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analysis region Bowing before the
market’s ‘power’ climate The dilemma of the
leadership Victim of neglect firstperson This is what politics
looks like
analysis Enigma of democratic governance Things are fluid at this stage but it would not be wrong to say that rolling back civilian governance is neither affordable nor feasible By Raza Rumi Pakistan’s
President Iskander Mirza (1956-58) is remarked to have said that democracy
was ‘unsuited’ to the genius of Pakistani people. Decades later,
similar questions about democratic form of governance are being raised in
Pakistan. Take any TV show, multitude of op-eds, or more worryingly, check
what the young people have to say on Facebook or Twitter. The parameters
of debate remain the same. The urban Pakistanis’
disdain for the ‘illiterate’, ‘rural’ politicians to rule the
country is a running theme. More importantly, the duality of
civil-military rule has generated a peculiar discourse: the weak and
corrupt ‘civilians’ compromise national security as opposed to
authoritarian regimes which guard ‘ideological’ and geographical
borders of the country. This is why we have seen
civilian governments come and go, especially in the past two decades with
charges of corruption and violation of national security. For instance,
Ghulam Ishaq Khan, while dismissing Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1993,
alluded to, among others, the charge of murdering General Asif Nawaz
Janjua, the Army Chief. Benazir Bhutto till her last remained a
‘security risk’ even when she compromised her principles and fully
supported and owned the Taliban policy of the 1990s. The grave sin of
Nawaz Shairf in his second tenure was attempting to secure peace with
India; and the gravest of all was allegedly plotting to kill the Army
chief in 1999 by diverting his flight. And now the ‘proof’
of this errant and traitorous behaviour is an unsigned memo sent to
Americans to contain Pakistan Army. Since the matter is soon going to be
subjected to an inquiry and perhaps judicial proceedings, it would be best
not to speculate any further than what has been reported, or shall we say,
trumpeted in the press. Prior to this, the provisions of
Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid legislation (passed by the US Congress) were
somehow considered to the handiwork of the civilian government. It eludes
commonsense as to how can a civilian government be so powerful to
influence a foreign legislature. But then, such tales require a willing
suspension of disbelief. The recent memogate
saga, not unlike the past occasions, has accelerated the pace of rumour-mongering
and has spurred obituaries of the civilian government. Perhaps even more
than the change-rhetoric generated by the October 30 rally of Pakistan
Tehreek e Insaaf (PTI) where the memo and its alleged author Pakistan’s
former Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani was named in public
as an official who may have compromised ‘national interest’. Most
media commentators are saying that a change is going to take place before
March 2012 Senate elections and the gathering storm of opposition
protests, inquiries against the civilians to plot against the national
security institutions, etc, are going to be the causes of this so-called
‘change’. Media pundits have also
deliberated on the various scenarios ranging from a government of
technocrats, dismissal of top elected leadership through what is
infamously known as the Kakar formula (forced resignations leading to an
election) to resignation of the government and dissolution of National
Assembly via street agitation. These extreme remedies involve some measure
of extra-constitutional leverage and ‘force’, which would result in
the political change. Pakistan is an unpredictable country, therefore,
forecasting is best avoided. Nevertheless, certain imperatives of our
overall state of nation need to be articulated. First, this is a 3 and a
half year old democratic order and undoing a legacy of decades and most
importantly the decade under Musharraf is not going to happen overnight.
Without essential agreements on rules of the game, democracy cannot take
root. These rules of the game have been set in some pretty interesting
ways during the past few years. The passage of 18th amendment means that
there is a consensus within the political elites to govern Pakistan with a
weaker centre. Any change to this wide consensus will be inimical to
future development of the country. Are the political parties thinking
about these issues? Furthermore, the rise of
PTI is a testament to a new political consciousness among the younger
Pakistanis who constitute a major population and voting group in the
country. With two thirds of Pakistan less than 26 years old, this is the
time for changing and reshaping the political discourse and not indulging
in smear campaigns or rolling back the democratic system in place. If the
PTI is able to generate sufficient public support with a good number of
electables it should rise as a third force in the country. And this is
good for democracy. It is in the interest of PTI to use democratic and
constitutional means (i.e a general election) to seek power. Pakistan’s
history tells us that whatever we may say about the politicians and
political parties, this route gives them the legitimacy in the long run. The second imperative is
the fragile state of security on our borders and within the country. The
war, originally ill-designed to be localised in border regions, is now
everywhere. No longer can it be handled via simplistic solutions (e g, end
the drones and there will be peace or let Only continued
democratic governance, strengthening of a pro-democracy public opinion and
values of tolerance will allow for gradual attainment of civilian
ascendancy. This is why both the alleged policies — of appeasement by
PPP and ANP; and belligerence by PML-N — are not going to work. Until
these parties stop pretending as more loyal than the King and agree to a
common framework, this is how things are going to be in the short to
medium terms. Therefore, revival of instruments such as Charter of
Democracy or using constitutional committees to incrementally resolve
thorny issues of power-imbalances is the best option available to the
political elites. Given that there is a
year or so left in the tenure of federal and provincial governments,
structural changes are not likely to happen. However, nothing stops the
parties to agree on a common national agenda and involve the security
