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Editorial parallels 'No
intervention again if judiciary is independent' 'Army
needs to pull out for its own survival' Democracy
of transition
When ex-servicemen start complaining about military's involvement in politics, talk of restoration of judiciary to its pre-Nov 3 status and think of marching on the Constitution Avenue to demand resignation of the president and to call for free and fair elections in the country, perhaps it is time to take the COAS letter regarding military's withdrawal from politics a little more seriously. At this very meeting of ex-servicemen in Rawalpindi -- generals, air-marshals and all -- some recall similar such letters written in earlier military regimes, leading to nothing. This time, they assert, the country could not afford to ignore the contents of the letter. Our last chance, they warn. But military away from politics was a conclusion we thought was too early to draw. Before that military IN politics was a subject that merited an academic and analytical treatment. There was a clear need for an understanding of what and how the military was brought into politics, and getting an insight into the historical and structural reasons. As a country we paid a heavy price to be able to reach a point where each one of us is ready to tread the hitherto 'no-go' area. But that is where the silver lining lies. When the beneficiaries of an exploitative system start questioning the system, for the good of the people at large, for strengthening institutions, we can only move forward from that point. Of course, the trail-blazers remain the lawyers and the judges who showed the way by making huge personal sacrifices, the media was quick to follow, and now it was the armed forces turn to take the first step. In doing so, the institutions have not only shown light to others, they have strengthened each other. In the case of military, at least, the doubts and misgivings are many. Whether it's a temporary withdrawal that is being sought to recapture its lost image or is it a genuine realisation that military has no business to be in politics? Are they trying to make a scapegoat out of Musharraf by these careful leaks that military was only a reluctant partner all along? These are all questions that are not too easy to answer. We try to find these answers in history, from a historian and from someone who was writing history by doing politics himself.
What was a trickle in the '80s has grown into a torrent in the current decade By I. A. Rehman It should be hoped that the new call for extricating the military from civil assignments is not a flash in the pan and that it represents a genuine effort to redesign the state's administrative structure. The undertaking is as
difficult as it is urgent. The problem under reference has been aggravated by In the administrative model Pakistan inherited from the colonial masters the military services were religiously shielded from exposure to the mess and temptations of civil works. They were allowed to enter the civilian domain only to deal with disasters and disturbances that the civil administration could not manage and that only on the latter's request. The British believed, rightly or wrongly, that military officers' involvement with civilian jobs could undermine their discipline and divert them from their essential responsibilities. Although General Ayub Khan was responsible for a fatal break with this tradition when he chose to partner Ghulam Mohammad in the latter's quarrel with politicians who, with all their faults, represented the people more than him, he did not altogether disregard the British thinking. He withdrew military officers from civilian jobs quite early in his reign and depended on his civilian advisers -- Shoaib, Akhtar Husain, Kalabagh, Mahbub ul Haq, Fida Husain, et al, perhaps more than on his brothers-in-arms. General Yahya feigned respect for the Ayub model for a short period but did the military great disservice by sending out military officers to bribe and buy out politicians, a practice that has kept Air Marshal Asghar Khan angry for over a decade. To General Zia goes the credit for developing the thesis of civil-military partnership and military's permanent role in politics. Under him the military's share of civilian responsibility increased to a great extent. But what was a trickle in the '80s grew into a torrent in the current decade. The present structure's incapacity to meet the demands of an efficient and just order is quite visible. The reason in a sentence is that the base of the pyramid of national talent used in administration has shrunk to a short line. Further, all monopolies and reservations breed stagnation and reduce a community's ability to move with times. This has been happening to Pakistan's state apparatus. While growing more and more coercive it is becoming less and less efficient and benevolent. The civil bureaucracy has been punished more than it deserved and its members look totally demoralised and even afraid of blurting out a healthy idea if they stumble on one. This model is on the verge of collapse, as apparent from the recession of the government's writ in various fields. Any further delay in revising the administrative set-up will imperil vital national interests. Fortunately, it is possible to organise reforms in such a manner as to cause minimum disruption or offence to either camp's sensibilities. The secondment of military officers to civilian posts has been one of the main issues in debate. To say that all military officers are unqualified for the jobs assigned to them will be as grossly unfair and wrong as the tendency to brand all civilians as incompetent and corrupt. The nation has a right to utilize talent wherever it may be available -- in the civil sector or in the barracks. What is needed is to forget all about enclaves in administration by right and reservations in services and adopt a method of selection on merit from all sections of the population in an open competition. Let all posts be filled through competition held by public service commissions where the vestiges of monopolisation need to be done away with. Lateral entry into civil cadres should be open to the military as well as to the