Overstepped!
Pakistan is cricket’s graveyard, its players the hangmen of the game
By Amir Mir
Thousands of miles away, on the greens of UK, the Pakistan cricket team was locked in an exciting contest against Australia and then England. True, the wins were rare -- just two in six Test matches -- yet the nation found refuge from its unbearably harsh reality in the exploits of its fast bowlers. It was a sight to behold: 18-year-old Mohammad Aamir and Mohammad Asif tearing into their formidable opponents with their extraordinary pace and swing. It seemed Pakistan could rediscover its fast bowling prowess of the yore and spark off a cricketing revival. The team became a glimmer of hope for a nation drowning in sheer sorrow.

kashmir

Basharat Peer is a Kashmiri journalist, author and political commentator. He is the celebrated author of the book Curfewed Night, "a chronicle from the eyes of a Kashmiri growing up in the valley and watching it transform into a hotbed of violent militancy pitted against state oppression."

He studied Political Science at Aligarh Mulsim University and Journalism at Columbia University. He started his career as a journalist in Delhi. Currently, he is a writer in residence at Open Society Institute in New York. He writes for publications like The Guardian, Financial Times, The National and New Statesman.

In an email interview with TNS from Kashmir, where he had just landed from New York and quite "jet-lagged", he explains the current phase of insurgency for our readers which he agrees is "completely indigenous".

The News on Sunday: How do you see the current phase of movement in Kashmir? It is said to be entirely indigenous. What in your view is the impetus this time?

Basharat Peer: It is completely indigenous. Young people are reacting to a state of over-militarisation and abuse of power by the troops deployed in Kashmir.

TNS: It is being said that there is little involvement from the Pakistani side. Do you think it is because of the US pressure or a genuine desire on the part of Pakistan for peace after Mumbai attacks?

BP: I can’t speak for Pakistan. Only the Pakistani establishment would know whether it is a genuine desire for peace or a reaction to pressure. In either case, a move towards peace is better than not.

TNS: What about the role of groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Have they taken a back seat as well. And what is the level of Lashkar’s popularity or political support in the valley?

BP: They seem to have taken a back seat. Militant activity is at an all time low in Kashmir. Kashmiris have moved away from guns. Very rarely is a Kashmiri young man joining a militant group nowadays.

TNS: In an earlier interview, you talked about the danger of the images of these rights abuses being used by jihadist forces for recruiting young people to militancy. Do you see this as a new danger? Is it not an ongoing phenomenon?

BP: It is not a new phenomenon, but with it grows the easy availability of internet and digital cameras.

TNS: So what exactly is the complexion of the insurgency? What proportion of it is secular committed to political rights and how much of it is dominated by the ideals of Islam and Jihad?

BP: The only real game in town regarding militancy in Kashmir is Lashkar-e-Taiba. Kashmiri separatist politics is largely dominated by protests and young men protesting with stones. They are motivated mostly by local politics and local political realities. Islamist politicians and activists are a minority, though a very visible one.

TNS: In the same interview, you have also talked about the desire of Kashmiris for independence instead of aligning with India or Pakistan. Is there clarity about the modalities of Kashmir as an independent state and what would it look like?

BP: There are no modalities in place. Aazadi has come to mean many things, not just a state. It is essentially the creation of a state of affairs where Kashmir is not run by force and threat of force either by India or by Pakistan, but comes to be in a state of dignified peace, where people can take control of their political future.

TNS: For how long do you think can Indian democracy sustain what it is doing in Kashmir and at what cost?

BP: It does have a corrosive effect on the Indian polity and pushes it towards becoming a national security state, an illiberal democracy. It is trend that has been bothering various Indian intellectuals who have spoken out against it. In terms of realpolitik, India is not under any international pressure, but does have to deal with a number of voices from within pointing out the things going wrong in Kashmir.

TNS: Do you think there are enough voices within India against the state policy in Kashmir. If not why?

