Out of fear or conviction
How 9/11 affected this part of the world 
By Rahimullah Yusufzai 
The world has changed a lot since 9/11 but every country, organisation and individual would look at that extraordinary event the way it affected them. For some the change was for the better, for others it was for worse. Fortress America until then had been considered impregnable and it had to react to exact revenge in a manner worthy of the world's only superpower.

The war is there, and so too are civilizations
There is no running away from the culture that turns the seemingly prosperous against the system.
By Asha'ar Rehman
Samuel Huntington looks at the world from his vantage point and he is smiling.
The twin towers in New York were no symbol of two parallel civilizations, but their fall five summers ago provided fresh impetus to the intrigue masterminded by Huntington.

The boom that came Pakistan's way as a result of 9/11 is fast turning out to be a false one 

By S Akbar Zaidi

Pakistan's dramatic economic performance, as measured by core macroeconomic indicators since 2002-03, has been on account of the huge windfall that came Pakistan's way after 9/11. The claim made by General Musharraf and his team that this has happened on account of better management and 'good governance', is highly exaggerated. Moreover, the fact that the 9/11 windfall is now losing steam and has come to an end, questions the claim by General Musharraf that he has been responsible for turning the economy around. The short lived artificial boom following 9/11, has now been replaced by the scandals and mismanagement which were marked during the good old days of democracy in the 1990s. The numbers may have improved, but we are now back to the bad old days of corruption and scandal.

September 11, 2001: The Day the World Changed

Pakistan had enough political and economic problems as it was, prior to 9/11. The nuclear test-related sanctions were in place, democracy had been overthrown through a military coup, Pakistan's debt burden was huge and the downturn in the economy had already set in prior to 9/11. There were two sets of outcomes with regard to 9/11 which were related to Pakistan's economic fortunes.

The first set included issues which emerged as a response to world economic growth slowing down more generally. This meant that with world growth slowing down, so would demand for world exports from the developed markets. Consumption and incomes fell in developed countries, and so did imports from other countries. Moreover, there was a sense of shock and insecurity, which meant that Americans were less enthusiastic to spend and were holding back. Second, there was a huge fear concerning Muslims, Islam, and people from other, particularly, Middle Eastern countries. Pakistan was also included in this category, so most US businesses and firms treated Pakistanis and Pakistan with distrust if not with contempt. This meant that foreign investors would not be willing to invest in Pakistan nor even visit possible exporters and markets in the country. Travel advisories were issued which persuaded US and other western businessmen not to visit places like Pakistan. By all accounts, Pakistan was a no-go area for foreigners, particularly Americans, whether they were donors or businessmen. In addition, many countries were no longer eager to deal with Pakistani businessmen, and industry suffered. This was the earlier consequence on Pakistan's economy. However, as Pakistan yet again became a front-line state, things changed once again, this time fortuitously.

In the medium and longer term, things changed dramatically, particularly for the military government of General Musharraf. From being labelled a rogue Islamic military state with nuclear pretensions, General Musharraf was welcomed back into the comity of civilised nations fighting the War Against Terror. Overnight, he became the darling of the West, with dozens of leaders and dignitaries from the developed countries -- the very same leaders who had denounced his coup two years earlier -- visiting him in Islamabad. While this ensured his political longevity at least for some time, the economic returns of siding with the Americans were unprecedented.

The biggest problem that had plagued Pakistan's government for many years since the profligate 1980s under General Zia, was that of excessive and growing debt (both domestic but particularly international) and annual interest payments. Pakistan's economy was struggling under debt equivalent to its GDP, with half being foreign debt. As a return for Pakistan's support to the US in particular and the West in general, huge amounts of debt were either written off, or rescheduled under very easy and comfortable terms relieving the pressure on Pakistan's foreign exchange situation. In addition, the quota for Pakistani exports to the US and the European Union was increased to compensate for earlier cancelled orders and costs. Equally importantly, was the signal to the IMF and World Bank and numerous other donors, to re-enter the field and begin supporting Pakistan again. For example, even USAID returned to Pakistan after nearly a decade, an aid agency which had exited Pakistan once nuclear-related sanctions were enforced under the Pressler Amendment in the early 1990s. Pakistan was no longer no-go territory, and as a consequence of Pakistan's role in the War Against Terror and War Against Afghanistan (and subsequently, in the US War Against Iraq later in 2003) Pakistan's government was repaid handsomely. Another consequence was the huge increase in remittances, particularly from the US, which came to Pakistan, particularly in 2002-03.

