Fandom menace
The attack on GHQ and other related incidents are enough to to prove that the Taliban are no more strategic assets but liabilities
By Aimal Khan
The recent attacks on the Army General Headquarter (GHQ) in Rawalpindi once again raised the issue of whether the militants have impressive striking capabilities and outreach or the security systems in place are defective. But the attacks exposed the vulnerability of our otherwise protected and sensitive installations.

Strengthening the tax base
FBR's sole stress on revenue collection through harsh measures will not serve any purpose
By Huzaima Bukhari and Dr. Ikramul Haq
The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), under tremendous pressure from International Monetary Fund (IMF) to generate 'extra revenue', is resorting to all kind of oppressive measures to achieve a meagre revenue target of Rs1380 billion during the current fiscal year. According to official figures, FBR managed to collect around Rs260 billion in the first quarter (July-September 2009) of the fiscal year against the target of Rs270 billion.

Julien Columeau is a French national residing in Pakistan for the last six years. He has also lived in India for eight years. Julien works in an international organisation and constantly moves around different continents. Two of Julien's novels were published in France. He just completed two novels in Urdu, Saghar and Zalzilah.

Following are the excerpts from an interview TNS had with him recently.

The News on Sunday: Can you recall precisely when did you decide to become a writer?

Julien Columeau: I don't think I ever decided to become a writer; I think I just decided to write. Becoming a writer, in my sense, sounds a bit pompous. There are very few people that I'd call writers. In French we have this concept of 'écrivain'. Écrivain is somebody whose life depends on writing. He is the person who'd die if he didn't write a book or a line. He lives out of writing, spiritually, gets his energy out of writing and not out of anything else. I think it is very difficult and very few people can attain that. Most of us get energy from writing, people who are like me, who are in the habit of writing, as people are in the habit of smoking. We derive our energy from writing but I don't think we derive all our energy from writing and we are striving to get close to that stage where you are one with your writing.

TNS: Could you tell us about your writing habits? Do you follow a strict regime or wait for inspiration or the 'right mood'?

JC: I don't believe in inspiration and I don't believe in getting in the mood either. I think what you have to write is within you and it has been within you for years. It's very much connected with your own subconscious. I think writing is a form of a conscious dialogue with your own subconscious. It's all about you letting your subconscious talk very often. You have to go and meet a psychoanalyst and you don't decide the time when you are going to meet him and, unfortunately, it's following a very strict routine. All the psychoanalysts stress a lot on the importance of routine.

TNS: How important is company or setting for a writer?

JC: It is important, to some extent, but it is also very good to be able to see it for your own imagination and not for your physical aids. I think in order to write fiction you need to give more importance to the unseen. I would say that without having been to Lahore I would have never written the book, Saghar, if I talk about myself. But at the same point, when I wrote Saghar I don't think I was in Lahore.

When I had the first idea of Saghar I was quite far away from Lahore. The city was some kind of a memory or a fantasy. And this is why I didn't feel restricted by geographical facts that at times you feel you have to respect if you are talking about a given place.

It actually got me a lot of liberty to write about Lahore in a very dreamy way. In order to translate it into words you need to feel the distance. I was not describing Lahore, I was describing the vision of Lahore, which is very imprecise and I wanted it to be so.

TNS: You have written a novel about poet Saghar, by the same name. Would you like to share the experience?

JC: I didn't have to go through much actually; it was just a couple of book readings about him, written by those who were close to him, who had a lot of love and respect for him, which was good. And I feel that a lot of Urdu poets have earned people's respect but I don't think many poets have earned people's love to the extent to which Saghar had. I have the feeling that he is very dear to the people of Lahore, especially the Walled City and some adjacent areas where he used to move around and that's a very specific thing. So what I encountered first was people's love for Saghar, and a lot of them could still identify themselves with Saghar and his memories, as if Saghar was embodying a period which is dead now.

And then I realised there were important things missing, unfortunately, people were talking about their perception of Saghar and their love for Saghar but not much about Saghar himself. And they were talking a lot about what they assumed Saghar was going through -- mentally, spiritually, and philosophically. The thing that was missing was Saghar 's point of view itself. It was then I realised that I'd have to go through his diwaan as often as I could and try to interpret it in my own way into some fiction. I've been writing the fiction for a couple of years, which was to find a kind of fictional background for a lot of the verses by Saghar, which moved me and that was the beginning of the purpose of writing the book.

TNS: What has influenced this text more: reading Saghar or living in his city?

JC: Yes I'd say both of them but especially Saghar himself, meaning whatever I could get from his poetry, from different biographical accounts, and what also I could gather and understand, which is very important, is that people don't know much about his life. So it's mainly about some kind of gaps which I noticed in his biographies, huge gaps. People were not aware of very important things; they knew where he was born, where he died, but they didn't know what happened to his mother after 1947. They didn't know who inspired him, whom he referred to all his life in a very metaphorical way. So basically what I didn't know about Saghar is what inspired me to write about him.

TNS: You feel that your perception is different from that of the local Urdu writer?

JC: I'm not too sure. It's debatable. If you talk about the local writer you might be talking about the masters. Obviously I cannot write anything classical because I don't know much about classical literature. People in the modern age feel differently. The set of experiments attempted by contemporary writers in the past thirty years have taken Urdu literature to its limits, for instance Enver Sajjad, Anis Nagi, and the stories of Hassan Askari, the first stories written in Urdu that are very fresh and willingly used the method of stream of consciousness. I was very much influenced by poetry as well, especially Majeed Amjad.

TNS: Do you use such a rich vocabulary in French as you've used in Urdu?

JC: The aspects of language, which I stressed on and exploited, while writing in Urdu and in French are different. In French I wrote in a very intellectual and internalised way, and in Urdu I tried to exploit the colourfulness of the language.