academia, corporate sector, the bars, and (why not) the media. The tendency to view the matter in terms of civil-military rivalry will not help nor is it necessary, for sovereignty belongs to neither; it vests in the people as a whole. Once that is settled it will be possible to decide certain principles of policy. More important than the presence of military personnel in civilian jobs is the question of the institutional weight of civil and military sectors and their mutual relationship. The Pakistan model has a strange feature in that while, apart from the defence budget, the civil side contributes to the military establishments' upkeep, it has little share in the latter's scientific and technological enterprises, and this widens the gap in terms of skills and proficiency between the two. This is the result of civil sector's ouster from defence planning and management. The adage that war is too serious a business to be left to generals alone may have lost some of its shine since Bush started ordering the generals but it is still valid. Compare the second world war record of civilian leaders Roosevelt, Churchill (chastened by his frustration to beat Ataturk in Gallipoli), Stalin (honorary marshal) and Mao with Petain, Tojo and Hitler, The theory that defense can be guaranteed by soldiers and guns alone and the civilian masses are good only for singing war songs needs to be buried for ever. In its place must rise the principle of elected governments' exclusive prerogative to sustain, defend and develop the state. Two essential results of this principle in Pakistan's context will be the end of bar to parliamentary debates on the defense budget and fresh thinking on the National Security Council. It is wrong to assume that a debate in National Assembly on defense expenditures will be an unmerited concession to a crowd ignorant of defence matters. Parliamentary debates, despite our efforts to vulgarise them, are not merely intra-house exchanges. Parliaments are only openings on to wide public spaces where the nation's entire talent is available. Earlier on one used to argue in favour of debates on defense budget with a view to promoting participatory democracy. Another need for this has arisen, namely, to combat popular misconceptions about the way defence funds are expended. To strengthen the process of accountability of the defence wing it will be necessary to re-establish the Finance Ministry's right to oversee the defence budget and accounts. The National Security Council issue has been quite badly handled. The kind of body fostered in Pakistan is completely incompatible with any democratic framework. However, a council to look after paramount security issues can be justified if the possibility of its encroachment on the elected institutions' rights is eliminated and its composition does not suggest a military-dominated caucus. There is no need to get into the details of the reform indicated by circumstances. That will be counter-productive. Haste in formulating remedies will make matters worse. The existing institutions of administrative studies and research should be able to contribute, directly and indirectly, by promoting debate at their forums, to the generation of ideas that could still see Pakistan out of the woods where it has been sequestering far too long.
Lt Gen (r) Asad Durrani is former Director General MI and ISI. He, along with many of his colleagues, has now stood up to support the cause of military's retreat from politics, something they found impossible to do during the course of their service. He speaks candidly on the subject with TNS, on the sidelines of an extraordinary meeting of ex-servicemen in Rawalpindi. Regretfully, he refuses to talk about a particular episode regarding his own involvement in politics as DG ISI which, he says, has been discussed enough already and he'd like to say no more. Excerpts follow: By Farah Zia & Nadeem Iqbal The News on Sunday: Do you
think the letter of the COAS is a temporary retreat for the military to Lt Gen (r) Asad Durrani: The realisation has always been there. As an institution army has been very reluctant to get involved and once it is, it waits for an opportunity to get out. Getting out, of course, is a problem as we have found out. So this looked like a good opportunity. First, it had been a long time [it was in power]. Secondly, one understood that the sentiment of the people was turning against the army. So the message had to be given. TNS: When you say good opportunity, one gets a sense that military had a choice or option even otherwise? AD: The choice is always there.The problem is when you are in power as the army chief, you do get stuck. Initially you manipulate judiciary to get this unconstitutional takeover legitimised or at least legalised. Then you're looking for a political facade and you find politicians who do not have much credibility. Once there, you also want to fulfill a particular agenda, for example in this case it was to turn the economy around. And then you start believing that no one else would do it. You are faced with political turmoil because the public is turning against you, the time which judiciary gave to legitimise you is running out, so you again arm-twist the judiciary. This is what happened last year a couple of times and this is how you get stuck. Some people say it is like riding a tiger. A more apt description would be that you are digging yourself deeper into the hole, getting out is now becoming more difficult. Indeed a bold decision could always take you out, but that does not happen with ordinary mortals. In this particular case, the gentleman got stuck because of a threat to his life. After supporting the so called war on terror, the security that Musharraf needs for his survival could only be available to him within the army house. So that is where he still stays even after taking his uniform off. TNS: I remember reading a seminar report from last October where you said that we need a transition with Musharraf in the seat and that may take five to six years? AD: I don't think I ever said that. I am one of those people who believe in a gradual withdrawal of army which may be a practical or pragmatic view of looking at things. Now I do not think that unless we make a clean