Debt rescheduling

After 9/11 and to repay Pakistan for its role in the war against terror, Pakistan's debtors offered to reschedule Pakistan's debt equivalent to around $12.5 billion, in December 2001. Not only was this amount far larger than any such rescheduling in the past, but more importantly, it was the terms of this agreement which set it apart from earlier endeavours. As a State Bank Annual Report stated, 'The Paris Club offered very generous terms; in contrast to the previous two rescheduling agreements that provided relief only in terms of debt flows (as per Houston terms), the existing arrangement is applicable to the entire stock of US $12.5 billion of Pakistan's bilateral debt owed to the Paris Club creditors. Consequently, this provided an implied debt reduction without having a HIPC [Heavily Indebted Poor Country] status, which is generally associated with Naples terms'.

Basically, the entire bilateral debt of Consortium countries had been rescheduled, and this rescheduling had been for a far greater period than in the past; Official Development Assistance (ODA) debt, which was 68 per cent of the total rescheduled, is to be repayable after 35 years, with 15 years' grace period, and non-ODA debt is to be repaid over a 25 years period, with a five year grace period for other loans. Moreover, there has been a 're-profiling of the debt in such a way that it takes into consideration the country's capacity to pay'. This rescheduling allowed relief of between $1.2-1.5 billion annually in payments of debt servicing on external debt during the years 2001-05. To put the icing on the cake, add to this the fact that Pakistan has not just had a debt rescheduling, but an actual debt write-off by many friendly countries, and we have an extraordinarily fortuitous situation based on Pakistan's support for the US invasion of Afghanistan.

The growing forex reserves

While Pakistan's debt situation has improved considerably over the last five years, so has that of the country's foreign exchange reserves. In 1999-2000 Pakistan's total forex reserves were $2.77 billion, but rose to $7.07 billion at the end of fiscal year 2001-02, and by the next year in June 2003, were $11.48 billion, rising to $ 13 billion in 2006. Moreover, in 2003-04, the Government of Pakistan was able to retire some of its foreign debt of the tune of $1 billion. While the substantial increase in foreign exchange reserves has allowed Pakistan's international credit rating to improve, allowing further private and public inflows, the most important consequence has been the stabilisation of the Pakistani rupee.

There have been two factors which have resulted in an unprecedented growth in foreign exchange reserves, showing an increase of a quite phenomenal 120 percent within one year: between 2001-02 and 2002-03 State Bank of Pakistan reserves rose from $4.33 billion to $9.52 billion. One factor has been an increase in Pakistan's exports, which crossed $10 billion for the first time ever in 2002-03. With a rebound of the global economy and with greater access to European and US markets with quotas being increased, this was likely to happen and continue. The second important reason has been, that with debt rescheduling, interest payments have also been reduced, allowing the State Bank to hold on to and increase its reserves. It is important to point out that the more reliable and traditional forms of inflows, such as foreign direct investment, have had little significance on increasing foreign exchange reserves, as they have in many other countries. Perhaps this is a matter of concern regarding the sustainability of the increase in foreign exchange reserves, especially if we consider the main reasons for the substantial increase.

Remittances have been a reliable source of foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan since the late 1970s. In the 1980s, particularly, remittances rose to very substantial levels equivalent to around 7 or 8 percent of GDP in single years. However, since the early 1990s, and after the first Gulf War and due to structural shifts in labour demand in the Gulf States, the main area from where Pakistan received remittances, remittances fell substantially. Traditionally, the Gulf States have been the main sources of remittances into Pakistan. Saudi Arabia sent between 35-45 percent of remittances in the 1990s, the UAE about 17 percent in 1999-00 and Kuwait 15 percent in 1999-00; Britain provided about eight percent of total remittances, and the US a maximum of 13 per cent in 1996-97, which had begun to fall thereafter, and was 8.75 per cent in 1999-00. However, following 9/11 there was a dramatic change in both volume and composition of remittances.