What you write is not what the language tells you to write but you are telling the language what it is to express. I was more conscious in the beginning when I was writing in Urdu, so that not to make it obvious for the reader that it's a foreigner writing. And since I had to write in the voice of Saghar I was not allowed to write anything but what I imagined would be a very rich, colourful and precise language. The effort was very conscious in the beginning but soon it became Saghar 's voice itself and then I was possessed by it. If I think about most of the scenes I have no idea how I wrote them, or no recollection of the mood I was in. This connection of distance is what helped me feel Saghar 's character and hear his voice within me.

TNS: So what you are saying is that you had some sort of a spiritual experience?

JC: I would not say that at all, being very far from roohaniyat. I think it's a very material experience. And in spirit it's a very sexual experience.

TNS: Do you believe Pakistanis have understood and appreciated Saghar the way he deserved it?

JC: Saghar was a malamati, somebody who despised himself and made himself despicable in the eyes of the society. I don't think there is any question of deserving. He stays in people's memories as a malang, with all the sensitivities and sensibilities that are associated with it, and that's what he wanted. This is something that I talk about in the novel, the malang who was so present in the public spheres and life. While malang is somebody who lives a life of retirement or that of a hermit, which was not his case. And I somehow came up with this idea that maybe Saghar could have been rejected by the other malangs that creates a different state of mind in the end where Saghar is completely satisfied with his life and he feels that he is neither a malang nor a normal person anymore. The last thing that gave meaning to his life was the company of his beloved.

He created his own mental space. I have the feeling, as far as his interaction with drugs is concerned, that it became a habit later at some point. As in the beginning it was born out of his wish to experiment with different states of consciousness. He talked about drugs, using the metaphor of wine and the name he chose for himself, Saghar. But it was more than just consuming drugs consciously and in a very organised way as far as his poetic dynamic is concerned. A point that I'm highlighting in the novel is that he became a malang out of compulsion, to some extent. But at the end it is his decision. When he walks out of the hotel room towards Data Darbar, he is someone who knows where he is going, with an aim in mind to describe and analyse the old process -- when he says "mein khud ko munazzam tarikay sey taraaj karonga", the only instance of the future tense in my novel.

TNS: Would you like to elaborate on the protagonist's choice in Saghar to appreciate the military parade over saving his love?

JC: That's the feature of Saghar, him being a patriot. I'm describing something that some people witnessed but the context is fictional where his girlfriend is feeling the effect of withdrawal and he is out to get some money for her heroin. She is dying while he is doing that.

I felt like it was echoing with the beginning of the second part when he writes the national anthem of Pakistan and in return loses his personality. It's a kind of metaphor expressing the way the states crush individuals through the passion that they ignite in their hearts and minds about the nation and other confused and meaningless concepts.

Saghar is very much attached to mythology, and nation is very much part of the mythology which is beyond his own existence and that makes him jealous of these soldiers for being part of it, yet real creatures.

TNS: You feel other writers influence your writing?

JC: I think writing is born also out of a dialogue with different authors and that makes you conscious of a very important thing, which is that there are books that you have never read and you would love to read but nobody has written them and you are the person who is going to write them. Writing is always about writing what others haven't written. You have to be faithful to the originality. You need to distance yourself from the authors who give you energy through their ideas in order not to write in the same style as them. The idea is to achieve the balance between yourself and the others, because if you're too much of yourself then nobody will understand a single word of what you write.

TNS: Before learning Urdu, what was your perception about this culture?

JC: A person coming in contact with something that is new to him has some prejudices. And I had some kind of fixed ideas in my mind and was going pretty much by all the stereotypes which are being circulated outside Asia. Learning Urdu was a very important and central experience, the experience of changing yourself through a language that is a very fresh object to you. While doing that, you give up on your own culture and background and more of your inner self and identity and focus on something else. And if you have been able to focus on that then you will realize that it doesn't really make any difference if you write in Hebrew or Urdu.

TNS: Your favourite Urdu authors.

JC: My favourite Urdu writers are poets. First on my list would be Majeed Amjad, then Saleem Ahmad and maybe not immediately Saghar, which may sound very paradoxical. I love what he wrote but I don't think he reaches the heights. He was not like a literary figure who is coming up with literature consciously. His own process of creativity and writing was very different in nature from the process of Majeed Amjad and Saleem Ahmad, or N.M. Rashid.

Each poet's poetry is, or defines a different genre. It's not that some people write in the poetical genre but I think that Majeed Amjad writes in the Majeed Amjadian genre. It goes beyond style because style is about repeating a certain set of images or combination of words. It's born out of the unity of the inner kaifiyyat and the way this kaifiyyat meets the author's world through words. I feel a lot of silence, or sakoot -- being stuck in time -- in Majeed Amjad's poems. Or like Joan Elea who was toying with the zero, or nihilism.

TNS: How do you see the contemporary Urdu literature?

JC: Urdu literature was in danger, some time ago, to die of suffocation. And I don't think many literatures can survive by themselves. There have always been two currents of Urdu literature, one is the riwayat pasand, who want to go by the tradition; and there are people who want to break free from the tradition.

I have the feeling that that kind of hangover with tradition was very much present with Urdu literature when the taraqi pasand were going to take over. Then some people, among which Asad Farooqi, and Muhammad Umar Memon, and Ajmal Kamal, realised that Urdu was going to die out of suffocation and decided to open the window by translating and adapting works from other languages into their own.

TNS: Anything else you want to share or shed light on?

JC: I wrote this novel first in French, and then I realised that very often I ended up explaining some concepts indigenous to this land. Then wrote it in Saghar 's language and changed it to the first person that gave me the liberty to impersonate him and play his role actively in my mind. Actually Urdu freed me from all the constraints that I was feeling while writing in French. People would find it very paradoxical for me feeling much more freedom in writing in a language which is not my mother tongue. But it was as if I was equipped with a new and fresh imagination, which was a very exciting and unique experience.