break, things would help. If the present state continues, you will again have some people allying with the military, others opposing it. TNS: How much do you think does the personality of the army chief matter in as far as military interventions in politics are concerned? AD: There have been different environments at different times and so many of them have led to takeovers and the common denominator in all of them has been the personality of the army chief. There have so many other army chiefs who, despite difficult times, did not take over such as Aslam Beg, Jehangir Karamat and Waheed Kakar. TNS: But what about the sense among the civilian governments that even when the army is not there overtly, it operates from behind the scenes, by conniving with the president etc. AD: Some truth may be there but one is looking at the institutional approach. At times, this behind the scene thing is well-intentioned (though not a good thing) and the intention may be that they want to help events from behind the scenes. It may be a better approach. The politicians do not look at it very kindly and that is where it becomes flawed. The truth is that whenever the politicians have taken an important political decision, the army has not come in their way. TNS: Can you quote a few examples? AD: Oh, yes. In her first government, Benazir asked for a review of Afghan Policy. Some people in the military circles were not terribly impressed. They thought that their policy, the old Zia policy, was very good because the Soviets were out. But ultimately the review took place and it was a good thing to have happened. Then Mian Nawaz Sharif, in his first government, reached out to India. I was the DG ISI and I know the army did not object to it. If he did not make progress there, it was for other reasons and not because of the military. Then in his second tenure Mian Nawaz Sharif started the peace process. It was under him that this composite dialogue thing began and was carried out by the foreign secretaries. Military had nothing to do with it and was not objecting. Then came the big decision on the nuclear tests. Of course the army and all other concerned institutions were consulted. The army said that we can only talk about the security and military aspects, this decision has psychological and economic implications, and the prime minister should take the decision. TNS: But what about Kargil? AD: I am not particularly fond of this episode. It was badly timed and badly managed. It should never have happened especially after Vajpayee's Lahore visit; it should have been called off even if it was in the works. But the fact is that the prime minister did know that something like this had been planned. To what extent did he know, or did he keep track of it, that I don't know but I know that the management and ultimately the political management of that episode was very poor. TNS: From a historical perspective, was it Pakistan's strategic location and US strategic compulsions (Cold War, Afghan War and War on Terror) that necessitated such a huge role of the military in running the country? AD: One could even go long before in history, before partition, and say that people in this area, especially what is Punjab, have been very impressed with the superior force. It was a transit point where armies have come and gone and people here have learnt to live with the superior force and compromise instead of resisting. Yes it started as a security state because of the problems with India, Kashmir mainly, and there the army became important. It is quite right that our relation with the United States, which was primarily a military relationship during the Cold War against the Soviets, provided the much needed strength to the army. TNS: Looking back do you think that was the best way to pursue our foreign policy? AD: The best way is that which has been learnt over a period of time. It is always better that the relationship is maintained at the highest political level and the diplomatic level and the armed forces are left to perform their own tasks. The decision to go to war and end the war are primarily political decisions and military should not be involved. It does become important in countries like Pakistan and Israel. In Israel the political process is important to the extent that elections are held periodically, so they give people a certain cushion in which military and the politics can be better integrated, but not in our case. TNS: How important is it for the COAS to sit on the National Security Council? AD: Not at all. The division of responsibility I think creates more problems because then no one takes responsibility. The type of NSC recommended to the civilian leadership in 1998 was not meant to take decisions; it was advisory in nature, but the main thrust was to keep the main political parties on board. The reason that leader of opposition should always be briefed on core security issues was that opposition parties should not exploit important security issues to get political advantage. It excluded the chiefs but wanted only the chairman joint chiefs of staff committee, as an ex officio member on security matters, So it was a civilian NSC that was suggested to the two governments. This particular NSC that we have or for that matter the CDNS that Farooq Leghari created, would not serve the purpose -- either temporarily or in the long run. That is something that can be described as continuation of military rule by other means. TNS: Why do we remain under a constant threat of martial law? We have Article 6 as part of the constitution, we have High Treason Act, we have the army chief take this oath that he would not indulge in politics. What more needs to be done? AD: If we see history, the military would not take over if the judiciary did not approve of it and, more than that, if the public at large would not welcome the military. If the military knew there would be resentment, not only among the politicians on all sides of the divide but also by the civil society, it would not take over. The reasons why I believe that the lawyers' movement of last year is so important is because it has been waged for the restitution of the constitutional rule, rule of law and military out of politics. And the support it got