In 2002-03, the Pakistanis in the US sent in $1.7237 billion, which was fifteen times the amount sent from the US just three years ago, in 1999-00! This trend of substantially increased remittances from the US had begun in 2001-02, with $778 million sent, which was ten times higher than the paltry $79 million sent in 1999-00. In 2002-03, the US with this substantially increased amount of remittances now provided as much as 29.53 percent of remittances of the $4.236 billion total, the highest amount ever received by Pakistan. Another significant development was that in 2002-03, Saudi Arabia's contribution had fallen markedly: from providing almost half Pakistan's total in the past, now Saudi Arabia provided a mere 13 percent.

The reasons for this unprecedented amount sent by Pakistanis from the US followed by Pakistanis in the UAE (20 percent of total remittances in 2002-03), was a result purely of post-9/11 developments. The US government started scrutinising accounts of Pakistanis and Muslims in the US, investigating funding for al-Qaeda type organisations. In order to avoid such investigations and in fear of their savings, many Pakistanis sent back money to Pakistan which they would have preferred to keep in the US. The same sort of scrutiny had also begun in the UAE, and hence the increase in remittances from there. Moreover, the informal foreign exchange transfer mechanism, the hundi, which has been providing the main share of remittances to Pakistan from the Middle East, also came under scrutiny. To appear legal and to avoid complications with the authorities, many Pakistanis sent back money through the formal banking sector. Also, it must be added, that the State Bank of Pakistan and its commercial banks also took additional measures to capture the hundi market and since the differential between official and market exchange rates had been largely eliminated, were able to divert some funds away from the hundi market. Nevertheless, the main reason for this huge surge in remittances, was 9/11-related developments.

Is the turnaround sustainable?

Most of the factors that resulted in the poverty stricken nineties decade have all disappeared. The debt burden has been lifted creating significant fiscal space; there has been no change in government and leadership since 1999, suggesting perhaps a sense of stability to some; Karachi is no longer at war with itself; the jehadis have been partially reigned-in on account of which there is talk of serious peace and economic cooperation with India; sanctions have not only been lifted but debt write-off and large amounts of aid have been made available to the government in its support for the war on terror. One needs to emphasise that, had the New York attack not taken place, it is quite improbable that Pakistan would have been able to get out of the post-nuclear tests and post-military coup scenario, both of which had been damaging to the economy.

In some ways there are many similar patterns being repeated in the decade underway since 2000, as there were in the 1960s and 1980s. There were military governments in place then as there is now, though each military regime has been very different from every other, and the world (and Pakistan) is far different now than it was in 1960 or 1980. There is a great deal of apparent stability now, as there was for much of the reign of the earlier two generals. All three generals have been generously supported by the US and other western powers. And the growth rates seen since 2002, look very similar to those of the 1960s and 1980s. Yet, the end of both General Ayub and General Zia's decades saw the unravelling not just of high economic growth rates, but both also had serious social and political repercussions to contend with, such as the separation of East Pakistan in the first case, and the rise of state-sponsored fundamentalism and ethnic violence, in the other. In both cases, what was perceived to be 'stability', after some years, gave rise to a noticeable degree of complacency on the part of the rulers, where the shining growth rates of economic indicators blinded policy makers to what was really going on underneath, politically and socially. While there are signs of an apparent economic turnaround, seven years through a probable Musharraf decade, one is forced to ask the following question: will the Musharraf era, when it comes to an eventual end, have an ending any different from the Ayub and Zia decades?

The market offers an antidote to rejectionism. But does it? 

By Muhammad Badar Alam

It's all in the name: The collapse of the World Trade Center brough world trade to the centre of the debate about commercial liberalisation, development, poverty and terrorism.