BP: There is no way to quantify enough. The Indian middle class doesn’t even know much about what is happening an hour away from Delhi and doesn’t care. It only gets amplified in relation to Kashmir. Something like the Lahore and Karachi elite’s relationship to Fata or Balochistan. The comfortable centre never seems to care much about the peripheries. Yet there are important thinkers and writers like Pratap Bhanu Mehta, the head of India’s Centre for Policy Research, writers Pankaj Mishra and Arundhati Roy among others who have written extensively and critically about the state policies in Kashmir. It is always a small number. And there is a growing number of Kashmiri writers and journalists speaking on major Indian tv channels and writing in the most read papers about what is going wrong in Kashmir.

TNS: Are you satisfied with the response of the international community on what is happening in Kashmir at the moment?

BP: International community can’t spell Kashmir. They don’t give a damn. And who cares? It is much better to have a serious conversation among ourselves in South Asia than to bother with looking for a statement from Western power. If Kashmir has to be solved, it will take only great moral courage from Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. We have to talk to each other again and again and find a way, nobody else can help us.

Another intifada

Pakistan’s lukewarm response to the current uprising in Kashmir Valley stunned many worldwide while a heated debate about the upsurge led by local youth attracted Indian and world media alike. Islamabad used to speak on behalf of the people of Jammu and Kashmir particularly since the eruption of 1990s mass movement. Last two decades witnessed that Islamabad never missed any opportunity to criticise New Delhi over human rights violations in Kashmir or marginalising its peoples’ aspirations.

However, since 2008’s land row over Hindu shrine in Kashmir Valley followed by economic blockade and mass unprecedented agitation, Islamabad remained largely a silent spectator. It ignored calls from the Kashmiri groups to intervene publically. Even, the Pakistani media, otherwise very vibrant, ignored major political developments inside Kashmir Valley.

Does it indicate Islamabad has adopted hands-off-Kashmir policy and is gradually disengaging itself or has overlooked Indian designs in the region? Several questions are asked by observers and particularly Kashmiris, though no official version is available about this paradigm shift. But a sequence of events shows that Islamabad is now following a more mature and well thought-out policy on Kashmir.

Islamabad believes that New Delhi would not be able to reconcile with the people of Kashmir particularly the youth of Kashmir in foreseeable future. No matter, how huge the investment in building state of the art infrastructure or creating employment opportunities, it will not pay off unless it amicably addresses political dimension of the issue and particularly its external aspect such as its relationship with Pakistan. It is also a matter of fact that dialogue between All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and New Delhi or any other political player could not yield anything tangible to market so far.

Secondly, the sentiment of Azadi has successfully transferred to a new generation that has proved that it can unnerve Indian rule in Kashmir without resorting to violence through street agitation. They use non-violent means which are the only available tool to advance political objectives in the today’s world. The New York Times aptly described the present nature of Kashmiri uprising in August 14 publication. It says that "today they (Indian forces) face a threat potentially more dangerous to the world’s largest democracy: an intifada-like popular revolt against the Indian military presence that includes not just stone-throwing young men but their sisters, mothers, uncles and grandparents."

Besides, as long as Indian forces are engaged in Kashmir it cannot avoid human rights violations. The consecutive incidents of human rights violence have played instrumental role to create unbridgeable gulf between the common man and state of India in Kashmir. These tragic events acted as catalyst to bring an impressive chunk of population on the streets who fearlessly challenged the state forces across the Valley. Several times, curfew was broken by spontaneous protests. Ironically, Indian army command is unwilling to demilitarise even from the urban areas or repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), a law that gives security forces powers to operate without fear of prosecution.

Additionally, it reinvigorated the long missing indigenous character and non-violent face of the people’s movement. It is widely acknowledged not only in India but also world over that the new upsurge has nothing to do with Pakistan or radical militants. This kind of movement has the potential to elicit support from within Indian civil society, which is considered essential element to solve the problem.