The book I have written is more of a tribute than a novel. After its completion I visited Saghar's shrine and asked for forgiveness from the baba.

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comment

After a brief lull, Pakistan's cities are once again haunted by suicide bombings and daring fedayeen attacks. It is impossible to explain the mayhem of the past few days in the wake of weeks and even months of relative calm. This is a 'war' like no other; there are no overt enemies, no headquarters to attack, no discernable weakness can be exploited. Even when intelligence information is received in advance of an attack, carnage is rarely averted. In short, we are getting used to being engulfed in an unending 'war' with rules unlike anything that has gone before.

Intriguingly descriptions such as this adorn the insides of counter-insurgency manuals all over the world. Yet the obvious inferences that should be drawn from the facts are conspicuous by their absence. It is left to public opinion -- sometimes expressed at the ballot box -- to force ruling establishments to abandon the mindless logic that guides state action in the 'age of terror'. In Pakistan, and many other third world countries, 'public opinion' is the monopolistic preserve of a few. Thus, tragically, those who are at the frontlines of the 'war on terror' resign themselves to the fact that they cannot force any change in state policy and instead brace themselves, hoping and praying that they are not the next unexpected victims of a brutal and cynical conflict with no end in sight.

Most Europeans today know that the 'long peace' that they have enjoyed for more than six decades was preceded by centuries of protracted and painful conflict involving the killing and maiming of countless Europeans by Europeans (non-Europeans received extra-special treatment during the colonial encounter). Not until after the World War II did this incessant warfare give way to relative peace. This peace has been based upon the rationalisation of bureaucratic states, the coalescing of myriad racial and ethnic groups around national identities, and enfranchised citizenship. Public accountability is a key feature of the social contract as it has evolved in Europe, a fact that has put limits on the inevitable transgressions of the state. It is not a surprise that it is Europeans citizens who have been the most critical of the narrative of the 'War on Terror'.

So, even while there is little tolerance of the ideology and methods of the non-state actors that perpetrate terror, many Europeans condemn the state terror that has been visited upon innocent populations all over the world, and particularly in Muslim-majority countries. There is an understanding that intensification of violence by states in the name of security simply fuels the fire and drives more and more people -- not always poor and disenfranchised -- towards renegade ideologies that seek to avenge the suffering of weak and defenseless populations (which are not always Muslims).

In recent years public opinion polls conducted in Europe have shown that Israel and the United States are widely considered to be the "biggest threats to world peace", with the Osama bin Ladens of the world figuring much lower down the list. Such polls are not popularity contests nor should they be taken too seriously, of course. But they do reflect that a representative cross-section of Europeans subscribe to a sober reading of the recent history of the world, and accordingly view suspiciously the state-driven discourse of 'terrorism'.

It was thus that pro-war governments in Germany and Spain were shunted out of office some years ago. While those that replaced them have hardly mounted a meaningful challenge to Washington-speak, the point is that the 'terrorism' bandwagon does face significant challenges from within European societies.

In Pakistan, much has been made of the deepening consensus over the need to take on 'terrorism'. The Swat operation was heralded as the beginning of a new dawn inasmuch as it was considered necessary by a broad spectrum of social and political constituencies. The fact that the 'terrorists' have resurfaced in a big way over the past few days has cast a shadow over that 'consensus', if it ever did exist. I mentioned at the outset that even the military men who are leading the 'anti-terror' effort recognise that this is not a 'war' with a recognisable beginning or end. With this in mind, should we expect that military operations will carry on indefinitely?

If state functionaries' public pronouncements are to be believed, the intensified bombing campaign in South Waziristan will soon be followed up by a full-fledged military operation. Indeed, there are uncanny similarities in the build-up to the upcoming operation and the days before the peace of Swat was shattered by a cacophony of explosions and maddened screams. One shudders to think what the fallouts of the looming operation in South Waziristan will be.

Among other things, large numbers of civilians can be expected to leave their homes. They will stream into Dera Ismail Khan and Tank where tensions between Seraiki/Pakhtun and Shi'a/Sunni are already at breaking point. When people fled the Swat Valley, much was made of the hospitality of locals in Mardan and other areas further south. Will the long-suffering local people of D.I. Khan be as accommodating?

There is also the small matter of the alleged build-up of militants in Seraiki areas in south Punjab. Quite aside from the difficulty of launching an operation in Punjab, can it be expected that 'terrorists' will simply be chased from one end of the country to the other? Surely it will not take us another eight years to understand that the paradigm that informs the 'anti-terror' fight is quickly approaching the absurd?

I am of the belief that the (conscious) absurdity of our decision-makers is not shared by the mass of ordinary people who do not figure in the 'national consensus'. It does not take a rocket scientist to see that the 'problem' – insofar as this means the deep social malaise that is ideological Islam -- can be eliminated in the way that is being posited. The sociological phenomena that we are confronting need to be understood as such, and in this regard the sensationalism of the media and mainstream religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is a major impediment.

Indeed one of the major reasons why so many progressives have found themselves on the side of states in this 'war' is because they do not want to be identified with the positions of the religious right. But just because the JI is ranting on about America, why should progressives retreat from their historical commitment to resisting imperialism? It is only by emphasising the dialectic between imperialism and the Islamic right that progressive politics can offer an alternative to the hollowness that currently prevails.

Many of us have become almost numb to the ebb and flow of an endless cycle of violence. Most of us are likely never to be directly affected by it. This is perhaps why the dehumanised discourse of 'terrorism' that has become part of common sense is subject to such little dissent. Even the United States appears to be growing war-weary, as evidenced from the rising tide of public opinion against further expansion of the war in Afghanistan. In recent years it has become apparent to me how radical it really is to demand peace. We need more radicals calling for peace and an end to the insanity that is the state perpetrating terror in the name of eliminating it.