is indicative of the awareness that has come about. Therefore, supposing that in this particular scenario, if that movement were to continue, I can't imagine the military asserting that influence ever again. TNS: But there are no signs of the military heeding the strength of that movement? AD: Military may not be in the habit of going on the rooftop and saying what it wants. In the last nine years we only heard certain opinions expressed by the army chief who was also the president. And he did consider the movement to be against his rule. But I'm talking about institutions and the things you may have heard in the last couple of weeks [the COAS letter] is a proof that military as an institution is not averse to going in that direction. TNS: So is judiciary the most important institution when we talk of military moving away from politics? AD: It is the most important institution. No one in this country, the civilian or the military leadership, has wanted judiciary to be independent because the politicians also like to ride roughshod over the judiciary. Last year one thought that judiciary was moving towards that independence especially with two-thirds of the judges not taking oath after Nov 3, 2007. So if that was the type of independence that judiciary was acquiring, and if the pre Nov 3 judiciary gets restored, we can be absolutely sure that it would provide the backdrop in which all other institutions start working. TNS: Do you think that restoration of judiciary to its pre Nov 3 status could become a bone of contention between the COAS and the president in the coming days and weeks? AD: I do not know. I have only talked about institutions. About individuals I cannot comment and I should not. About Pervez Musharraf one can comment because he's a public figure enjoying limelight, but the senior brass of the army cannot be discussed as individuals. TNS: Where does constitutionalism figure in a soldier's training? Is there an indoctrination going on at some point against civilian rule? AD: No, none of that indoctrination takes place. But that's a phenomena worldwide in which we have two distinct cultures, civilian and military. They have much in common because they belong to the same society. But again institutionally people do tend to look at things differently, and the military institutions all over the world do not regard the civilian institutions very highly; they think they are the ones who are more motivated, more trained, focused and proactive. So that's the military culture. But the indoctrination does not take place in that sense that you are superior, the civilians are inferior. TNS: What is the structure of the three agencies? AD: In the constitution there is nothing against the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) being headed by a civilian -- politician, academic anyone. But so far, except for one occasion, it has always been headed by a serving general. IB (Intelligence Bureau) again can be headed by anyone; usually the heads have been civilians, but there have been exceptions too. The functions are also quite clearly laid out, in the constitution, in the rules of business, but if they are going to be used by either a civilian or a military government, for different purposes, then it's a different matter. MI (Military Intelligence) is a purely military institution; its task is purely military. TNS: So that's on paper? AD: But so is your constitution. If people decide to violate it, it gets violated. The military has violated it, the civilian leadership, though less frequently, has violated it. All rules, all laws, all norms are on paper unless they are implemented on ground. TNS: You gave an affidavit in the Supreme Court... AD: I am not going to talk about it. It's been such a long time, and one has discussed it so often. The same subject should not be touched so many times. TNS: We just want to know the status of the case regarding the creation of IJI? AD: Anyone who has not understood that case in the last fifteen sixteen years will not understand it now. Those people who were responsible for the creation of IJI have taken the responsibility.
By Usman
Ghafoor The News on Sunday: Given the circumstances in which Pakistan was created, with the country inheriting a huge army, do you think the military's intervention in politics was but natural? Dr Ayesha Jalal: There were
structural constraints. Pakistan's defense requirements were out of As a historian, I don't subscribe to inevitability; there are structural restraints but there's always a choice. So, choices were made, to bring Kashmir into Pakistan. And following that policy, priority was given to military's requirements for defense. Once hostility started on Kashmir, India withheld arms and ammunition and that, of course, created a need to go to the world markets. And the story goes on. All I'll say is that, yes, structurally there was a problem, but ultimately human choice was responsible for the direction Pakistan took, which eventually resulted in greater military domination. I think one of the great flaws in our understanding of Pakistan history has been that everybody assumes that it's in 1958, but military dominance had started much earlier. Certainly it started in '51 with Liaquat's assassination and in '53. So, in fact, we need to distinguish between phases of dominance and actual intervention by the military. Even when we say the military has ruled us for 36 years, in fact it was much more when you weigh in the dominance factor. TNS: So, where does that leave us? AJ: The military's dominance in politics is something that we have to conceptualise. What we mean when we talk in terms of where Pakistan should go. Because, when you look at the dominance of the military in other countries -- let's say, Latin America, especially Argentina and Brazil, two countries where the military ruled the roost for long -- they have succeeded in the last 10-odd years. Now the question arises as to why did that happen. First of all, what did happen in the case of Argentina was a complete loss of face on the part of the army. There was a huge civil society movement against the missing people. And, even if we talk about the army pulling out of politics we must realise that the space that is created must