Of course a ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization was already due and scheduled even before the September 11 attacks. But "the odds on holding a successful ministerial gathering at Doha that could initiate a new Round were very small even as late as the summer of 2001," says Ernesto Zedillo, director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, in a speech delivered in April this years. This was particular true because the preceding ministerial meeting, held at Seattle in 1999, had broken down acrimoniously with every important player in international trade blaming others for the debacle.

Certainly 9/11 put the skids under international trade negotiations, though for the exponents of globalization and free trade it was a sad re-start. Zedillo, therefore, notes regretfully that it took "9/11 tragedy to...inspire the leadership required to launch the new Round". But in spite of this inauspicious start, or rather because of it, the meeting was able to achieve quite a bit. "At any rate, the new sense of urgency gave rise to a strong acceleration of trade diplomacy which in less than two months culminated -- not without much

wrangling ...with the adoption of the Doha Ministerial Declaration on November 14, 2001," he says.

The reasons for this diplomatic urgency and "leadership, generosity, good manners and good will that converged at Doha" were explained by the then American Trade Representative Robert Zoellick in a series of articles. The crux of his argument was as follows:

The international market economy -- of which trade and the WTO are vital parts -- offers an antidote to violent rejectionism.

Five years after Doha, the world trade talks have arrived where they were before 9/11. Between a failed ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, a partially successful one in Hong Kong in 2005 and an altogether botched one Geneva in 2006, Doha round stands suspended, with no one being certain about its fate.

A lot of explanations are being bandied about the collapse of the world trade talks. Some observers have pointed out that the round was too heavily loaded with political agenda to let it run as a smooth trade round. Others say the link between trade and terrorism is too tenuous to have allowed itself to make into international trade agenda. "...the Doha agenda was ill-conceived from the start. Its main objective was combating global terrorism by promoting economic opportunity in the third world through trade breaks. But this objective was based on fantasies. The alleged link between global poverty and global terrorism, for example, has never withstood serious scrutiny. After all, the 9-11 hijackers overwhelmingly were the sons of businessmen and professionals, not peasant farmers. Similarly, the suspects in the latest London hijacking plot were mostly citizens or long-time residents of the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the world's poorest regions -- rural China, rural South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa -- have spawned no significant global terrorist threats," says Alan Tonelson, a research fellow at the US Business & Industry Educational Foundation, in a recent article 'The Real Lessons in the Doha Round's Failure'.

But the problem with world trade agenda is not that it leans too heavily on trade-development-terrorism nexus. It lies in the fact that the international ruling elite stands too divided after 9/11 to agree to a common set of rules for international economy and trade. Robert J Samuelson, writing in 'Newsweek's' August 21-28, 2006 issue, has put it perfectly. "Every successful economic system requires a supporting political structure: rules, standards of behavior, ways of resolving conflicts. For years, the United States and its allies were bound together by political and economic alliances. But as Princeton historian Harold James notes, the war on terror -- mainly the war in Iraq -- has created divisions on political issues that make agreement on economic matters harder." The Western alliance, as everyone remembers, was badly shaken in the runup to war in Iraq, pitching what US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously called old Europe versus a new one.

The other problem is that leading Western regimes, in particular the Bush administration in the United States and Tony Blair's government in the United Kingdom, had bet a lot of their political capital on winning the war on terror in general and military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. Having lost that bet, they are not left with enough political stock to gamble on another equally risky stake which, at least in the short run, is seen by people in the street as a sure loser. The voters' fears, real and imagined, about jobs lost to workers in developing countries as a result of globalised production and the negative psychological and social fallouts of migrants' influx from the poorer corners of the globe have , albeit wrongly, linked liberalisation of world trade with globalisation. But political leadership in the West is too occupied in explaining its acts of omission and commission in an increasingly unsuccessful war on terror that they have hardly anything to say on globalisation and international trade, let alone try to convince them on their merits.

Nevertheless, the suspension of world trade talks does not mean that the world has ceased to exist after 9/11. In some ways it's moving with even greater gusto. According to Samuelson, "Since 2001, the world economy has expanded more than 20 per cent." Even "world trade -- exports and imports -- has risen by more than 30 per cent," he writes.

These phenomenal figures prove just one thing: The indomitable human spirit to create, consume and exchange can survive the collapse of anything -- from the World Trade Center to world trade talks.