On the other hand, Islamabad holds little international standing and credibility. It is obvious that international community is not willing to support the Kashmir cause on the behest of Pakistan. It has made various major mistakes in Kashmir during receding decades. It encouraged Islamic militancy which eventually marginalised the local and particularly the nationalist forces. Islamabad’s wrong policies turned indigenous uprising into an Islamic and broadly Sunni-extremist led movement which resulted into zero international support. Another major debacle was Kargil adventure which internationally bracketed the entire Kashmir issue with terrorism and also dubbed Pakistan as an irresponsible country.

Although Pakistan is party to the dispute and has locus standi to intervene or advance its interest, it is a known fact that hitherto its efforts have produced no tangible results. If Kashmiris continue their struggle by employing non-violent means, it has the potential to garner huge international support to forward their objectives. For instance, during the last two months almost all major media outlets have been publishing or airing the news and views about Kashmir. Hardly anything appeared against the Kashmiri aspirations. It proves that the world opinion is largely against violence and not political movements and does not favour state repression.

It is argued that if Pakistan does not come up with a firm stand in favour of Kashmir, it might lose the traditional support in Kashmir Valley. Besides, it would help Kashmiri nationalists to improve their idea of independent Kashmir which is obviously not plausible for Pakistan as Islamabad fears that it might gain popular support in the areas under its controls particularly in Azad Kashmir.

However, this argument is deeply flawed. As long as Islamabad continues its diplomatic and moral support to Kashmiris, they will not turn their backs on Pakistan. Another hard reality is that they do not have any other option but to seek Pakistan’s support to further their goals.

Pakistan should continue to avoid jumping into the current Kashmir situation as it will not gain anything. It should not turn into an India-Pakistan traditional blame game. Its local character and non-violent face should be preserved at any cost. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Islamabad should abandon its role. It can press upon New Delhi to provide space to peaceful movement and that a stone-thrower does not deserve to be treated as a militant. Secondly, human rights violations should not go unchecked.

Guns rule Gilgit

As if floods, triggered by torrential rains, were not enough to cripple life in this mountainous region, a fresh wave of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims brought life to a standstill during the month of August in Gilgit.

With a history replete with violence, sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan dates back to 1970s when it flared up in Gilgit. Ever since, hundreds of people have been killed and injured in sectarian motivated attacks believed to be planned and executed by a handful of troublemakers. The recent violence flared up in late July during a football match between two regional teams, and engulfed the whole town of Gilgit -- the region’s capital -- in the ensuing days as target killings left four people dead and one wounded. The father of two men who were killed in the violence alleged his sons were shot dead by a policeman. The blame dealt a death blow to the credibility of Gilgit police whose role had been questioned time and again in the past.

"The government reacted swiftly and arrested constables Azmat Ali of Nagral, Asif Hussain of Majini Muhallah and Syed Afzal of Ampheri in connection with sectarian killings," said a police official, adding they were serving as guards with different senior officials. The situation further worsened in the middle of August after firing on a passenger van near Yadgar area led to exchange of heavy gunfire, turning Gilgit into a virtual battle ground. The firing with sophisticated weapons continued uninterrupted for over three hours [from 7:00 pm to 10:00 pm] as law enforcing agencies watched the whole show from behind the fence. Four houses were also torched near Yadgar area in the violence.

"We will not let any one take law into one’s hands," Chief Minister Gilgit-Baltistan Mehdi Shah told his cabinet while chairing a meeting to decide a course of action. In a press conference afterwards, he said lower grade policemen were involved in sectarian crimes. Shah ordered posting out of at least 68 policemen to other parts who had been serving in Gilgit station for the past five years or so.

The armed forces commander in Gilgit-Baltistan, Major Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, reportedly monitored the situation himself as complaints against police grew. Security forces have also started a de-weaponisation campaign in Gilgit town and a door-to-door search operation was being conducted. "The decision of de-weaponisation was taken in Islamabad after Chief Minister Mehdi Shah met with Interior Minister Rehman Malik on Wednesday," official sources said.