establishment in this process. It may fail but it is better to undertake
this exercise rather than play the charades of passing rhetorical,
nationalistic parliamentary resolutions or declarations which Things are fluid at this
stage but it would not be wrong to say that rolling back civilian
governance is neither affordable nor feasible. A technocratic government
beyond ninety days will require judicial sanction; and the Honourable
Chief Justice has ruled out ratification of unconstitutional acts, as was
the case in the past. A noisy and ubiquitous
media is also a new phenomenon to handle for any government; and given
Pakistan’s state of affairs how long will the clean technocrats manage
the media? Most importantly, the new electoral rolls, which are being
prepared to strike out the bogus or dubious votes, are not going to be
ready before June 2012. This date is seven months away; so why this
rumpus? Instead of competing via
rallies, the political parties may like to devote a fraction of their
energies on their mandates, their policy plans, and how are they going to
rescue Pakistan from the current mess of uncertainty, poverty, inequality
and insecurity. As rational political players pitching for long-term
influence, this is what is going to salvage them and their stakes in
system. Backdoor entries, coups, technocrats have all been tried and they
failed to deliver. Can we please learn something from the past instead of
repeating it as a farce? www.razarumi.com
region The 17th South
Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit was held on
November 10 and 11, 2011 in Addu, Maldives. The theme of the summit was
“Building Bridges”. The theme reflected both physical connectivity and
figurative political dialogue. However, the notion of bridging differences
was represented as the overarching theme of the summit rather than any set
diplomatic or development aims. The stated objective of
this summit was to improve communication and collaboration throughout the
region. A number of concrete proposals were presented, including
reconnecting SAARC countries through sea channels besides strengthening
economic and diplomatic ties between different member nations for their
mutual benefit and prosperity. South Asia is
specifically unique in that it is home to 100 different languages, ten
different major religions and one fifth of the world’s population. The
Maldives is the lowest lying nation in the world, at the same time Nepal
has the planet’s highest points. With these differences, an attempt
could be made to use these as an opportunity to celebrate as a united
force to build bridges of friendship, peace and security. Attended by head of
states or governments of eight SAARC member countries and nine Observers,
including the US, the meeting achieved quite a number of stated
objectives. Like previous summits, this also could not attract public
attention for reasons of its being ineffective platforms to deliver to
basic public demands. Since its birth in
December 1985 at Dhaka, SAARC hasn’t been very successful in dealing
with problems and challenges of its member states many of whom represent
world’s poorest countries. Its objectives include: to bring development
and prosperity to the region, overcome challenges of the region’s more
than 1.5 billion people and achieve their aspirations. Over the last 26 years
some notable achievements of the forum include South Asian Free Trade
Area, SAARC Disaster Management Centre, SAARC Coastal Management Centre,
South Asian University, Inter Governmental Expert Group on Climate Change,
and Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation. However
some argue that these so called achievements are mere façade, meaningless
and ineffective. Unlike other regional
bodies (e.g. EU and ASEAN) SAARC is more of an association with lots of
noise and less action. None of its actions brought any measurable economic
development nor had any positive effect on people’s living standard. For
example; SAFTA, which was to be the engine to drive the regional trade and
economy, was crippled from the beginning. The big countries’ refusal to
bring down trade barriers and their unwillingness to give preferential
treatment to smaller economies, are some of the reasons of its failures. It may be argued that
the real objective of SAARC is of course not such ‘trivial’ benefits
when one talks about its responsibility to look after 1.5 billion lives.
Yet, the fact remains that as regional body one should look what it brings
to the whole region. The agreements before
the leaders were to establish a sea link between Pakistan, India and
Maldives, establish cross-regional railway, increase the number of
placements of South Asia University; and agree on disaster management
mechanisms. The summit did come up with a concrete plan in the end. The adoption of a
20-point Addu Declaration was a welcome progress of the summit. It
included commitments of member states on forging effective cooperation on
a host of areas, including economy, connectivity, climate change and food
security. Importantly, leaders agreed to direct SAFTA ministerial council
to intensify efforts to fully and effectively implement and reduce
sensitive lists as well as early resolution of non-tariff barriers and
expediting the process of harmonizing standards and customs procedures.
All these factors have limited the SAARC trade to 10 percent of its actual
potential. While the earlier
declarations have been disappointing over a “number of initiatives not
translating into tangible and meaningful benefits to the people, the Addu
declaration recognises the importance of bridging differences. Leaders also agreed to
direct the SAARC finance ministers to chart a proposal that shall allow
for greater flow of financial, capital and intra-regional long-term
investment. Agreements on holding the 12th SAARC Trade Fair along with
Travel and Tourism Fair in the Maldives in 2012; and developing modalities
by involving the relevant private sector in promoting the region globally
as ‘Destination South Asia’ are welcome features of the summit. Concluding on the
time-bound regional Railways Agreement and convening of Expert Group
Meeting on the Motor Vehicles Agreement before the next session of the
Council of Ministers; and directing a demonstration run of a container
train (Bangladesh-India-Nepal) are other refreshing conclusions of the
summit. A number of other
proposals on climate change, renewable energy investments, energy
cooperation and regional power exchange concepts were also agreed upon.