The impact of 9/11 attacks has created waves that have come to engulf the world, and created drastically changed realities that affect many people, no matter where they live 

By Kamila Hyat

Just like the surreal images of jets crashing into multi-storey buildings, the effects of 9/11 too refuse to fade away.

Across Europe, North America and indeed the rest of the world, the most recent reminder has come in the alleged plot to blow up nine passenger aircraft over the Atlantic. Whether concocted by western intelligence agencies with the connivance of Pakistan, in a bid to raise the ratings of Tony Blair and re-focus international attention on the terrorist threat as has been claimed in some quarters, or a genuine plan devised by young men apparently deranged by hatred, the fact is that the terrorist threat may have changed air travel norms forever.

While some of the initial measures have been relaxed, security everywhere remains stringent. Global travellers, in the last five years, have already adjusted to longer queues, more restrictions on hand baggage and the general sense of unease that often seems to lurk amidst the familiar chaos of airports. It appears likely they will have to live with these realities for many more years to come.

But the lingering effects of 9/11 reach out far beyond the world's airports. They have penetrated the very heart of many communities in the West, and, perhaps most dangerously of all, contributed to the intolerance and hatred that, in a vicious cycle, can give rise only to more terrorism and more mayhem.

The moulding of a harder, more sharply defined Islamic identity, which has swiftly been embraced by young Muslims everywhere, also seems here to stay. The swift evolution of this identity is linked of course to the racist attacks, the discrimination, the injustice faced by Muslims, and indeed many other immigrant communities, immediately after 9/11. The controversial Patriot Act, introduced in the US weeks after the terrorist attacks, contributed to the hostility Muslims confronted. The law increased the powers of security agencies to investigate terrorism, access electronic communication and check the transfer of money. Civil rights groups in the US fiercely opposed the provisions of the law. A domestic storm over the issue broke out in December 2005, when it was reported that the shadowy National Security Agency (NSA), set up at the height of the Cold War in 1952 by President Harry S Truman, had been monitoring thousands of phone calls and other communications within the US, with the cooperation of the telephone giant AT &T, which provided it access to its network. The San Francisco-based Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a civil liberties organization, took the matter to court. As the high profile case continues, the US government and AT&T have failed to persuade the judge to drop the case on the basis of 'national security', or the need to keep information about the phone tapping secret.

In other countries too, new post 9/11 laws, aimed at curbing terror, have raised a furore over the question of privacy and security. Often, the laws have been used as a convenient means to harass or to intimidate. The campaign by governments and many sections of the media, have played a huge part in shaping public opinions, and in turn creating the cultural narrowness and racism so often seen today.

Five years on, there is no evidence that the realities set in place in the altered world that emerged immediately after 9/11 have changed. Indeed, a result of the hardened lines drawn up between communities, conflicts that existed for decades -- over school uniforms for Muslim girls, over the wearing of the 'hijab', over the alleged lack of patriotism of Muslims living in the UK, US or other countries -- have suddenly assumed far higher profiles. 

These conflicts, these perceptions of a failure to accept a different code of religious practice, have played a part in terrorist acts that have followed 9/11, such as the bombings that hit the London transport system in July 2005 or the latest plan, apparently devised by young Muslim men some still in their teens, to use liquid chemicals to trigger explosions in airborne  planes. 

The restrictions imposed under legislation such as the Patriots Act in the US, have of course often most directly been used against Muslims. The villifying of the religion, as in the distastefully crude and insensitive cartoons published in a Danish newspapers, and then replicated by other publications across Europe, is a part of the same process. But the problem goes far beyond the issue of racist jibes in schools or on the streets, or the other petty acts of discrimination that non-whites living in any western society inevitably face at one time or the other. Instead, what has been created, is a terrible cycle of hatred and violence, that is not easy to break. 

As Muslims face greater hostility, they have reacted by turning inwards, towards their own community. Most noticeably in the UK, this has often meant the local mosque, or 'study circles' that have cropped up in many homes. For the young in particular, these gatherings have played a part in channelling the rebelliousness of many immigrant communities living in a hostile environment, towards violence. 