A police official investigating the suspects told TNS that security forces, led by Pakistan Rangers, have picked up over 30 people in connection with riots and arson. The security forces have also recovered fake uniforms of police and army during a raid in Basin, Barmas and Nagral areas. Deputy Commissioner Gilgit Asad Zamin said that confiscated uniform could have been used in crimes.

Weapons are secretly brought in to Gilgit-Baltistan from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and sold out in various parts of this region at relatively higher rates. "The arms trade is gaining momentum in Gilgit," source said. Passengers travelling frequently on Karakoram Highway [KKH] wonder how come smugglers succeed in bringing such sophisticated weapons despite the presence of dozens of check posts on KKH. "It’s really a matter of grave concern for us," said Abdul Majeed, a resident of Gilgit.

Speaker Gilgit-Baltistan, Wazir Baig also voiced concern Tuesday over the influx of arms and ammunition into Gilgit, saying that unless illegal smuggling of weapons is checked, Gilgit cannot be deweaponised. "I have conveyed this to the chief minister too that we should first take steps to stem smuggling of weapons into the region," he told TNS.

Karachi is in the grip of ethnic, political and sectarian violence besides criminal gang warfare in certain areas with 150 political murders taking place in Jan-July 2010. However, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) put the toll at 260. Out of these, 16 victims were identified as religious activists, 105 political and 139 were apparently not affiliated with any religious or political group. Most political victims belong to the Mohajir Qaumi Movement-Haqiqi (MQM-H, 34), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM-Altaf, 22), Awami National Party (ANP, 16) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP, 16) – the parties that are the city’s main political actors.

Dynamics of violence

The city’s current political strife seems motivated by concerns about the city’s changing ethnic demography, political hold on the city, forthcoming local body elections and occupation of valuable real estate. The main political parties are locked in a battle for the political turf and control over the mega city’s immense resources, the land-grabbing being one significant aspect of the fight. The Mohajir political class fears the city is slipping out of its hands with a fast changing demography marked with the rising share of the Pakhtun population.

Mohajirs, Sindhis, Pakhtuns are the main ethnic communities active in city politics. The Memon, Ismaili, Seraiki, Mekrani, Baloch and Bengali communities also constitute a substantial portion of the 16-million city population, but they are not politically active. Since different main ethnic groups are mostly concentrated in particular areas, they form ethnic political blocks as well.

Mohajirs are mainly represented by the MQM-Altaf (though MQM-Haqiqi is another small Mohajir group), Pakhtuns by the ANP and the PPP stands for the Sindhis. Memons mostly side with the MQM while the Baloch, mostly inhabiting Lyari, are associated with the PPP. Punjabis are mostly scattered over the city and make up a support base for the PML-N.

With the local government elections around the corner, a tacit alliance exists between the PPP and the ANP that has a potential to upset the Muttahida (MQM-Altaf) majority in many localities. The MQM-Haqiqi and the Sunni Tehreek are already allied with each other. A grand understanding among anti-Muttahida political groups during the local body elections could deprive the Altaf group of its control over the municipal administration.

A seeming objective of political target killings is said to be creating scare so that the influx of the Pakhtun and Sindhi population in the city could be checked. As a result, the revenge target killings have been taking place with the victims on all sides of the ethnic divide – Mohajirs, Pakhtuns and Sindhis. It is an open secret that Karachi is flushed with arms with all the rival parties armed to teeth, and all the main parties have their militant wings and patronised gangsters and professional land-grabbers. Some city parts are no-go areas for one or the other ethnic community. Mohajir activists can’t enter Sohrab Goth, Lyari and Banaras without risking their lives and Pakhtuns can’t dare into Azizabad.

Mohajir vs Pakhtun

This year, the tit-for-tat killings between the Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns have picked up. At least 18 workers of the ANP have been shot dead including the party’s security chief, Ubaidullah Yousufzai and his guard. One member of the Punjab-Pakhtun Ittehad has also been murdered. The message was clear that it would not be easy for the ANP to survive in Karachi as even its security chief could not protect himself. It is also believed that Yousufzai’s murder was a response to MQM parliamentarian Raza Haider’s killing.