Summit also resolved operational issues related to the SAARC food bank by
the next session of the Council of Ministers ensuring its effective
functioning. Most importantly, a few
days before the summit India and Pakistan shared goodwill gestures as
Pakistan declared India as Most Favored Nation (MFN) thus announcing its
trade priorities. This announcement changed the mood and language of the
summit. It also helped in sorting out various outstanding issues. For years the forum has
not been able to achieve its basic objectives as two main powers of the
region were at the loggerhead with each other and have been consciously
trying to scuttle the progress on key regional matters. The forum’s
principle of consensus decision in its decision-making blocked several of
its useful proposals as in most cases India or Pakistan would disagree
with each other, hence blocking the consensus. The Addu summit made
progress due to these two countries agreeing to most of the proposals for
regional cooperation. Of the few critical
points was the issue of lifting the moratorium on expansion of observers
which was debated and remained inconclusive. The proposals to award
observer status to Turkey and interactive partnership of China were turned
down by India arguing the SAARC should strengthen its Secretariat and
begin implementing the decisions taken earlier. The final decision to
strengthen the SAARC mechanisms, including the Secretariat and Regional
Centres, came through an inter-governmental process, thus catering to
India’s desire to stabilize the organisation’s internal processes and
institutions instead of adding more Observers. Pakistan’s view for
undertaking a comprehensive review of all matters relating to the
SAARC’s engagement with observers, including the question of dialogue
partnership were also accommodated in the resolution. The mention of terrorism
in the Declaration was brief. But it touched most of the points with the
regional grouping, steering clear from mentioning “terrorist
sanctuaries,” a staple in India’s joint statements with other
countries. Apart from few
achievements the summits have not been taking people’s issues seriously,
hence losing credibility and acceptance. Matters related to
denuclearization of South Asia and declaring it a weapons-free zone
promoting liberal visa policies, binding commitments and progress on a
south Asian social charter did not get much attention. Similarly,
reviewing and updating the governing principles of SAARC for smooth
functioning of the forum were not even included in the summit’s agenda. It is indeed important
that the forum, while struggling with its reputation of being an
inefficient body, first works on those agreements besides making new
agreements. Also, it has to remove the ill feelings among themselves. So far, what we see are
more disagreements than agreements. The positive mood created at Addu
summit can change the directions and culture of this regional body,
provided this mood continues and not fall victim to narrow national
interests or other so called “security imperatives”. The journey to make this
region prosperous is still long and the dream for making this region
prosperous will take more serious efforts to realize. The writer is Deputy
Chief of South Asia Partnership Pakistan and Global Campaigner irfanmufti@gmail.com
Bowing
before the market’s ‘power’ Much has been
written in Pakistan and outside about mullah-military alliance but no
attention has been given to document the enormous financial support to
clergy from the market. The term bazaar in
Pakistan refers to traders occupying big markets that have always played a
pivotal role in economics and politics of the country. These markets are
well represented through traders’ bodies and chambers. Though their
contribution in total tax collection is negligible, they are rich and
mighty; always keen to contribute generously for any cause that is
declared “scared” by the Mullah. It is thus not surprising that
mullah-bazaar alliance is the root cause of many ills in Pakistan ranging
from religious militancy to open tax defiance. On November 21, 2011,
the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) withdrew 5 percent tax imposed under
SRO1021(I)/2011 of 4 November 2011 under protest of traders and also
extended for the third time date of filing of income tax
returns/statements till 30 November 2011. According to a news
report, Chairman All Karachi Tajir Ittehad (AKTI) warned the FBR on 17
November 2001 saying “traders will not file tax returns if the disputed
conditions are not omitted”. Reportedly, he said the traders would
“not refrain from turning violent in order to stop tax recovery teams in
the markets” for which committees had already been constituted. This open defiance of
tax laws by traders is not new in Pakistan. Historically, they defeated
all moves by the government aimed at documentation of economy. This time
their main protest is against disclosure of personal expenditures in the
income tax return (introduced by the FBR through annexure D). In October 2011, the
market power successfully forced FBR to defer till 1 January 2012
disclosure of details of unregistered persons in monthly sales tax
returns. Before that in March 2011, the powerful chambers, trade bodies
and manufacturers, through an extravagant media campaign, compelled FBR to
abandon long-overdue move of bringing all the taxable persons in the tax
net — only 1.9 million filed tax declarations in 2010 against actual
potential of 20 million. These and all other similar efforts by FBR for
widening of tax base and collecting proper taxes from leading markets of
the country have been frustrated by traders’ bodies and chambers in the
country. The bazaar —
represented by KCCI, LCCI, RCCI, ICCI, FCCI, SCCI, All Pakistan
Anjuman-e-Tajiran, Qaumi Tajir Ittehad and several other trade and
commerce bodies — is united against FBR. For not paying taxes due from
them, corruption in FBR is their main argument (or pretext). They
frequently call press conferences and arrange seminars and workshops to
spat venom against FBR, especially against any move aimed at documenting
of the economy. Each time, they successfully force the government to
withdraw any law they do not like. The power of the market
and corrupt officials of FBR managed to defeat introduction of Value Added
Tax (VAT) — later renamed as Reformed GST — and our Finance Minister,
Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, while addressing convocation in Karachi on December 4
2010, frankly conceded that “one-third of the country’s population is
below the poverty line and the elite are still reluctant to pay taxes and
are resisting reforms.” The unholy alliance
between the traders and tax collectors is depriving the State of billions
of rupees. The seasoned and skilful tax administrators in FBR wrongly pose
that they are at war with the traders. In fact, they manage to get
concessions for them by posing that tough decisions are that of the
Finance Minister alone. Their tough posture towards traders is a tactical
move to mint more money from the unscrupulous elements in industry. According to FBR’s
data as on 10 December 2010, for tax year 2009, 34 leading markets in
Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Multan and Peshawar
paid meagre income tax of Rs. 1.273 billion (total net income tax
collection this year was 528.669 billion) vide 12,311 tax declarations
against 36,157 registered taxpayers. Leading markets of Karachi, namely,
Burns Road, Forum Mall, Hyderi, Jodia Bazaar, Park Towers and Tariq Road
paid total tax of Rs. 658,398,237 filing 2,438 declarations against actual
cases of 5,933. In Islamabad, traders of Aabpara Market, Jinnah Super,
Melody and Super Market filed 321 returns/statements against total cases
of 1,256 paying Rs. 26,556,428. In Lahore, total
declarations from Akbari Mandi, Anarkali, Azam Cloth Market, Brandreth
Road, Ferozepur Road, Ichra, Liberty, Moon Market, Shah Alam Market and
Defence Y Block Market were 6,368 (actual cases 19,183), paying total tax
of Rs. 435,532,886. From Rawalpindi 2,013
tax declarations were filed against actual cases of 5,596 in Moti Bazaar,
Raja Bazaar and Saddar showing total payment of Rs. 107,012,940. From
Faisalabad, 31 declarations were filed against actual cases of 69 in
Makkah Centre, Raheem Centre and The Ione Plaza paying Rs. 127,815 only. In Multan, the total
declarations were 27 against actual registered cases of 78 in Hassan
Arcade, Madni Trade Centre and Raheem Centre with total payment of just Rs.