Attempts to stop such violence, bring the kind of raids on private homes seen recently on television as police stormed into houses in several localities in the UK. As the uniformed men and women entered homes, from the street corners, other children, other young men and women watched -- and many made it clear where their sympathies lay as TV teams spoke to them about the operation. 

At a wider level, this cycle of violence is a reaction to the injustice seen in the Middle East, the perpetration of which has been made possible by the US and its allies. In this new order of the world, Washington has emerged in the perception of many Muslims as a prime enemy, and the fact that some of these Muslims live in the midst of western societies, complicates matters for them. 

The question to be asked now is how this cycle is to be broken. How the distrust and suspicion that has crept into relations between much of the West and many Muslims can be eased.

There are no easy answers. The manner in which the 9/11 attacks were handled in the panic-stricken days after they occurred, the war announced at the time by the US, has altered much about the world. These changed realties will remain in place yet for more years, possibly decades -- and through this period in time new dangers will continue to lurk around corners almost everywhere in the world.

How 9/11 affected this part of the world 

By Rahimullah Yusufzai 

The world has changed a lot since 9/11 but every country, organisation and individual would look at that extraordinary event the way it affected them. For some the change was for the better, for others it was for worse. Fortress America until then had been considered impregnable and it had to react to exact revenge in a manner worthy of the world's only superpower.

Not long after that fatal day on September 11, 2001, the US set out to redraw the political map of our planet. Every state was given a stark choice to either join America in its war on terror or be counted among its enemies. There was to be no middle ground and those daring to take this route were warned to consider the consequences. Such was the extent of Washington's fury that even powerful nations decided not to cross America's path and invite its ire.

The war on terror continues five years after 9/11 and indications are that it would go on forever. In fact, this endless war against an often hidden enemy has become so blurred in its direction that it is difficult to pin it down to one or two clear objectives. Initially, it aimed at punishing the perpetrators of 9/11 and those harbouring them. By the evening of September 11, 2001, the US had concluded that al-Qaeda was the architect of the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington while the Taliban regime hosting its leaders such as Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan was guilty by association. Most countries, out of fear or conviction, agreed with this assessment and backed US plans to invade Afghanistan to bring al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts to justice.

In two months, the most intense bombing since the Second World War by American warplanes and ground attack by Northern Alliance, armed and funded by states ranging from the US to Iran, Russia to India and Turkey to France, led to ouster of the Taliban and the installation of a pro-West government headed by Hamid Karzai. Regime change had been accomplished and al-Qaeda evicted from its Afghanistan headquarters after suffering considerable damage. It wasn't a complete victory because bin Laden, his deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and other top leaders could not be killed or captured and al-Qaeda wasn't put out of business. The Taliban too survived as a military and political force while biding its time to fight another day. Still President George W Bush had something to show for victory to the American people and Afghanistan was hailed as a major success in the war on terror.

So far so good even if the fierce resistance by the 'remnants of Taliban,' the way the defeated armed Islamic movement was described by the West, has surprised US and Nato military commanders and forced them to rethink their strategies. Things began to go wrong when the US, UK and certain other Western countries invaded Saddam Hussein's Iraq on false pretexts and fuelled an insurgency that has strengthened with the passage of time and made the country ungovernable. It is alleged that resources were diverted to fight the Iraq war and one of the consequences was to relegate Afghanistan to the background. Priorities had to change while coping with the rise in anti-US sentiment in the Middle East and rest of the Islamic world. The coalition of Western nations formed to wage the war on terror also started unravelling due to differences on invading Iraq. More importantly, al-Qaeda emerged for the first time in Iraq and linked up with likeminded groups to notch-up the resistance to US-led foreign occupying forces and give the war a bloodier and religious flavour.

