satti is being tipped as the next army chief. But, at the time when we are not sure whether Musharraf really wants to shed uniform or not it cannot be treated as anything more than mere conjecture.

Then there is the question of the war on terror. Musharraf, for the time being, has very skillfully overcome the gap of trust between the US and Islamabad by taking some bold and yet imaginative steps against the foreigners in the tribal region. However, there is said to be a deficit of trust between him and the ISI already in the making. And, just in case the US elections bring to the fore a Democrat President, one really wonders how he is going to manage a government in Washington only too sceptical of his intentions. To put it mildly, while he is a shrewd planner too much of shrewdness may actually come back to roost. Even if he manages to get elected to the twin offices his win might be tantamount to the victory in a small battle and not the war he has been fighting and seems to have already lost.

When you find him surrounded only by the scarecrows for allies, you know what is meant by a typical lose-lose situation. And, misadventures like the CJ case have done a great deal in educating the masses. While many think that voters in this country are like an impotent herd of sheep, no one has actually appreciated the true genius of the people. Even though they could not come out on the streets against Bhutto's hanging, they ensured the return of his daughter to the throne once relatively free elections took place.

At a heated drawing room discussion on politics exactly one month ago, the division became sharp and clear. One group, of what then seemed like cynics, predicted that by May 1 the 'so-called judicial crisis' would be off newspaper headlines and obviously nowhere on the streets. Musharraf's will, or status quo, would prevail in a month from now, it prophesied. The other group, of revolutionaries shall we say, read too much in the protesting lawyers movement and remarked wishfully that the movement wouldn't stop short of bringing Musharraf down and making judiciary truly independent for all times to come.

One month later, the best of political analyses seem like a matter of conjecture. Enough has happened in these thirty days that has forced both the cynics and the revolutionaries to budge from their stated positions. The judicial crisis may be manifesting itself in an ever-growing street agitation and yet the political solutions it was supposed to bring in its wake are nowhere in sight. The person of the president and the institution he represents may have weakened considerably but the loud whispers of a post-election deal with Benazir Bhutto do project a scenario where Musharraf is a key player.

It's time for the revolutionaries to turn cynics and the cynics to strut, even if for a bit.

But conjecture, as said earlier, is the buzz word of politics today. Thus, the reality of superior judiciary putting its weight behind the chief justice matters little in front of Sharifuddin Pirzada finally deciding to represent the government.

It was not without reason that March 9 and what followed was called a 'defining moment' in history. The aftermath of the ouster of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry may not impact the political map as hoped by some but it certainly has acted as a catalyst to clarify certain sad truths. Thus, lawyers in black coats who represent a struggle for independence of judiciary and supremacy of constitution also hold, at least most of them do, another identity -- as representatives of political parties. For now, at least the lawyers of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) should find it hard to justify the street protest and the deal with Musharraf in one breath.

And this point has not been lost on the people. They owe this political insight in no small measure to the electronic media. The people know that in the present scheme of things their issues do not matter. Only this time, their issues are not just health, education, employment or economics -- independence of judiciary too is as much their issue as the military control of civilian institutions. But the rhetoric they get to hear from the politicians -- both government and opposition -- is of a different nature. 'Secularism versus extremism' is the new election slogan, it seems. MMA, PML-N and Tehreeke Insaaf find themselves on the other side of the fence though.

The biggest threat to Pakistan is from extremists, is the loud and clear message from the largest liberal political party. Well-timed, Jamia Hafsa indeed came to their rescue.

The politically mature populace finds this line of argument a bit hard to digest. Their definition of extremism is a bit broader than that. Extremism, they have learnt through experience, is when military comes to pack civilian institutions. Talibanisation may look like the biggest threat to Benazir Bhutto but people count the continuous flouting of constitution a bigger threat.

Any political party may have this genuine desire to have a secular moderate setup but how does this justify doing a deal with General Musharraf, is people's legitimate question. Political battles must be fought in the political arena and Charter of Democracy provides the necessary space for that. People think that when PPP does a deal with Musharraf, it leaves the political arena open for others that it likes to think as extremists. But PPP, it seems, is all set to create that vacuum which many analysts declare as political suicide.

But the alternative that people have in minds to this altruistic political suicide is even worse. PPP, they have every reason to think, has tried to cash in on the vulnerability of Musharraf to get relief for its leaders in corruption cases. In return it will not allow any grand opposition alliance to succeed against Musharraf. Thus PPP would sit as partner with Musharraf in the next political dispensation, enjoying the taste of power after many many years.

Serious analysts are rather cynical about this clear line of distinction between 'secular' and 'religious' that Musharraf, a good part of PML-Q and Benazir-led PPP are trying to thrust upon the people of this country. This they think is a recipe for disaster. Based on international concerns instead of any domestic compulsion, this notion is inevitably going to push the society in the direction it seeks to avoid. It was on this very count that the religious parties that had till then secured not more than 2-3 per cent votes in any election got 11 per cent in the 2002 general election. If PPP sides with Musharraf, the percentage of this vote may increase tremendously, they think.