The government has finally taken the first step towards bringing Pakistan's tribal areas into mainstream politics. President Asif Ali Zardari, in a landmark declaration on the eve of Pakistan's 62nd independence day, removed the decade-long impediment on the people of FATA to take part in politics and host political activities.

The president simultaneously announced a package of reforms in the British era Frontier Crimes Regulation -- the legal framework or order through which the affairs of FATA are being managed since 1901. The package of reforms would be introduced in the shape of amendments to certain key provisions of FCR, criticised for being draconian and violating human rights. Some of the changes that are to be made in the FCR mainly deal with giving right to appeal against the decisions of political agent, who is a repository of not only administrative but also judicial powers in a tribal agency; and doing away with the Collective Responsibility clauses under which the entire tribe of a wrongdoer is held liable and thus punishable.

According to head of Fata Reforms Committee, Justice (r) Mian Mohammad Ajmal, although President Zardari has approved the changes in the FCR, they have not been enforced as yet because no official notification has been issued in this regard. But Justice Ajmal said that for the time being, permission for carrying out political activities has been granted.

The permission of carrying out political activities in FATA is synonymous with giving political rights to tribesmen. Despite getting suffrage back in 1996, these people were devoid of all other political rights including right of association, assembly, forming political forums and organising the locals on public platforms. Even after 1996, the old practice of taking part in elections on non-political basis was kept intact. Resultantly, the tribal chieftains and their handpicked individuals, clerics, drug barons, who were influential, filled the unoccupied political sphere in FATA.

The so-called religious political parties took advantage of this peculiar situation in FATA. Their leaders, not believing in secular politics, used mosques and madrassas to do politics in the area. In this bid they were fully supported by their surrogate clerical outfits and individuals on ground.

Secular parties like ANP have been crying foul on this situation. They couldn't use the institution of hujra -- the basic unit of politics in the Pashto culture -- in tribal areas for politically organising public there.

The decision is expected to lead to the much-needed mainstreaming of FATA. The push and pull of the national political stream would have positive effects on the prevailing socio-economic conditions in FATA. The only problem, however, is the security and ground situation in the tribal areas making it extremely difficult to carry out political activities there.

On the one hand, Taliban and other arm groups like Lashkar-e-Islam of Mangal Bagh, dominate large tracts of land in FATA by force while apolitical clerical groups and individuals have a psychological control over a large number of tribesmen.

"Allowing political activities in FATA is a very positive step but the law and order situation in FATA is not conducive for political activities. None of the political party without mullahs' support can stage political moots there. The real benefit of this step could be achieved when government restore its writ in FATA," said Latif Afridi prominent tribal leader belonging to leader ANP

Political and civil right activist from FATA, Syed Alam Mehsud, who also heads Pashto Awareness Movement (PAM) told TNS that in the current situation allowing political activities in FATA do not make sense. "FATA has already been occupied by Arab al-Qaeda, local and Punjabi Taliban and in their presence no one could go there," he said.

In the current situation allowing political activities in tribal areas understandably is aimed more at countering the growing influence of Taliban and clerics than to mainstream FATA. Nevertheless, if the first is the cause the second would be its natural effect and herein, lies the real benefit of granting political rights and permitting political activities in tribal areas. In this backdrop also it is a step in the right direction.

Political activities in FATA should not be the end rather a means towards the main end, which is, politically organising tribesmen and opening up the region to outside influences.

China at 60

On October 1, 2009, the People Republic of China turned sixty. During its journey of six decades, China grew on various fronts, elevating it as a potential power in the region, if not the world as yet. Proud of its growing stature and the fixation, China displayed a massive display of military power on its independence day.

Sixty years ago, China was a led to a path of independence by its leader Mao Zedong. Such was the revolutionary charisma of Mao that his version of Communism was called as Maoism. While Mao is a fatherly figure for modern day China, it was under Deng Xiaoping in 1979 that China opened up its economy leaving an impression on the world. Thus, unlike other communist states in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, it didn't fall like an apple from a tree when it was shaken hard. In fact, China already had parted from the Soviet block and US flew to China to normalise its relations in 1970s.

Today, even though the Communist Party rules China, it has one of the world's most open economy. Ever since 1978 when Chinese opened up its economy, it has been witnessing a rise. So much that even in the midst of the ongoing financial crisis, the Chinese growth rate stands at 8 percent.

However, as China becomes a leading player in the global politics, many an eyebrows are raised. US is already on alert when it comes to China. It understands how a rising economy may try to harm security interests of US abroad. In its latest National Intelligence Strategy report, the intelligence community in US has suggested to look for threats emanating from the Republic that might harm America's interest.

So far, it is economy and environment which draws the foreign policy debate on US and China. Both the issues are pushed to China's table; but with rise, comes responsibility -- this is what is being pressed upon China.

One, when it comes to blaming someone for the current global economic imbalance from a global perspective, US and China lock the horn. The ground position is that while US is a consumer economy; China has been producing for US and other countries to consume the stuff.

Hence, the debate -- US asks China to rectify its economy by producing consumers at home; China blames US for consuming upon consuming while mired in deficits.

Two, if economic progress raises environmental concerns for all the emissions from the industries. Here too, China is seen as a global polluter. Together with US, the two countries emit 40 percent of the green house gases. China is cautious; it reminds the world that it is unfair to sacrifice growth -- after all, did the developed West ever do so? Understandably, the world cannot wait long for global leaders shirking their responsibility. Presently, there has been commitment from both the countries at several levels. This year's conference on environmental treaty in Copenhagen is an eye-setter.