From fighting terrorism to changing regimes, the US-led war on terror subsequently assumed the form of an imperialist campaign to mould the world in accordance with American designs. Having stumbled at formidable hurdles to achieve their colonial objectives, President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair and their policy advisers have been at pains to variously describe their military campaigns as attempts to advance the cause of democracy and human rights, tackle the threat posed by rogue states wanting to make nuclear arms, rid the world of weapons of mass destruction and build a new, democratic Middle East. Mr Blair, at present facing an embarrassing challenge to his leadership in his ruling Labour party, went one step further recently when he said the West was fighting a war to defend its values and transfer them to places fertile for a change. President Bush then gave his war on terror a whole new meaning when he declared that America's enemies were 'Islamic fascists.' It was a crude attempt to regain the higher moral ground by comparing Muslims with the Germans, Italians and other fascists who challenged the Western democracies in the Second World War and were defeated. It is possible for the war on terror to assume new shapes and set for itself fresh targets as it blunders on.

As we are now aware, 9/11 initially enabled President Bush to achieve record job approval ratings and win a second term in office. It was much later that the Iraqi quagmire made the US military presence in that country unpopular and pushed the embattled President's ratings on a downslide. The post-9/11 developments turned our uniformed President, General Pervez Musharraf, from an outcast shunned by Western governments to a darling of the US and its allies. After General Ziaul Haq, who went on to rule for 11 long years due to the West-sponsored Afghan war against Soviet occupying forces, Musharraf became the second Pakistani General to benefit from the US need for a strong military ruler in Islamabad to help it in defeating its enemies. The enemies during General Ziaul Haq's rule were Russian and Afghan communists but this time past partners in the Afghan jehad including Muslim fundamentalists now grouped in al-Qaeda and Taliban have become enemies of the US. Of course, it is none of US and Western concern that their support for a military regime was undermining the struggle for true democracy in Pakistan, radicalising the country's society, and fuelling polarisation between the ethnic groups, Islamic organisations and the armed forces. The only interest they have is to secure their own interests and upgrade their own security at the expense of countries like Pakistan from attacks by Islamic militants.

President Musharraf had to undertake a number of changes in foreign and domestic policies to qualify for US and Western support. There was a U-turn in the country's Afghanistan policy when the Taliban were abandoned and the US was assisted to destroy their regime and install Hamid Karzai and the Northern Alliance in power. Changes also occurred in relations with India, which in the aftermath of 9/11 moved closer to the US while still maintaining strategic ties with Russia, and offers were made to New Delhi for resolving the Kashmir issue on the basis of unconventional proposals bypassing the UN resolutions. Militant jehadi groups were banned and some of their leaders put behind bars temporarily. Plans were unveiled to reform the madrassas, proscribe hate material and promote progressive policies aimed at checking religious extremism and empowering women. The President's pet project of 'enlightened moderation' too received more than adequate attention and steps were taken in line with this thinking.

On the downside, the Musharraf government got away with human rights abuses. The war on terror came handy while dealing with Islamic hardliners as the Western governments and organizations didn't bother to take up such cases. Not only Pakistan but a host of countries ruled by unrepresentative governments used the war on terror to persecute political opponents and elements deemed anti-state. They were also allowed to rig elections and give a civilian facade to client governments because it suited the West to deal with strong dictatorial rulers instead of representative regimes answerable to their people. In Pakistan, those accused of links with militant Islamic, nationalist and ethnic groups were picked up and made to disappear. The issue of people who have gone missing was highlighted by the media, which was strangely enough given unprecedented freedom, and taken up by the courts.

In our neighbourhood, Mr Karzai was picked up from obscurity in the post-9/11 period and made the president of Afghanistan. Western troops from almost 40 countries were deployed there and Nato for the first time in its history sent soldiers outside the West to curb Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Secret prisons in Afghanistan were used by the US and CIA to lock-up alleged al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters and some cases of prisoner abuse that came to light explained the depth of the problem that was reported earlier from Baghdad's Abu Ghraib jail and Guantanamo Bay. The abuse of Muslim prisoners served as a provocation to further inflame anti-US feelings. Adding fuel to fire was the blind US support for Israel to occupy Palestinian territories and kill anyone opposing Tel Aviv's policies of apartheid. Israel's attack on Lebanon with not-so-secret American connivance was like the last straw on the camel's back. Five years after 9/11, the world is much more unsafe than it was prior to that and there is every indication that the situation would deteriorate in future.