261,462. From Peshawar, only 935 tax declarations were filed against
registered taxpayers of 935 in Khyber Bazaar, Namak Mandi, Qisa Khawani
and Saddar, paying total amount of Rs. 45,834,824. In all these markets,
registered sales tax cases as on 10 December 2010 were only 4090. In the beginning of
2000, shop-to-shop survey (National Tax Survey) was conducted with the
army’s help and there was hope that all the traders would be brought
into tax net, but soon it proved to be yet another illusion. After a
long-drawn battle, marred by bitterness, hostility and closure of
businesses, the government and the traders finally concluded an agreement
on August 22, 2000 in Islamabad by virtue of which it was decided that
retailers and shopkeepers would be given an option to opt for a new slab
of 1 percent turnover tax, without being registered under the sales tax
regime. It was really shocking that the military regime of Musharraf
having no electoral obligations also succumbed to the pressure of the
market and since then bazaar walas have defied all measures for
documentation of economy. All governments in
Pakistan asserted to extend retail sales tax to all the exempted areas of
economy, but failed to do so. After realising that it might lead to tax
revolt in the country, even the strong military regime of Musharraf
decided to save its own skin by striking a deal with the powerful shutter
lobby. The traders/retailers
from the very beginning have maintained that they would not pay sales tax
on each and every transaction — for this they even confronted the armed
forces in 2000. Documentation, despite
the main demand of IMF, has proved to be yet another unrealised dream.
Pakistan at the moment is struggling hard to overcome monstrous fiscal
deficit (over Rs. one trillion) and come out of unsustainable debt burden
(nearly Rs. 14 trillion). In these circumstances, the government instead
of succumbing to pressures from vested interests, must ensure proper
compliance of taxes. It must negotiate with
traders’ bodies and chambers ensuring them that if they pay taxes
honestly and diligently, the same will be spent for the welfare of the
masses. A national consensus on fair and just tax policy is the only hope
for coming out of fiscal deficit and debt enslavement. The writers, tax lawyers
and authors of many books on Pakistani tax laws, are Adjunct Professors at
Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS).
climate South Asia is
environmentally a fragile region. Its mountains, rivers, seas forests, and
biodiversity are susceptible to the emerging challenges of climate change.
Whether these are deltas of Bangladesh, mountains of Nepal, Afghanistan
and Bhutan, planes of India and Pakistan, and islands of Maldives, region
has an economy linked with natural capital. With economy and natural
capital, societies build their social and political fabric. Since South
Asia is a poverty, food insecurity, and conflict-prone region, the
importance of climate change in relation to its political economy is
significant. When combined with
effects of climate change on dryland production systems, the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates that the aggregate effect
of climate change is likely to be a significant reduction in total
agricultural productivity. The greatest adverse impacts of climate change
on people are expected in South Asia. In the next 40 years, child
malnutrition is expected to increase by 20 percent as a direct result of
climate change. There is no exaggeration
in claiming that since the economy is predominantly agriculture and
livestock driven, the industrial capability is also linked with the
agriculture sector. While major source of income generation is fragile,
the rest of the economy and social wellbeing can be seriously damaged with
any changes in climatic conditions. Once economy and social
wellbeing is destabilised, there are chances that conflicts start
resurfacing in this part of the world. Water can be a major source of
conflict which needs to be used in a sustainable way. In many cases,
subsidies encourage exploitation of water at unsustainable rates. The
Economist in 2009 reported that in India’s Punjab Province, electricity
for groundwater pumping is supplied to farmers either at a heavily
subsidised price or for free. It appears that South
Asia needs to focus on developing a green policy and investment circle
around agriculture, fisheries, water, and forests. At the same time, the
modernisation process needs investments in clean and renewable energy,
waste management, efficient buildings and transport while brining special
focus on cities. It must be noted that waste and recycling activity is
similarly labour-intensive. For example, according a report by ILO in
Dhaka, Bangladesh, a project for generating compost from organic waste
helped create 400 new jobs in collection activities and 800 new jobs in
the process of composting. The South Asia Women’s
Network argues that South Asia shoulders a global ecological crisis,
including climate change and species extinction. The melting of the
Himalayan glaciers, the intensification of droughts, floods, and cyclones
and the rising sea level aggravate the already-serious ecological stresses
in the region. The network claims that
the element of harmony with nature is desired. Rather than increasing
resource depletion in non-renewable ways, ecosystem balance should be
achieved. It is worthwhile to mention that there has been cases of
over-exploitation — around the world a considerable proportion of
aquifers and river systems are overused. It has been estimated that 15
percent of India’s total agricultural production is being delivered via