While such trans-national issues are put in China's casket, its relations with the states are also followed closely. China has interesting equations with the countries around the world not least with regions in its immediate environ. These relations may try to wound its rise. Two notable cases are that of Taiwan and Tibet, where the view of regional nationalists is believed to be finding no harmony with the dictation of China.

Then there are Muslim Uighurs in the western Xinjiang province who are seen as separatists by the Chinese authority. China has taken action against them. Interestingly, it is US which has indirectly expressed concerns to China over violating human rights in the garb of containing extremism. More interestingly, China's relations with Uighurs, is not strictly translating into its relations with Muslim states. So far, it has not even irked the Muslim states. Perhaps they also understand the dynamic of US-China relations.

Here, Pakistan makes a special mention which sees China as a "fast friend" but will have to face many changing realities. Although hawks in India are warning of a possible show of strength by the Chinese in the near future, the fact on the ground is that the relations between India and China has been smooth for a good period of time. Pakistan's obsession with India is not able to understand that even 'friends' are not there to share their strategic vision.

Moreover, Pakistan's nurturing of militants is biting its friends abroad; China has repeatedly mentioned the presence of leaders of an anti-China movement in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Former Information Minister Mushahid Husain, who has recently been appointed as the chairman of the first Pak-China think tank, also stated this. Much better it would be, if Mushahid were to admit bluntly that literally conceptualising "1965-wallah" China is utterly false.

security

Federal Interior Minister Rahman Malik and all the government officials who were denying the presence of Blackwater in Pakistan are right in a way, because the controversial private army has already changed its name to Xe Worldwide LLC or, simply, Xe.

Blackwater or Xe is a US-based private army. It trains more than 40,000 people a year. At least 90 percent of the company's revenue comes from government contracts. The company has existed in Afghanistan for long and also provides security to the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai.

While the officials can deny the presence of Blackwater, they can't deny the presence of Xe and DynCorps in the country. Foreign security agents are present in many parts of Pakistan. It's a reported fact. These foreign agents insulted even the cops of the federal capital on occasions. The print and electronic media has been highlighting the renting of some 100 spacious buildings by unidentified foreigners in Islamabad, also airing several packages about the suspicion of the Xe or DynCorps personnel residing there. Even The New York Times had reported the presence of two private armies' personnels in Islamabad. A later article in NYT confirmed that Shamsi airbase in Balochistan was being used by the US and it is from there that the drones attack the tribal areas.

The opposition parties are not satisfied with the statements of the government officials on the issue. On September 14, the PML-N submitted an 'adjournment motion' in the National Assembly. Through the 'motion', the MNAs of the party -- Raja Muhammad Asad Khan, Malik Shakir Bashir Awan and Javed Hussain Shah -- asked the speaker to allow them to speak on the sensitive issue. The National Assembly's Standing Committee on Interior also expressed concerns over the presence of Xe in the country, asking the Interior Ministry to submit a report on the matter. During a meeting, presided by Abdul Qader Patel, the committee discussed the issue of Blackwater's activities and its presence in different parts of the country. The NA body decided to call Rehman Malik in the next meeting to brief the members and make a 'categorical' statement in this regard.

The NWFP Assembly proved to be the second highest forum to take up the issue of Xe and DynCorps. Tabling an 'adjournment motion', Dr Iqbal Din Fana of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), argued the 'infamous agency' was operating with a new name, Xe, and hiring offices in the posh areas of Peshawar and other districts. "People have reservations about the company and the unrest is growing," said Dr Iqbal quoting media reports about setting up offices of Xe in Shabqadar Town, located between Peshawar, Charsadda districts and Mohmand tribal agency. The lawmaker recalled how an official of the agency, Craig Davis, was recently deported from Pakistan after he was found illegally residing in Peshawar.

"Foreigner security personnel are present in the area with the consent of the rulers and that is why the government should tell the House about the suspicious activities in the province," insisted Iqbal.

Leader of the Opposition and former chief minister of the province, Muhammad Akram Khan Durrani, who seconded the motion, said the issue was of sensitive nature and needed to be debated in the House.

In Peshawar, where the foreigners's movement is restricted following the violent turn in law and order situation in the past many months, people armed with sophisticated guns in vehicles with tinted glasses were seen moving in the streets of University Town and University Road, despite imposition of section 144 on brandishing weapons and moving in cars with tinted glasses. The foreigners are residing in at least 24 buildings which are located on Circular Road, Chinar Road, Gul Mohar Lane, Park Road, SAQ Road, Jamaluddin Afghani Road, Park Avenue, Rahman Baba Road, Railway Road, A B Road and Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Road. Many of these houses are being used by suspicious-looking people. But Ateef ur Rahman, a member of the NWFP Assembly whose constituency also includes the University Town, categorically denies the presence of suspicious foreigners in his area. "These are all speculations" was his response.

This was after a failed attempt on the life of former principal officer of the US Consulate in Peshawar, Lynn Tracy, and the murder of a US aid official Stephen Devance almost a year back that the foreign security personnel were seen on the streets of University Town guarding top diplomats. Later, they were also seen moving without escorting officials.

The chief of NWFP police and the ANP government officials have been denying their presence but the suspicious movement of foreigners was noticed not only in University Town and University Campus but also in Gujjar Garhai in suburban Peshawar and Bajri village between the provincial capital and tribal Khyber Agency in the past months.

Scare prevailed all over the University Town after reports about the presence of suspicious elements in the posh locality. "We are concerned about hiring of houses in University Town by suspicious foreign elements and we will lodge a protest with the government in this regard. There seems to be something wrong with the mission and intentions of these foreigners. If they are clear, they should not hide themselves," remarks Colonel Afridi, the president of the University Town Residents Society. Apart from innumerable federal ministers, chief ministers and governors, the house of former president of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, is also located in University Town.