There is no running away from the culture that turns the seemingly prosperous against the system 

By Asha'ar Rehman

Samuel Huntington looks at the world from his vantage point and he is smiling.

The twin towers in New York were no symbol of two parallel civilizations, but their fall five summers ago provided fresh impetus to the intrigue masterminded by Huntington. Clashes followed everywhere, in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in London and in other parts of the West, amid repeated denial of the existence of any faultlines, what to speak of battlelines, between civilizations.  After all, we were all chasing one progress ideal, in a world so singularly obsessed with capital prosperity. The very thought that there could be bifurcations of cultures sounded preposterous.

Prime Minister Tony Blair, second only to President George Bush in the war's control room, though gives the secret away when he offers his own take on the civilization debate, adding to Bush's own frank denunciations of those who abhor standard development.

In his speech to Foreign Policy Centre in London as recently as 21 March this year Blair blared out: "This is not a clash between civilizations. It is a clash about civilization. It is the age-old battle between progress and reaction, between those who embrace and see opportunity in the modern world and those who reject its existence; between optimism and hope on the one hand; and pessimism and fear on the other." Huntington appears to be more civilized than Mr Blair for he chooses to say it in a polite way. He at least characterises the antagonists sitting in the anti-development camp as the inhabitants of their own civilization. Superior or inferior, may be a civilization which is losing out, but a civilization  made up of people, their desires and disciplines nonetheless.

Whereas Huntington builds his thesis on the disparity between cultures, Blair's and the like place emphasis on globalisation that is anathema to all things and ideas indigenous, and therefore can be a cause more than a cure for the clash, call it a rift if you must. Yet the divide is equally vivid in each case and essentially, it is a matter of using different sets of words and terms. "...where nations depend on each other and where our security is held in common or not at all...the outcome of this clash between extremism and progress is utterly determinative of our future," Blair says, choosing not to name the extremists. 

That it is a divide between the people and not necessarily between countries is borne out by Tony Blair's remarks in the same speech with reference to elections in Iraq and Afghanistan, two pessimism-ridden countries which are to be rubbed violently clean of their extremist substances: "The fact is: given the chance, the people wanted democracy. OK so they voted on religious or regional lines. That's not surprising, given the history (remember Huntington?). But there's not much doubt what all the main parties in both countries would prefer and it is neither theocratic nor secular dictatorship. The people -- despite violence, intimidation, inexperience and often logistical nightmares -- voted. Not a few. But in numbers large enough to shame many western democracies. They want Government decided by the people...And who is trying to stop them? In Iraq, a mixture of foreign Jehadists, former Saddamists and rejectionist insurgents. In Afghanistan, a combination of drug barons, Taliban and Al Qaida."

These observations may be contentious, but it can be corroborated with examples from liberal writing that the fear of the marauding jehadists trampling democracy under their feet instils the worst fear in the heart of Blair's optimist wherever he is.

That optimist may be sitting in London or in Lahore, he is as far or as perilously close to the non-progressive rejectionist. The two optimists have to surge closer to each other for safety against one common enemy who is out to ruin their sole model of civilization. Quite often, the tendency is to dub the challenger as the cave man, and condemn him to obscurity of the mind, when physical obliteration is not possible.

That the pessimist represents a miniscule minority is a convenient self-assurance the Pakistani liberals frequently resort to, and among those who acknowledge the presence of sizable dissenters, there are many who use the bogey to justify the neither jehadi, nor rejectionist but the secular dictators Blair and Co cannot have in Iraq and Afghanistan and cannot do without in Pakistan. Sops pass hands, from the Western masters to their local agents and to the favourites among the common people. Meanwhile, the great minds in Washington (should) wonder how is it that a boy from Lahore who is brought over to London and is conditioned there for years can still be found wanting to dismantle the progressive world around him? This is a most immediate sign for the West to understand in earnest. The divide is not geographical, and a sign for scholars to perhaps give some credit to Huntington. He was right in foreseeing reasons based in cultures and not in economy creating conflicts. Until we overcome our fear to agree that the thesis has at least some substance, we will not truly begin our search for answers.