groundwater depletion. It can be argued that
Rio+20 offers a real opportunity to scale-up and embed green economy
perspectives in South Asia. Moving towards green economy has the potential
to achieve sustainable development and eradicate poverty on an
unprecedented scale. It required putting more burden on our moral
resources than natural resources. At the same time there
is a need to understand that the natural environment forms the basis of
our physical assets and must be managed as a source of growth and
well-being. It requires reallocating public and private investments —
spurred through appropriate policy reforms and enabling conditions — is
needed to build up natural capital such as forests, water, soil and fish
stocks. In this way, major problems of food security can perhaps be
resolved. It is possible that
green investments enhance new sectors and technologies that will be the
main sources of economic development and growth of the future: renewable
energy technologies, resource and energy efficient buildings and
equipment, low-carbon public transport systems, infrastructure for fuel
efficient and clean energy vehicles, and waste management and recycling
facilities. In countries like India
and Pakistan, rigidities of an infrastructure and industrial base can pose
serious challenges. While new technologies can bring growth, it must be
seriously thought that unnecessary and trade protectionism does not start
seeping in. Pakistan has decided to accord MFN status to India. This
opportunity must be utilized for technology and knowledge transfer for the
greater good of the region. Some possible indicators can be improvement in
climate smart infrastructure and increase in investment for clean energy
production. In promotion of green
economy media has a very important role to play. The Hindu Kush region
countries can promote green economy — an economy which is low-carbon and
resource-efficient. It is possible through media highlighting advantages
of green economy, educating public on the subject and by providing guided
action. How to manage a smooth
and fair transition from a brown economy to a green one at each nation
state level? One possible answer can be bringing focus on capacity
building, training and educational efforts. UNEP in 2008 argued that In
Nepal, for instance, incentives for private sector participation in
capacity-building events and the implementation of sustainable action
plans have helped to increase their access to international sustainable
tourism markets, improved project performance and stimulated interest
among other companies, creating synergies throughout the industry. The
lesson can be spread to the whole of South Asia. The writer is a Project
Assistant with Impact Consulting, Pakistan. www. impactconsulting.com.pk
The
dilemma of the leadership A significant
question in Pakistani politics is whether our largest political party —
the PPP —is incapable of understanding the crisis or is deliberately
ignoring it? The internal crisis of the party pertains to a bond of
attachment between party leadership and party workers. Evidently, in the
context of various conflicts, some personalities in the party thought they
could fight and win on ideological front inside the party structure. None
of them was equal to the task. For example Dr Mubashar Hassan, Ghulam
Mustafa Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Lughari,
Naheed Khan, Safdar Abbasi, Dr Zulfiqar Mirza, and Yousaf Talpur, etc,
parted ways with the Bhutto family and the party workers turned a deaf ear
to them. It is said that the PPP
cadre is tied with the leadership ideologically and the same is the real
asset of the party. Some say that party workers cannot even think of
betraying the party. At times, people’s party has enjoyed warm and
enthusiastic support from intelligentsia groups, including writers, poets,
professors, students and labour unions but the party drove them away
through a negative attitude. That’s why, to some supporters, it has
become almost impossible to defend and justify the role of party
leadership. The resentment of some
party workers is justified when we see that they are not involved in
policy making and decision-making process by the leadership. In
parliamentary democracy, the central executive committee in the party is
regarded as the backbone. But the People‘s party, for the last three
years, has preferred to run the government and affairs of the state
without going to the CEC. Party leaders do avoid
talking to the common man. What to talk of an ordinary citizen, some
critics believe, party workers are becoming victims of exploitation at the
hand of party leadership and government institutions. One can explore several
causes behind this dilemma, but an important factor is that leaders who
are in good books of President Zardari have captured important slots in
the party and government as well. The veterans backed by Benazir Bhutto
have got disappeared. Formerly the party was criticized by the political
opponents and intelligentsia for not having internal democratic culture
and practices. But in the situation
that we have in hand workers and leaders have started criticising the
party. In addition to Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the list of party critics and
deserters includes: Aitezaz Hassan, Raza Rabbani, Dr Zulfiqar Mirza, Dr
Israr shah, Nasir Shah, Rana Ikram Rabbani, Nabeel Gabool, Yousaf Talpur,
Naheed Khan, Safdar Abbassi and others, raising their voice. Dr Zulfiqar Mirza is
mainly responsible for creating hype by revealing corrupt practices of
Provincial ministers and provincial party president and other leadership.