Some analysts go a step ahead to declare that if this is what PPP aims to do, it must declare itself disbanded. It's perhaps time for a new party which must go to the people with its fresh mandate of power sharing. BPP or Benazir Progressive Party is just a suggestion for a new name.

For all practical purposes, 2007 should be the general elections year, as the constitutional term of the present assemblies will be over in November. President Pervez Musharraf has already termed these as 'the mother of all elections'. For political analysts, the scenario may well undergo a sea-change if the present regime allows free and fair elections. According to the Constitution, it is the duty of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to organise and conduct elections, and to ensure that they are carried out "honestly, justly, fairly, and in accordance with the law."

The present ECP is a judicial body headed by the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) who can only be a retired judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court. He is appointed by the President 'in his discretion' for three years. As the office of the President in Pakistan is not perceived as neutral, the appointment of Election Commissioner (by the President) often becomes controversial. In the present scenario, when Musharraf famously attends and addresses political gatherings arranged by the ruling party, the impartiality of the office of the CEC is also under fire.

According to Ahsan Iqbal of PML-N, if something like this had happened in India, the CEC would have sent a letter of explanation to the president.

The other four members of the Commission are Judges of the High Court from each province, again appointed by the President. With the exception of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, all major political parties demand that they must be taken into confidence before the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and other members of the commission are appointed.

Ahsan Iqbal further says that this is the year of elections and so far none of the EC officials has got in touch with ARD or any other political party. Besides, they haven't consulted political parties during the course of the preparation of electoral rolls. All this goes to show how prepared and concerned the ECP is to conduct free and fair elections.

The present ECP administration is yet to prove its impartiality and credibility, he adds.

According to Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, the ECP should interact regularly with political parties on election-related affairs. It can set up a consultative committee comprising the members of the political parties represented in the parliament, which should meet at least twice a month to discuss election-related matters. Such a committee can be useful only if the EC is willing to address the issues raised in its meetings.

Secretary Election Commission Kanwar Muhammad Dilshad says that the ECP is well prepared to hold the next general elections. According to him, the CEC is open to meet all political parties and respect their views.

"As for the electoral rolls, we have prepared these very carefully. And, I hope that once the final electoral rolls are displayed in the end of May, reservations of all political parties will be addressed."

According to the Constitution, the ECP is an independent and autonomous body charged with the function of conducting transparent, free, fair and impartial elections. It is also a fact that the ECP describes every election it conducts as fair and free, while the major political parties and independent political observers do not agree. This has created a credibility gap between the Election Commission and the various political parties of Pakistan, especially the opposition parties. The present Election Commission is also facing a similar problem. The opposition parties are of the view that the present EC is unable or unwilling to exercise its powers to satisfy the opposition's demands to stop official interference in election process. According to them, by-elections in Sindh have shown that the ECP is powerless to address the reported irregularities and political interference in electoral process. PPP-P has also pointed out that there is a difference of 2 million voters between the official figures given by the Election Commission and those from the National Database Registration Authority.

All the opposition parties have already raised their concerns over the impartiality of the present CEC Justice (retd) Qazi Mohammed Farooq. Both ARD and MMA are of the view that during his turn as a judge of the Supreme Court he co-authored some of the most controversial judgements. An article of Sherry Rehman published in April 2006 reads, "He was a part of the 12-member bench which validated the emergency proclaimed by General Pervaiz Musharraf on the basis of the Doctrine of State Necessity on May 12, 2000. Moreover, Farooq was also a member of the bench which had dismissed the constitutional petitions of Qazi Hussain Ahmad, among others, on April 27, 2002, and had thereby validated Chief Executive Order No 12 of 2002 regarding the holding of a presidential referendum on April 30 that year. Two other important cases in which Farooq was on the bench were the petitions challenging the Legal Framework Order and the condition of graduation introduced for the candidates contesting the 2002 general elections. Both petitions were dismissed."

The demand of the political parties regarding the holding of next general elections under a neutral EC means they want the present CEC replaced with some new. A delegation of PPP-P led by Shah Mahmood Qureshi met the CEC December last year and presented him a paper, titled 'Steps To Ensure Fair 2007 Elections'. According to Section 7 of this paper, "there are eight key people in the Election Commission who conduct elections. These include the five members of the Election Commission namely Chief Election Commissioner and four Provincial Election Commissioners, the Secretary, Additional Secretary and Joint Secretaries. They should be independent, unbiased people, preferably from Human Rights Commission of Pakistan or any other well respected NGO."

The Constitution of Pakistan, however, does allow this. According to its Article 215, the term of the CEC is three years: "The Commissioner shall not be removed from office except in the manner prescribed in Article 209 for the removal from office of a Judge and, in the application of the Article for the purposes of this clause, any reference in that Article to a Judge shall be construed as a reference to the Commissioner."

Section 3 of the same Article, however, provides an option: "The Commissioner may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office."

Shah Mahmood Qureshi, President PPP-P Punjab, believes that if a national consensus is built on the issue, the CEC may resign from his post and a new election commissioner acceptable to all political parties may be inducted.

He also says that in order to ensure free and fair polls, the government should suspend the local governments also; otherwise the whole practice of conducting the general elections will become suspicious.