be occupied by the civil society which has been asleep and pulverised for too long. That's what Argentina's example shows you. But, the more interesting thing that has to be kept in mind -- which I think has echoes of the situation currently facing Pakistan -- is the Brazilian example. The Brazilian army chose to withdraw because it was in there, because it began to realise that there were parts of the army that were getting infiltrated. So, the coherence of the army as an institution was at stake. The Brazilian army intelligently withdrew from politics but did not give up its prerogatives. So, what I want to suggest is that even if the Pakistan army withdraws from politics, we cannot assume that its prerogatives and privileges will go. The dominance will stay for extended periods of time. TNS: Why should the army pull out? AJ: An army pulls out when its internal coherence is at stake. We need the army to carry out the operations in FATA. It's vital. But, the civil society has to occupy the space that the army will try to concede. The army needs to focus on what it is supposed to be doing rather than in running the country or its intelligence interfering in elections. That is clear. And, that is achievable. I think, some of the things are in place. Clearly the army itself has to be persuaded to pull out a little bit, and I think the internal coherence point is there, too, but the pressure from the civil society has to continue. The press and media have also got to continue to play their roles. The other point that I want to make is that the civil society has been weak in this country; it's been pulverised and manipulated. But the civil society has to have a more effective means of constantly holding the electoral process and the political process accountable. We can't just think that the civil society has to become active at election time only; it's a constant thing. And, this is what we haven't had. TNS: But, where is the impetus going to come from? AJ: Debate is clearly very important. We've done it before. Remember what happened in '73? When Bhutto came and after Bangladesh seceded, there was a great opportunity but it wasn't exploited. TNS: How do you view Pakistan's strategic placement and the US strategic compulsions that turned Pakistan into a 'strategic rentier'? AJ: Pakistan was definitely strategically placed. The land entry points of Frontier happened to fall in Pakistan. We needed the same amount of defense as was required to the undivided India. For its part, the US started off with a far less of an interest. In 1947, when Pakistan went begging for money to avert bankruptcy, America was less interested and more involved, at that stage, with Greece and Turkey. In '49, it became more lukewarm. The Americans began to strike out on their own in South Asia only around the time of the Korean War, and they were also concerned about what was happening in the Middle East. But, the relationship was based on divergent interests. For America, it was an opportunity to use Pakistan's forces to defend what it called the Persia-Iraq sector, the lucrative oil fields. For Pakistan it was a means to raise a shield of defense against India, to acquire the weapons. We didn't have the money. So, in a sense, it is right to say that Pakistan basically sold itself to acquire those bits and pieces of arms and ammunition it needed to build an army. I am currently reading Gauhar Ayub's book and it has chapters on arms procurement. Gauhar also says that it was an obsessive dimension. TNS: Was it the military leadership that was taking the initiative each time? AJ: The military said they needed arms. When Jinnah told Gen Messervy to go into Kashmir, the fact is that there was no army. Messervy said that army was not capable of putting up a fight against the Indians in Kashmir. They had to come through the international border. So, they had to give up the idea, the desire for Kashmir, which means that the political leadership was itself involved. But, yes, the drive ultimately was coming from the military for arms. In the first few years, the army was looking more at the British, and Pakistan wasted a lot of very precious money to pick up obsolete World War II arms which had to be then got rid of. So that drive was very important. But that still doesn't explain the ultimate involvement -- the involvement that begins with the removal of Liaquat Ali Khan -- a clear shift, first of all, from the Karachi-based Urdu speaking group to a die-hard pro-West consisting of the likes of Ghulam Muhammad and Gurmani. All these characters were then in cohorts with the army. The other main reason was to keep the Bengalis at bay, because you didn't complete constitution-making since the Bengalis were in a majority. So, you got to sort of play around with the Constitution. That shifted from '51 -- then getting rid of Nazimuddin in '53 -- that was our first coup carried out by Ghulam Muhammad. From that point onwards, the army's involvement has prevented the civil, elected institutions from strengthening and blossoming. TNS: Would you also accuse our politicians of showing a lack of sagacity? AJ: Your first lot of politicians was emmigre politicians. They were from India. Liaquat had support among the Mohajir group, but he didn't have a natural constituency in Pakistan. So, they were not pushed to build the Muslim League in the real sense. They were, in fact, threatened by the Muslim League. So, the result was that the Pakistan Muslim League was handed over to Khaleeq-uz-Zaman -- a UP politician -- and he began to appoint wayward people from the top to the provincial leagues. The provincial leagues then revolted, with people like Mamdot wanting their own fiefdom. Instead of building up the Muslim League as a party with a base of support throughout the country, what they did was to focus on state consolidation. That worked to the advantage of the civil bureaucrats. They were taking decisions that should have been taken by the politicians. So, you see, it happened very early on. A confluence of factors resulted in a scenario where the civil officials -- in cohorts with certain army guys -- began to play a very prominent role. The other point I'd like to make is that Pakistanis have always been crying 