The ANP was so upset with the killings of its men in Karachi that its central leaders demanded handing over Karachi to the army or a partial martial law in the city. In response, Altaf Hussain said the army generals should take over power all over the country -- a statement he watered down afterwards.

An estimated 4 million Pakhtuns live in Karachi and the number is increasing by the day with an influx from the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the violence-ridden tribal belt. Moreover, the Pakhtun settlements are strategically located at both main entrances to the city – Sohrab Goth at the Super Highway and the Pakhtun settlements close to Gulshan-i-Hadeed at the national highway to Thatta. Pakhtuns could also be seen building new localities on the hills adjacent to the Mohajir-dominated Nazimabad area. The SITE and Banaras areas are already the Pakhtun territories.

At present, Mohajirs dominate the city’s electoral politics with the support of the Memon community that forms nearly 12 per cent of the city population. In the last general elections, the Pakhtun’s ANP won city’s two provincial seats for the first time ever. Besides, a Pakhtun member was elected to the provincial assembly on a PPP ticket. Thus, the ANP, which would have only a negligible presence in Karachi, has now become a factor to be reckoned with.

The party was reinvigorated under the leadership of a rich businessman, Shahi Syed, who owns dozens of petrol pumps across the country. He is closely related to ANP Chief Asfandyar Wali. The party has started organising itself and opened offices in various parts of the city. The ANP’s government in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and its close links with the US in the war against terror also helped boost its position in Karachi.

The Muttahida responded to the increasing ANP role in the city politics by labelling all the Pakhtun political workers as the Taliban and land-grabbers. The MQM claims that Taliban and encroachment mafias are responsible for the Karachi violence. This allegation confuses the Pakhtun’s political assertion with two other separate phenomena. The ANP leaders say that the MQM is wary of the ANP’s inroads into the city politics. The ANP leaders also claim that the Muttahida is setting up new Mohajir localities to offset the Pakhtun votes.

An increase in the Pakhtun population in Karachi is also a concern for the Sindhis and the PPP because, in the long-run, it will hurt the Sindhi interests and cut into the PPP’s political base. But for the time being, the PPP has joined hands with the ANP on account of the immediate clash of interests with the MQM.

Mohajir vs Mohajir

In the Jan-July 2010 period, 34 Haqiqi men and 22 MQM workers have been shot to death. In 2009, at least 86 Haqiqi men were shot dead in target killings and 69 workers of MQM-Altaf lost their lives. To date, not a single murder has been resolved and no culprit has been brought to justice.

Violence breaks out as soon as some political party, especially Altaf Bhai’s splinter group, the MQM-Haqiqi, becomes active in the Muttahida territory. In 2009, following the general elections, the Haqiqi tried to restart its activities and its underground workers started surfacing. The Muttahida resisted strongly. A series of tit-for-tat target killings ensued between the two groups.

The Haqiqi has its pockets of support in Malir, Korangi, Landhi and Liaqatabad (aka Laloo Khait). In 1992, Gen Asif Nawaz launched a military operation against the MQM to explode the myth of Altaf Bhai. The then Corps Commander Karachi Gen Naseer Akhtar supervised the military drive and army’s intelligence agencies patronised the Haqiqi led by Afaq Ahmed and Amir Khan to counter the Altaf group.

However, Gen Musharraf put both the Haqiqi leaders behind the bars, unfreezing cases of heinous crimes against them in order to win the MQM-Altaf’s political support. The administration tightened noose around the Haqiqi group, and its Landhi headquarters (aka White House) and a sanctuary of its militants, was razed to earth. The Haqiqi men were either arrested or went into hiding.

Mohajir vs Sindhi

An estimated two million Sindhi-speaking people live in Karachi with a constant migration of educated Sindhis continuing. The Sindhi clusters in the city are situated in Gulistan-Jauhar, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Gulshan-e-Hadeed, Gulshan Town, behind the Airport terminal, Lyari and Gaddap. In addition, there are villages (goths) of the Sindhi population on the national highway from Karachi to Thatta.