Apart from the concern of over 800-member families of the University Town Residents Society, the villagers of Ragha Baba Town on Warsak Road also suspect something wrong is going on inside an under construction building. Dwellers of the village which is located close to Mohmand Agency and had a refugee camp being run by Gulbadin Hikmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami in the past, are working as labourers in the under construction building where they are not allowed to take cellular phones and friends. "The movement in the building is suspicious as locals are not being allowed to go even close to it," says a curious young villager, Humayun.

"The building for Xe or DynCorps in Mohmand Agency has been completed. They (the foreigners) are eyeing the Pearl Continental (PC) hotel now which is located next to the official residence of Corps Commander Peshawar and not far from the Governor House, Chief Minister House, NWFP Assembly and headquarters of police and other security agencies," says Sirajul Haq, Deputy Amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan.

Siraj believes the entire project is being initiated by the American Embassy in Pakistan. "We plan to discuss it with the intelligentsia and mobilise a public resistance movement."

The JI is yet to kick off a campaign but the students of the historic Islamia College recently took out a small procession to oppose the presence of suspicious elements in the city. It was due to the mounting pressure from the public and opposition parties that the government had to move against a local firm that provided guards for the security of the US embassy in Islamabad. The capital city police raided the Inter-Link Security Company last month to recover 61 repeater guns, nine 30-bore pistols, one 22-bore pistol and 545 rounds and arrested two staffers, including a retired army officer, who is the owner of the firm. The government should admit whatever is the fact to avoid embarrassment in the future. It should take a cue from previous governments that kept on denying the existence of US air base in Peshawar, whereas the airbase in Surizai village near Badaber very much existed there and, even today, it is being used by the Pakistan Air Force.

Fandom menace

The recent attacks on the Army General Headquarter (GHQ) in Rawalpindi once again raised the issue of whether the militants have impressive striking capabilities and outreach or the security systems in place are defective. But the attacks exposed the vulnerability of our otherwise protected and sensitive installations.

The militants are repeatedly reminding us about their striking capability, skills and outreach. The message is clear, no matter how tight security arrangements are, we will attack whenever, wherever and whosoever we want.

Our region is witnessing strategic rivalries due to deepening of clash of interests among some of regional and global powers. Amid regional strategic rivalries, it has become difficult to eliminate militancy in the region and it will continue to exist in one form or another with varying intensity despite hectic military efforts to root it out.

The recent developments whether the Afghan presidential elections, the Kerry-Lugar Bill, role of the foreign private security agencies in Pakistan and US threats to target Taliban Quetta Shura are leaving far-reaching strategic impacts in the region.

The Obama administration is yet to decide its war strategy in Afghanistan i.e. whether to go for troops surge or limit itself to counter-insurgency operation. The recently-held presidential and provincial council election, formal results are still awaited due to fraud charges, is further undermining the democratic process.

The US officials are pressing Pakistan for more aggressive counter-insurgency operation in tribal areas for rooting out the suspected militants, Taliban hideouts and bases. The recent statements by US Ambassador Anne Patterson and her deputy Gerald M Feierstein about the presence of the Taliban in Quetta is stirring reaction and displeasure among the Pakistani policy makers. The religious and pro-establishment parties and groups are agitating against it. The growing anti-US feelings are creating favourable environment for extremist elements to flourish.

Amid hostility between India and Pakistan, the increased strategic partnership between Washington and Delhi is seen detrimental to Pakistan's interests. Pakistan is not pleased over the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan criticises US for allowing India in Afghanistan for reconstruction hence disregarding Islamabad's concerns.

Voicing Islamabad's concern over Indian presence in Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi recently said, "India has to justify its interest. They do not share a border with Afghanistan, whereas we do. So the level of engagement has to commensurate with that," Qureshi said.

Realising Pakistan's sensitivities, the top US commander in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal's in his recent assessment report acknowledged that Indian influence in Afghanistan was likely "to aggravate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani counter-measures. However, Islamabad is not interested in rhetoric but looking towards US for practical steps for curtailing increasing Indian clout in Afghanistan. The US and its western allies are trying to allay and accommodate some strategic concerns of some major regional actors but the game has become complicated that any move to improve the situation is further aggravating it.

Due to the huge Indian investment (around $1.2 billion) in reconstruction of Afghanistan, the US-India growing strategic partnership and strong influence of Indian lobby in US is not meeting the strategic concerns of Pakistan.

Militant's support base is significantly shrinking due to their brutal acts and misusing the religion for their selfish interests. To some extent the use of force against the militants in Swat and other places by the state is infesting sense of confidence among the public. Any attempt to differentiate between "good" and "bad" Taliban and targeting the latter and protecting the former would be disastrous. The attack on GHQ and other related incidents are enough to understand that the Taliban are no more strategic assets rather liabilities.

The Taliban card as a policy leverage will continue to be used by some regional actors. The efforts are for controlling and purging the militant ranks from criminal, uncontrolled and disgruntled elements rather than completely eliminating them.

Militancy is becoming a great security challenge to most of the countries in the region, therefore, maintaining peace and order needs joint and concentred regional efforts. The menace of militancy has caused massive destruction but still many precious lives could be saved by sincere and coordinated efforts.

trade

Every government seeks to minimise rade deficit and achieve trade surplus -- favourable trade balance as it is commonly called. The basic policy framework for attaining this goal is trade policy. However, trade policy goes far beyond merely achieving favourable trade balance to affect revenue generation, maintaining growth momentum and providing essential commodities to consumers and capital goods to businesses at cheaper prices. In addition, trade policy is an important instrument of extending political patronage as well as penalising political opponents. This makes trade policy formulation a complex interplay of a host of political and economic factors. This is true of developed and developing, rich and poor, countries.