'America!' But, the Americans have had their own legitimate strategic interests in Pakistan. You are taking money from America, and then you are saying, 'How dare you dictate?' You can't have it both ways. TNS: Regarding Kashmir, would you say that we had a choice at all? Kashmir remains the 'unfinished agenda' from partition times? AJ: Well, one always has a choice. Gauhar Ayub writes in his book that troops were sent into Sri Nagar, and that the opportunity was there, but they didn't take it. I disagree with that. Clearly, it was not something that Pakistan could have achieved militarily. It was going to have to be done politically -- either with the Kashmiris, and you've got to look at the reality on the ground which was that Abdullah was very popular at that stage. The opportunity came in '53 when Abdullah was thrown out. But once you had got yourself entangled militarily, it became much more difficult to press the advantage politically. It's not a complete zero-sum game. India will need to give you something in order to justify taking that position. This may be an opportunity to get a solution on Kashmir that is acceptable to the people of Kashmir. That has changed, by the way, in Pakistan. That hand-us-over-Kashmir business has done us a lot of damage, because the world didn't buy that. It was a legitimate stance, but the world saw Pakistan as an opportunist and that undermined the country's position. Kashmir is certainly a flashpoint, but it is by no means the only issue, because, let's say, tomorrow the Kashmir issue is solved, do you think that we will be in a position to roll back the defence? My answer to you is, we won't. What's very interesting is that in 1951, prior to the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, the British and the Americans were pushing the Pakistan army to accept a division of Kashmir along the Chenab River. This was acceptable to senior officers as the only practical solution. From a military point of view, however, it was the politicians who couldn't sell it -- because it meant giving India three quarters and living with one-thirds that you have. So, in that sense, you have to admit that the politicians are to blame, and I connect Liaquat's stance with the fact that he made up for his lack of popular support with the Kashmir issue, or tried to. They paid a price. TNS: The issue has been there throughout. We fought the 1965 war over Kashmir. AJ: The famous story is that civilians were responsible for the war. But, clearly, there has been a nexus on as far as Kashmir is concerned between the politicians. It's not that we're to point the finger strictly at the army, but the army has been the ultimate beneficiary of this. And, once it got into the saddle, it has prevented every other institution from developing. There has been constant interference -- and the politicians are to blame as well -- because if you look at the past few decades, all the politicians were happy to work with the ISI or get the ISI on their side to deploy against the others. TNS: By the 1990s, the common understanding was that military is a 'given'. How can we get out of that situation? AJ: I think what has been fundamentally flawed with this country is that institutions haven't been able to strike any kind of a balance. Either we've had no institutions or utter chaos, or the army comes in and then tries to rule it. It's very possible that people think they're doing their best. But, the net result today is that there is a severe institutional imbalance. Army is far too involved in everything. And, for its own sake, it's own institutional coherence as an effective fighting force and as an effective army, it needs to pull out. TNS: How sincere, in your view, are Gen Kiyani's intentions to pull the army out of civil institutions? AJ: Frankly, I would't know. I don't know Mr Kiyani. But, the past record of the army suggests that we have to take this very lightly -- because, there are structural reasons why the army can't pull out. It may well be that they will pull out the serving officers, but not the retired lot. The sum total of the issue is the army's involvement in politics. Are they going to now allow some degree of freedom to the political process? Every political process has its dynamics. You cannot constantly manipulate and manage. There is far too much manipulation and management of the intellectual scene in Pakistan. TNS: Would you say that independent judiciary could ensure democracy? AJ: See, judiciaries don't ensure democracy; democracies ensure the independence of the judiciary. The lawyers' movement has definitely been a remarkable one. It is because of them that we've come this far. But, we've got to go further on from here. A vibrant, vigorous debate through the press should be of help. TNS: Constitutionally, is there a provision of ISI getting involvement in politics? AJ: See, the 1973 Constitution has been distorted to the extent that to call it a constitution would be a misnomer; thanks to constant amendments. The Army Act is also a disaster -- totally unconstitutional. TNS: What are the dangers to the Pak federation under a military rule? AJ: That's quite obvious. In smaller provinces, it is perceived as a Punjabi colonising army. And, unfortunately, this has always magnified under a direct military rule. I mean, under whatever combination. The fact of the matter is that it is seen as a military prerogative. You have a full-fledged insurgency going on in Balochistan. There is resentment in Sindh. But I do think that the counter to that has been the PPP and Benazir Bhutto's stance and now Zardari's. So, the federation, unfortunately from the perception of the non-Punjabi provinces, is inherently inequitable, as it stands. It is very necessary to re-constitute it. And, if we cannot re-constitute it democratically, the threat will be there. And, that, in itself will ricochet on the nuclear assets. There, too, the army has to balance its own institutional interests with broader interests of the state. Pakistan has become a military barrack and it's meant to be a state. TNS: Why we don't find parallels in the post-partition India? AJ: First of all, India inherited British India's military state apparatus, whereas we were cast in the role of the seceding