Following the recent flooding, 30,000 displaced Sindhis from the flood’s worst affected areas including Thatta, Kahmore and Jacobabad have come to stay at Karachi’s relief camps. Thousands of other Sindhi families left their flood stricken homes to live with their relatives in the city. PPP’s Zulfikar Mirza seems to be quite active for the permanent settlement of these displaced families in the city. An estimated migration of 100,000 to 200,000 Sindhis in the city could have political implications.

On the other hand, the Muttahida’s efforts to creep into the PPP territory in Lyari are also a source of friction between the two parties who fought proxy battles through their client gangs during the last two years.

The Sindhi nationalist groups such as the Jeaye Sindh are also active in the city, especially among the students and in the real estate or the land encroachments, which pitch it against the MQM. This year, so far, two members of the Jeaye Sindh Mahaz have been shot dead.

Land-grabbing

All the parties, irrespective of ethnicity, are allegedly involved in land-grabbing and patronising builders’ illegal activities, but they blame each other. Thousands of acres of state land in Karachi have been encroached upon, including parks and playgrounds. The examples include Altaf Nagar, playgrounds and parks of North Nazimabad, Baldia Town, Sohrab Goth, parts of Gulistan-e-Jauhar, Gulshan-e-Iqbal and lately Payar Ali Allana’s vast acres of land at the national highway. Early this year, the provincial government launched a campaign against encroachments, though mostly focusing on the Pakhtun-dominated localities, but that too soon came to a halt for obvious reasons.

State response

Over the years, the Karachi police have consistently failed to check the target killings. The police may identify the suspects but is said to be not in a position to arrest and prosecute them because it works under immense political pressure. Most police officials have been appointed on political recommendations. The police’s morale is also low because a large number of police officials who had arrested and prosecuted the suspected militants during the mid-1990s were shot dead in target killings during the Musharraf regime. As the Muttahida remained in power for eight long years of the Musharraf regime, the police rank and file is now packed with its sympathisers.

A few months ago, the federal government empowered the paramilitary force, Rangers, to raid suspected places and arrest suspected men -- but with little let-up in the killing spree. At times, it seems the political parties’ militant wings act defying the party bosses. The backlash and riots on Raza Haider’s murder indicate that the city may burst into widespread violence any time unless some effective political initiative and strong administrative measures are taken.

Thousands of miles away, on the greens of UK, the Pakistan cricket team was locked in an exciting contest against Australia and then England. True, the wins were rare -- just two in six Test matches -- yet the nation found refuge from its unbearably harsh reality in the exploits of its fast bowlers. It was a sight to behold: 18-year-old Mohammad Aamir and Mohammad Asif tearing into their formidable opponents with their extraordinary pace and swing. It seemed Pakistan could rediscover its fast bowling prowess of the yore and spark off a cricketing revival. The team became a glimmer of hope for a nation drowning in sheer sorrow.

Pakistan, quite literally, became the news of the world -- its fast bowling sensations, Aamir and Asif were accused of bowling no-balls in the fourth test match against England, agreed upon between journalists working under cover and Mazhar Majeed.

Majeed was caught on the tape saying he would need to pay 4000 pounds each to captain Salman Butt, who was named the ring-leader, and the quickies for bowling, arguably, the most controversial no-balls in the annals of cricket.

Today, Pakistan is cricket’s graveyard, its players the hangmen of the game. People understood this instinctively and, for a change, reacted spontaneously. In Lahore, an angry mob pelted rotten tomatoes on donkeys named Asif, Aamir, Kamran and Salman. One of them said, "We are already facing so many problems... they took away our one source of joy".