Initially, Mirza was considered a mouthpiece of President Zardari but
these days the anger of Mirza, it seems, can prove disastrous for the
party. One possibility for the PPP can be that the party forms an alliance
of Sindhi nationalist parties in coming election. We see a situation where
the party has got some grip over a number of issues. Coalition partners
are going smooth, the doctrine of reconciliation is fruitful, apparently
the establishment is satisfied and remarkable achievements like NFC award
and 18th amendment go to the credit of people’s party. In spite of all
these positive points the challenge to reduce the disappointment of party
workers remains unfulfilled. Still, party’s
political compromise with MQM, PML (Q) and ANP is not being disapproved by
the party cadre. Similarly, the performance of ANP government in KP can
cause a severe political damage to the PPP. In the 1970s the party enjoyed
vast popularity in both urban and rural areas of Punjab. But now the party
has become weak and fragile. At present, People’s
party does not seem to matter in Lahore on the political front as Nawaz
Sharif and Imran Khan Politics are the main players. It is incumbent on
party leadership to think why the party is losing popularity in the cities
of Punjab and why the communication gap between workers and leadership is
widening. To the People’s
party’s surprise, a number of party workers and leaders are thinking to
join other political forces such as the PTI. However, it is an established
fact that people’s party is a respected political force in Pakistan for
its democratic struggle. Is it true that the party is losing its sheen at
the hand of its leadership surrounded by pseudo leaders or is it the other
way round? The writer is political
analyst and can be reached at salmanabidpk@gmail.com)
Victim
of neglect In the
sub-continent, cooperative movement was initiated during British Raj. The
British rulers wanted to wean the cotton growers from the clutches of
village moneylenders so that the farmer takes more interest in producing
cotton for use in the British Textiles Industry way back in England. The ambit of the
cooperative movement was around those agriculture products and services
only which benefited the British Industries. Slowly and gradually, the
benefits of cooperative movement were realised by desi Urban Class of the
sub-continent. To regulate cooperative movement, various legislations were
made. The 1925 Cooperative Act is the last legislation which applies to
all cooperative ventures in Pakistan since independence. The current Act
is inadequate because it ignores several requirements of an independent
country with its own socio-economic preferences. Sindh was the main
province that made full use of cooperative movement in the field of
housing. The reason being the refugees who came to Karachi, Hyderabad and
Sukkar from India belonged to the educated middle class or they were
experienced artisans. That is why until 1960, we find many cooperative
housing societies coming up in Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkar and Mirpur Khas,
whereas, in Punjab, we do not find any cooperative housing worth
mentioning in the same period. Of course, Model Town Cooperative Housing
Society Lahore was established 25 years before partition. The architects
of this society were highly educated affluent Hindus and Sikhs. From 1960 to 1974, we
can find a very few cooperative housing societies in Lahore. Soon after
1974, there was a mushroom growth of cooperative and commercial housing
societies in the Punjab, especially in Lahore. In 1973, Federal Housing
Act was approved during Z.A. Bhutto’s government. This Act was criticised.
Through this Act, the government could acquire any land for housing
purpose by paying a very miserly compensation of Rs.2500/- per Kanal. The
Lahore Development Authority and other housing development authorities in
Punjab and also in Sindh, were created under the Housing Act 1973. Not
only that, the Housing Act 1973 was cruel but also, the rules of business
of development authorities were coercive and were made in such a way that
corruption and useless litigation was the result. However, the rate of
compensation for the land acquired by development authority was amended by
the Superior Courts and from then onward, the development authority has to
pay compensation for the land according to the market rates. With the passage of
time, awareness of the benefits of cooperative housing spread throughout
the Punjab, particularly in Lahore. Several
hundred cooperative housing societies grew in Punjab. Many of them were
not manageable due to poor experience of the sponsors of failed
cooperative housing societies. Some of them ended up by cheating and
defrauding their members. Sometimes, this was done with the connivance of
lower functionaries of cooperative department. With the passage of
time, good cooperative housing societies emerged and flourished and as of
today, only efficient societies have survived despite very hostile,
un-sympathetic and discriminatory treatment by the Development
Authorities. There are some examples.
The LDA and for that matter all development authorities, including
Government Housing Department, do not differentiate between cooperative
and commercial housing. Commercial developers work for profits. Barring a
very few, all commercial developers rip the customers by lowering the
development quality and resorting to high pressure marketing gimmicks to
attract clients. Cooperative housing
cannot grease the palm of functionaries of the development authorities.
The cooperative housing works with members’ money. The development
authorities give tough time to cooperative housing because they cannot
cough up ‘speed money’. Approval of town plan is delayed to frustrate
the management of a cooperative housing society. Cooperative housing
works for social welfare motives. It is an NGO duly regulated by the
government. Private and commercial developers do not have welfare motives.