state despite protests by the Quaid. He had protested the retention of the name 'India' by the Congress, saying that this was an unfair advantage. Moreover, Congress in India was a better organised party than Muslim League was in Pakistan. Like Pakistan, Congress also adopted the 1935 Act. Three quarters of the Indian Constitution is still the 1935 Act. So, basically, India was unitary in substance and federal in form. Then, we find that our prime minister was assassinated, whereas Jawahar Lal Nehru took India to elections. By the time we broke up in '71, India had gone to elections four times -- in '51, '57, '62 and '67. Most interestingly, if you look at it geographically, India's science has been its saviour. I don't want to underestimate the steps taken by Nehru to keep the army in place. If you look at protocol, tell me what the protocol of an army chief is. It comes down to 7 or 8 -- very low, compared to what it actually is. In Pakistan, it was the bureaucracy and the army that forged the alliance against the politicians. Some politicians did help them, but to keep the Bengalis in place. Another factor was the international dimension. India and Nehru kept the foreign powers at bay while Pakistan invited America. Finally, every normal Pakistani knows how a coup is carried out. It's not possible in India because it's a very large country and the army would break. All these reasons have meant that India has definitely kept army in its place. So, what we need is a continuous political process. Otherwise the military will come and go, and everytime it comes into power, it will make martyrs and saints out of politicians. While Pakistan has been in this situation before, will it be merely a transition to another limited period of democracy or will the curse continue and the cycle be repeated after an interregnum? By Adnan Rehmat When General Pervez Musharraf passed the symbolic baton of the army to General Pervez Kayani in December 2007, after a nine-year stint in double skin (he famously said the uniform is like a second skin for him), it was more than a mere change of command within the army; it was the baton passing from another (failed) period of direct military rule to another (hopeful) direct civilian dispensation -- Pakistan's average 10-year stint of Khaki rule making way for the sway of the Sherwani. But while Pakistan has been here before, will it be merely a transition to another limited period of democracy or will the curse continue and the cycle be repeated after an interregnum? Experimenting with democracy An answer to the question
above will have to really be crafted out of a comparative analysis of the There are several similarities -- and dissimilarities -- in the last two instances of 'transition' to democracy in Pakistan's political history and we're in the thick of a third. For one, all three periods of military rule stretched for at least eight years. In each instance, the public grew weary of the generalissimos as they overstayed their welcome. Each time a combination of public pressure, political compulsions, troubled economies, fading international legitimacy and plain ineptitude contributed to the army deciding to beat a tactical retreat from the political stage and agree to a 'transition'. Each time a ruling general doffs his uniform in Pakistan -- voluntarily or through divine intervention -- the party with the strongest anti-military fundamental credentials -- the PPP -- manages to defeat years of coercion, intimidation, harassment and poisonous propaganda against it to bounce back as the single largest arbiter of popular national sentiments and forms a government. It happened after Ayub-Yahya and Zia and seems like it will happen again, after Musharraf. Each time in the past, the army only reluctantly let a Bhutto and PPP back into the Prime Minister House. This time it seemed the army would do so willingly only for the script to change and Benazir assassinated. This may arguably have been Pakistan's most tragic murder after her father's, but it still can't stop her PPP from doing an incredible hat trick of raising the flag of democracy in Islamabad after yet another bout of military rule. Each time rigging marred elections and this instance looks no different (the natures of the current caretaker government and the Election Commission alone are proof). Destabilising democracy There are more disturbing similarities in the previous two 'transitions'. Each time a democratic dispensation assumed the onerous task of restoring public trust in governance and rolling back the structural damage to state institutions, the army-centred establishment ensured that the conditions were not allowed to take root in which the emaciated democratic forces could find their moorings, reclaim the political space for representative service and set up sustainable frameworks of accountability and good governance. Should this have been otherwise, Bhutto in 1977 would have gone on to reign until 1982, if not beyond, and there may not have been a need for Benazir who may have excelled herself at the United Nations as Pakistan's premier diplomat and Nawaz Sharif would probably have been one of the country's biggest industrialists, beating Ambani at the steel business. It was not to be. Through hangings, sackings, jailings, exiles and capricious cases of corruption and abuse of office, the military managed to ensure that Bhutto, Benazir and Sharif had artificially truncated periods of governance at best. Zia and Musharraf both used state resources to hound and vilify Bhutto, Benazir and Nawaz. In the end, Zia hanged Bhutto and Benazir was killed on Musharraf's watch. And Nawaz got a life term in jail (later swapped with exile). Another major similarity among the three sets of military rule is that each military ruler converted the governance system to a presidential one -- this way Ayub-Yahya, Zia and Musharraf could simultaneously operate as army chief and president with the Khaki uniform providing the ammunition to keep the democratic forces at bay and the Sherwani arming them with the means of governance. In each of the past two instances, the presidential system proved unpopular -- precisely because it was devoid of accountability; failures could be credited to