Some think Butt and the two As -- Asif and Aamir -- have done greater disservice to Pakistan than those terrorists who attacked the Lankan cricket team last year. As former spinner and ex-chief selector Iqbal Qasim says, "Pakistan cricket has seen every possible mishap, but allegations of spot-fixing is one of the greatest. Let us see how our cricket comes out of it." Adds former captain Imran Khan, "There is a need to send out a message to youngsters -- crime does not pay…"

The possible loss of two As to Pakistan cricket could be the reason why the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) hasn’t shown alacrity in taking action against the spot-fixers. Perhaps the PCB bosses feared prompt suspension could provide the basis for their removal as well. Leading the clamour for their sacking is Iqbal Muhammad Ali, Chairman of the Pakistani National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Sports. He has threatened that his committee would resign should the government not change the PCB management and recall the accused players. It was in response to the nation’s outrage that the government thought it prudent to fly two senior officials of the Federal Investigation Agency to London for probing the charges. In addition, the International Cricket Council (ICC) has reportedly sent a strong message to the PCB asking it to suspend the guilty three.

Suspension can just heal the hurt to collective conscience. It isn’t likely to stamp out illegal betting, nor dissuade the players from taking the bookie’s bait for spot-fixing or match-fixing. The problem is systemic, it emanates from the cesspool that the PCB has become. The government replaces PCB officials on its whim; they, in turn, play favourites. Former PCB Chairman Arif Abbasi even accuses the PCB officials of being involved in the scam. He asks, "Why was Shoaib Malik taken back into the national team despite his alleged involvement in match-fixing? Why do they keep bringing back the same corrupt, banner players over and over again?"

Perhaps it is an exaggeration to implicate PCB officials in match-fixing, but there’s no denying that they have in the past condoned guilty players or allowed them to get away with punishment quite laughable. Justice Malik Mohammad Qayyum, who headed a judicial inquiry into match-fixing 10 years ago and who himself had to quit the superior judiciary on corruption charges, says: "Some of the players who I recommended should not be given any responsibility in team affairs are now associated with the team." He was referring to the current coach Waqar Younis, whom the Qayyum committee had fined then, and fielding coach Ijaz Ahmed, who also has several cases of fraud pending against him.

The presence of senior players and managers who have a dubious past creates an atmosphere conducive for match-fixing. Nor can they compel players to adhere to the prescribed norms. For instance, Aamir was caught talking on a mobile phone in the dressing room during an Asia Cup match between Sri Lanka and Pakistan in Dambulla earlier this year. Apparently, Mazhar Majeed, preliminary investigation suggests, was prowling around in the town. Had the authority taken exemplary action against him then, he and Pakistan could have been saved from the current embarrassment.

Similarly, the PCB simply lacked the ability to keep Asif away from the path of destruction.

Former captain Rameez Raja comments: "Aamir comes from a humble background. He is 18, with an impressionable mind, and if he has been keeping bad company, it’s possible he could have been drawn [into wrongdoing]. But if that’s the case, then the guys who got him in should be put behind bars because they’ve spoilt a grand career. They’ve infiltrated and spoilt a young mind, and it’s such a shocking state of affairs."

The ‘humble-background school of thought’ contends that circumstances drive certain players to maximise their earnings as quickly as possible, including by throwing away matches. Agrees another former PCB chairman Tauqir Zia, "Our cricketers come from humble backgrounds, they lack proper education and they think that their only chance to earn money is while they are playing. So they want to earn as much as they can."

But cricketers like Sarfaraz Nawaz scoff at such arguments. "As per the standard scale of salaries in Pakistan, the earnings of cricketers have made their lives into rags to riches stories. They receive far better salaries than those in other fields. These players have been conveniently let off each time they committed crimes."

Tauqir Zia links the menace to the changing values of Pakistani society. Greed for money has become its defining features. "Our players are part of this society", contends Zia. And spot-fixing has a particular allure because it is morally easy to justify -- a no-ball appears an innocuous crime to, say, match-fixing. It seems a good bargain for thousands of dollars. "But the match-fixing web is vicious. Once you enter it, there is no way out", he adds.

So then, what does Pakistan do? If cricket is indeed a metaphor for the nation, then perhaps the solution for Pakistan lies in rediscovering the innocence, values, it has lost in the past many years of vicious and violent politics.