Take international negotiations for liberalisation of trade in agriculture. Although trade in agriculture accounts for only about 6 percent of global trade, its liberalisation has important implications for both developed and developing countries. One, agriculture being a labour intensive sector is a source of employment for nearly half of the world's population. Hence, liberalisation of trade in agriculture will have important implications for job creation (or job elimination) and incomes. Countries having comparative advantage in agriculture will gain in terms of increase in incomes and number of jobs, as export of agricultural products from them will have new markets open to them. Conversely, inefficient producers of agricultural products will stand to lose, as their domestic products will find it difficult to compete with cheaper imports.

Two, food being the primary human need, all countries want to ensure a minimum level of domestic food production as food dependence can have serious political implications. Three, several developing countries, particularly the least-developed countries (LDCs), depend on cheap food imports from developed countries; therefore, increase in world food prices will adversely effect consumers there. Four, in developed countries, the landed class, though small, exercises a lot of political influence. The need to protect the interests of this class accounts largely for the high level of protectionism that characterises the agricultural policies of most of the developed countries, notably the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) of the European Union.

The CAP had its beginnings in the post World War II period. Partly the need to ensure food safety and chiefly the interests of the influential landed class forced the then European Economic Community (EEC) to provide support to farmers. The result was that both the quantity and price of farm produce went up more than what the market forces would dictate. The EEC was not a closed economy and therefore, the fundamental problem before the policy makers was how to deal with imports from other countries where prices of agricultural produce were lower than those in the EEC.

If imports were allowed, they would price out the local farm produce. For the policy makers, the solution to the problem was simple: Impose exceedingly high tariffs on agricultural imports so that when they are in the EC market after paying customs duties, they are as expensive, if not more, as the domestic commodities.

High tariffs were one solution but not the panacea for the problem. High tariffs would help ward off competition with imports, but they would not solve the problem of surplus production. The only way to get rid of the surplus was to export it. But who will buy expensive products when cheaper products were available from elsewhere? The only way the surplus could be sold in foreign markets was to bring down the price.

To induce producers to bring down their price it was necessary to provide them subsidies that were contingent upon export performance-export subsidies. This policy of high tariffs and subsidisation has characterised the CAP to date. Expenditure on farm subsidies accounts for 40 percent of total EU budget. France is the major beneficiary. What is important here is who benefits from these subsidies. Subsidies are granted on the basis of the amount of land and number of animals farmed. With such criterion, not surprisingly it is the wealthy landowners and mega agribusinesses that have been the major beneficiaries. Thus subsidies have re-distributed wealth from the ordinary taxpayer to the rich landowners making them richer. It is the political need to safeguard the interests of this influential class that is the major obstacle to the removal of trade distorting farm subsidies.

Now come to the non-agricultural market access (Nama) negotiations. Though average industrial tariffs in developed countries are less than 4 percent, amid these exist higher tariffs for certain sensitive products, most of which are of export interest to developing countries.

A case in point is comparatively high tariffs on textile and clothing (T&C) products, which are of special interest to Pakistan and many other developing economies. In the USA, in particular, the textile industry is very powerful. That is why most of textile products are outside the scope of the US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which grants duty free treatment to exports from developing countries.

In theory, preferential tariff treatment from developed countries to developing countries is unilateral and non-reciprocal. However, in reality, the preferences are not non-reciprocal. In return, developing countries have to fulfil certain conditions imposed by developed countries and the failure to do so may result in the suspension of benefits. For instance, in 1996, the US suspended preferential benefits to Pakistan under its GSP scheme for failure to comply with its labour standards. Pakistan was readmitted to the GSP scheme in 2004, only after it became an ally of the US in the war on terror.

The GSP scheme of the EU has a sub-arrangement called Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance (commonly known as 'GSP Plus'), which grants duty free treatment to beneficiary countries. One condition for getting admission to GSP Plus is that the recipient country must have ratified and effectively implemented 27 international conventions relating to human rights, good governance and sustainable development.

Until recently, the EU's GSP scheme almost totally excluded agricultural products for being sensitive. Textiles remained excluded from the GSP scheme of Canada until 2003. Even now, the benefits are extended to the LDCs only. The GSP scheme of Japan is characterised by low coverage of agricultural products, because this sector is considered very sensitive.

The trade policy of Pakistan is also dictated by political economy considerations. Take the example of the much protected auto sector. While average applied industrial tariffs in Pakistan have been reduced to 13 percent, those for the auto sector are in the range of 90 percent. In case of preferential trade agreements concluded by Pakistan, the auto sector is treated as a sensitive sector and kept outside the scope of liberalisation.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) rules allow a country to restrict imports to overcome its balance of payment (BoP) problem. Pakistan is in throes of a BoP crisis for last couple of years, which allowed it to restrict import of luxuries. But this has not been done as the government lacked the political will to do so. WTO rules also allow a country to restrict export of essential products to overcome or pre-empt their shortage in the domestic industry. In case of Pakistan, the use of this WTO flexibility has remained subject to political considerations. In 2007, for instance, the production of wheat was grossly overstated and on the basis of that it was exported. The result was acute shortage of wheat in the domestic market and wheat had to be re-imported at a much higher price at the cost of public exchequer but to the benefit of powerful players. Similarly, decision to restrict or permit export of sugar represents a tussle between conflicting interests of powerful stakeholders. Which way the decision goes depends on who has greater political weight. The recent sugar crisis, created in part by reluctance to import the commodity in time, will go down as a classic case of political economy of the trade policy.

Strengthening the tax base

The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), under tremendous pressure from International Monetary Fund (IMF) to generate 'extra revenue', is resorting to all kind of oppressive measures to achieve a meagre revenue target of Rs1380 billion during the current fiscal year. According to official figures, FBR managed to collect around Rs260 billion in the first quarter (July-September 2009) of the fiscal year against the target of Rs270 billion.