cabinets, which were dismissed while credits could be stacked up in the Aiwan-e-Sadr -- and thus gave way to parliamentary forms in practice when elected governments came to office through general elections. And even during the democratic or pseudo democratic interregnums, if prime ministers strayed from the script, they could be sacked. Ask Junejo, Benazir, Nawaz and Jamali. A different democracy With this pessimistic past as a guide, what's on the horizon that is NOT similar? And if so, is it a good thing, for different may not necessarily mean the same as desirable? Where the third 'transition' to democracy is different from its two predecessors is that while Ayub, Yahya and Zia simply bowed out of politics after their political or physical death, Musharraf is not only very much alive but simply refuses to fade away elegantly. Unlike his military ruler-predecessors, he insists on 'serving the nation' for at least five more years (nine years at the helm are obviously not enough for this endeavor even though democrats can be faulted with 'failure' in less than 20 months despite a five-year constitutional mandate), this time as a 'civilian'. This is a stark departure from the past and creates a host of new political problems. For one, he is obviously not planning a presence in the post-army retirement Aiwan-e-Sadr as benign as presidents Fazal Elahi or Rafiq Tarar. Musharraf wants the foreign, interior and economic policies of the past eight years, which he crafted and implemented, to remain unchanged and to be in direct charge of them. This, of course, is based on his assumptions that these policies have been successful and not in need of a review. This also implies that the 'new' parliamentary system would have to really be the old presidential system in practice and that the whole business of the upcoming elections is not about a new mandate, a new beginning and a new leadership. That's quiet an obnoxious assumption since it is premised on a cosmetic outcome rather than a majority-backed people's mandate. The latest 'transition' to democracy is also different from the previous two in one major aspect, one which is key to Musharraf's political fate, and by that extension, to Pakistan's -- he is a 'ruler' who has retired only from the army, not from politics, unlike Ayub, Yahya and Zia, who when they quit they quit for good. He plans to stay centerstage without creating the political space necessary for the transition for one key national actor: the army chief. And that's General Kiyani. Previously the successors of Yahya (Gen Gul Hasan) and Zia (Gen Aslam Beg) played key roles in rolling the army back from public space (which is not the same as retaining control behind the scenes but that's another story). Kiyani shows all signs that he intends to follow the script of the past in that he wants to roll the army back away from the public space (a tall order thanks to Musharraf's far-and-wide spread of the military in civilian polity). However, he has no Fazl Elahi or Ishaq Khan in the Aiwan-e-Sadr to keep things uncomplicated. Musharraf is anything but simple. He does not want to go quietly. The fact that he stays firmly ensconced in the Army House rather than Aiwan-e-Sadr despite shedding a skin is designed to mean only one thing: that he never really left the army (the army has shed Musharraf, Musharraf has not shed the army). Or that he intends to be an aggressive president. This complicates things for Kiyani. If Kiyani is to make his mark under the Pakistani sun for posterity, stay a key player in national politics and redeem the army as a trustworthy institution again, he cannot do so sharing the political space with Musharraf. What Kiyani does next, and how Musharraf responds, will determine the fate of Pakistan's latest attempt at a 'transition' to democracy. Pakistan's history shows that it is the army chief that decides the future direction of the army, not a former army chief, however powerful he may have been. Musharraf is attempting what is unprecedented -- a system in which the army has two 'active' chiefs, a formal and another informal. It won't work. But if it does, there will not be a transition to democracy. It will be something dangerous.
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usage to such an extent that it will not yield to any casual operation or
emotional rhetoric. There will be a need for open-minded deliberation on the
various requisites of an administrative model that will allow the people's
best talent to play a fair role in securing the greatest good of the greatest
number. It may also be necessary to keep in mind the more consequential turns
in Pakistan's experiments with administration, after the capital mistake of
worshipping the colonial pattern had been made.
regain its lost prestige, or is there a genuine realisation that this is how
it should be?
proportion with its resource base. We inherited 30 per cent of the Indian
defense forces and only 17 and a half per cent of the financial assets.
Moreover, the entire defense of the undivided India was based on defending
the North West Frontier regions. So, effectively, what it cost to defend the
undivided India cost to defend Pakistan. With the resource base that was much
less -- 17 and a half per cent (23 per cent of land base and 18 per cent of
the population), there was a disjunction.
previous two instances of transition from military rule to democratic
dispensations. The first time it happened was in the 1970-71 timeframe when
the General duo of Ayub and Yahya, after an 11-year reign, made way for
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his nascent Pakistan People's Party to usher in the
country's first experience with democracy under a system of universal adult
franchise. It took less than six years for the military to decide they didn't
much like this democracy business and in 1977 seized power again. General
Zia's no-nonsense reign lasted, again, 11 years until one morning in 1988
when he fell out of the sky and the army decided to retreat into the shadows.
This time the democratic interlude lasted around a decade. General Musharraf
seized power in 1999 and the military kept the Aiwan-e-Sadr warm for eight
years until late 2007 when he, grudgingly, became a civilian.