The private (commercial) developer, once he sells his estate, he is out of
the circuit. He is not bound under the law to service the estate after the
sale is complete. The cooperative management is legally bound to provide
all services for all time to come and if a cooperative management fails to
render municipal and maintenance services, it is held responsible and can
be interrogated and punished. Private developers do not have such fears. Cooperative sector
housing is bound to provide social infrastructure (schools, mosques,
clinics, clubs, etc) whereas the commercial developer may leave the space
for social infrastructure but may not build it. No doubt, some prestigious
and reliable commercial developers provide lavish amenities and pristine
social infrastructure. But they are very few. Cooperative network of
housing in the South-West of Lahore has provided huge road infrastructure
(over 327 km) and about 80,000 housing units with modern amenities such as
playgrounds, parks, community clubs, shopping arcades, security, school
and colleges (through out-sourcing). The sense of social
responsibility of cooperative housing can be realised from the fact that
as soon as the scourge of dengue epidemic spread in Lahore, the
Association of Cooperative Housing Societies Punjab tightened its belts
and advised all the housing societies throughout the province to take
anti-dengue measures. The Secretary Cooperative visited all the Lahore
cooperative housing societies. The cooperatives spent their finances to
fight the dengue monster. Neither media nor political government took
notice of such a gigantic and expensive exercise by cooperative housing in
Lahore and in other cities of Punjab. We expect from all
concerned, the government, development authorities, Provincial and Federal
Taxation Department and our public to distinguish between Housing
Cooperatives and Commercial Housing. Cooperative Housing should not be
judged as private housing. The writer is a retired
bank executive with twenty seven years of overseas assignments
firstperson The News on
Sunday (TNS): When did you choose to become a historian and research on
the Mughal period? Harbans Mukhia (HM):
There is no compelling reason for that. There was no one in the family to
guide me. At Banaras, I heard of Indian Administrative Service and was
told that history provides an easy entry into it. I came to Delhi to study
history and came into contact with my Guru, Dr K M Ashraf, the great
historian of medieval India and a Communist leader. I forgot all about IAS
and tried to emulate Dr Ashraf; as a historian but could not become a
patch on him. TNS: What is the
definition of feudalism in your words? HM: I think feudalism is
impossible to define because the notion of feudalism evolved in Europe
somewhere in the late 18th century when what came to be identified as
feudalism had died out some three or four centuries earlier. Two things
need be noted here: the notion of feudalism evolved in Europe in the
European context and it evolved after the demise in the wake of the rise
of capitalism. It was thus understood as the residue of the European past,
as everything that was ‘modern’ was not. In other words, feudalism was
never understood in its own terms, but in terms of its adversary,
capitalism. It could thus never acquire a universally applicable
definition of its own, except for a vague definition of all that is
medieval, oppressive, backward, cruel… ‘not modern’. TNS: What difference can
we see between feudalism in Mughal era and the British imperialism? HM: First, very few
historians are willing to characterise Mughal India as feudal. Second,
between Mughal period and the period of British colonialism, virtually
every structure gets metamorphosed: economic, administrative, cultural,
social, educational, legal, even the mode of dressing. Yet, in India at
least, a great deal of Mughal culture still survives. The most telling
metaphor for this survival is that ever since 15th August 1947, the Prime
Minister of independent India delivers the Independence Day speech from
Shah Jahan’s Red Fort in Delhi. The Red Fort symbolises the most
compelling feature of Mughal legacy to India, i.e., the power of an
inclusive, rather than an exclusive culture, a culture that is shared by
all groups of Indians, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians. The BJP and its
allies are hell bent upon destroying this legacy, but are nowhere near
success. TNS: Do you think there
is a kind of feudalism in India? HM: As a residual term
of abuse, yes; as a category of serious historical analysis, no. TNS: There is a debate
in Pakistan about feudalism. One point of view is that there is no
feudalism but it is the feudal mindset. Is Hamza Alvi’s thesis of
military, civilian, feudal, industrialist elite ruling Pakistan still
valid? HM: I am aware of the
debate in Pakistan and in fact have participated in it in the pages of a
newspaper a few years ago. My answer is nearly the same as the one to the
preceding question. As for Hamza Alvi’s thesis, it really boils down to
elites vs the masses. That’s true everywhere, around the world, at all
times. The current protests in the West proclaiming ‘we are the 99
percent’ expresses the same dichotomy. TNS: How do you look at
Pakistan India relations? What measures do you suggest for further
improvement? HM: If our ruling
classes on both sides had been wise, South Asia would have the envy of the
world. But they have invested so much in continuance of tension and
conflict that both India and Pakistan figure at nearly the bottom of the
table in any measurement of prosperity, happiness, health, education,
gender equality or any other criterion. Of course, the top 1 or 2 percent
in both countries have acquired big amounts of wealth. I think the role of
the state on both sides remains crucial. We have seen many times that
whenever the state has sought to ease tensions, people have responded
enthusiastically; so too whenever the state has sought to heighten
tensions. But where people’s movements can intervene it is to force the
respective states to alter their agenda and tilt it towards peace and
exchange, both commercial and cultural. People’s movements have the
ability to set agenda for the state in a democratic set up. TNS: How about Pakistani
and Indian scholars teaching in each other’s country? HM: To begin with, let
us have students from each country going to universities in the other
country. As of now, even the notion of student visa does not exist. I know
of just one single instance of one Pakistani student, Atiya Khan, having
studied and obtained an M A and an M.Phil degree from an Indian
University, i.e. Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. She is now
finishing her Ph.D at Chicago University. And perhaps no Indian student
has ever studied in a Pakistan University. That’s a shame for both
countries. The exchange of teachers can come later. Same should apply for
students. TNS: What are you doing
these days and what do you intend to do in future? HM:
I retired from service in 2004 after teaching medieval Indian and
medieval European history first at Delhi University for 11 years and then
at JNU for 33 years. I am settled in Gurgaon on the outskirts of New
Delhi. I have not sought, nor taken any further employment or a Fellowship
or a project. In the time I have, I, along with some colleagues, edit The
Medieval History Journal, published by SAGE Publications from New Delhi,
London, Washington, Los Angeles and Singapore. It is a unique journal in
that it covers the whole of the medieval world. Some new books, either my
own or edited by me, have been and are being published. I also like to
write in newspapers on current issues. A couple of times in a year I
participate in seminars/discussions or give lectures in India and abroad.