The shortfall of over Rs10 billion, despite blocking genuine refunds and using negative tactics for recovery, once again exposes the efficacy of our tax machinery. On the directions of FBR, the field officers are adopting the age-old practice of creating huge fictitious demands and resorting to collection through coercive measures even before the decision of first appeals. The IMF is least concerned about such blatant high-handedness of FBR in collection of taxes -- its only concern is to receive money lent with interest.

What a tragedy that the rich and the mighty are not only enjoying tax exemptions, but also living a full life at the expense of taxpayers' money. If FBR is an effective body, it should tell the nation how much tax was paid by Asif Zardari, Yusaf Gillani and Nawaz Sharif during the last five years and from the beneficiaries of loan write-offs during the last 20 years. It is a bitter reality that civil-military bureaucrats, corrupt politicians-cum-unscrupulous industrialists, greedy hoarders and absentee landlords are the de facto beneficiaries of State's resources. Pakistan is not a poor country. The State's kitty is empty because of unwillingness of the government to tax the rich and due to the colossal wastage of taxpayers' money on unproductive expenses and non-exploitation of vital natural resources.

The absentee landlords, who include mighty generals and political favourites who have been allotted State land under one pretext or the other during the last many decades, have been resisting personal taxation on their colossal wealth and incomes. It is shameful to note that total agriculture income tax collection by four provinces is not more than Rs 2 billion. An unholy anti-people alliance of the trio of indomitable civil-military bureaucrats, corrupt and inefficient politicians and greedy businessmen control at least 90 percent of the State resources and contribute just 3 percent in total revenue collection.

Adding insult to injury, the government is not ready to reduce its gigantic and useless machinery that is busy wasting whatever taxes are collected. The army of ministers, state ministers, advisers, consultants, high-ranking government servants is not willing to cut down unprecedented perquisites and privileges. They are not ready to live like common men. For their luxuries, the poor are burdened with more and more indirect taxes.

Take the example of FBR that has mercilessly wasted borrowed funds of millions of dollars for implementation of Tax Administration Reform Project (TARP). At the fag end of the five-year programme, serious infighting is going on between Income Tax and Sales Tax groups; engaged in court litigations and what not. After five years of TARP our tax-to-GDP ratio is just 9 percent. During the last many years, especially when Musharraf-Shaukat duo ruled, FBR propagated great success in every area of tax administration. The nation was told that wonders had been achieved. Every year the budget target was surpassed and officials received generous rewards. In 2009, it is revealed that everything was a farce. All claims were false. It is admitted by all that our tax base remains punctured and narrow and growth in tax collection has been negative in real terms if inflation rate is accounted for.

Independent analysts have been expressing serious concerns about narrow tax-base; lower tax-to-GDP ratio and shifting of tax burden on the poorer sections of society. There is a consensus between official and independent quarters that Pakistan needs to strive very hard to come at par with many developing countries in achieving a desirable tax-to-GDP ratio of over 15 percent. Some radical changes -- like broadening of tax base and reduction of exorbitant sales tax and corporate rates, simpler and fairer tax codes -- are required.

Pakistan needs to re-prioritise its tax policy to improve tax-to-GDP ratio, attain better compliance and collections, coupled with rapid industrial and business growth. FBR's sole stress on revenue collection through harsh measures will not serve any purpose. The IMF-fixed cap on budget deficit can be achieved by drastic cuts in non-productive expenses coupled with rapid industrial growth that will ultimately improve tax-to-GDP ratio. As a first step, both rulers and bureaucrats, who are plundering and wasting national resources ruthlessly, should start living at the level of common people.

The mighty segments of society do not pay personal taxes and then through their hand-picked FBR's stalwarts periodically avail loathsome amnesty schemes to decriminalise their untaxed wealth and incomes that amounts to sneering at honest taxpayers. Our President who, before his election on September 6, 2008 got $60 million unfroze in Switzerland, did not bother to tell the nation how much tax was paid on this colossal money and why it was lying abroad. Before taking the oath of office of President, he did not declare his assets and liabilities with evidence of payment of taxes where due. If the man at the top is delinquent in paying taxes, how can tax enforcement be ensured?

The same is true for other top politicians. It is high time that all public office holders should make their tax returns public. There should be a public campaign that the absentee landlords, most of whom are members of parliaments, should reveal their tax declarations. The judges and high-ranking public servants should also be required under the law to make public their assets and tax declarations on annual basis.

The tendency to squeeze more and more from the existing taxpayers and giving a free hand to non-filers has eroded the tax base to the extent where voluntary compliance and tax enforcement have lost their relevance. The present tax system imposes greater and undue incidence on the poor and middle-class people (16 percent sales tax takes larger portion of low-income groups compared to high- income groups). The rich and mighty agriculturists are enjoying complete personal tax exemption. Adding insult to injury, they get unprecedented privileges and perquisites at the cost of taxpayers' money.

We can raise tax-to-GDP ratio to 20 percent in one year if we tax absentee landlords, speculative dealings in real estate (this will also help in promoting construction industry as prices of land will come down) and introduce asset-seizure legislation for untaxed assets and incomes. It is the need of the hour that FBR should be insulated from all kinds of political, financial and administrative pressures. It should be an autonomous body like State Bank of Pakistan. Chairman and members of FBR should be appointed through a Select Committee of Parliament and not at the wishes and dictates of ruling political party headquarters. Through public debates and democratic processes, the Parliament should devise a rationale and workable tax policy after taking inputs from all the stakeholders and experts in the field. This alone can help in broadening the tax base and improving tax-to-GDP ratio in the country. But extorting money through traumatising taxpayers by creating demands that will buckle in appeals can never prove beneficial in the long run.