Not least, for the past over six years I have been learning to play the
flute. TNS: How do you look at
Pakistani scholarship, historians? HM:
Much to my regret, I do not find history-writing in Pakistan
awe-inspiring. This is largely because there is an absence of that one
essential requisite for intellectual vigour: fierce debate. I realised the
enormous power of debate when my essay, “Was There Feudalism in Indian
History?” published in the eminent British journal, The Journal of
Peasant Studies in 1981 led to a long lasting international debate from
1985 to 1993 in the JPS. I
would have remained intellectually much poorer minus that marvelous
debate. Within India, too, constant almost unrelenting discussion, debate,
argument, contention occurs almost every day. I do not find that vigour in
Pakistani historians’ writings. Mercifully, a historian like Mubarak Ali
still keeps opening all kinds of cans of worms for Pakistani history
reading public. We need a dozen more like him.
This
is what politics looks like The National
Students Federation (NSF) held its first convention in more than two
decades this past Friday and Saturday (25-26 November) in Faisalabad. For
those associated with the NSF in its heyday from the 1960s through the
1980s, the name of the organisation itself evokes intense feelings.
Today’s young people, on the other hand, have neither been exposed at
all either to the progressive ideals that informed — and still do inform
— the NSF, nor are able to really identify what constitutes a
left-of-centre political programme. It is in this extremely challenging
context that a handful of dedicated students decided to rebuild the NSF
approximately four years ago. The Faisalabad
convention brought together students from approximately 15 districts of
Punjab — the organisers decided to initiate work first in the
country’s largest province. Representatives of student organisations
operating in other provinces, and sharing basic political principles, were
asked to attend so as to link Punjab’s progressives with those in the
rest of Pakistan. These included the Sindhi Shagird Tanzeem, Baloch
Students Organisation, Pashtun Students Organisation and Progressive Youth
Front. Left-wing parties and intellectuals were also present — the
convention was thus one of the first gatherings of progressives from
across Pakistan in many years. Given the divisions that wrack the
Pakistani polity, on this count alone the convention was a roaring
success. The NSF convention was
also a rebuttal, as it were, to the fashionable ‘change agents’
currently garnering a lot of attention in the country and beyond. Much has
been said in recent times about change and the role of young people in it.
But little has been said about how this change will be brought about, in
light of the complex conflicts raging within Pakistani society and the
whims of regional geo-politics. Indeed, for all the rhetoric there is
almost no recognition of how difficult it will be to effect change in the
face of resistance from entrenched interests (particularly the Empire and
the military establishment), and the teetering yet resilient economic and
political structures that keep Pakistan’s people enslaved. It is true that leftist
ideas are considered by most in this day and age to be anachronisms. But
the NSF convention at least featured open discussion and debate on the
proposals for change favoured by today’s leftists. For example, how will
the three-tiered educational system — English-medium, public school,
madrassah — be dismantled and replaced by a universal system of
education? How long a period of transition must be allowed before such a
universal system can be properly institutionalized and fully accepted by
society? Similarly, what is required for the state to reclaim its
responsibility to guarantee a minimum level of education — and for that
matter other basic amenities such as health, housing and employment — to
all citizens regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender and other such
identities? How can progressive ideas become common currency in society
again given the tremendous power of the media to manipulate public opinion
and act as a mouthpiece for state ideology? Of course, the NSF
convention — or any other such event — is only one step in the
long-term effort to rehabilitate progressive politics in this country. It
will be a long time before the ideological and organisational monopoly of
reactionary forces will be definitively challenged, but it is necessary
for armchair critics to be clear that there is no substitute to
(old-fashioned) political organising. It boggles the mind that so many
progressives seem to have forgotten that change will only take place when
established structures of power are confronted by popular forces, and
accordingly that popular forces must be organised to play this historic
role. Imran Khan and others like him are absolutely correct that informed
and mobilised youth must be at the forefront of a politics of change. The
PTI does not represent a politics of change, but progressives sitting
around and moping about ‘extremism’ and ‘corruption’ are hardly
doing the cause any favours either. The hundreds of student
delegates in Faisalabad would be right to feel betrayed by the older
generations of progressives who have left the former to fend for
themselves. The paucity of progressive political alternatives in today’s
Pakistan is explained in large part by the withdrawal of erstwhile
leftists from active political involvement during and immediately after
the Zia dictatorship. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also
contributed to what by the end of the decade was a total vacuum in
progressive thought and politics. The young people who
decided to revive the NSF did so in spite of this lack of guidance and
continuity. They did so because they recognise the need to take it upon
themselves to address the multiple problems of society and the broader
world in which they live. It is still as true today as it was four decades
ago that youth alone possess the idealism and romance that are the
essential ingredients for any political movement worth its salt to take
shape and ultimately be successful. But young people without clarity and a
dose of pragmatism can also resemble a loose canon. It is unfortunate that
so many Pakistani progressives of the previous generation have chosen not
to be part of the revived NSF and the building of a new political movement
more generally. Of course, history does not wait for anyone — it unfolds
according to its own logic, and only those who seek to shape it are
remembered in its annals. It is not enough to
simply identify all that is wrong in today’s Pakistan — too many
people settle only for cold analysis. Much more valuable are those who
seek to fix the problems, to the best of their ability. Let us not forget
that many young people look at Imran Khan not necessarily as a saviour,
but as an untried option. Frankly, it does not surprise me that some are
flocking to the PTI despite their discomfort with many of the party’s
stated political positions. Only when we have built a genuine progressive
alternative can we legitimately expect the hollow rhetoric of today’s
‘change agents’ to be exposed. The brave youth who came out with their
red flags and powerful slogans on Faisalabad’s streets this past weekend
are among the very few who are not just talking the talk but also walking
the walk. |
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